Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in Injury Law
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Plaintiff filed this state law negligence action against two park maintenance employees of the City of Portland after she fell and was injured while jogging in one of Portland’s parks. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Defendants, concluding (1) Defendants were “owners” of the park for purposes of the Oregon Public Use of Lands Act and were hence entitled to immunity under the Act; and (2) granting Defendants immunity under Act did not violate the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution. Plaintiff appealed the adverse judgment. The parties subsequently filed a joint motion to certify two questions to the Oregon Supreme Court: (1) whether city maintenance workers are “owners” of the park and therefore entitled to immunity under the Act; and (2) if so, whether the Act violates the remedy clause of the Oregon Constitution. Because there is no controlling precedent on these questions in the decisions of the Oregon Supreme Court and the Oregon Court of Appeals, the Ninth Circuit certified them to the Oregon Supreme Court. View "Johnson v. Gibson" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff, a resident of California, and Defendant, a resident of Michigan, worked together with a third man to develop and market an electrolyte for use in hydrogen fuel cells. When Plaintiff and the third man sold the electrolyte technology without telling Defendant, Defendant threatened to sue if he was not paid what he claimed was his one-third share of the proceeds under an oral agreement. Thereafter, Plaintiff sued Defendant in California seeking a declaration that no oral agreement existed between the parties and for damages for intentional interference with a sales contract. The district court dismissed the suit, concluding that it lacked jurisdiction over Defendant on either of the two claims. The Supreme Court affirmed, holding that because Defendant neither purposefully availed himself of the privilege of conducting activities in California nor expressly aimed his conduct at California, the district court did not err in dismissing the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. View "Picot v. Weston" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against I-Flow, manufacturer of the PainBuster continuous infusion pump, alleging state common law claims for negligence and strict products liability. Plaintiff alleged that I-Flow negligently failed to warn that its pain pump should not be used in intra-articular spaces such as the glenohumeral joint; and that I-Flow was strictly liable for selling a product that was unreasonably dangerous due to the lack of adequate warnings. The PainBuster is regulated under the Medical Device Amendments of 1976 (MDA) to the Food, Drug & Cosmetics Act (FDCA), 21 U.S.C. 360c(a)(1)(A)(i), (B), (C)(i). Concluding that it has jurisdiction to hear the appeal where judgment was entered as to all defendants, the court concluded that the requested jury instructions regarding negligence and federal standards were not preempted by the MDA. Therefore, the court remanded and declined to reach the evidentiary issues. The court dismissed I-Flow's cross appeal as moot. View "McClellan v. I-Flow Corp." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff and his wife filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346(b), claiming that tribal officers employed by the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) acted negligently when pursuing a drunk driver and that such negligence resulted in plaintiff and his wife's injuries. Congress extended the FTCA's waiver of sovereign immunity to claims resulting from the performance of functions authorized by the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975, commonly referred to as section 314, 25 U.S.C. 450f. Under the two-part test of section 314, courts must first determine whether the alleged activity is, in fact, encompassed by the relevant federal contract or agreement. The scope of the agreement defines the relevant "employment" for purposes of the scope of employment analysis at step two. Second, courts must decide whether the allegedly tortious action falls within the scope of the tortfeasor's employment under state law. If both these prongs are met, the employee's actions are covered by the FTCA. The court vacated the district court's dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and remanded for further proceedings. On remand, the district court should conduct a new analysis of its subject matter jurisdiction using the two-step framework the court discussed. View "Shirk v. United States" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs, citizens and former residents of Colombia, filed suit in California against two corporations, both headquartered in the United States, for their alleged complicity in the 1998 bombing of a Colombian village by members of the Colombian Air Force (CAF). The district court dismissed all claims under the political question doctrine. The court held that plaintiffs lack a valid claim under either the Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA), 28 U.S.C. 1350 Note., pursuant to Mohamad v. Palestinan Auth., or the Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, under Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co.; the court affirmed the district court's judgment of dismissal with respect to plaintiffs' state-law claims, but did so on the ground of international comity; the district court abused its discretion by applying the incorrect legal standard in its comity analysis when it erroneously concluded that a "true conflict" between domestic and foreign law is required for the application of international comity in all circumstances; and, in light of Mujica IV, the court concluded that the state-law claims before the court are not justiciable under the doctrine of international comity. View "Mujica v. AirScan, Inc." on Justia Law

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Donna and Gerald Young and their minor daughter filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2680(a), against the United States for negligently failing to warn visitors at Mount Rainier National Park of a hazard that the National Park Service both knew of and created. Donna had fallen into a twelve-foot-deep hole that formed underneath the snow, which was created by the heat of a transformer, near the Park's main visitor center and sustained several injuries. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that the Service's decision not to warn of the latent dangers associated with the transformer was a decision "totally divorced" from the policies that the government has identified as the basis for its decision. Where, as here, warning against a hazard known to and created by the Service would not implicate concerns for access, visitor enjoyment, or environmental preservation, the only policy the Service must consider is one it appears to have ignored: visitor safety. The court concluded that the Service's decision not to warn of a hazard that it knew of and created - that it placed near a visitor center serving 1 million visitors annually - cannot be shielded by the FTCA's discretionary function exception. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "Young v. United States" on Justia Law

