Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

by
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed the asylum petition of a Zambian woman, Milly Kalulu. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) had previously dismissed her appeal of a removal order. Kalulu, who identifies as a lesbian, claimed past persecution in Zambia on account of her sexual orientation.The Ninth Circuit agreed with the BIA that substantial evidence supported the agency’s adverse credibility determination, meaning that the agency was justified in not believing Kalulu’s testimony. The court found that Kalulu had been inconsistent in her testimony regarding when she made plans to remain in the United States and her alleged fear of future persecution if she returned to Zambia. Her demeanor during the removal hearing also contributed to the adverse credibility determination.However, the Ninth Circuit identified errors in the agency’s evaluation of the documents Kalulu provided as evidence to support her claims of past persecution. The court found that the agency had misread some of these documents and had improperly discounted their evidentiary value based on these misreadings.The court therefore granted Kalulu's petition for a review of the BIA's decision and instructed the agency to reconsider whether the documents, when properly read, independently prove Kalulu’s claims of past persecution. The court made no determination as to whether these documents do provide such proof or whether Kalulu merits any of the relief for which she applied. View "KALULU V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

by
The case involved an appeal by Philip James Layfield against his convictions for wire fraud, mail fraud, and various tax offenses. Layfield argued that the 21-day period it took the U.S. Marshals Service to transport him from the District of New Jersey, where he was arrested, to the Central District of California (CDCA), where he was indicted, violated the Speedy Trial Act and required the court to overturn his convictions. The argument centered on a provision of the Speedy Trial Act that mandates trial commencement within seventy days from the date a defendant appears before a judicial officer of the court where the charge is pending.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected Layfield's argument, affirming his convictions. The court ruled that the 21-day delay between Layfield's detention in New Jersey and his first appearance before a judge in the CDCA was immaterial to the Speedy Trial Act analysis. The court held that a plain reading of the relevant section of the Speedy Trial Act dictates that the 21-day delay did not trigger a Speedy Trial Act violation. The court also rejected Layfield's argument that a different provision became relevant because he was detained. The court held that this provision applies to prisoners traveling between jurisdictions for court proceedings once the seventy-day clock has started, not to a pre-indictment or pre-appearance transfer. View "USA V. LAYFIELD" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
In this case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of absolute and qualified immunity to two County of San Bernardino social workers, Gloria Vazquez and Mirta Johnson. The plaintiffs, Sydney Rieman and her minor child K.B., alleged that the social workers violated their Fourth and Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing to provide them notice of a juvenile detention hearing and by providing false information to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing.The court held that the social workers were not entitled to absolute immunity for their actions and omissions, such as providing false information to the Juvenile Court and failing to give notice of the detention hearing. These actions were not similar to discretionary decisions about whether to prosecute. Absolute immunity did not apply to the plaintiffs' claim that the defendants failed to give them notice of the detention hearing as such notice was mandatory.The court also held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity from suit for failing to provide notice of the hearing. Ms. Rieman had a due process right to such notice and that right was clearly established. The court stated that it was clear at the time that parents could not be summarily deprived of the care and custody of their children without notice and a hearing, except when the children were in imminent danger.Finally, the court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity for their misrepresentation to the Juvenile Court about why Ms. Rieman was not noticed for the hearing. The court concluded that a reasonable social worker in the defendants' shoes would have understood, based on prior decisional law, that providing incomplete and false information to the Juvenile Court about Ms. Rieman’s whereabouts to convince the court that the social workers had satisfied the due process notice requirement constituted judicial deception. View "RIEMAN V. VASQUEZ" on Justia Law

by
The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions of Edgar Hernandez Lemus and Junior Almendarez Martinez for conspiracy, aiding and abetting the receipt of the proceeds of extortion, and receiving the proceeds of extortion. The defendants, involved in a scheme to kidnap Mexican nationals seeking illegal entry into the United States and extort their families, argued that they could only be convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 880 if they knew the money they received was obtained from extortion.The court, however, held that § 880 only requires knowledge that the proceeds were “unlawfully obtained,” not specifically from extortion. The court noted that if Congress had intended for specific knowledge of the money's origin from extortion to be necessary, it would have included such language in the statute. The court also rejected the defendants' arguments that the court's interpretation of § 880 rendered the statute vague, stating that the defendants' conduct clearly fell within the proscription of the law.The court remanded the case for recalculation of the restitution amount, but otherwise affirmed the convictions and sentences. View "USA V. LEMUS" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
by
This case concerns an employment discrimination action filed by Alyssa Jones against her former employer, Riot Hospitality Group and its owner-operator Ryan Hibbert. During discovery, Riot Hospitality Group discovered that Jones had deleted text messages exchanged with her coworkers and had also coordinated with witnesses to delete messages. In response, the District Court for the District of Arizona ordered Jones and other parties to hand over their phones for forensic analysis.However, Jones and her attorney failed to comply with multiple court orders to produce the relevant messages. Subsequently, Riot Hospitality Group filed a motion for terminating sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 37(e)(2), citing intentional spoliation of electronically stored information (ESI) by Jones.The court found ample evidence that Jones intentionally deleted relevant text messages and collaborated with witnesses to do the same. It concluded that Jones' actions impaired Riot Hospitality Group's ability to proceed with the trial and interfered with the rightful decision of the case. The court therefore dismissed the case with prejudice under Rule 37(e)(2) due to intentional spoliation of ESI by the plaintiff.The court's decision was affirmed by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, which found no abuse of discretion in the dismissal of the case or the district court's consideration of an expert report on the deletion of ESI.The appellate court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in ordering Jones and others to hand over their phones for forensic search, and in awarding attorneys’ fees and costs to Riot Hospitality Group. View "JONES V. RIOT HOSPITALITY GROUP LLC, ET AL" on Justia Law

