Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit against the IRS under 26 U.S.C. 7426(a)(1), alleging that the IRS wrongfully seized $13,000 from plaintiff. The IRS thought the money belonged to plaintiff's father and, after seizing it, applied the funds to pay down the father's tax debts. Plaintiff was 10 years old at the time of the seizure and plaintiff alleged that he did not find out about it until after he turned 18 years old. The court reaffirmed its prior holding that the nine-month limitations period set by section 6532(c) is not jurisdictional and may be equitably tolled. In this case, because the district court dismissed plaintiff's suit without determining whether he has established grounds for equitable tolling, the court reversed and remanded, leaving that question for the district court to resolve. View "Volpicelli v. United States" on Justia Law

Before his retirement, Asa Williams, Sr. participated in various benefit programs (the Xerox Plans), which are subject to the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Asa married Carmen and designated Carmen as his beneficiary. After their divorce, Asa attempted to change his designated beneficiary from his ex-wife to his son (Asa, Jr.). After Asa, Sr.'s death, Carmen claimed to be the beneficiary under the Xerox Plans and Asa, Jr. likewise asserted the same claim. Carmen subsequently moved for summary judgment, asserting that because Asa, Sr. failed to fill out and to return the beneficiary designation forms, he did not properly designate Asa, Jr. as beneficiary in her place. The district court granted the motion. The court concluded that the district court erred in determining that Asa, Sr. was required to abide by the language contained in the forms - but not in the governing plan documents - to change his beneficiary from Carmen to Asa, Jr. Reviewing de novo whether Carmen or Asa, Jr. is entitled to plan benefits, the court concluded that based on the evidence, including Xerox's call log reflecting that Asa, Sr. called Xerox to change his beneficiary designation from Carmen to Asa, Jr., a reasonable trier of fact could determine that Asa, Sr. intended to change his beneficiary to Asa, Jr. and that his phone calls to Xerox constituted substantial compliance with the governing plan documents' requirements for changing his beneficiary designation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Mays-Williams v. Williams" on Justia Law

Petitioners, purchasers of luxury condominium units, seek a writ of mandamus directing the district court to vacate its grant of a motion, while arbitration was pending, to disqualify an arbitrator for evident partiality under 9 U.S.C. 10(a)(2). The court determined that it had jurisdiction under the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. 1651. In determining whether a petitioner has carried the burden of establishing a "clear and indisputable" right to issuance of the writ, the court examined the five factors set out in Bauman v. U.S. Dist. Court: (1) the party seeking the writ has no other adequate means, such as a direct appeal, to attain the relief he or she desires; (2) the petitioner will be damaged or prejudiced in a way not correctable on appeal; (3) the district court’s order is clearly erroneous as a matter of law; (4) the district court’s order is an oft-repeated error, or manifests a persistent disregard of the federal rules; and (5) the district court’s order raises new and important problems, or issues of law of first impression.The court concluded that the third and fifth Bauman factors, along with the first and second Bauman factors to a lesser extent, weigh in favor of granting the petition for mandamus. In this case, the district court's ruling was clearly erroneous as to the legal standard for "evident partiality" and the nature of the equitable concerns sufficient to justify a mid-arbitration intervention. Accordingly, the court granted the petition. View "Sussex v. U.S. Dist. Court for the District of Nevada" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his 18 year sentence after being convicted for conspiracy, distribution, and possession with intent to distribute cocaine base, seeking a retroactive reduction of his sentence based upon the 2010 Sentencing Commission's reduction of the Sentencing Guidelines retroactively for crack cocaine. In United States v. Austin, the court held that Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in the judgment in Freeman v. United States controls under Marks v. United States. In this case, the district court's determination that it lacked jurisdiction to reduce defendant's crack sentence is consistent with Austin. In light of Austin, defendant's sentence was "based on" his plea agreement pursuant to Fed. R. Crim. P. 11(c)(1)(C) unless one of the two Freeman exception applies, and they do not. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Davis" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for possessing and distributing child pornography. The court concluded that convictions for possessing child pornography and distributing the same child pornography do not amount to double jeopardy; sharing the child pornography through a peer-to-peer network amounts to distribution, even though the distributor does not take some concrete affirmative action for the particular download that is charged as the distribution. The court also concluded that the evidence was sufficient to convict defendant of distribution under United States v. Budziak. In regards to defendant's argument under Federal Rule of Evidence 403 regarding the district court's admission of interview statements made in connection with a prior child pornography conviction, the Curtin-Waters error compels reversal. The district court cannot properly exercise its discretion to decide whether the probative value of evidence objected to under Rule 403 outweighs the risk of unfair prejudice without examining the evidence. Accordingly, the court vacated and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. McElmurry" on Justia Law

