Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to being a removed alien found in the United States, a violation of the terms of his federal supervised release. Reviewing for plain error because defendant did not raise his Sixth Amendment objections before the district court, the court held that the revocation of supervised release and the imposition of additional prison time do not violate the Sixth Amendment's guarantee of a speedy trial, even when the revocation and sentencing take place years after the original conviction; Alleyne v. United States does not affect the validity of the court's determination in United States v. Huerta-Pimental, that the revocation of supervised release and the imposition of additional prison time under 18 U.S.C. 3583 do not violate the Sixth Amendment right to trial; and the court addressed defendant's other arguments in an unpublished memorandum. Accordingly, the court affirmed the revocation of supervised release and the sentence imposed upon revocation. View "United States v. Gavilanes-Ocaranza" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his sentence after being convicted for being a felon in possession. The court concluded that the district court did not err by determining that defendant's prior California conviction for robbery was a violent felony under the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e)(1)-(2)(B), because attempted robbery presents a serious potential risk of physical injury to another and it is roughly similar, in kind and in degree of risk posed, as burglary and extortion. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Price" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of one count of conspiracy to possess marijuana with intent to distribute and two counts of possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. On appeal, defendant argued that the admission of out-of-court statements by a nontestifying post officer supervisor and photographs of a seized package that was the subject of the statements violated his rights under the Confrontation Clause. The court concluded that the photographs did not violate the Confrontation Clause because they were not witnesses against defendant; the statements violated defendant's rights because the postal supervisor did not testify and there is no contention of unavailability or that defendant had a prior opportunity to cross-examine the supervisor; and the error was not harmless. The court rejected defendant's remaining contentions. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "United States v. Brooks" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs Gant and Ventura filed over twenty federal and state law claims against various defendants, alleging that defendants issued flawed warrants, improperly arrested plaintiffs, or improperly detained them. The district court granted defendants' motion to dismiss and motions for summary judgment. The court concluded that the district court did not err by dismissing Gant's Fourth Amendment section 1983 claim against the L.A. City defendants where Gant did not show that failure to enter his judicial clearance form rendered the warrant abstract insufficiently particular or that the absence of such an entry was the proximate cause of his mistaken arrest; Gant's Fourth Amendment particularity claim failed against L.A. County defendants where the Third Amended Complaint alleged that L.A. City defendants, not L.A. County defendants, obtained the warrant for Gant's brother; Ventura's Fourth Amendment claims against L.A. City defendants was foreclosed by Rivera v. County of Los Angeles; Ventura's Fourth Amendment claim against Chino defendants failed because he failed to meet his burden of showing that the mistaken arrest was more than a single, isolated or sporadic incident; Rivera also foreclosed Ventura's claims against San Bernardino defendants; because post-arrest incarceration is analyzed under the Fourteenth Amendment alone, the district court did not err by dismissing Ventura's Fourth Amendment claim against L.A. County defendants; because Gant did not allege that he told the L.A. County defendants he had a judicial clearance form or that he otherwise called this case of mistaken identity to their attention, and because he was detained for the purpose of receiving process and did receive a prompt hearing, the district court correctly dismissed Gant's Fourteenth Amendment claim against L.A. County defendants; and the district court correctly granted summary judgment for Chino defendants and San Bernardino defendants on Ventura's Fourteenth Amendment claims. The court reversed the dismissal of Ventura's Fourteenth Amendment claim against L.A. County defendants because there are genuine issues of material fact about whether Ventura complained to L.A. County defendants that they had the wrong person. The court also reversed that district court's grant of summary judgment for Chino defendants on Ventura's claim under the Bane Act, Cal. Civ. Code 52.1(a), (b), where a trier of fact could conclude that the officers intended to coerce Ventura. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "Gant v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for violating a VA regulation prohibiting disorderly conduct that creates loud, boisterous, and unusual noise, 38 C.F.R. 1.218(a)(5) and (b)(11). The court held that disorderly conduct creates sufficiently loud, boisterous, and unusual noise to be prohibited under section 1.218(a)(5) and (b)(11) when such conduct would tend to disturb the normal operation of a VA facility. In this case, the evidence established that defendant's conduct would tend to disturb the normal operation of the hospital and that the hospital's operation was actually disturbed where the altercation between defendant and his son could be heard inside the facility 25 yards away, and a VA nurse and social worker were drawn away from their ordinary tasks to monitor the situation. View "United States v. Agront, Sr." on Justia Law

