Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Government & Administrative Law
by
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated a Biological Opinion (BiOp) by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (the Service) and remanded the case for further consideration. The case involved a dispute over the use of water from the San Pedro River Basin in Arizona by the U.S. Army's Fort Huachuca. The Army uses water from the basin, which is also home to several species protected under the Endangered Species Act. To compensate for the water use, the federal government proposed a "conservation easement" that would limit the use of nearby land for agricultural purposes, therefore saving water and protecting the wildlife that depend on the basin. The plaintiffs, environmental organizations, argued that the BiOp lacked evidence to support the claim of water savings from the easement. The Ninth Circuit agreed, stating that the government's determination that the easement would not jeopardize wildlife was arbitrary and capricious due to the lack of evidence supporting the claimed water savings. The court stated that the government must show that the benefit from the conservation easement would be "reasonably certain" under the relevant regulations. The court also held that the government's conclusion that reduced flow in the Babocomari River, a tributary of the San Pedro River, would not jeopardize the northern Mexican gartersnake was not arbitrary and capricious. View "CENTER FOR BIOLOGICAL DIVERSITY V. DEB HAALAND" on Justia Law

by
A group of individuals from India, who have been lawfully working in the United States for years and waiting in line for more than a decade for their immigrant visas, sued the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) and U.S. Department of State. They sought to compel the USCIS to act on their applications for adjustment of status to become lawful permanent residents. However, the USCIS had not processed their applications because the State Department revised its forecast and concluded that it had hit the visa cap for the year. The plaintiffs argued that the USCIS and the State Department were improperly interpreting the Immigration and Nationality Act (INA) by requiring an immigrant visa to be available at the time of adjudication rather than at the time of filing the application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district courts' denials of injunctive relief. The court concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court found that the government's interpretation of the INA, requiring an immigrant visa to be available before the government can adjudicate an application for adjustment of status, was consistent with the INA and reasonably filled in a procedural detail left open by Congress. The court also noted that the regulation was not in conflict with the statutory text and was left in the government's discretion by Congress. The court further opined that the plaintiffs' proposed rule could result in inefficiency and further delay. View "JIGAR BABARIA, ET AL V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff and other tenants filed suit against the Duringer Law Group, PLC, and Stephen C. Duringer, alleging that Duringer violated the Act by filing a memorandum of costs in state court proceedings concerning an unlawful-detainer judgment. The district court concluded that Tenants’ federal suit constituted an improper appeal of a state-court judgment and thus was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment. The court explained that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine provides that, by vesting jurisdiction over state-court appeals in the U.S. Supreme Court, 28 U.S.C. Section 1257 precludes a federal district court from exercising subject-matter jurisdiction in an action asking the court to overturn an injurious state-court judgment. The panel held that the doctrine is limited to cases (1) brought by state-court losers (2) complaining of injuries caused by state-court judgments (3) rendered before the district court proceedings commenced and (4) inviting district court review and rejection of those judgments. The panel concluded that the tenants’ action did not challenge a memorandum of costs on which the state court already had rendered judgment, but rather a later memorandum. Because there was no relevant state-court judgment purporting to adjudicate the validity of the costs in the later memorandum, Rooker-Feldman did not apply. View "JANEY BROWN, ET AL V. DURINGER LAW GROUP PLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

by
This case involves alleged violations of the Clean Water Act (CWA). Plaintiff Cottonwood Environmental Law Center (Cottonwood) filed suit against Defendants Big Sky County Water & Sewer District No. 363 (the District) and Boyne USA, Inc. (Boyne) for their alleged discharge of treated wastewater into the West Fork of the Gallatin River (the West Fork) without a National Pollution Discharge Elimination System (NPDES) permit. The district court ruled that Cottonwood could not advance a direct-discharge theory of CWA liability against the District at trial. The district court also dismissed Cottonwood’s claim against Boyne for lack of proper notice.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s judgment. Affirming in part, the panel held that the district court properly ruled, in orders denying summary judgment, that Cottonwood could not advance a direct-discharge theory of liability against the District at trial. The panel held that it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s orders denying summary judgment to Cottonwood because, in those orders, the district court rejected Cottonwood’s direct-discharge theory as a matter of law. The panel affirmed the district court’s holding that the District could not be liable on a direct-discharge theory because an underdrain pipe below but not connected to the District’s holding ponds did not transfer pollutants between meaningfully distinct water bodies and thus was not a “point source” of pollution. Reversing the district court’s dismissal of Cottonwood’s Clean Water Act the panel held that Cottonwood’s letter to Boyne provided sufficient notice of Cottonwood’s indirect-discharge theory of liability. View "COTTONWOOD ENVIRONMENTAL LAW CENTER, ET AL V. RON EDWARDS, ET AL" on Justia Law

