Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Juan Carlos Enriquez, a pharmacy technician, was involved in a scheme to refer Medicare and Medi-Cal beneficiaries to pharmacies owned by his alleged co-conspirator, Irina Sadovsky, in exchange for kickbacks. Enriquez was indicted for conspiracy to receive healthcare kickbacks in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371 and for receiving prohibited payments in violation of the Anti-Kickback Statute (AKS). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it failed to state an offense and lacked specificity because it did not negate the statutory safe harbor for a bona fide employment relationship under 42 U.S.C. § 1320a-7b(b)(3)(B).The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Enriquez’s motion to dismiss. Enriquez then entered a conditional guilty plea, reserving the right to appeal the denial of his pretrial motion. The district court sentenced him to one day of imprisonment, followed by two years of supervised release, and ordered him to pay $121,115 in restitution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. Enriquez argued that the principles from Ruan v. United States, which required the government to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that a defendant knew they were acting in an unauthorized manner under the Controlled Substances Act, should apply to the AKS. He contended that the AKS bona fide employment safe harbor should be treated as a "quasi-element" for pleading purposes. The Ninth Circuit declined to extend Ruan’s reasoning to the AKS or to pleading requirements, affirming that indictments need not allege affirmative defenses. The court held that the indictment provided sufficient detail to inform Enriquez of the charges and enable him to prepare his defense. The district court’s denial of Enriquez’s motion to dismiss was affirmed. View "USA V. ENRIQUEZ" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a class action lawsuit against Nike, Inc., alleging gender discrimination and hostile workplace claims. During discovery, a collection of internal workplace complaints, known as the Starfish complaints, was produced under a protective order. Three media organizations, including The Oregonian, intervened in the case to gain access to these documents. Plaintiffs' attorney inadvertently sent confidential documents to a reporter from The Oregonian, who refused to return or destroy them upon request.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon initially granted a motion to intervene by the media organizations. However, when the inadvertent disclosure occurred, the magistrate judge ordered The Oregonian to return or destroy the documents. The district court vacated this order, reasoning that it lacked authority to compel a non-party to return the documents. The magistrate judge then denied the motion, and the district court affirmed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court had the inherent authority to order The Oregonian, as an intervenor and thus a party to the case, to return or destroy the confidential documents. The court determined that The Oregonian did not have a First Amendment right to withhold the documents because pretrial discovery proceedings are not public components of the judicial process. The court applied relaxed First Amendment scrutiny and concluded that the district court's exercise of its inherent authority over discovery furthered a substantial government interest unrelated to the suppression of expression. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "CAHILL V. NIKE, INC." on Justia Law

Abelardo Rodriguez-Arvizu was arrested by U.S. Border Patrol agents on November 18, 2019, for a suspected immigration violation. During processing, an outstanding arrest warrant related to his involvement in a marijuana "rip crew" was discovered. He was subsequently arrested by FBI agents, who did not inform him of the specific charges. During the ride to the FBI office, Rodriguez-Arvizu made incriminating statements. At the FBI office, he was read his Miranda rights, and he made further statements after waiving his rights.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Rodriguez-Arvizu's motion to suppress his statements. The court found that although the FBI agents violated Fed. R. Crim. P. 4(c)(3)(A) by not informing him of the charges, suppression was not warranted. The court also found no violation of his Fifth Amendment right to counsel, as he did not unambiguously invoke this right. Additionally, the court determined that he validly waived his Sixth Amendment right to counsel despite not knowing the specific charges. Finally, the court ruled that his confession was within the safe harbor period of 18 U.S.C. § 3501(c) and did not violate the McNabb-Mallory rule.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that suppression was not warranted for the Rule 4(c)(3)(A) violation, as the agents' conduct was not sufficiently deliberate or culpable. The court also agreed that Rodriguez-Arvizu did not unambiguously invoke his Fifth Amendment right to counsel and that he validly waived his Sixth Amendment right. The court further held that the safe harbor period began with his FBI arrest, making his confession admissible. View "USA V. RODRIGUEZ-ARVIZU" on Justia Law