Posted in: Injury Law
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Plaintiff, an aspiring model, filed a failure to warn suit against Internet Brands, the company who owns the website modelmayhem.com. Plaintiff had posted information about herself on the website and two rapists used the website to lure her to a fake audition where they drugged her, raped her, and recorded her for a pornographic video. The district court dismissed plaintiff's action because her claim was barred by the Communications Decency Act (CDA), 47 U.S.C. 230(c). The court held that section 230(c)(1) precludes liability that treats a website as the publisher or speaker of information users provide on the website. This section protects websites from liability for material posted on the website from someone else. In this case, plaintiff does not seek to hold Internet Brands liable as a "publisher or speaker" of content someone posted on modelmayhem.com, or for Internet Brands' failure to remove content on the website. Plaintiff also does not claim to have been lured by any posting that Internet Brands failed to remove. Instead, plaintiff attempts to hold Internet Brands liable for failing to warn her about how third parties targeted and lured victims through the website. The duty to warn allegedly imposed by California law would not require Internet Brands to remove any user content or otherwise affect how it publishes such content. Therefore, the CDA does not bar plaintiff's failure to warn claim and the CDA was not a valid basis to dismiss the complaint. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.View "Doe v. Internet Brands, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff filed suit against the City and the ECCC, alleging violations of the Americans with Disabilities Act of 1990 (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12101 et seq., and various California statutes. Plaintiff tripped and fell as he tried to walk around a car show vendor's display blocking a curb ramp. On appeal, defendant challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants. The court concluded that the district court erred by granting summary judgment in favor of the City because the district court relied on an inapplicable legal standard and because there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether the City denied plaintiff access to a public service or otherwise discriminated against him under Title II. Because the City was not entitled to summary judgment on the ADA claim, the district court erred by granting summary judgment for the City on plaintiff's claims under the California statutes. The court took no position on whether the City did in fact deny plaintiff access to a public service or discriminate against him by reason of disability under 42 U.S.C. 12132. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cohen v. City of Culver City" on Justia Law

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Mohammad Usman Chaudhry's family and three organizational plaintiffs filed suit after Usman was shot and killed by an LAPD officer. The Coroner took custody of his body but did not notify his family until twenty-one days later and the delay prevented Usman's family from burying him in accordance with the religions customs of Islam. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged most of the district court's orders granting defendants' motions to dismiss and for summary judgment. The City and the officer cross-appealed. The court concluded that plaintiffs waived claims against some defendants by not addressing them in their opening brief. The court held that California's prohibition against pre-death pain and suffering damages limits recovery too severely to be consistent with 42 U.S.C. 1983's deterrence policy; thus, California's survival statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 377.34 does not apply to section 1983 claims where the decedent's death was caused by the violation of federal law; and therefore, the court reversed the district court's finding that section 377.34 is not inconsistent with section 1983 and the district court's striking of the jury's $1,000,000 verdict in favor of the Estate. The court remanded to the district court to consider in the first instance a motion for remittitur. The district court erred in dismissing the Estate's Cal. Civ. Code 52.1 claim and in denying its post-trial motion to amend the judgment where the City conceded that a successful claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment provides the basis for a successful claim under section 52.1. The court reversed and remanded with instructions to amend the judgment to reflect the Estate's success on that claim. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of Usman's parent's section 1983 claim against the officer for violating their Fourteenth Amendment right to substantive due process. The court concluded that the court's decision recognizes that parents have a liberty interest in the companionship of their adult children and have a cause of action under the Fourteenth Amendment when the police kill an adult child without legal justification. The court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment to the County defendants on the negligence claim under California law; affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment to defendants on Usman's siblings' intentional infliction of emotional distress and section 1983 substantive due process claims; reversed as to their negligence claim against the County; and vacated the district court's attorneys' fees award. View "Chaudhry, et al v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

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UNM, a trade show cleaning company, filed suit against SDC, alleging claims for interference with contract, interference with prospective economic advantage, and antitrust violations. The court reversed the district court's holding that under California law, SDC could not be held liable for the tort of intentional interference with contractual relationship; reversed the grant of judgment as a matter of law on that ground; affirmed the district court's holding that it committed instructional error by not interpreting the terms of the contract and that this error constituted prejudicial error that warranted a new trial; affirmed the district court's holding that SDC possessed state action immunity from UNM's antitrust claim; held that the a new trial is warranted on UNM's claim for intentional interference with contractual relationship; and concluded that, under California law, SDC could not be liable for punitive damages because it is a public entity. View "United Nat'l Maint. v. San Diego Convention Ctr." on Justia Law