by
For several years, Defendant, Shannon Poe, engaged in instream suction dredge mining in Idaho’s South Fork Clearwater River (the South Fork) without a National Pollutant Discharge Eliminating System (NPDES) permit. Plaintiff Idaho Conservation League (ICL) sued Poe, arguing that he violated the CWA each time he operated a suction dredge on the South Fork without an NPDES permit. Poe countered that (1) his suction dredge mining did not add pollutants to the South Fork and therefore did not require an NPDES permit, and (2) even if his suction dredge mining did add pollutants, those pollutants are “dredged” or “fill” material regulated exclusively pursuant to Section 404, not Section 402, of the CWA. The district court granted summary judgment to ICL. Poe appealed the judgment as to liability.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed. The panel held that to establish a violation of the Clean Water Act’s NPDES requirements, also referred to as Section 402 permitting, a plaintiff must prove that the defendant (1) discharged, i.e., added (2) a pollutant (3) to navigable waters (4) from (5) a point source. As to the first element, the panel held that Poe’s suction dredge mining “added” a pollutant to the South Fork. The panel followed Rybachek v. EPA, 904 F.2d 1276 (9th Cir. 1990), which upheld Environmental Protection Agency regulations interpreting the Clean Water Act. The panel further held that the processed material discharged from Poe’s suction dredge mining was a pollutant, not dredged or fill material, and therefore required an NPDES permit under Section 402 of the Clean Water Act rather than a permit from the Army Corps of Engineers under Section 404. View "IDAHO CONSERVATION LEAGUE V. SHANNON POE" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiff first applied for disability insurance benefits on September 3, 2019, alleging a disability onset date of December 1, 2017. His date last insured for the purpose of benefits eligibility was June 30, 2018. The Social Security Administration (“SSA”) denied his application initially and on reconsideration, and he requested an administrative hearing. After the December 14, 2020, hearing, the ALJ determined that Plaintiff was not disabled. The Social Security Appeals Council denied Plaintiff’s request for review. Plaintiff then sought review in the district court, and the district court granted the Commissioner’s motion for summary judgment. This appeal followed.   The Ninth Circuit reversed. The panel explained that at step two of the sequential analysis, claimants need only make a de minimis showing for the ALJ’s analysis to proceed past this step and that properly denying a claim at step two requires an unambiguous record showing only minimal limitations. The seven-month period for which Plaintiff seeks disability benefits falls within a two-and-a-half-year gap in his medical treatment records. The panel held that Plaintiff made the requisite showing to meet step two’s low bar, where he submitted evidence that he suffered from multiple chronic medical conditions that both preceded and succeeded the gap in his treatment. The panel concluded that this cumulative evidence was enough to establish that Plaintiff’s claim was nonfrivolous and to require the ALJ to proceed to step three. Therefore, the ALJ’s denial of Plaintiff’s claim at step two was premature. View "BRIAN GLANDEN V. KILOLO KIJAKAZI" on Justia Law

by
Intervenor UNITE HERE Local 11 (Union) was the exclusive collective bargaining representative for a unit of employees whom Kava Holdings LLC employed at the Hotel Bel-Air. Kava temporarily closed the Hotel for extensive renovations and laid off all the unit employees. As Kava prepared to reopen the Hotel, Kava conducted a job fair to fill about 306 unit positions. Approximately 176 union-affiliated former employees applied for those positions. Kava refused to rehire 152 of them. The National Labor Relations Board found that Kava committed unfair labor practices. The Board ordered various remedies, including reinstatement of the former employee applicants who were affected by Kava’s discriminatory conduct. Kava petitioned for review of the Board’s order and a supplemental remedial order, and the Board cross-applied for enforcement.   The Ninth Circuit denied in part and dismissed in part Kava Holdings, LLC’s petition for review and granted the National Labor Relations Board’s cross-petition for enforcement of its order, which found that Kava committed unfair labor practices in violation of Sections 8(a). The panel held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that Kava committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to rehire union-affiliated former employees so that Kava could avoid its statutory duty to bargain with the Union. The panel held that substantial evidence supported the Board’s finding that Kava committed an unfair labor practice by refusing to recognize and bargain with the Union as it reopened the Hotel and by unilaterally changing the bargaining unit’s established pre-closure terms and conditions of employment. View "KAVA HOLDINGS, LLC V. NLRB" on Justia Law