by
The case involves Peridot Tree, Inc. and Kenneth Gay, who filed suit against the City of Sacramento and Davina Smith, alleging that the city's requirement for individuals applying for permits to operate storefront marijuana dispensaries to be Sacramento residents violated the dormant Commerce Clause of the federal Constitution. The clause prevents states from discriminating against interstate commerce.The District Court abstained from exercising jurisdiction over the claim due to the conflict between state and federal law regulating marijuana use and distribution, and directed the plaintiffs to seek relief in California state court. The plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision to abstain from exercising jurisdiction. The court found that abstention was not warranted under any of the established abstention doctrines, including the Pullman, Burford, Thibodaux, and Colorado River doctrines. The court reasoned that the case did not present "exceptional circumstances" warranting abstention, and that the district court effectively imposed an exhaustion requirement on the plaintiffs by requiring them to first identify and litigate potential state-law claims before raising their federal constitutional concerns.The case was remanded back to the lower court for further proceedings on the dormant Commerce Clause claim. View "PERIDOT TREE, INC. V. CITY OF SACRAMENTO" on Justia Law

by
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit ruled in favor of the United States in a dispute over the planned transfer of a site, Oak Flat, of spiritual importance to the Apache tribe to a mining company, Resolution Copper. The nonprofit Apache Stronghold had sought to block the transfer, arguing that it would infrely violate its members’ rights under the First Amendment, the Religious Freedom Restoration Act ("RFRA"), and an 1852 treaty between the U.S. and the Apaches. The court, however, disagreed.Applying the precedent set in Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective Association, the court held that while the transfer of Oak Flat would significantly interfere with the Apache tribe's religious practices, it would not coerce them into acting contrary to their religious beliefs, and therefore did not violate the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amendment.Further, the court held that RFRA did not abrogate the holding in Lyng, and thus the planned land transfer did not "substantially burden" the Apache tribe's exercise of religion under RFRA.Finally, the court rejected the argument that an 1852 treaty created a trust obligation that would be violated by the transfer of Oak Flat. It interpreted the Land Transfer Act as abrogating any contrary treaty obligation. Consequently, the court held that Apache Stronghold was unlikely to succeed on the merits of any of its claims and therefore was not entitled to a preliminary injunction blocking the land transfer. View "Apache Stronghold v. United States" on Justia Law

by
In this case, the petitioner, Miguel Angel Uribe Andrade, sought a review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision dismissing an appeal of the Immigration Judge (IJ) order denying him asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Uribe proposed the social group, “Mexicans with mental health disorders characterized by psychotic features who exhibit erratic behavior,” as the basis for his asylum and withholding claims.However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit denied Uribe’s petition, ruling that the BIA did not commit legal error in finding that Uribe’s proposed social group lacked particularity. The court stated that the term "erratic behavior" was not defined in the record and was not used by Uribe’s treatment providers in describing his conditions or symptoms. Therefore, the BIA could conclude that "erratic behavior" did not provide a clear indication of who might be in the proposed group.The court also found that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s denial of CAT protection. Uribe had not shown that it was more likely than not that he would be institutionalized in Mexico and tortured. Even if Uribe were committed to a mental health institution, the poor conditions in Mexico’s mental health facilities were not created with the intent to inflict suffering. Furthermore, Uribe’s claim that he would be tortured due to his former gang membership and tattoos was also speculative. View "URIBE ANDRADE V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
by
In this case, two state senators from Oregon, Dennis Linthicum and Brian Boquist, challenged a recent amendment to the Oregon Constitution that disqualifies any state senator or representative from the next election if they have accrued ten or more unexcused absences from legislative floor sessions. In 2023, the senators engaged in a legislative walkout spanning several weeks, each accumulating more than ten unexcused absences. As a result, Oregon's Secretary of State disqualified them from appearing on the ballot for the 2024 election. The senators sought a preliminary injunction, arguing that their walkout was a form of protest protected by the First Amendment to the U.S. Constitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that the senators' walkout was not protected by the First Amendment, as it was not a form of expression, but an exercise of legislative power. The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Nevada Commission on Ethics v. Carrigan, which held that the First Amendment does not protect the exercise of official legislative power, even if it could be characterized as expressive. The court also noted that the power of a legislator to be absent from legislative sessions, and thereby frustrate legislative action, is not personal to the legislator but belongs to the people. Therefore, the senators could not claim a personal First Amendment right to walk out. The court concluded that the senators were unlikely to prevail on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim and affirmed the denial of their request for a preliminary injunction. View "Linthicum v. Wagner" on Justia Law

by
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, in a case involving physicians who challenged California's Assembly Bill 2098 (AB 2098), which declared it unprofessional conduct for a doctor to provide COVID-19-related disinformation or misinformation to patients, ruled that the case is moot following the repeal of AB 2098. The court found no reasonable expectation that California would reenact AB 2098 or similar legislation. Additionally, evidence from the Executive Director of the Medical Board of California indicated that the board's employees and agents had been instructed not to enforce AB 2098, and that the board would have no legal authority to enforce the law once it was no longer in effect. Therefore, the court vacated the lower court's judgement and instructed it to dismiss the case due to mootness. View "MCDONALD V. LAWSON" on Justia Law