Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Criminal Law
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the conviction of former congressman Jeffrey Fortenberry for making false statements during an investigation into illegal campaign contributions. Fortenberry was interviewed by federal agents in his Nebraska home and his lawyer's office in Washington D.C., who were based in Los Angeles, California, where the alleged illegal contribution activity occurred. He was charged in California, tried, and convicted there. Fortenberry argued that the district court incorrectly denied his motion to dismiss the case because venue was improper in the Central District of California. The district court held that a violation of making a false statement under 18 U.S.C. § 1001(a)(2) occurs not only where the false statement is made, but also where it has an effect on a federal investigation. The Ninth Circuit rejected this interpretation, holding that such an effects-based test for venue in a § 1001 offense has no support in the Constitution, the text of the statute, or historical practice. The court held that the false statement offense is complete when the statement is made, and it does not depend on subsequent events or circumstances, or whether the recipient of the false statement was in fact affected by it in any way. The court reversed Fortenberry's conviction without prejudice to retrial in a proper venue. View "USA V. FORTENBERRY" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In this case, the defendant, Christopher De Leon Guerrero, was convicted on two counts of attempted enticement of a minor in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2422(b) and 18 U.S.C. § 2, and was sentenced to ten years in prison and five years of supervised release. Guerrero appealed his conviction and sentence.Guerrero's conviction was based on his online conversations with a fictional 13-year-old girl named "Emily," who was actually a federal agent. He made plans to meet "Emily" at Andersen Air Force Base for sexual activities. Guerrero argued that he could not be charged under Guam law for actions that took place on a federal enclave, Andersen Air Force Base. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit disagreed, citing a precedent set in United States v. Lopez.The court affirmed Guerrero’s convictions under § 2422(b) by referencing another predicate offense, not specified in the indictment, with which he could have been charged. They concluded that both of Guerrero’s convictions could be supported by § 13.10, the Guam criminal attempt statute.As for the sentence, the court agreed with both parties that Guerrero’s sentence should be reversed, vacated, and remanded to the district court for reconsideration of three special conditions imposed on his supervised release. These conditions were that Guerrero must not go to places where children under the age of 18 are likely to be, must not view or possess any visual depiction of sexually explicit conduct, and must participate in a sex offense-specific treatment program.The court affirmed the convictions but reversed, vacated, and remanded the sentence to the district court for reconsideration of the three special conditions of supervised release. View "USA V. GUERRERO" on Justia Law

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In a case before the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, plaintiff Spencer Elden, who as a baby was photographed naked in a pool for the cover of Nirvana’s album Nevermind, sued Nirvana L.L.C., Universal Music Group, and others. Elden claimed that he was a victim of child pornography due to the photograph and sought personal injury damages under 18 U.S.C. § 2255 (2018). The district court dismissed Elden's lawsuit, stating that it was barred by the ten-year statute of limitations, 18 U.S.C. § 2255(b)(1) (2018).However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and held that because each republication of child pornography may constitute a new personal injury, Elden’s complaint alleging republication of the album cover within the ten years preceding his action was not barred by the statute of limitations. The court drew a parallel between the personal injury caused by defamation and the injury caused by republication of child pornography, noting that victims of child pornography may suffer a new injury upon the republication of the pornographic material. The court remanded the case back to the district court for further proceedings. View "ELDEN V. NIRVANA L.L.C." on Justia Law

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In the Central District of California, defendant-appellant Christopher Esqueda was convicted for possession of a firearm as a felon, following the denial of his motion to suppress evidence collected during an undercover operation. Undercover agents, with Esqueda's consent, entered his motel room to conduct a controlled purchase of a firearm. The agents secretly recorded the encounter using audio-video equipment concealed on their persons. Esqueda argued that the secret recording of the encounter exceeded the scope of the "implied license" he granted when he consented to the officers' physical entry, hence infringing upon his Fourth Amendment rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The court held that no Fourth Amendment search occurred. It relied on longstanding Supreme Court precedents asserting that an undercover officer who physically enters a premises with express consent and secretly records only what he can see and hear by virtue of his consented entry does not trespass, physically intrude, or otherwise engage in a search violative of the Fourth Amendment. The court noted that the Supreme Court's decisions in Florida v. Jardines and United States v. Jones, which outline a property-based, trespassory test for Fourth Amendment violations, do not disturb this principle. View "USA V. ESQUEDA" on Justia Law

