Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was charged with assault under a statute that provided for a maximum prison sentence of six months. On appeal, defendant argued that the possibility of being ordered to pay a substantial amount of money in restitution gave him the right to a trial by jury under the Sixth and Seventh Amendments. The court concluded that the prosecution of defendant, even though it resulted in an order requiring him to make monetary payment in restitution, was still a prosecution for a petty offense, and was not a civil action. Therefore, defendant had no right to a jury under either the Sixth or Seventh Amendment and the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Stanfill El" on Justia Law

Fitness Holdings, the debtor in this bankruptcy case, was a home fitness corporation. At issue was whether debtor's pre-bankruptcy transfer of funds to its sole shareholder, in repayment of a purported loan, could be a constructively fraudulent transfer under 11 U.S.C. 548(a)(1)(B). The court held that a court has the authority to determine whether a transaction created a debt if it created a right to payment under state law. Because the district court concluded that it lacked authority to make this determination, the court vacated the decision and remanded for further proceedings. View "In re: Fitness Holdings Int'l" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed an action under 8 U.S.C. 1503(a) seeking a declaratory judgment that he is a citizen of the United States. Plaintiff was born in the Philippine Islands and his father was a U.S. citizen who had lived his entire life in the Philippines. Plaintiff argued that, as a child born out of wedlock, he was covered by a special provision of the Nationality Act of 1940, Pub. L. No. 76-853, section 201(e), that made section 201(e) applicable retroactively to children born out of wedlock before the Act's effective date. The court concluded that the 1940 Act was not the law in effect at the time of plaintiff's birth in 1931, so he must establish that the Act applied retroactively to individuals before its effective date. The court did not think that the provisions of the Act on which defendant relied reflected a legislative intention that they should apply retroactively. Further, plaintiff conceded that he could not meet the condition precedent to acquiring citizenship, that his paternity have been established by legitimation or adjudication during minority. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's summary judgment dismissal of his action. View "Friend v. Holder" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for distribution, possession with intent to distribute, and conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by failing to deliver a "missing witness" instruction; the district court erred by sua sponte instructing the jury not to "speculate" as to why the witness was absent; the sua sponte instruction was harmless with regards to the charges of distribution and possession with intent to distribute; the court did not need to decide whether the district court's sua sponte instruction had a prejudicial effect on the conspiracy charge because the court reversed the conspiracy conviction on other grounds; even viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, there was no such agreement between defendant and someone else to distribute meth; therefore, the evidence was insufficient to convict defendant of this offense; and the court rejected defendant's contention that the judge should not have imposed a sentencing enhancement under 21 U.S.C. 841(b). Accordingly, the court vacated the conspiracy conviction, remanded to the district court to grant a judgment of acquittal on that count alone and to conform the sentence accordingly, and affirmed the remainder of defendant's convictions and sentence. View "United States v. Ramirez" on Justia Law

This dispute involved a revenue-sharing agreement between GCSD and SNW to build the Skywalk over the Grand Canyon on remote tribal land. GCSD filed suit against SNW seeking declaratory judgment that the Hualapai Tribe lacked the authority to condemn its intangible property rights and injunctive relief. After multiple hearings, the district court denied GCSD's temporary restraining order to enjoin SNW based on the principles of comity and ordered GCSD to exhaust tribal court remedies prior to review in federal court. The court affirmed and held that where, as here, a tribal court has asserted jurisdiction and was entertaining a suit, the tribal court must have acted in bad faith for exhaustion to be excused. The facts of this case did not support a finding of bad faith on the part of the tribal court. The submitted evidence supported the district court's finding that the tribal court operated independently from the tribal council and the evidence presented did not meet the narrow futility exception. The tribal court did not plainly lack jurisdiction because Montana v. United States's main rule was unlikely to apply to the facts of this case. Furthermore, the district court correctly relied on Water Wheel Camp Recreation Area, Inc. v. LaRance, which provided for tribal jurisdiction without even reaching the application of Montana. Even if the tribal consensual relationship with SNW or the financial implications of the agreement likely placed it squarely within one of Montana's exceptions and allowed for tribal jurisdiction. View "Grand Canyon Skywalk Dev. v. 'Sa' Nyu Wa Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff brought suit against Boeing and BISS alleging breach of contract as well as several statutory and common law claims. At issue was the enforceability of a forum selection clause. The court held that the evidence submitted and the allegations made by plaintiff were more than sufficient to create a triable issue of fact as to whether the forum selection clause at issue here was enforceable under M/S Bremen v. Zapata Off-Shores Co. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion by granting BISS's motion to dismiss without convening an evidentiary hearing. The district court also abused its discretion in denying plaintiff leave to amend his pleadings. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. The court did, however, grant Boeing's and BISS's joint motion to strike the portions of plaintiff's reply brief that included new evidence or alleged new facts not in the record before the district court. View "Petersen v. Boeing Co." on Justia Law

