Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Airs International, a purported owner of an ANGEL DREAMS trademark, filed suit against Victoria's Secret alleging breach of contract claims and requesting cancellation of Victoria's Secret's registered DREAM ANGELS trademark. On appeal, Airs International challenged the district court's dismissal of its claims. The court held that Section 37 of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1119, did not provide an independent basis for federal jurisdiction. Because Airs Aromatics had not appealed the dismissal of the only claims it brought that could support jurisdiction, the district court's judgment dismissing this action with prejudice must be affirmed. Airs Aromatics has not alleged sufficient facts to support a claim for trademark infringement where it failed to allege that the litigation was the kind of continuous, public usage of a trademark that served to identify the marked goods to the public as those of the mark's owner. Finally, leave to amend would be futile. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Airs Aromatics v. Victoria's Secret" on Justia Law

Defendants appealed their convictions for aggravated sexual abuse of a minor. Applying the test set out in Waller v. Georgia, the court concluded that defendants' Sixth Amendment rights to a public trial were not violated when the district court closed the courtroom while the child victims were testifying; the closure at Defendant Yazzie's trial did not violate the statutory provision permitting a closed courtroom during the testimony of a child witness; and Yazzie's multiple convictions under 18 U.S.C. 2241(c) for discrete sexual acts that occurred during one sexual encounter with the victim did not violate the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Yazzie" on Justia Law

Students brought a civil rights suit against the school district and two school officials after the school asked a group of students to remove clothing bearing images of the American flag when school officials learned of threats of race-related violence during a school-sanctioned celebration of Cinco de Mayo. The court concluded that school officials did not violate the students' rights to freedom of expression, due process, or equal protection where the school officials anticipated violence or substantial disruption of or material interference with school activities and their response was tailored to the circumstances. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's holding that the policy was not unconstitutionally vague and did not violate the students' rights to due process. View "Dariano v. Morgan Hill Unified Sch. Dist., et al." on Justia Law

