Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in August, 2011
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Plaintiff filed a federal complaint against officers and the Mount Shasta Police Department pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that the officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights when they entered his home without a warrant and obtained evidence that he had driven under the influence of alcohol. Plaintiff had pled nolo contendere to a violation of California Vehicle Code section 23103.5(a). The district court dismissed plaintiff's section 1983 complaint, concluding that the case was barred by Heck v. Humphrey and that the district court therefore lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held, however, that Heck did not bar the section 1983 claim where plaintiff's conviction derived from his plea, not from a verdict obtained with supposedly illegal evidence. The court also held that, even if the terms of plaintiff's appellate waiver were ambiguous, the court would construe that ambiguity against the government and conclude that the waiver in the plea agreement did not affect plaintiff's ability to pursue this separate civil law suit. The court further held that there was no collateral estoppel bar to plaintiff's Fourth Amendment claim in this civil action. Therefore, the court reversed and remanded.

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Defendant was convicted of child molestation in Washington state and sentenced to two years confinement. At issue was whether the government must prove that a defendant knew that the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 18 U.S.C. 2250(a), imposed a registration requirement in order to convict a defendant of a violation of this statute. The court joined its sister circuits in holding that the government need not prove this knowledge element. In this instance, although defendant did not receive notice of the requirement to register under SORNA, the government did not have to prove that he knew of this requirement in order to convict him of an offense under section 2250. Defendant was required by the terms of his judgment to register in Washington as well as in any new state to which he moved. Therefore, the court held that there was ample evidence on which the district court could base its determination that defendant knew he was required to register and failed to do so. Accordingly, the court rejected defendant's challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence.

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This case originated with a misunderstanding regarding a $645 charge on the credit card bill of appellant. Chase Bank misidentified the basis for the charge but failed to respond to appellant's requests for information about it. After unsuccessfully attempting to get response from Chase Bank, appellant and his wife filed this action, alleging, inter alia, claims under the Fair Credit Billing Act (FCBA), 15 U.S.C. 1666-1666j and Oregon's Unlawful Debt Collection Practices Act (UDCPA), Or. Rev. Stat. 646.639-643. The court held that the trial court erred in holding that appellant failed to state a claim under the UDCPA. The court declined to certify appellant's proposed question to the Oregon Supreme Court regarding this claim because existing state precedent guided the court's decision. As to the FCBA claims, the trial court erred in requiring evidence of detrimental reliance to support actual damages and in limiting statutory damages for Chase Bank's multiple violations of the FCBA to a single recovery. Finally, the court held that the trial court abused its discretion in denying any award of attorneys' fees related to appellant's successful claim under the FCBA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

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These consolidated cases arose out of a 2007 labor dispute between the Painters Union and Nevada contractors over whether the Union's card check established its majority status under the terms of the collective bargaining agreement (CBA), thereby requiring the contractors to bargain with the Union pursuant to Section 9(a) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 151 et seq. One set of cases arose from the Union's charges before the NLRB that the contractors failed to bargain in good faith during the following card check. The other case arose from the district court, where the Union sought an order to arbitrate whether the card check established the Union's majority status under the terms of the CBA. In the petitions for review from the NLRB's decision, the court enforced the NLRB's order, and denied the Union's and Flooring Solutions' petitions for review. In the appeal from the district court, the court held that the dispute over whether the Union established majority status pursuant to the CBA's card check provision was primarily contractual and subject to arbitration. Therefore, the court withdrew its prior decision and replaced it with this opinion reversing the district court's order denying arbitration. The court remanded for the district court to order all parties to arbitrate whether, under the CBA's card check provision, the Union established majority status.

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This case stemmed from plaintiff's detention as an undocumented immigrant where plaintiff claimed that various authorities deprived him of medication for his schizophrenia and that the detention resulted from the insufficient training of public defenders regarding the immigration consequences of criminal pleas. At issue was whether plaintiff properly exhausted his administrative remedies under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, 2671-80, where the federal agencies denied plaintiff's administrative tort claims before he amended his complaint in an ongoing civil action to name the United States as a party and allege a new cause of action under the FTCA. The court held that the claims were properly exhausted but affirmed the district court's dismissal on the alternative ground that plaintiff stated FTCA claims that fell outside the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity. The court also affirmed the grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's ineffective assistance of counsel claims, premised on 42 U.S.C. 1983 and Monell v. Department of Social Services.