Clevo appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Hecny. Clevo, a Taiwan-based manufacturer of computer parts and accessories, and Amazon, a Brazilian entity, agreed that Clevo would manufacture and sell, and Amazon would buy, millions of dollars' worth of Clevo computer parts. Under Clevo and Amazon's negotiated terms, the Hecny Group was designated to handle all of the contract shipments. More than a year after the initial misdelivery to Amazon, Clevo sued numerous Hecny Group entities for the unpaid remainder of the goods' purchase price. The court concluded that the Guarantee was initially effective to place Clevo and Hecny Transportation in direct contractual privity, without any contractually-created statute of limitations. But that initial relationship was modified when the Bills of Lading issued. By operation of the Himalaya Clause, the benefit of the one-year statue of limitations in the Bills of Lading extended beyond Hecny Shipping to Hecny Transportation as well. Because Hecny Transportation had asserted that provision in defense to suit, Clevo's claims were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Clevo Co. v. Hecny Transp., Inc." on Justia Law

Petitioner challenged the district court's ruling that he was not a United States citizen pursuant to 8 U.S.C. 1252(b)(5). The court held that Lim v. Mitchell, which required de novo review, was no longer good law, and the court must review the district court's finding of fact for clear error. The court concluded that the district court did not err in placing the burden on petitioner to prove his citizenship by a preponderance of the evidence and then shifting the burden of proof to the government, nor did it err in selecting the "clear and convincing" formulation when assigning the level of proof that the government had to meet. In view of the many undisputed facts and the additional non-erroneous subordinate findings, the court held that the district court's key finding, that petitioner is Salvador Mondaca-Vega, was not clearly erroneous under the "clear and convincing" standard of proof. Accordingly, the court denied the petition. View "Mondaca-Vega v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs sued the Agencies, challenging changes to the Survey and Manage Standard (Standard) of the Northwest Forest Plan. Plaintiffs and the Agencies negotiated a settlement which the district court approved and entered in the form of a consent decree. D.R. Johnson appealed, contending that the district court's approval of the consent decree was an abuse of discretion. At issue was whether a district court could approve resolution of litigation involving a federal agency through a consent decree, which substantially and permanently amended regulations that the agency could only otherwise amend by complying with statutory rulemaking procedures. Because the consent decree allowed for substantial permanent amendments to the Standard, it impermissibly conflicted with laws governing the process for such amendments. Therefore, the district court abused its discretion in approving it in its current form. Finally, D.R. Johnson waived its C & O Act, 28 U.S.C. 1291, argument. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Conservation Northwest v. Sherman" on Justia Law

The Commissioner appealed the tax court's determination related to a deficiency in petitioners' federal income tax involving distributions from petitioners' variable universal life insurance policy. The Commissioner asserted that surrender charges could never be considered under I.R.C. 402(b)(2), and maintained that petitioners actually received the full stated policy values of their respective policies. The court affirmed the tax court's determination that the "amount actually distributed" when petitioners received ownership of the policies after their employer wound down their employees' benefit trust was "the fair market value of what was actually distributed." Further, the surrender charges associated with a variable universal life insurance policy could permissibly be considered as part of the general inquiry into a policy's fair market value. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision. View "Schwab v. CIR" on Justia Law