Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in January, 2014
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Experience Hendrix filed suit against Pitsicalis alleging that Pitsicalis was infringing trademarks in violation of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1051-1127, and that the trademark infringement also amounted to an unfair or deceptive trade practice proscribed by Washington's Consumer Protection Act (WCPA), Wash. Rev. Code 19.86.010-19.86.920. Determining that Pitsicalis had Article III standing, the court concluded, inter alia, that the WPRA was constitutional as applied to the narrow set of non-speculative circumstances at issue in this case; Pitsicalis was liable under the Lanham Act for using domain names that infringed Experience Hendrix's trademark "Hendrix"; and Paragraph 5 of the permanent injunction failed to state clearly the terms of the injunction and did not describe in reasonable detail the acts that were and were not restrained. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's determination that the Washington statute was unconstitutional and remanded Pitsicalis's declaratory judgment claims pertaining to the WPRA with instructions to enter judgment on those claims in favor of Experience Hendrix; affirmed the grant of partial summary judgment on Experience Hendrix's claim that Pitsicalis's use of domain names infringed Experience Hendrix's mark; vacated the permanent injunction and remanded so the district court could revise the language at issue; reversed the Rule 50(b)(3) decision to strike most of the jury's award of damages under both the Lanham Act and the WPRA; affirmed the district court's order granting a new trial on damages under both statutes; remanded for a new trial on such damages; vacated the district court's award of attorney's fees under the WCPA; and remanded the fee request for further proceedings. View "Experience Hendrix v. HendrixLicensing.com" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit alleging that he was entitled to use the Fortymile Trail for access to his state mining claims. Plaintiff sought a declaration that he was entitled to a right-of-way to access his state mining claims on the Fortymile Trail both under a federal statute commonly referred to as R.S. 2477 and because he has an easement by implication or necessity, and that the real property interests claimed by the non-federal defendants were subject to this right-of-way. The district court dismissed plaintiff's claims against all defendants and plaintiff appealed. The court concluded that plaintiff's claims against the federal government were barred by sovereign immunity, but that the district court erred in concluding that his claims against Doyon Limited and Hungwitchin Corporation were barred by principles of prudential standing. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and reversed in part. View "Mills v. United States" on Justia Law

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Because of petitioner's gang activities, he had been confined for many years to a security housing unit (SHU), to protect other prisoners from him and his gang underlings. This appeal addressed the enforcement of orders regarding petitioner's conditions of confinement. In 2006, because petitioner claimed that he was no longer an active gang member, the district court ordered him released from the SHU. Petitioner was then returned to the SHU based on allegations of gang activity. The district court subsequently issued orders in 2009 and 2011 enforcing its 2006 order to release petitioner. The court concluded that, in the circumstances of this case, the district court abused its discretion by finding violations of its 2006 order in 2009 and 2011. Accordingly, the court concluded that prison officials did not violate the 2006 order. The court concluded, however, that the 2009 and 2011 orders must be vacated as an abuse of discretion where they improperly impeded state prison management. Accordingly, the court remanded with directions to dismiss the 2009 and 2011 orders. View "Griffin v. Gomez, et al." on Justia Law

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After MediVas defaulted on a loan, Marubeni foreclosed on promissory notes held by MediVas and threatened to foreclose on additional MediVas assets. MediVas and others filed suit against Marubeni in state court, raising numerous state law claims. Marubeni, invoking a contractual arbitration clause, removed the action to federal court and moved to compel arbitration and initiated arbitration against plaintiffs. At issue was whether an order compelling arbitration was appealable when the district court neither explicitly dismissed or explicitly stayed the action. The court held that such an order implicitly stayed the action and thus was not "a final decision with respect to an arbitration" under the Federal Arbitration Act, 9 U.S.C. 16(a)(3); the court adopted a rebuttable presumption that an order compelling arbitration but not explicitly dismissing the underlying claims stayed the action as to those claims pending the completion of the arbitration; and the court dismissed the appeal for lack of jurisdiction. View "MediVas, LLC v. Marubeni Corp." on Justia Law

