Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, in his capacity as the State Director of the United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO (UPW), negotiated contracts with dental and health insurance providers, HDS and PGMA, on behalf of UPW members and their families. A jury subsequently convicted petitioner of fifty counts of "theft of honest services" from the UPW and its members, as well as conspiracy, embezzlement, money laundering, and health care fraud. At issue was the instructional omission to the jury regarding honest services fraud in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Skilling v. United States. The court held that the error had no "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Accordingly, the court affirmed the theft of honest services, money laundering, and health care fraud judgments of conviction against petitioner and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In consolidated appeals, Marcus Major and Jordan Huff appealed from their convictions under Title 18 U.S.C. 1951 and 924. They also appealed from their sentence pursuant to section 924(c). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of other crimes and in admitting evidence of defendants' affiliation with the High Roller Boyz. The court also held that there was no constitutional error in the district court's effort to restrict defendants' contact with anyone other than their attorneys; section 924(c) did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers or violate the Eighth Amendment; and the district court was correct in concluding that section 924(c) required the court to determine the order in which a defendant received convictions, rather than the order in which offenses were committed. Applying the rule of lenity, when the district court did not have sufficient information to determine the order in which the jury made determinations of guilt during jury deliberations on multiple counts under section 924(c), it must order the convictions so that the mandatory minimum sentenced was minimized. In this case, application of the rule required the district court to deem one of the brandishing counts, rather than a discharging count, to be the first conviction.

When a dispute arose regarding certain services Janice Karman, plaintiff, provided in connection with the movie, "Alvin and the Chipmunks, The Squeakquel," plaintiffs (Karman and Bagdasarian Productions) filed this action. Fox moved to stay the case and to refer the dispute to a referee as the parties' Purchase/Producer Agreement-Literary Material provided. The district court granted the motion and plaintiffs brought this interlocutory appeal to contest the reference. The court concluded that the district court's order was not final, plaintiffs have not been put "out of court" by the order, and the collateral order doctrine was inapplicable because the decision to refer could be reviewed and, if incorrect, later remedied by the court. As such, the appeal was premature and the court lacked jurisdiction over it under 28 U.S.C. 1291.

This case required the court to determine whether a mortgage company violated Hawaii state law when it did not publicly announce the postponement of a foreclosure sale of property owned by appellant, and if so, to ascertain the proper remedy for that violation. The court held that the lack of public announcement did violate Hawaii's nonjudicial foreclosure statute, and this defect was a deceptive practice under state law. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy court's avoidance of the foreclosure sale. However, the court remanded to the bankruptcy court for a proper calculation of attorney's fees and damages under Hawaii Revised Statute 480-13.

Defendant was convicted of one count of obstruction of justice for failing to disclose the full extent of his knowledge regarding the mailing of a letter that could reasonably be believed to constitute an attempt at voter intimidation. Defendant, a Republican candidate for a seat in the U.S. House of Representatives at the time, contended that there was insufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant and that, therefore, the evidence obtained pursuant to it should have been suppressed at his trial. The court held that there was sufficient probable cause to support the issuance of the warrant to search defendant's home and campaign headquarters. The court rejected defendant's First Amendment claim. Although defendant was never prosecuted for a violation of the election laws, in light of the contents of the letter and the facts surrounding its distribution, there was a fair probability that the campaign mailing constituted a tactic of intimidation intended to induce its recipients to refrain from voting. Accordingly, the order of the district court denying the motion to suppress was affirmed.

This case involved the enactment of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Responsibility Act (IIRIRA), 8 U.S.C. 1182(c), which repealed the waiver of deportation under Immigration and Naturalization Act (INA) 212(c). Petitioner, a native and citizen of China, petitioned for review of the BIA's denial of section 212(c) relief. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion when it denied petitioner a continuance because she was eligible to apply for a waiver of deportation under INA 212(c). The court held that the BIA did not err when it held that INA 212(h)'s seven-year continuous presence requirement was not impermissibly retroactive. Accordingly, the petition for review was granted and the case remanded to allow petitioner a continuance to apply for the former 212(c) waiver of removal. The petition was denied as to petitioner's claims arising under section 212(h).

