Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence of 70 months imprisonment followed by a lifetime term of supervised release when he was convicted of possession of child pornography. At issue was whether his sentence was procedurally erroneous due to the district court's refusal to accept his Kimbrough v. United States argument absent guidance from the court and whether his sentence was substantively unreasonable. The court held that it was unable to ascertain whether the district court committed procedural error by failing to appreciate its Kimbrough discretion to vary from the child pornography Guidelines, U.S.S.G. 2G2.2, on policy grounds or whether it recognized, but declined to exercise that discretion. The court also held that only when it was satisfied that the district court appreciated its Kimbrough discretion would it consider the substantive reasonableness of the sentence imposed. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to resentence exercising its Kimbrough Discretion.

U.S. South Communications, Inc. ("U.S.South"), an issuer of prepaid calling cards, appealed from the judgment entered against it and in favor of GCB Communications, Inc. and Lake Country Communications, Inc. (collectively "GCB"), a payphone service provider ("PSP"), where the district court held that U.S. South owed GCB dial-around compensation for disputed calls "regardless of whether the proper Flex-ANI digits were transmitted." After addressing threshold issues, the court determined that the issue was whether U.S. South was required to pay GCB for completed coinless payphone calls, dial-around calls, if U.S. South did not receive coding digits that would identify the calls as GCB payphone calls. The court concluded that GCB, through its local exchange carrier ("LEC"), must assure that the Flex-ANI was transmitted in the system. Therefore, because the district court did not make findings on this issue because it did not deem it relevant, the question of whether the Flex-ANI codes for the disputed calls were sent into the system by GCB and its LEC must be decided. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner, a native of the Soviet Union and citizen of Azerbaijan, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming an immigration judge's ("IJ") denial of his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. At issue was whether there was substantial evidence to support the IJ's determination that petitioner was not credible due to inconsistencies between his testimony before an asylum officer and his subsequent written statements and testimony, which described additional incidents of persecution. The court denied the petition and held that substantial evidence supported the IJ's conclusion that the additional incidents materially altered petitioner's account of persecution in a way that casted doubt on his credibility.

Plaintiff and defendant, the United Parcel Service, Inc. ("UPS"), appealed a jury verdict awarding plaintiff unpaid overtime, meal, and rest-period wages. The district court originally certified a class comprised of full-time supervisors employed by UPS under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 and appointed plaintiff as class representative under California's Industrial Welfare Commission ("IWC") Wage Order No. 9, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 8 11090. At issue was whether the district court erred in subsequently decertifying the class on the ground that plaintiff failed to establish that common issues of law or fact predominated over individual ones. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in decertifying the class where the district court held that plaintiff had not established predominance, had relied heavily on a survey that was neither reliable nor representative of a class, that his remaining evidence similarly was not representative of the class, and did not address the "primarily engaged" element of the exemptions under the IWC Wage Order No. 9.

Defendant, while under federal supervision, was arrested and charged in Ada County, Idaho for a number of state offenses and in light of the arrests, the government petitioned the district court to revoke defendant's federal supervised release. At issue was whether probation officers' sentencing recommendations following the revocation of supervised release must be disclosed. The court held that post-revocation sentencing recommendations, like post-conviction sentencing recommendations, must be disclosed unless the district court directed otherwise by local rule or by order in a case. Therefore, the court held that the district court complied with United States v. Baldrich's requirements that the court disclose any factual information in the confidential recommendation on which it relied in sentencing. The court also held that Rule 32(e)(3) and its implementing local rule counterpart, District of Idaho Local Criminal Rule 32.1, comported with the Equal Protection Clause and there was no violation of defendant's constitutional rights.

The United States appealed from the district court's dismissal of several counts of an indictment charging defendant with, inter alia, numerous violations of the Computer Fraud and Abuse Act ("CFAA"), 18 U.S.C. 1030, when defendant recruited employees of his former employer to obtain trade secrets and other proprietary information by using their user accounts to access the employer's computer system. At issue was whether the employees had exceeded their authorized access by accessing information that they were entitled to access only under limited circumstances. The court reversed the district court's decision and held that an employee, like the employees at issue in this instance, exceeded authorized access under section 1030 when he or she violated the employer's computer access restrictions, including use restrictions.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his habeas corpus petition seeking relief from his state conviction for felony first-degree murder, armed robbery and kidnapping, and from his capital sentence. At issue was whether defendant's conviction and sentence was a reasonable application of clearly established federal law or a reasonable determination of the facts under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 ("AEDA"), 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court affirmed the denial of defendant's habeas petition and held that defendant failed to show that he was entitled to relief on his appeal when his petition was filed after the effective date of the AEDPA, he failed to show that the Arizona Supreme Court acted unreasonably in rejecting his arguments that admission of his incriminating statements to correctional officers violated his rights under Miranda v. Arizona and Massiah v. United States; he failed to show that the district court abused its discretion in denying his request for discovery and an evidentiary hearing where he did not establish "specific facts which, if true, would entitle him to relief;" and where the incriminating statements were admissible and the evidence presented provided a sufficient basis for the imposition of a capital sentence.

Defendant appealed his sentence of 210 months imprisonment and a lifetime term of supervised release for receipt/distribution of child pornography. At issue was whether the district court correctly relied on the factors set forth in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) to guide its discretions in choosing which of two counts to dismiss when required to do so by the Double Jeopardy Clause where the district court noted that Ninth Circuit precedent prohibited conviction and sentencing for both possession and receipt/distribution of child pornography when the charges were predicated on the same set of images. Also at issue was whether the district court's sentence was procedurally or substantively unreasonable. The court held that, in choosing which count to vacate, the district court clearly evaluated the totality of the circumstances of defendant's case under United States v. Hector along with the section 3553(a) factors and therefore, did not abuse its discretion. The court also held that the sentence was procedurally and substantively reasonable where the district court carefully and correctly considered the factors set forth in section 3553(a) in sentencing the defendant.

Plaintiffs, 54 residents of Ryderwood residential community, filed an action against the Ryderwood Improvement and Service Association ("RISA") alleging that the age restrictions imposed by RISA violated the Fair Housing Act ("FHA"), 42 U.S.C. 3604(a)-(e), 3605, 3606, 3617, and that RISA had never satisfied the requirements of the Housing for Old Persons Act exemption ("HOPA"), Pub. L. No. 104-76, section 2, 109 Stat. 787. At issue was whether RISA was exempt from the FHA's prohibitions on familial status discrimination under one of the housing for older persons exemptions set out in section 3607(b). The court vacated in part and remanded for further proceedings holding that a residential community that had continuously operated as a retirement community for persons age 55 or older could qualify for the housing for older persons exemption from the FHA's prohibition on familial status discrimination by establishing that it currently satisfied the exemptions' three statutory and regulatory criteria at the time of the alleged violation, even if the community enforced age restrictions when it first achieved compliance with the exemption's age verification requirement.

Appellant, a former student in the Forest Grove School District ("Forest Grove"), appealed the district court's determination that he was not entitled to an award of reimbursement for his private school tuition under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1415(i)(2)(C). At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in holding that equitable considerations did not support any award of private-school tuition at Mount Bachelor Academy as a result of Forest Grove's failure to provide appellant with a Free and Appropriate Education ("FAPE") under the IDEA. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that there was sufficient evidence in the record to support the district court's factual determination where appellant's parents enrolled him at Mount Bachelor solely because of his drug abuse and behavioral problems.