While petitioner, a native of Iran and citizen of Armenia, was appealing the BIA's removal order, he married a United States citizen. The BIA then affirmed the removal order and petitioner filed a timely motion to reopen, which the BIA denied. The court concluded that the BIA abused its discretion by improperly relying on a de facto DHS veto as dispositive of petitioner's motion to reopen; petitioner's affidavit was sufficient to make the prima facie showing required when the BIA considered a motion to reopen; had the BIA addressed the issue on the merits, it would have been an abuse of discretion to deny the motion; and if the BIA had indeed meant to address those merits, it did not fulfill its obligation to provide a reasoned explanation for its actions. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded to the BIA for further proceedings. View "Tadevosyan v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was cast in a minor role in an adventure film with the working title "Desert Warrior." The film never materialized and plaintiff's scene was used, instead, in an anti-Islamic film titled "Innocence of Muslims." The film was uploaded to YouTube.com and her brief performance was dubbed over so that she appeared to be asking, "Is your Mohammed a child molester?" An Egyptian cleric subsequently issued a fatwa, calling for the killing of everyone involved with the film. After Google refused to take it down from YouTube, plaintiff sought a restraining order seeking removal of the film, claiming that the posting of the video infringed the copyright in her performance. The district court treated the application as a motion for a preliminary injunction but denied the motion. The court concluded that plaintiff demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits where plaintiff had an independent copyright interest in her performance; the work for hire doctrine was inapplicable in this instance because plaintiff was not a traditional employee and the filmmaker was not in the regular business of making films; and although plaintiff granted the filmmaker an implied license to use plaintiff's performance, the filmmaker exceeded the bounds of the license when he lied to plaintiff in order to secure her participation and she agreed to perform in reliance on that lie. The court also concluded that plaintiff faced irreparable harm absent an injunction where plaintiff took legal action as soon as the film received worldwide attention and she began receiving death threats; the harm plaintiff complained of was real and immediate; and plaintiff demonstrated a causal connection because removing the film from YouTube would help disassociate her from the film's anti-Islamic message and such disassociation would keep her from suffering future threats and physical harm. Finally, the balance of the equities and the public interest favored plaintiff's position. Accordingly, the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion in denying the motion for a preliminary injunction. The court reversed and remanded. View "Garcia v. Google, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit against Foster Farms under the Family Medical Leave Act (FMLA), 29 U.S.C. 2601, and California law. The parties disputed whether plaintiff sought FMLA leave in order to care for her ailing father in another country. The court concluded that an employee can affirmatively decline to use FMLA leave, even if the underlying reasons for seeking the leave would have invoked FMLA protection. The court concluded that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's motion for judgment as a matter of law where, viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the jury's verdict, there was substantial evidence that plaintiff elected not to take FMLA leave. The jury had ample evidence to render a verdict against plaintiff due to her noncompliance with Foster Farms's "three day no-show, no-call rule." Because the district court issued a limiting instruction regarding plaintiff's prior FMLA leave, any error in admitting the evidence was harmless. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to award costs of suit to Foster Poultry. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Escriba v. Foster Poultry Farms" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against police officers and the city after the officers entered her home without a warrant and shot her five or six times when she reacted violently to the officers' presence, grabbing a knife and threatening to kill the officers. Plaintiff, a woman in her mid-50s suffering from a mental illness, told the officers that she did not want to be taken to a mental health facility. The court affirmed in part, holding that the officers were justified in entering plaintiff's home initially under the emergency aid exception because they had an objectively reasonable basis to believe that she was in need of emergency medical assistance and they conducted the search or seizure in a reasonable manner up to that point. The court held that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the second entry violated the Fourth Amendment where a jury could find that the officers acted unreasonably by forcing the second entry and provoking a near-fatal confrontation. The court further held that there were triable issues of fact as to whether the officers used excessive force by resorting to deadly force and shooting plaintiff. Finally, the court held that the district court properly rejected claims of municipal liability; the court joined the majority of circuits that have addressed the issue and held that Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. 12132, applied to arrests; on the facts presented here, there was a triable issue as to whether the officers failed to reasonably accommodate plaintiff's disability; and the court vacated summary judgment on plaintiff's state law claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Sheehan v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed a putative class action against FreeScore under the Credit Repair Organizations Act (CROA), 15 U.S.C. 1679 et seq. The district court dismissed the claim, concluding that FreeScore was not a "credit repair organization" as defined in the CROA. The court held, however, that FreeScore was a credit repair organization because FreeScore, through the representations it made on its website and in its television advertising, offered a service, in return for the payment of money, for the implied purpose of providing advice or assistance to consumers with regard to improving the consumer's credit record, history, or rating. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Stout v. FreeScore, LLC" on Justia Law

The government appealed the dismissal of defendant's indictment for unlawful reentry. Defendant had pleaded guilty to "conspiracy to commit the crime of burglary" in violation of Nev. Rev. Stat. 199.480.205.060(1) and was subsequently ordered removed as an undocumented alien convicted of an aggravated felony. Applying the methodology prescribed by the Supreme Court for defining generic offenses for categorical purposes, the generic federal definition of conspiracy, 8 U.S.C. 1101(a)(43)(U), conditioned conviction on performance of an overt act in pursuit of the conspiratorial objective. Because Nevada's conspiracy statute criminalized a broader range of conduct than the properly determined generic definition of conspiracy, defendant's conviction did not qualify as an aggravated felony. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's determination that defendant's prior removal order was constitutionally inadequate because she was denied her right to seek discretionary relief from removal. View "United States v. Garcia-Santana" on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm and was sentenced under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1). On appeal, defendant argued that neither his prior Nevada conspiracy conviction nor his Nevada kidnapping conviction was a violent felony under the ACCA. The court concluded that a Nevada conviction for robbery was a violent felony because it created a serious risk of harm that was comparable to the risk posed by burglary. The court also concluded that second degree kidnapping in Nevada categorically involved a serious risk that physical force could be used in the course of committing the offense and that this risk was roughly similar to the risk involved in burglary. Accordingly, the court concluded that both offenses were violent felonies under the ACCA and, therefore, the court affirmed the sentencing enhancement under the ACCA because defendant had previously been convicted of three violent felonies. View "United States v. Chandler" on Justia Law