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In the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, the defendant, William Klensch, appealed his sentence after pleading guilty to one count of transportation of an illegal alien. Klensch argued that he was entitled to a minor-role reduction in his sentencing, contending that he had no knowledge of the full smuggling operation and was paid only a small sum for his part. The district court denied this reduction because Klensch was the one physically transporting the individuals. However, the appellate court ruled that the district court did not apply the correct legal standard in denying a minor-role reduction, as the court did not conduct a proper comparative analysis of Klensch’s conduct. The court noted that the district court's explanation did not indicate it considered the factors required for a minor-role reduction. As such, the appellate court vacated Klensch’s sentence and remanded for resentencing in regard to the minor-role reduction.Additionally, Klensch argued that the district court erred by imposing a dangerous-weapons enhancement because he did not possess the stun gun in his car in connection with his illegal smuggling activity. The appellate court rejected this argument, as Klensch acknowledged having the stun gun within his reach while transporting the two men. The court ruled that even if the district court applied an incorrect standard of proof by not requiring the Government to prove a nexus to the stun gun, this error was harmless. As such, the district court's imposition of the dangerous-weapons enhancement was affirmed. View "USA V. KLENSCH" on Justia Law

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In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions and sentences of four defendants who were involved in the January 2016 occupation of the Malheur National Wildlife Refuge in eastern Oregon. The defendants were charged with various offenses including conspiracy to impede officers of the United States, possession of firearms in a federal facility, and depredation of government property. The court rejected the defendants' contentions that the district court erred in the jury selection process and that they were entitled to a jury trial for the misdemeanor offenses charged. The court also held that the evidence was sufficient to support the defendants' misdemeanor and felony convictions. Furthermore, the court rejected the defendants' arguments that their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial was violated. The court remanded the case back to the district court to resolve certain issues related to the sealing and discovery of materials. The court's ruling is significant as it addressed the rights of the accused in the context of jury selection and the conduct of the trial. View "USA V. EHMER" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of the second federal habeas corpus petition by Jaime Dean Charboneau, who sought to overturn his conviction for the 1984 shooting death of his ex-wife in Idaho. Charboneau alleged that Idaho officials violated their obligations under Brady v. Maryland by encouraging his ex-wife's daughter, Tira, to provide false statements and testimony regarding her mother’s death and to dispose of potentially exculpatory evidence. In support of these allegations, Charboneau relied on a letter written by Tira in 1989. However, the court held that Charboneau failed to meet the threshold requirement of showing actual innocence as required by 28 U.S.C. § 2244(b)(2)(B)(ii) for consideration of second or successive federal habeas petitions. The court held that, even if the letter was genuine, the statements in the letter, viewed in light of all the evidence, were not sufficient to establish by clear and convincing evidence that no reasonable factfinder would have convicted Charboneau of first-degree murder. The court concluded that Charboneau’s new materials did not suffice to make the requisite showing of actual innocence. Therefore, the district court properly dismissed his petition without reaching the merits of his Brady claim. View "CHARBONEAU V. DAVIS" on Justia Law

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Defendant participated in a drug distribution operation in Hawaii and charged with possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and heroin. On appeal, Defendant argued that the district court should not have applied the leader-or-organizer enhancement under Section 3B1.1(c) of the Sentencing Guidelines because no evidence suggests that he “exercised control over others” in the organization.The Ninth Circuit affirmed, finding that the level of control required to be an organizer is only “the ability and influence necessary to coordinate the activities of others to achieve the desired result.” United States v. Doe, 778 F.3d 814, 824 (9th Cir. 2015). View "USA V. DANIEL VINGE" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Petitioner was sentenced to death after a California jury found her guilty of attempted murder and first-degree murder, finding true the special circumstances of lying in wait and murder for financial gain. Petitioner appealed the district court’s denial of her 28 U.S.C. Section 2254(d) habeas petition. In the petition, Petitioner argued that the prosecutor committed prejudicial misconduct during penalty-phase closing arguments by referencing Biblical verses to persuade the jury to impose a death sentence. Applying the extremely deferential standard required by the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA).   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial. The panel granted a Certificate of Appealability (COA) as to Petitioner’s claim that the prosecutor improperly used peremptory challenges in violation of Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). After conducting a comparative juror analysis, the panel concluded that, under AEDPA’s deferential standard of review, the California Supreme Court’s finding that the trial court did not err in determining there was no purposeful discrimination was an objectively reasonable determination of the facts. View "MAUREEN MCDERMOTT V. DEBORAH JOHNSON" on Justia Law

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Defendant was convicted of voluntary manslaughter and using a firearm during a crime of violence. Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion under 28 U.S.C. Section 2255. He argued that his Section 924(c) conviction and its mandatory 15-year consecutive sentence should be vacated because his predicate crime, voluntary manslaughter, does not qualify as a crime of violence.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion. The panel wrote that for purposes of Section 924(c), voluntary manslaughter has the same mental state as murder—intent to commit a violent act against another or recklessness with extreme indifference to human life. Like murder, voluntary manslaughter requires at least an “extreme and necessarily oppositional” state of mind. The panel held that the district court therefore properly denied Defendant’s Section 2255 motion. View "USA V. DANIEL DRAPER" on Justia Law