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Plaintiff, 37-years-old, suffered from anorexia nervosa for more than twenty years. At issue was whether defendant was required to pay for her care at a residential treatment facility, either under the terms of her insurance plan or under California's Mental Health Parity Act (Parity Act), Cal. Health & Safety Code 1374.72. The court held that plaintiff's plan did not itself require that defendant pay for residential care for her anorexia nervosa. The court held, however, that the Parity Act provided that defendant "shall provide coverage for the diagnosis and medically necessary treatment" of "severe mental illnesses," including anorexia nervosa. Therefore, defendant was foreclosed from asserting that plaintiff's residential care was not medically necessary. Accordingly, the court held that defendant was obligated under the Parity Act to pay for plaintiff's residential care, subject to the same financial terms and conditions it imposed on coverage for physical illnesses.

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Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision granting defendants' motion to strike plaintiff's defamation suit under California's anti-SLAPP statute. Cal.Civ. Proc. Code 425.16. Plaintiff argued that the district court erred in concluding that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that various statements made by the county supervisor were false. Plaintiff also appealed the district court's order granting attorney's fee under California's anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that plaintiff failed to make a prima facie case that the "substance" of the county supervisor's statements were false. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorney's fees incurred by defendants in bringing both anti-SLAPP motions. Therefore, the court affirmed both decisions of the district court.

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This case arose from a traffic stop for a seatbelt violation in which a Los Angeles County Sheriff pepper sprayed plaintiff and struck him with a baton after plaintiff exited his vehicle and disobeyed the Sheriff's order to reenter it. Plaintiff filed this action against the Sheriff and the county, claiming that the Sheriff's use of force was excessive under the Fourth Amendment and that the Sheriff's conduct constituted false imprisonment and negligence under California tort law. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the Sheriff with respect to plaintiff's false imprisonment claim because the Sheriff had lawful authority to arrest plaintiff on account of his violation of Cal. Penal Code 148(a)(1). The court held, however, that the use of intermediate force was unreasonable and the suspect clearly posed no threat to the officer or the public safety. Therefore, the court reversed as to the dismissal of plaintiff's excessive force and negligence claims.

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This was an appeal by objector, a Nevada attorney, seeking review of the Nevada district court's order denying his motion to quash a subpoena for bank records of his client trust account. The district court concluded that it did not have the authority to consider objector's motion since the subpoena was issued by another district court. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeal in the circumstances of this case because the bank had no incentive to disobey the subpoena and force an otherwise appealable contempt order. The court affirmed the district court because it correctly interpreted the provisions of Rule 45 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure governing issuance and quashing subpoenas.

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Petitioners challenged an order of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) concerning the proposed construction by the Port of Portland of a new runway at Hillsboro Airport (HIO). On appeal, petitioners argued that the decision not to prepare an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was unreasonable for several reasons, chief among them the FAA's failure to consider the environmental impacts of any increased demand for HIO resulting from the addition of a runway. Petitioners also argued that the FAA did not afford them a public hearing within the meaning of 49 U.S.C. 47106. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed the Port's and the FAA's arguments that petitioners waived their claims because they failed to raise them during the public comment period. The court held, after finding that certain precedents did not apply here, that remand was necessary for the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project, if any, pursuant to the National Environmental Protection Act of 1969 (NEPA), 40 C.F.R. 1508.8(b). The court also held that an EIS was not warranted based on petitioners' contention that the context and intensity of the project independently required an EIS. The court further held that petitioners' arguments regarding whether the FAA afforded them a public hearing was unpersuasive where the hearing afforded petitioners was a "public hearing" within the meaning of section 47106 and FAA Order 5050.4B. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded with instructions to the FAA to consider the environmental impact of increased demand resulting from the HIO expansion project pursuant to section 1508.8(b).