Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Elizabeth Holmes and Ramesh “Sunny” Balwani founded Theranos, a company that claimed its technology could run fast, accurate, and affordable blood tests using just a drop of blood. Holmes served as CEO, and Balwani as President and COO. They raised significant investments by making representations about the capabilities of Theranos’s proprietary devices, financial health, and business relationships. However, investigations revealed that the technology was unreliable, Theranos often relied on third-party devices, and its partnerships and finances were misrepresented to investors. Both Holmes and Balwani were indicted for conspiracy and wire fraud relating to investors and patients; they were tried separately, and each was convicted of multiple counts of fraud.Proceedings were held before the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. Holmes was convicted on four investor-related counts, while Balwani was convicted on all counts, including those related to patients and investors. At sentencing, both were found responsible for losses to multiple victims and given lengthy prison terms. The district court also ordered them to pay $452 million in restitution to fourteen victims, finding that the money invested constituted the lost property.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed and affirmed the convictions, sentences, and restitution order. The panel held that while some testimony by former Theranos employees should have been treated as expert opinion under Rule 702, any error was harmless. The court found no abuse of discretion in admitting a regulatory report, limiting cross-examination, or excluding certain hearsay statements. It rejected arguments of constructive amendment and Napue violations. The panel clarified restitution calculations under the MVRA, holding that the victims’ actual losses equaled their total investments, affirming the district court’s order. View "United States v. Holmes" on Justia Law

Jennifer Gates, a former loan officer at VIP Mortgage, claimed that VIP violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) and Arizona state law by failing to pay her required overtime wages. She alleged that she was made to work more than forty hours per week but was instructed to record only eight-hour days on her timesheet. After her resignation in September 2022, Gates initiated arbitration as required by her employment agreement. VIP responded with counterclaims for breach of fiduciary duty and breach of contract, but these were later settled, with both parties agreeing to bear their own attorneys’ fees and costs for the counterclaims.The arbitration took place under the Federal Arbitration Act, and the arbitrator ultimately issued an award in favor of Gates, granting her unpaid overtime, liquidated damages, and attorneys’ fees. Despite the prior stipulation regarding counterclaims, the arbitrator did not distinguish between time spent on Gates’s claims and VIP’s counterclaims when awarding attorneys’ fees. VIP petitioned the United States District Court for the District of Arizona to vacate the award, arguing that the arbitrator erred by awarding attorneys’ fees that included time spent on the counterclaims. The district court found the arbitrator’s decision to be detailed and reasoned, concluding that the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law or act irrationally.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo and affirmed the district court’s rulings. The court held that federal courts may vacate arbitration awards based on a factual error only in rare cases where the error involves a “legally dispositive fact” that was obvious and intentionally ignored by the arbitrator. Here, although the factual error was legally dispositive, the arbitrator’s failure to recall the fee stipulation was not so obvious or intentional as to warrant vacatur. The arbitration award was confirmed. View "VIP MORTGAGE INCORPORATED V. GATES" on Justia Law

Michelle Rodriguez was arrested after South Pasadena police discovered her in possession of a significant quantity of stolen mail and financial information, including 140 pieces of mail from 110 victims, 19 checks, multiple bank account and social security numbers, credit and debit cards, and two California driver’s licenses. The driver’s licenses were found among the stolen mail and other items in her backpack and a bag in the vehicle. Rodriguez admitted she was seeking mail and acknowledged possession of the items.The United States District Court for the Central District of California charged Rodriguez with three offenses: possession of stolen mail, possession of at least 15 unauthorized access devices, and aggravated identity theft. Rodriguez ultimately pled guilty to possession of unauthorized access devices under 18 U.S.C. § 1029(a)(3), with the government agreeing to drop the other charges. At sentencing, the Probation Office calculated her Guidelines range, applying enhancements for number of victims and possession of authentication features, specifically the two California driver’s licenses. Rodriguez objected to the authentication feature enhancement, arguing it should require proof that she knowingly possessed such features with intent to defraud.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo and its application for abuse of discretion. The Court held that U.S.S.G. § 2B1.1(b)(11)(A)(ii) applies based on simple possession of an authentication feature and does not require proof of mens rea or intent to defraud. The enhancement was properly applied to Rodriguez’s sentence, as she conceded possession of the driver’s licenses with authentication features. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. RODRIGUEZ" on Justia Law