Plaintiff sued the University of Oregon, alleging that it prevented her from completing a Ph.D. program in retaliation for having complained of gender-based institutional bias in the University's Ph.D. program, and gender discrimination by her faculty dissertation committee chair. The court held that the facts were sufficient to establish a prima facie case of retaliation under Title IX. Because a reasonable jury could conclude from the evidence presented at summary judgment that the faculty chair's resignation was gender-based retaliation, the district court erred in granting summary judgment. The court also reversed the district court's award of costs because the University was no longer the prevailing party under Rule 54(d).

This case arose when R&R sued the Insurance Company of Pennsylvania, a subsidiary of AIG, for breach of contract, unfair competition, and tortious bad faith denial of an insurance claim to recover damages from a wildfire. In Case No. 10-55115, R&R appealed from the district court's grant of judgment as a matter of law on its bad faith tort claim. In Case No. 10-55888, R&R appealed from the district court's grant of costs in favor of AIG. The court reversed the district court's grant of judgment in AIG's favor on R&R's bad faith tort claim after addressing the disclosure requirements of Rules 26(a) and 26(e), as well as exclusion of the invoices at issue under Rule 37(c)(1). Therefore, the court remanded for further proceedings. The court's reversal of the district court's judgment on R&R's claims necessitated reversal of the district court's award of costs as well.

Under Internal Revenue Code 1361(a) and 1362(a)(1), qualifying small business corporations could affirmatively elect S corporation status for federal income tax purposes. Under Internal Revenue Code 1363(a) and 1366(a)(1)(A), an S corporation's "profits pass through directly to its shareholders on a pro rata basis and are reported on the shareholders' individual tax returns." At issue was whether a corporate taxpayer was ineligible for S corporation status, and therefore must be taxed as a C corporation, because its sole shareholder was a custodial Roth IRA. Taproot contended that a Roth IRA could not be distinguished from its individual owner under a reasonable interpretation of the governing statute. Adhering to this construction, Taproot thus argued that it satisfied the S corporation requirements. The court agreed with the Tax Court that Revenue Ruling 92-73 provided persuasive guidance that IRAs were ineligible for S corporation shareholders. Here, the 2004 amendment, coupled with the prior legislative history, unequivocally supported the IRS's interpretation of the S corporation statute and promulgation of Revenue Ruling 92-73. The court also agreed with the IRS's narrow interpretation of Treasury Regulation 1.1361-1(e)(1), restricting its application of custodial accounts in which corporate dividends were taxed in the year received. Moreover, the court found persuasive the IRS's opinion that ownership of custodial IRAs and Roth IRAs should not be attributed to the underlying individual for purposes of S corporation eligibility. Accordingly, the decision of the Tax Court was affirmed.

Plaintiffs, a group of investors defrauded by the "Millennium Ponzi scheme," sought recourse against JPMorgan, alleging that WaMu aided and abetted the Ponzi scheme by providing banking services to several companies controlled by the scheme's principals despite actual knowledge of the fraud. JPMorgan, they argued, was liable as successor in interest of WaMu and was liable because it continued WaMu's problematic processes following assumption. The district court dismissed plaintiffs' complaints for failure to exhaust the Financial Institutions Reform, Recovery, and Enforcement Act of 1989 (FIRREA), Pub. L. No. 101-73, 103 Stat. 183. The court concluded that litigants could not avoid FIRREA's administrative requirements through strategic pleading. Accordingly, the court concluded that a claim asserted against a purchasing bank based on the conduct of a failed bank must be exhausted under FIRREA. Claims based on a purchasing bank's post-purchase actions are not governed by FIRREA. They could not, and accordingly need not, be exhausted before the FDIC. Although the court agreed with plaintiffs' legal argument on this score, the court concluded that it had no application to the case at bar. Plaintiffs did not adequately plead a claim based on JPMorgan's independent conduct; they relied instead solely on conclusory allegations. Therefore, the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' claims, along with its subsequent denial of plaintiffs' Rule 60(b) motion was proper.