Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought this suit in 2004, challenging the constitutionality of the "Don't Ask, Don't Tell" policy, 10 U.S.C. 654(b). While an appeal was pending in this case, Congress enacted the Don't Ask, Don't Tell Repeal Act of 2010, Pub. L. No. 111-321, 124 Stat. 3515. Consequently, the court held that this case became moot when the repeal of section 654 took effect on September 20, 2010. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded with directions to dismiss.

Taxpayers appealed the district court's denial of their Rule 60(b) motion to vacate a 1967 tax judgment against them. Taxpayers argued that the government committed fraud on the court during their 1967 suppression hearing and their subsequent appeal to this court. Taxpayers also argued that the judgment should be vacated under United States v. Throckmorton because taxpayers' business associate who sometimes served as their attorney, gave information to the government. The court concluded that, although the evidence uncovered by taxpayers showed some misconduct on the part of the government, it was insufficient to demonstrate fraud on the court. The court also held that because taxpayers have not shown that the business associate was their attorney rather than their business associate at the time he informed on taxpayers, the court rejected taxpayers' Throckmorton claim.

Plaintiffs, representing a putative class of purchasers of contact lens solutions, appealed the district court's order granting summary judgment for defendant. Plaintiffs brought suit alleging that defendant violated California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq., and False Advertising Law (FAL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17500 et seq., by marketing Complete MoisturePlus as a product that cleaned and disinfected lenses. The district court ruled that plaintiffs lacked standing. Defendant argued that the ruling was not in error and that even if it was, the suit was properly dismissed because the class' claims were preempted by 21 U.S.C. 360k(a) of the Medical Devices Amendments of 1976 (MDA), 21 U.S.C. 360(c) et seq. The court held that the district court was incorrect to conclude that this class of plaintiffs lacked standing where they had demonstrated economic harm, but the court held that it could affirm the district court's summary judgment on any ground supported by the record. Therefore, the court held that the record demonstrated that the class' claims were preempted, so the court affirmed the grant of summary judgment.

Defendant was convicted of illegal reentry in 2004, escape, and a second count of illegal reentry with a found-in date of June 7, 2007. Defendant appealed his conviction on the second illegal reentry offense, challenging the denial of his motion to dismiss based on violation of the 30-day preindictment time limit imposed by the Speedy Trial Act, 18 U.S.C. 3161(b). The court held that the Speedy Trial Act's 30-day preindictment time limit, which ordinarily ran from the date of the defendant's initial arrest, restarted when the underlying complaint was dismissed without prejudice and the charges were later refiled. In this case, the 30-day clock both started and stopped upon the filing of the second superseding indictment, which reinstated the dismissed illegal reentry charge. Therefore, there was no violation of section 3161(b) and the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss.

Apple brought this action against Psystar for copyright infringement because Psystar was using Apple's software on Psystar computers. The district court held that Psystar was infringing Apple's federally registered copyrights in its operating software, Mac OS X, because Psystar was copying the software for use in Psystar's computers. Psystar subsequently appealed the district court's rejection of Psystar's copyright misuse defense, the district court's order enjoining Psystar's continuing infringement, and the district court's grant of Apple's motions to seal documents on grounds of maintaining confidentiality. The court held that Psystar's misuse defense failed because it was an attempt to apply the first sale doctrine to a valid licensing agreement. The court affirmed the district court's order enjoining Psystar's continuing infringement and Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 1203(b)(1), violations and held that the district court properly applied the Supreme Court's four eBay Inc. v MercExchange, L.L.C. factors. The court held, however, that there was no adequate basis on the record to support the sealing of any Apple records on grounds of confidentiality and applied the presumption in favor of access, vacating the district court's sealing orders.

Plaintiff, a Washington State prisoner, sought relief under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of his First and Fourteenth Amendment right of access to the courts and alleged supplemental state law claims for conversion and fraud. Along with his complaint, plaintiff moved to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP) pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1915. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's sua sponte dismissal of his pro se civil rights action for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted. In light of the Prisoner Litigation Reform Act's (PLRA), 28 U.S.C. 1915(g), "three-strikes" provision, the court concluded that because three of the five dismissals on which defendants relied were not final at the time plaintiff took his appeal, they could not count against him in this case. Therefore, the court declined to revoke plaintiff's IFP status. The court also reversed the district court's order dismissing plaintiff's right to access the courts, retaliation, and state law conversion claims and remanded for further proceedings. The court affirmed the district court's judgment as to plaintiff's Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961-1968, claim because the district court properly concluded that the deficiencies in plaintiff's complaint could not be cured by an amendment.

Plaintiff, a former recruiter for Nielsen Media Research, Inc. (Nielsen), appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment on her age and disability discrimination and wrongful termination claims under California law against Nielsen. The court held that, in viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to plaintiff, reasonable jurors could find that Nielsen's proffered reason for terminating plaintiff's employment was a pretext for age discrimination. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment against plaintiff on her age discrimination and wrongful termination claims. The court affirmed summary judgment against plaintiff on her disability discrimination claim.

This case arose when the Port of Los Angeles prohibited motor carriers from operating drayage trucks on port property unless the motor carriers entered into concession agreements with the port. The concession agreements set forth fourteen specific requirements covering, among other things, truck driver employment, truck maintenance, parking, and port security. The agreements were adopted as part of the port's "Clean Truck Program," adopted in response to community opposition that had successfully stymied port growth. Plaintiff challenged the concession agreements, arguing that they were preempted by the Federal Aviation Administration Authorization Act (FAAA Act), 49 U.S.C. 14501 et seq. The court held that the district court meticulously identified and applied the governing law. The court affirmed the district court's holding that the financial capability, maintenance, off-street parking, and placard provisions were not preempted. The court reversed the district court's conclusion that the employee-driver provision was saved from preemption by the market participant doctrine, and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was sentenced to death for the murder of two thirteen-year-old girls. Defendant challenged his sentence under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that he should receive an evidentiary hearing to develop the claim that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at sentencing by failing to adequately investigate and present evidence that defendant suffered from organic brain damage at the time of the murders. The court held that, under the demanding standard of Strickland v. Washington, defendant had not presented a colorable claim that counsel's actions were constitutionally ineffective. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of an evidentiary hearing.

Defendant, a former Boeing engineer who gave technological information to China, appealed his convictions on six counts of violating the Economic Espionage Act of 1996 (EEA), 18 U.S.C. 1831(a)(1), (3); on one count of conspiring to violate the EEA, 18 U.S.C. 371; on one count of acting as an unregistered foreign agent, 18 U.S.C. 951; and on one count of making a false statement to federal agents, 18 U.S.C. 1001. On appeal, defendant argued primarily that his convictions were not supported by sufficient evidence, and in the alternative, defendant contended that he was entitled to a new trial because the government failed to turn over exculpatory information in violation of its duty under Brady v. Maryland and because the district court made several erroneous evidentiary rulings. Defendant finally challenged the district court's calculation of his offense level under the Sentencing Guidelines. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendant's convictions; that there were no Brady violations; that there was no violation of defendant's Sixth Amendment rights where the admission of certain evidence at issue was harmless; and that the district court did not err in choosing section 2M3.2 as the most analogous guideline applicable to the foreign agent conviction.