Christian Ruiz, a native and citizen of Nicaragua, experienced significant trauma during his childhood due to persecution by the Sandinista government, including the murder of his father, threats to his family, and repeated harassment. After living in Nicaragua and Guatemala for several years, Ruiz moved to the United States in 2006. He applied for asylum more than a year after his arrival, citing the lasting effects of his childhood trauma, and also sought withholding of removal and protection under the Convention Against Torture. Ruiz later married a U.S. citizen and requested administrative closure of his removal proceedings to pursue adjustment of status, but his immigration history included multiple DUI convictions.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all forms of relief, finding Ruiz’s trauma did not constitute “extraordinary circumstances” excusing the untimeliness of his asylum application, and concluded that neither his past experiences nor current conditions in Nicaragua supported claims for withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture. The IJ also denied administrative closure, citing Ruiz’s criminal and immigration history. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed these decisions, agreeing that Ruiz had not shown how his trauma prevented timely asylum filing, that country conditions in Nicaragua had changed, and that administrative closure was unwarranted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case, addressing its jurisdiction under recent Supreme Court precedent. The court held it had jurisdiction to review the “extraordinary circumstances” determination as a mixed question of law and fact, subject to deference. On the merits, the Ninth Circuit found no error in the BIA’s denial of asylum, withholding, CAT relief, or administrative closure, and denied Ruiz’s petition for review. View "RUIZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A computer science teaching professor at a public university included a statement in his course syllabus that parodied the university’s recommended indigenous land acknowledgment. This statement, which challenged the university’s view regarding the ownership of campus land, drew complaints from students and staff, particularly those involved in diversity and indigenous advocacy. The professor refused to remove the statement when asked, prompting university administrators to replace his syllabus, publicly condemn his remarks, and encourage official complaints from students. The university then initiated a lengthy disciplinary investigation, withheld a merit pay increase during this period, issued a reprimand, and warned of potential future discipline if the professor continued similar conduct. The university’s actions were based on the disruption and distress reported by students and concerns about creating an unwelcome environment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington found that the professor’s speech was protected and addressed a matter of public concern. However, applying the balancing test from Pickering v. Board of Education, it granted summary judgment to the university, finding that the institution’s interest in preventing disruption and maintaining an inclusive learning environment outweighed the professor’s First Amendment rights. The district court also dismissed the professor’s facial challenges to the university’s nondiscrimination policy, interpreting it narrowly to apply only to conduct resembling unlawful discrimination, harassment, or retaliation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment for the university and directed that summary judgment be entered for the professor on his First Amendment retaliation and viewpoint discrimination claims. The appellate court held that the professor’s syllabus statement was protected academic speech on a matter of public concern, and that student or community offense or discomfort could not justify university retaliation or discipline under the First Amendment. The panel also ruled that the district court improperly construed the university’s nondiscrimination policy and remanded for further proceedings on the policy’s facial constitutionality. View "REGES V. CAUCE" on Justia Law

A prison inmate with a documented history of mobility impairments and medical accommodations, including the use of a wheelchair and a transportation code requiring wheelchair-accessible vehicles, was scheduled for transfer between two facilities. On the day of the transport, he arrived in his wheelchair but was not provided with an accessible van. Instead, prison officials attempted to move him onto a standard bus. The inmate protested, stating he could not board without proper accommodations, but officials treated his protest as a refusal. After a crisis negotiator was called and negotiations failed, prison staff physically moved him onto the bus, allegedly causing him injury.A magistrate judge in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington found that there were genuine disputes of material fact regarding the officials’ awareness of the inmate’s needs, the transportation code in effect, the extent of force used, and the resulting injuries. The magistrate recommended denying summary judgment and qualified immunity for most defendants. However, the district court rejected these recommendations, granted summary judgment for the State of Washington and the individual prison officials, and found that qualified immunity shielded the officials, reasoning that the mistaken transportation code did not amount to deliberate indifference.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court erred in granting summary judgment because material factual disputes remained regarding whether officials had notice of the inmate’s need for accommodation and the extent of their investigation into those needs. The Ninth Circuit also found that these disputes precluded summary judgment on Eighth Amendment claims alleging deliberate indifference and excessive force, and that qualified immunity was improperly granted at this stage. The court reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "WELDEYOHANNES V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

The defendant pled guilty to possessing methamphetamine with intent to distribute, in violation of federal law. At sentencing, he received a prison term of 151 months, followed by three years of supervised release. The court also imposed a $1,000 fine and a $100 special assessment, stating they were “due immediately.” However, given the defendant’s indigency, the court established a payment schedule requiring him to make minimal payments while incarcerated and while on supervised release, including participation in the Bureau of Prisons’ Inmate Financial Responsibility Program.After judgment was entered reflecting both the immediate due date and the payment plan, the government sent a letter demanding immediate payment but also referencing the payment schedule. The defendant appealed, arguing that under 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1), the court could either require the penalties to be due immediately or set a payment schedule, but not both simultaneously. He sought vacatur of the monetary penalties and resentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the statutory interpretation issue de novo. The court held that the district court did not violate 18 U.S.C. § 3572(d)(1) by declaring the penalties due immediately while also establishing a payment plan. The Ninth Circuit explained that the statute’s language and relevant precedent allow for the entire monetary obligation to be due immediately, with a payment schedule set in recognition of the defendant’s financial circumstances. The holding is consistent with similar approaches adopted by other circuits in analogous situations. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. PATRICK" on Justia Law