Black Mesa sought costs and expenses from the OSM after Black Mesa participated in a successful challenge to OSM's grant of a coal mining permit revision. The ALJ denied the fee request, the IBLA affirmed, and the district court affirmed. The court held that, on the standard of review applicable here, the review of the agency's "eligibility" determination is de novo and its "entitlement" determination is reviewed for substantial evidence; on de novo review, Black Mesa is "eligible" for fees because it showed some degree of success on the merits; in light of the court's decision on "eligibility," the court declined to reach whether, on this record, Black Mesa was "entitled" to fees; and the court remanded for the agency to consider the issue. In addition, the court rejected Black Mesa's argument that the Secretary waived a challenge to the reasonableness of any award amount that the agency might grant on remand for costs and expenses reasonably incurred for Black Mesa's participation in the proceedings at the agency level. Accordingly, the court reversed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "Black Mesa Water Coalition v. Jewell" on Justia Law

Plaintiff filed suit on behalf of her son, Philip Cortez, under 42 U.S.C. 1983, against a corrections officer and the State of Arizona after Cortez was attacked by two other inmates and sustained severe, permanent mental impairment. The court concluded that there are triable issues of material fact related to the officer's awareness of an objectively substantial risk of serious harm where the officer escorted Cortez and the other two inmates by himself through an isolated prison passage. All three inmates were mutually hostile, half-restrained, and high-security inmates. Further, there is sufficient evidence that the officer was subjectively aware of the risk involved in the escort and acted with deliberate indifference to Cortez's safety. The court also concluded that there are triable issues of material fact in regards to the gross negligence claim against the State where the State's gross negligence standard is lower than the federal deliberate indifference standard. Accordingly, the court remanded the district court's grant of summary judgment on plaintiff's claims and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cortez v. Skol" on Justia Law

Plaintiff was appointed the chapter 7 trustee when Hokulani Square filed for bankruptcy. The trustee moved to auction Hokulani's principal assets and two groups of secured creditors jointly submitted the winning bid at $1.5 million. The secured creditors exercised their right to credit bid under 11 U.S.C. 363(k) and the trustee subsequently petitioned the bankruptcy court for compensation. The UST objected on the ground that including the value of the credit bid was not authorized under section 326(a). The court agreed with its sister circuits and held that section 326(a) does not permit a trustee to collect fees on a credit bid transaction in which the trustee disburses only property, not "moneys," to the creditor. Accordingly, the court affirmed the bankruptcy appellate panel's reversal of the bankruptcy court's award of compensation to the trustee. View "Tamm v. UST" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for making excessive campaign contributions, and making contributions in the name of another. The court concluded that the district court did not err in refusing defendant's proffered jury instructions that an unconditional gift of funds cannot violate 2 U.S.C. 441f if the funds have become the property of the donors under Nevada law because defendant's theory is not supported by law; to the extent defendant's theory is that the unconditional nature of the gifts prevented him from forming the necessary intent, the instructions given by the district court adequately encompassed his theory; defendant's claim that the individual contribution limits of section 441a and the prohibition on conduit contributions in section 441f violate defendant's free speech and association rights under the First Amendment is foreclosed by Buckley v. Valeo; the court rejected defendant's claims of evidentiary errors; and the evidence was sufficient to support defendant's conviction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "United States v. Whittemore" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of being a felon in possession of a firearm, seeks certification of his filing of a second or successive 28 U.S.C. 2255 petition based on Descamps v. United States. As a preliminary matter, the court joined the majority of its sister circuits and held that when a section 2255(h) motion presents a complex issue, the court may exceed section 2244(b)(3)(D)'s thirty-day time limit. The court held that the Supreme Court did not announce a new rule of constitutional law in Descamps, but rather, clarified the application of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 924(e), in light of existing precedent. Accordingly, the court rejected petitioner's argument that Descamps announced a new rule of constitutional law, made retroactive on collateral review by the Supreme Court, that was previously unavailable. The court denied the motion for certification to file another habeas corpus petition. View "Ezell v. United States" on Justia Law