Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the district court's preliminary injunction precluding enforcement of California Welfare and Institutions Code 14105.191(f), which amended California's Medicaid Plan and set provider reimbursement rates for the 2009-2010 rate year, and for each year thereafter. Plaintiffs challenged the law under 42 U.S.C 1983 and the Supremacy Clause because the State did not obtain federal approval of its State Plan Amendment (SPA) prior to implementing the rate changes. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and held that plaintiffs have not shown that they have an unambiguously conferred right to bring a section 1983 claim.

Plaintiff and his children (plaintiffs) brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 suit against defendants for damages resulting from plaintiff's unlawful arrest. Plaintiff was arrested as he stood outside a fair selling promotional tickets for $5 that he had received for free from a radio station. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of defendants on the grounds of qualified immunity. The court agreed with the district court that there was no probable cause to arrest plaintiff and his right to be free from unlawful arrest was violated. The court held, however, that the district court's grant of summary judgment on the grounds of qualified immunity for an unlawful arrest was reversed where all reasonably competent officers would have agreed that plaintiff was not committing a crime because there was no scalping law in Nevada; it was simply not a crime to sell tickets to a fair; plaintiff's t-shirt, which had the logo of the radio station, did not suggest fraud; and the ticket buyers were not duped by the sale. The court also held that plaintiffs' substantive due process right to family integrity was not violated where the facts of the case did not come close to rising to the level of conduct that shocked the conscience. Because the court concluded that plaintiffs' right to family integrity was not violated, the court need not reach the question of whether the deputy sheriff was entitled to qualified immunity for the violation of the right to family integrity.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA dismissing his appeal of an IJ's order of removal. The IJ determined that, under 8 C.F.R. 245.13(k)(1), petitioner had abandoned his pending application for adjustment of status under Section 202 of the Nicaraguan Adjustment and Central American Relief Act (NACARA), 8 U.S.C. 1255, as of the moment he drove from the United States into Mexico, even if his unplanned departure was not desired and he immediately turned around and attempted to return. The court concluded that deeming petitioner's NACARA application abandoned was contrary to the regulation where petitioner's departure was not "desired," and ordering removal conflicted with NACARA itself. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico and an alien, pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to violating 8 U.S.C. 1326(a) and 1326(b)(2) because he was found in the United States after having been removed or deported from the United States and without permission to reapply for admission following removal or deportation. Defendant timely appealed his sentence of 21 months' imprisonment where the district court held that a citation for a traffic violation was the same as an arrest under U.S.S.G. 4A1.2(a)(2). The court concluded that nothing in the record suggested that defendant was ever formally arrested for driving with a suspended license. Defendant was not told he was "under arrest," he was not transported to the police station, and he was not booked into jail. Absent one of these hallmarks of a formal arrest, the district court erred in finding that defendant had been "arrested" for purposes of the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, defendant's sentence was vacated and the case remanded for resentencing.

Plaintiff appealed from the dismissal of his claims against two arbitrators who disqualified him from representing a client. The district court concluded that the claims were barred by arbitral immunity. The court held that the district court had subject matter jurisdiction and correctly dismissed the action because the claims were precluded by arbitral immunity. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

After his unsuccessful cataract surgery, plaintiff brought a claim for battery against the United States government and his United States Navy surgeon. The United States invoked the Gonzalez Act, 10 U.S.C. 1089, immunizing individual military medical personnel from malpractice liability. At issue was whether section 1089(e) waived the government's sovereign immunity for common law battery claims. The court held that it did not and affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's complaint for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The court did not address plaintiff's remaining claims.

Defendant appealed the district court's imposition of a residency restriction as a special condition of supervised release, following his conviction and sentencing for one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 2423(c), which prohibited U.S. citizens from traveling to a foreign country and engaging in illicit sexual conduct. The court had jurisdiction pursuant to 18 U.S.C. 3742. Because the district court did not provide any explanation for its imposition of the 2,000 foot residency restriction, and none was apparent from the record, the district court committed procedural error. Thus, the court vacated the special condition and remanded to the district court to explain or reconsider the residency restriction.

This case involved the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service's (Service) removal of the Yellowstone grizzly bear from the threatened species list. The court affirmed the district court's ruling that the Service failed to articulate a rational connection between the data in the record and its determination that whitebark pine declines were not a threat to the Yellowstone grizzly, given the lack of data indicating grizzly population stability in the face of such declines, and the substantial data indicating a direct correlation between whitebark pine seed availability and grizzly survival production. The court held, however, that the Service's determination regarding the adequacy of the existing regulatory mechanisms was reasonable and reversed the district court.

The Supreme Court of Arizona answered questions that the court certified to that court. Specifically, it had determined that the rule of American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah did not toll the statute of repose for construction-defect claims set forth in Arizona Revised Statutes section 12-552. It also determined that Arizona's saving statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 12-504(A), did not operate to save appellants' claims. Both of the parties agreed that the Supreme Court of Arizona's answers to the court's certified questions put an end to the litigation that was before the court. Consequently, the court held that, for the reasons articulated by the Supreme Court of Arizona, appellants' claims were time-barred. Therefore, the judgment of the district court dismissing appellants' complaints was affirmed.

This case involved a proposed class action settlement between AOL and plaintiffs where the parties agreed that AOL would make a series of charitable donations. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in approving the proposed class action settlement, including a proposed cy pres settlement distribution. The court held that the cy pres distributions here did not comport with the court's cy pres standards. While the donations were made on behalf of a nationwide plaintiff class, they were distributed to geographically isolated and substantively unrelated charities. The court concluded that the district court judge did not have to recuse herself pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 455(a) or (b)(4), 5(iii). The court declined to address the issue of whether the class notice was sufficient. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, affirmed in part, and remanded.