by
Kari Lake and Mark Finchem (“Plaintiffs”), the Republican nominees for Governor and Secretary of State of Arizona, filed this action before the 2022 general election, contending that Arizona’s use of electronic tabulation systems violated the federal Constitution. The district court dismissed their operative first amended complaint for lack of Article III standing. Lake v. Hobbs. Plaintiffs’ candidacies failed at the polls, and their various attempts to overturn the election outcome in state court have to date been unavailing. On appeal, they no longer seek any relief concerning the 2022 election but instead seek to bar use of electronic tabulation systems in future Arizona elections.   The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that Plaintiffs’ “speculative allegations that voting machines may be hackable are insufficient to establish an injury in fact under Article III. The court explained that even assuming Plaintiffs could continue to claim standing as prospective voters in future elections, they had not alleged a particularized injury and therefore failed to establish the kind of injury Article III requires. None of Plaintiffs’ allegations supported a plausible inference that their individual votes in future elections will be adversely affected by the use of electronic tabulation, particularly given the robust safeguards in Arizona law, the use of paper ballots, and the post-tabulation retention of those ballots. The panel concluded that speculative allegations that voting machines may be hackable were insufficient to establish an injury, in fact, under Article III. View "KARI LAKE, ET AL V. ADRIAN FONTES, ET AL" on Justia Law

by
Plaintiffs—five individuals and the California Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc.—filed this action in the Southern District of California challenging the constitutionality of Section 32310 under the Second Amendment. On September 22, 2023, the district court issued an order declaring Section 32310 “unconstitutional in its entirety” and enjoining California officials from enforcing the law. Defendant Rob Bonta, the Attorney General of California, filed an emergency motion for a partial stay pending appeal. The Attorney General seeks to stay “all portions of the order except those regarding Sections 32310(c) and (d), which relate to large-capacity magazines that were acquired and possessed lawfully prior to the district court’s order granting a permanent injunction.”   The Ninth Circuit granted the motion. First, the court concluded that the Attorney General is likely to succeed on the merits. The court explained that the Attorney General makes strong arguments that Section 32310 comports with the Second Amendment under Bruen. Second, the Attorney General has shown that California will be irreparably harmed absent a stay pending appeal by presenting evidence that large-capacity magazines pose significant threats to public safety. Third, it does not appear that staying portions of the district court’s order while the merits of this appeal are pending will substantially injure other parties interested in the proceedings. Finally, the court concluded that the public interest tips in favor of a stay. View "VIRGINIA DUNCAN, ET AL V. ROB BONTA" on Justia Law

by
This is the latest proceeding in a long-running case regarding Indian fishing rights in certain waters in Washington State. This proceeding was instituted by three Indian tribes who sought a ruling that the recognized fishing rights of the Lummi Nation (“the Lummi”) under the 1974 decree do not extend to certain areas. The current dispute centers on a single line in the decree recognizing that “the usual and accustomed fishing places” in which the Lummi have fishing rights “include the marine areas of Northern Puget Sound from the Fraser River south to the present environs of Seattle, and particularly Bellingham Bay.” (“Final Decision I”). The question is whether the specific waters in dispute here—namely, the sheltered waters east of Whidbey Island and south of Fidalgo Island—fall within the Lummi’s historical fishing territory.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the Swinomish Indian Tribal Community, Tulalip Tribes, and Upper Skagit Indian Tribe; dismissed as moot a cross-appeal filed by the Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe and Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribe (collectively, “S’Klallam”) from the district court’s grant of summary judgment; and dismissed as moot S’Klallam’s appeal of the district court’s denial of the S’Klallam’s motion for reconsideration. Applying the two-step inquiry, the panel concluded that the district court correctly held that the Swinomish, Tulalip, and Upper Skagit carried their burden to warrant a ruling, under Paragraph 25(a)(1) of the 1974 Decree, that Judge Boldt’s “determination of Lummi’s usual and accustomed fishing grounds and stations” did not extend to the disputed waters at issue here. View "SWINOMISH INDIAN TRIBAL CMTY., ET AL V. LUMMI NATION" on Justia Law