Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought injunctive relief in district court pursuant to section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. 160(j), alleging that CHHP was a successor employer to Karykeion and that a majority of CHHP's registered nurses had been members of the California Nurses Association under Karykeion. Petitioner therefore alleged that CHHP's continuing failure to bargain in good faith with the chosen representative of its employees violated sections 8(a)(1) and 8(a)(5) of the NLRA. The district court granted petitioner's petition and issued a preliminary injunction, applying the test established in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in issuing the preliminary injunction and affirmed the order.

Defendant, an Oregon state prisoner, appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition, arguing that the evidence presented was constitutionally insufficient for a rational jury to find him guilty of attempted aggravated murder beyond a reasonable doubt. The court held that its review of the evidence convinced the court that the prosecution presented evidence of specific intent to kill, as that element had been defined by Oregon state law and interpreted by the state appellate court. Accordingly, the state court's determination that there was sufficient evidence of defendant's intent to support his conviction was an objectively reasonable application of Jackson v. Virginia.

Defendants, David Ray Newman and Jon Tedesco, committed crimes that subject them to criminal forfeiture: Newman robbed two banks, and Tedesco conspired to defraud banks. Defendants each pleaded guilty and agreed to forfeit a specific amount of money. The district court nevertheless eliminated criminal forfeiture or reduced it to a trivial amount. The government timely appealed. Because the district court's reasoning in the two cases was substantially similar, the court issued a joint opinion. The court vacated and remanded with instructions. In Newman's case, the district court should enter a criminal forfeiture money judgment of $5,102. In Tedesco's case, the district court should either enter a criminal forfeiture money judgment of $1 million or, if there was a reason to doubt the accuracy of that agreed amount, follow the procedure described and enter a criminal forfeiture money judgment in the amount of the "proceeds" of Tedesco's crime, not to exceed $1 million.

This case stemmed from defendant's operation of a fraudulent investment fund. Defendant's Ponzi scheme took almost $13 million from over 50 investors and petitioners were among the investors. Petitioners appealed the district court's order dismissing their third-party petition to adjudicate property interests in forfeited property. The court held that the district court erred in holding that petitioners lacked prudential standing. The court also held that the district court erred when it found that the Government's interest in the funds was superior to petitioners' interests. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant plead guilty to possession of child pornography. At issue on appeal was whether 18 U.S.C. 2251(d)(1)(A) required an individual to personally produce the sexually explicit visual depictions of minors that he advertised for distribution. The court held that the plain language of the statute did not contain a personal production requirement, and nothing in the tense of the wording evidenced a congressional intent to insert such an element. Accordingly, the district court properly denied defendant's motion to dismiss the indictment.

This case arose from a deadly use of force lawsuit filed by decedent's family against defendants. The district court issued an in limine order precluding defendants from arguing that decedent was armed when he was shot. In his summation, defense counsel argued that the police sergeant who shot decedent thought decedent failed to surrender because he had shot a man just moments earlier. Plaintiffs' counsel objected, apparently based on the in limine order and the court sustained the objection, instructing the jury to ignore defense counsel's statement. Plaintiffs subsequently moved for sanctions against defense counsel for his statements. The district court granted the motion and sanctioned defendants. Defendants appealed. The court reversed the district court's order imposing sanctions. On remand, the district court could, if it chose, hold further proceedings, consistent with the court's opinion, to determine whether any sanction was warranted for defense counsel's conceded violation.

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 2254. At issue was whether the California trial court's use of California Jury Instruction, Criminal (CALJIC) No. 2.50.01 violated petitioner's constitutional right to due process by allowing the jury to find him guilty of charged offenses based only on facts found by a preponderance of the evidence. The court held that because the decision of the California Court of Appeals to reject petitioner's constitutional challenge to CALJIC No. 2.50.01 was not contrary to clearly established federal law, the court affirmed.

Over the course of more than 30 years, petitioner was convicted of crimes involving deviant sexual acts with children. After a series of unsuccessful appeals and postconviction procedures, petitioner filed a federal habeas petition on February 7, 2008. The district court denied his habeas petition and petitioner appealed. During the course of the proceedings, California adopted Proposition 83, which changed the commitment term for sexually violent predators from renewable two-year periods to an indeterminate period. On appeal, petitioner contended that his federal due process rights were violated because he was held under the Sexually Violent Predators Act, Cal. Welf. & Ins. Code 6600-6609.3. The court held that because the only relief petitioner sought was release from custody, and because petitioner was not in civil commitment for an indeterminate term based on a proceeding that was legitimately commenced and the result of which was not challenged in this appeal, the appeal was moot.

Plaintiff appealed the denial of his application for disability insurance benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 401-34. Plaintiff claimed he was disabled by thoracic spine and lumbar spine degenerative disc disease, a muscle disorder, a pain disorder with agoraphobia, and a personality disorder. The court held that because plaintiff's physician's psychiatric evaluation and medical source statement were not considered by the Appeals Council or the ALJ, the court remanded to the ALJ for further consideration. The court also noted that the ALJ's previous five-step sequential analysis also contained several errors.

This case arose when plaintiffs voluntarily filed applications for adjustment of status in reliance on the Ninth Circuit's opinion in Perez-Gonzalez v. Ashcroft, wherein the court purportedly held that individuals like plaintiffs were eligible for relief. The court held that plaintiffs' request for relief from the retroactive application of Duran Gonzales II to their applications for adjustment of status must be denied because (1) Duran Gonzales II itself applied its rulings to plaintiffs, thus giving the opinion retroactive application; and (2) another three-judge panel had reaffirmed that Duran Gonzales II applied retroactively and that, accordingly, plaintiffs were ineligible to receive I-212 waivers. Therefore, the district court's orders denying plaintiffs' motions to amend class certification and to file an amended complaint, and dismissing the action, were affirmed.