Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from the 24-month prison sentence imposed following his conviction for illegal reentry. The court adhered to its precedent that required it to decline to review whether the district court procedurally erred by failing to grant defendant a departure or by failing to consider departures before applying the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors. Accordingly, the court declined defendant's invitation to review the district court's denial of a departure and instead, reviewed the district court's exercise of discretion only for substantive reasonableness. Because the record made clear that the sentencing judge considered the relevant evidence and argument, defendant's claims of procedural error failed. The court concluded that the district court's within-Guidelines sentence was reasonable in light of the totality of the circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Vasquez-Cruz" on Justia Law

Marilyn Monroe LLC and its licensee sued Milton Green in the federal district court, claiming ownership of Marilyn Monroe's right of publicity and alleging that Milton Greene was violating Marilyn Monroe LLC's rights by using Monroe's image and likeness for unauthorized commercial purposes, including the advertising and sale of photographs of Monroe. At issue in this case was whether appellants inherited a right of publicity, which was created and deemed posthumous by the states of California and Indiana decades after her death, through a residual clause in her Last Will and Testament. The court concluded that because Monroe's executors consistently represented during the probate proceedings and elsewhere that she was domiciled in New York at her death to avoid payment of California estate taxes, among other things, appellants were judicially estopped from asserting California's posthumous right of publicity. View "Milton H. Greene Archives, Inc. v. Marilyn Monroe LLC, et al." on Justia Law

William Jefferson & Co., Inc. (William Jefferson) lost a state administrative appeal in which William Jefferson challenged the Orange County Tax Assessor's valuation of a parcel of real property. William Jefferson then filed a suit in federal district court, alleging that its procedural due process rights were violated in the course of the administrative appeal hearing. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the state administrative appeal did not deny William Jefferson procedural due process. In a separate memorandum disposition filed concurrently with this opinion, the court affirmed the lower court's grant of the agency's motion for a protective order and its denial of class certification. View "William Jefferson & Co., Inc. v. Board of Assessment and Appeal, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action for copyright infringement, as well as unjust enrichment and accounting, against defendants. According to plaintiff, defendants infringed her purported interest in a book and two screenplays that together allegedly formed the basis for the 1980 motion picture "Raging Bull." The court held that plaintiff's copyright infringement claim was barred by laches and therefore did not reach the merit of the claim itself. The court also held that, because laches was an equitable defense, the court agreed with the district court that laches also barred plaintiff's unjust enrichment and accounting claims. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying defendant's sanctions and attorney's fees motions. View "Petrella v. Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer, Inc., et al." on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. During the selection of the jury that convicted and sentenced petitioner, the prosecution used its preemptory challenges to strike all of the black and Hispanic jurors available for challenge. The trial judge concluded that petitioner had established a prima facie case of racial discrimination under Batson v. Kentucky, but permitted the prosecution to give its justifications for the challenges of these jurors in an in camera hearing from which petitioner and his counsel were excluded. The trial judge then accepted the prosecution's justifications for its strikes without disclosing them to the defense or permitting it to respond. The court held that this procedure violated the Constitution and, together with the state's later loss of a large portion of the record, adversely affected petitioner's substantial rights. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of the petition and remanded with instructions to grant the writ. View "Ayala v. Wong" on Justia Law

These proceedings involved a complex, rarely litigated federal statute, the Perishable Agricultural Commodities Act (PACA), 7 U.S.C. 499a et seq., designed in part to assure that farmers were paid for their produce. In 2009, a Judicial Officer (JO) of the USDA determined that petitioners had violated the PACA by failing to make prompt payment for produce purchases. The court held that the JO's determination that the Subsidiaries purchased produce and failed to make prompt payment for it as required by section 499b(4) was supported by substantial evidence; the JO's conclusion that Petitioners Duncan and Bennett were responsibly connected to Consolidation and Farms under section 499a(b)(9) was also supported by substantial evidence and free from legal error; and therefore, the petitions for review were rejected. View "Perfectly Fresh Farms, Inc., et al. v. USDA; Bennett v. USDA" on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the district court's conclusion that his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas petition was time-barred by the one-year statute of limitations in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d). As to statutory tolling, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that petitioner was not entitled to statutory gap tolling for the 44 day period between the denial of his first habeas petition filed in the superior court and the filing of his second petition in that same court, because his second petition was not limited to an elaboration of the facts relating to the claims in his first petition. As to equitable tolling, even assuming de novo review, the court affirmed the district court's ruling that petitioner was not entitled to such tolling where he has failed to meet his burden of showing that his "mental impairment made it impossible to meet the filing deadline under the totality of the circumstances, including reasonably available access to assistance." View "Stancle v. Clay" on Justia Law

This case stemmed from plaintiff's suit to recover overpayments from the IRS and his subsequent appeal of the district court's judgment which did not award him an overpayment related to his 1999 tax year. The court held that a taxpayer's claim for credit of an overpayment was limited to the amount of the overpayment made within the applicable look-back period in I.R.C. 6511(b)(2)(A). Any claim for refund based on an amount claimed as credit but paid outside of the look-back period was time-barred and uncollectible. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment where plaintiff's claim for credit of his overpayment of his 1999 taxes was time-barred under section 6511(b)(2)(A). View "Reynoso v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254. The court held that petitioner exhausted his claim, that his trial counsel was ineffective, before the Washington Supreme Court. The court also held that the Washington Supreme Court adjudicated his claims on the merits. Nevertheless, the court affirmed the district court's denial of habeas relief on this claim because the Washington Supreme Court's disposition of the claim was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law or based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also affirmed the denial of habeas relief on petitioner's remaining claims. View "Gentry v. Sinclair" on Justia Law

The FTC sued defendants alleging that their online marketing of prepaid debit cards and short-term loans to consumers in the subprime market violated section 5 of the Federal Trade Commission Act, 15 U.S.C. 45. After the parties settled and stipulated to the terms of a Final Order, the FTC applied for an order to show cause why defendants should not be held in contempt for violating the Final Order through their marketing of two products: a shopping club membership program and a "no cost" debit card. The court affirmed the contempt order in its entirety and held that the district court did not abuse its discretion when it sanctioned defendants for the full amount lost by consumers. View "FTC v. EDebitPay, LLC, et al." on Justia Law