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Petitioner sought review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal from an IJ's entry of a final order of removal. In 1989, petitioner pleaded guilty to possession of cocaine with intent to distribute after police officers pulled over a truck in which petitioner was the driver and the sole occupant and where the truck contained 900 pounds of cocaine. The conviction was overturned on appeal because the officers lacked sufficient suspicion to make a traffic stop. As a general rule, a voluntary guilty plea to criminal charges was probative of evidence that the petitioner did, in fact, engage in the charged activity, even if the conviction was later overturned for a reason unrelated to voluntariness. The court concluded that the BIA did not violate due process or otherwise err in holding that petitioner was removable under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(C)(i) where there was "reason to believe" that he "is or has been an illicit trafficker" in a controlled substance or knowingly has assisted others in trafficking. Accordingly, the court denied the petition for review. View "Chavez-Reyes v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Defendant appealed his sentence and conviction for online enticement of a female minor to engage in sexual activity in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2422(b). The court held that section 2422(b) clearly and unambiguously criminalized attempted sexual activity where the object of the attempt would amount to either a misdemeanor or a felony under state law; because the statutory language of section 2422(b) was not ambiguous, the doctrine of constitutional avoidance was inapplicable as well; section 2422 was not void for vagueness where a person of ordinary intelligence would have no doubt that criminal liability under the statute did not depend on whether the conduct constituted a misdemeanor or a felony under state law; and the court rejected defendant's argument that his sentence violated the Eighth Amendment and the court refused to apply the categorical approach to defendant's ten-year mandatory minimum sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Shill" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff appealed the denial of his claims for supplemental security income (SSI). At issue was whether the ALJ failed to make an adequate showing that a significant number of jobs existed in the region in which plaintiff lived or in several regions of the country. The court concluded that the ALJ did not err by defining "region" for purposes of 42 U.S.C. 1382c(a)(3)(B) as the State of California, and 2,500 jobs in California constituted a significant number of jobs in the region. The court also concluded that 25,000 jobs also signified a significant number of jobs in several regions of the country. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Gutierrez v. Comm'r of Soc. Sec." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs challenged BOEM's Final Environmental Impact Statement (FEIS) analyzing the environmental effects of proposed oil and gas development in the Chukchi Sea off the coast of Alaska. The court concluded that BOEM has reasonably concluded that the missing information from the FEIS and Supplemental Environmental Impact Statement (SEIS) was not "essential" to informed decisionmaking at the lease sale stage. The court concluded, however, that BOEM acted arbitrarily and capriciously by estimating that one billion barrels of oil would be economically recoverable where BOEM did not provide an adequate explanation of its selection. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Native Village of Point Hope v. Jewell" on Justia Law

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GSK filed suit against Abbott over a dispute related to a licensing agreement and the pricing of HIV medications. The central issue on appeal was whether equal protection prohibited discrimination based on sexual orientation in jury selection. GSK contended that a new trial was warranted because Abbott unconstitutionally used a peremptory strike to exclude a juror on the basis of his sexual orientation. The court concluded that GSK had established a prima facie case of intentional discrimination where the juror at issue was the only juror to have identified himself as gay on the record and the subject of the litigation presented an issue of consequence to the gay community. The court held that classifications based on sexual orientation were subject to a heightened scrutiny under United States v. Windsor. The court also held that equal protection prohibits peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation. The history of exclusion of gays and lesbians from democratic institutions and the pervasiveness of stereotypes about the group leads the court to conclude that Batson v. Kentucky applied to peremptory strikes based on sexual orientation. The court also concluded that a Batson challenge would be cognizable only once a prospective juror's sexual orientation was established, voluntarily and on the record. The court rejected Abbott's harmless error argument. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "SmithKline Beecham Corp. v. Abbott Laboratories" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, a class of cardholders who paid credit card penalty fees, challenged those fees on constitutional grounds. Plaintiffs argued that the fees are analogous to punitive damages imposed in the tort context and are subject to substantive due process limits described in BMW of North America, Inc. v. Gore. The court concluded that the due process analysis developed in the context of jury-awarded punitive damages was not applicable to contractual penalty clauses. Further, there was no derivative liability under the Unfair Competition Law. Accordingly, the district court did not err in dismissing the complaint where constitutional due process jurisprudence did not prevent enforcement of excessive penalty clauses in private contracts and the fees were permissible under the National Bank Act, 12 U.S.C. 85-86, and the Depository Institutions Deregulation and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA), 12 U.S.C. 1831d(a). View "In re: Late Fee & Over-Limit Fee Litigation" on Justia Law