Defendant pleaded guilty to six counts of harboring and concealing illegal aliens for financial gain and subsequently appealed his sentence. The court concluded that the district court did not err in applying a two-level sentencing enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.1(b)(4) for harboring unaccompanied minor aliens where it was reasonably foreseeable to defendant that unaccompanied minors would be smuggled. The district court's finding comports with due process and defendant has not met his burden of demonstrating that his sentence was based on false or unreliable information. The court also concluded that the district court did not err in applying a two-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. 2L1.1(b)(8)(A) for involuntarily detaining aliens through coercion or threat or in connection with a demand for payment where this particular smuggling organization detained aliens both in connection with a demand for payment and through coercion or threat. Further, it was reasonably foreseeable to defendant that the organization would detain aliens through coercion or threat or in connection with a demand for payment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gamez Reyes" on Justia Law

Alliance filed suit challenging the decision of the federal defendants, as well as MDOL, to permit recurring, low-altitude helicopter flights to haze bison in the Yellowstone Grizzly Bear Recovery Zone. Alliance alleged that the federal defendants and MDOL have violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the National Forest Management Act (NFMA), 16 U.S.C. 1600 et seq., because they have failed to undertake the proper procedures for reevaluating the effect of helicopter hazing on Yellowstone grizzly bears and have not issued an incidental take permit for the alleged harassment of Yellowstone grizzly bears. The court reversed the district court's holding that Alliance lacked standing to bring its ESA and NEPA claims; reversed the district court's ruling that Alliance failed to comply with the ESA citizen suit 60-day notice provision; affirmed the dismissal of all of Alliance's ESA claims against Inspection Service and FWS as they were not included in the 60-day notice on which Alliance relies; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's ESA Section 7 claim as it is moot; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants and granted dismissal to MDOL on Alliance's Section 9 claim where no genuine issues of material fact exist in the record concerning whether a take of a Yellowstone grizzly bear has occurred or is likely to occur; and affirmed the grant of summary judgment to the federal defendants on the NEPA and NFMA claims. View "Alliance for the Wild Rockies v. USDA" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of felony murder predicated on attempted robbery. The State subsequently believed petitioner that he was not the actual shooter and the state trial court resentenced petitioner as an aider and abettor to a term of imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Petitioner objected to resentencing, contending that the jury had not found him guilty of aiding and abetting the robbery, and that he was entitled to a new trial. On appeal, petitioner challenged the district court's denial of his petition for habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. 2254(d)(1). The court concluded that the right to a jury in this case means that petitioner had the right to have a jury decide what conduct he committed. Resentencing on the basis of facts that the jury did not find, and that conflicted with what the jury did find, violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment rights. Further, there was no trial error that could be subject to harmless error analysis. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Taylor v. Cate" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, sought review of a final order of removal where BIA found petitioner inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), and ineligible for an exception under section 1182(a)(2)(A)(ii), because he was convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). Petitioner was convicted of spousal abuse under California Penal Code 273.5(a) and threatening to commit a crime resulting in death or great bodily injury under California Penal Code 422. The court held that although the BIA correctly concluded that petitioner's conviction under section 422 is a CIMT, the BIA erred in concluding that petitioner was convicted of spousal abuse under section 273.5(a) by looking to evidence outside the record of conviction; the BIA's decision in In re Rotimi is entitled to deference; and the BIA correctly found petitioner ineligible for an extreme hardship waiver. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cervantes v. Holder" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed suit alleging that the Californians Against Sexual Exploitation (CASE) Act, Cal. Penal Code 290.015(a)(4)-(5), infringes their freedom of speech in violation of the First Amendment. The district court granted plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and defendants and intervenors appealed. The court applied intermediate scrutiny and concluded that plaintiffs are likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment challenge. The court concluded that registered sex offenders who have completed their terms of probation and parole enjoy the full protection of the First Amendment; First Amendment scrutiny is warranted because the Act imposes a substantial burden on sex offenders' ability to engage in legitimate online speech, and to do so anonymously; the Act unnecessarily chills protected speech in at least three ways: the Act does not make clear what sex offenders are required to report, there are insufficient safeguards preventing the public release of the information sex offenders do report, and the 24-hour reporting requirement is onerous and overbroad; and the district court did not abuse its discretion in deciding that all the necessary elements for obtaining a preliminary injunction are satisfied where there is irreparable injury sufficient to merit relief, and the balance of the equities and the public interest favor the exercise of First Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Doe v. Harris" on Justia Law