During a protest in Oakland, California on May 29, 2020, Robert Alvin Justus, Jr. drove a van while his co-defendant, Steven Carrillo, fired an assault rifle at two Protective Security Officers stationed outside a federal courthouse. One officer was killed and the other sustained permanent disabilities. Prior to the incident, Justus and Carrillo connected through social media, sharing content that promoted antigovernment views and referenced the “Boogaloo” movement, known for its extremist rhetoric. Evidence at trial included Justus’s posts and communications indicating animosity toward law enforcement and the federal government, as well as their coordination before the attack.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the trial, where Justus was convicted by a jury of aiding and abetting murder and attempted murder of persons assisting federal officers under 18 U.S.C. §§ 1114(1), 1114(3), 1111, and 1112. The district court sentenced Justus to life imprisonment for murder and 240 months, to run concurrently, for attempted murder. Justus challenged the admissibility of his social media evidence, the district court’s jury instruction regarding duress, and the sufficiency of evidence supporting his convictions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting Justus’s social media posts as relevant and probative of his intent, nor did it err in finding the evidence admissible under Rules 401, 403, and 404 of the Federal Rules of Evidence. The appellate court also found the duress jury instruction proper, as the defense was unavailable but duress-like evidence was admitted to address Justus’s mental state. Finally, the panel concluded that sufficient evidence supported the convictions and affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "USA V. JUSTUS" on Justia Law

Epic Games, a developer and operator of the Epic Games Store, sued Apple over its App Store practices, alleging violations of federal and California competition law. The dispute centered on Apple’s rules requiring developers to use Apple’s in-app payment system, which imposed a 30% commission, and its prohibition of developers directing users to other purchasing options outside the App Store. After a bench trial, the district court found Apple’s anti-steering provisions violated California’s Unfair Competition Law by preventing informed consumer choice but upheld Apple’s in-app payment system requirement for digital goods. The court issued an injunction barring Apple from restricting developers from including in their apps buttons, links, or other calls to action that direct users to alternative purchasing mechanisms.Following the injunction, Apple implemented a compliance plan involving a 27% commission on linked-out purchases and a series of restrictions on how developers could present external payment options, including limitations on button design, link placement, and user flow. Epic contested Apple’s compliance, arguing these measures still effectively prohibited alternative purchases. After holding multiple evidentiary hearings, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California found Apple in civil contempt for failing to comply with the injunction, citing Apple’s bad faith and pretextual justifications. The district court imposed broad sanctions, including prohibiting any commission on linked-out purchases, restricting Apple’s ability to limit external links, and referring Apple for criminal investigation.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s contempt findings and most of the resulting sanctions but found portions of the sanctions—particularly the blanket ban on commissions—overbroad and more punitive than coercive. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded those parts for further tailoring, clarified the scope of permissible developer link prominence, and declined to vacate the injunction or reassign the case. The court otherwise affirmed the district court’s orders. View "EPIC GAMES, INC. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

A non-profit publisher mailed its legal resource book, The Habeas Citebook, to prisoners at a Washington state correctional facility. In 2018, the state's Department of Corrections implemented two policies: one prohibited inmates from possessing case law documents unless approved, and another barred possession of legal materials containing information about other Washington state inmates. Relying on these policies, prison officials at Coyote Ridge Corrections Center rejected and delayed delivery of the book. Although the Department’s Publication Review Committee later found the book permissible, the publisher was not notified of this reversal, and delivery to prisoners was significantly delayed—sometimes by over a year.The Human Rights Defense Center sued the prison superintendent and mailroom sergeant in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington, alleging violations of the First and Fourteenth Amendments and seeking damages and injunctive relief. The district court initially granted summary judgment for the defendants on all claims, holding that the claims were either moot, failed on the merits, or did not establish personal liability. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding genuine disputes of material fact and instructing the district court to reconsider standing and liability issues. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment for the defendants and denied requests for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the defendants were entitled to qualified immunity against damages on the First and Fourteenth Amendment claims regarding the mail policies and lack of notice, as there was no clearly established precedent finding such policies unconstitutional. However, it reversed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief related to both the mail policy and notice procedures, finding that the appropriate legal standards had not been applied. The court also reversed the grant of qualified immunity on the delayed delivery claim, finding the right at issue clearly established, and remanded for further proceedings. View "HUMAN RIGHTS DEFENSE CENTER, INC. V. UTTECHT" on Justia Law