Shirley v. Yates

by
Petitioner, convicted of first and second degree robbery, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for habeas relief. The court concluded that the state court acted contrary to clearly established law when it based its prima facie analysis on the discredited, pre-Johnson v. California standard articulated by the California Supreme Court in People v. Box. In this case, it was appropriate for the district court to determine de novo whether petitioner had raised an inference of racial bias; the court also agreed with the district court that, contrary to the state court’s conclusion, petitioner did raise an inference of discrimination more than sufficient to meet his “minimal” burden at Batson Step One; the fact that a prosecutor peremptorily strikes all or most veniremembers of the defendant’s race – as was the case here – is often sufficient on its own to make a prima facie case at Step One; if a prosecutor testifies both to his general jury selection approach and that he is confident one of these race-neutral preferences was the actual reason for the strike, this is sufficient circumstantial evidence to satisfy Batson Step Two; this evidence alone will seldom be enough at Step Three to overcome a prima facie case unless the prosecutor has a regular practice of striking veniremembers who possess an objective characteristic that may be clearly defined; and, in this case, petitioner's prima facie case was sufficient to carry his burden of showing by a preponderance of the evidence that the strike of an African American juror was motivated in substantial part by race. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Shirley v. Yates" on Justia Law