Gurparas Singh, a native and citizen of India, sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT) in the United States, claiming persecution by members of the ruling BJP party due to his involvement with the Mann political party. Singh recounted two specific incidents of persecution: one in July 2017, where BJP members threatened him while he was placing posters, and another in December 2017, where he was attacked by BJP members while returning from a blood drive. Singh entered the U.S. without valid documents in April 2018 and was charged with removability. He admitted the allegations and applied for asylum and related relief.The Immigration Judge (IJ) found Singh not credible due to significant linguistic and factual similarities between his declaration and those of other asylum applicants from India, suggesting a fabricated claim. The IJ also found that Singh knowingly filed a frivolous asylum application and denied his CAT claim, concluding that the remaining evidence did not establish a likelihood of torture upon his return to India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's findings and dismissed Singh's appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Singh's petition for review. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's adverse credibility determination, noting the identical language and narrative structure in Singh's declaration compared to other applicants. The court also found that the IJ followed proper procedural safeguards in making the frivolous application finding. Additionally, the court concluded that the denial of CAT protection was supported by substantial evidence, as Singh failed to provide sufficient individualized evidence of a likelihood of torture. View "SINGH V. BONDI" on Justia Law

Paige Thompson committed a significant data breach, hacking into Amazon Web Services (AWS) customers' accounts, stealing data from at least 30 entities, and causing tens of millions of dollars in damage. She also used the stolen credentials to mine cryptocurrency, further increasing the financial impact on the victims. Thompson was arrested after she revealed her activities to a cybersecurity professional, leading to an FBI investigation.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington calculated Thompson's sentencing range under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines to be 168 to 210 months of imprisonment. However, the court granted a substantial downward variance, sentencing her to time served (approximately 100 days) and five years of probation. The court emphasized Thompson's personal history, including her transgender identity, autism, and past trauma, as significant factors in its decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the district court overemphasized Thompson's personal story and failed to properly weigh several of the 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) factors. The appellate court held that the district court's findings regarding Thompson's lack of malicious intent, her remorse, and the seriousness of her actions were clearly erroneous and not supported by the record. The Ninth Circuit also noted that the district court did not adequately consider the need for general and specific deterrence or the risk of unwarranted sentencing disparities.The Ninth Circuit vacated Thompson's sentence and remanded the case for resentencing, instructing the district court to properly weigh all relevant factors and provide a more substantial justification for any variance from the Guidelines. View "USA V. THOMPSON" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's voting system, claiming it did not adequately protect voters' rights and should be replaced with a hand-counted paper ballot system. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of standing, and the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal. Subsequently, the district court imposed sanctions on the plaintiffs' attorneys, including Alan Dershowitz, for filing a frivolous complaint.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed the plaintiffs' complaint and granted the defendants' motion for sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11. The district court found that the complaint contained false and misleading statements and ordered the plaintiffs' attorneys to pay a portion of the defendants' legal fees. Dershowitz, who signed the complaint as "of counsel," was held jointly and severally liable for a portion of the sanctions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's holding that "of counsel" attorneys can be sanctioned under Rule 11 for signing frivolous complaints. The Ninth Circuit rejected Dershowitz's argument that the sanctions violated the First Amendment and found that the district court imposed sanctions to deter frivolous actions, not to silence speech. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the imposition of sanctions on Dershowitz, as the liability of "of counsel" attorneys under Rule 11 had not been clearly articulated in previous case law. The court declined to apply the rule retroactively but stated that it would apply to any signed pleadings after the publication of this opinion. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in Arizona district court challenging the state's electronic voting system, arguing it should be replaced with a system using exclusively hand-counted paper ballots. They also sought a preliminary injunction to prohibit the use of computerized equipment in elections. The district court dismissed the complaint for lack of Article III standing, and the dismissal was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit in Lake v. Fontes. Subsequently, the district court granted the defendants' motion for sanctions against the plaintiffs' lead attorneys, Andrew J. Parker and Kurt Olsen, and their law firms, holding them liable for $122,200.00 in fees.The district court found that the lead attorneys made false, misleading, and unsupported factual assertions in their first amended complaint and motion for preliminary injunction, and did not conduct a reasonable pre-filing inquiry. Key false allegations included claims that Arizona does not use paper ballots and that its voting machines are not tested. The district court concluded that these misleading statements rendered the complaint factually insufficient and open to sanction. Additionally, the court found that the attorneys acted recklessly and in bad faith, particularly in the timing and nature of their motion for a preliminary injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's imposition of sanctions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 11(c) and 28 U.S.C. § 1927. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding attorneys' fees, as the lead attorneys' actions were both baseless and made without a reasonable and competent inquiry. The court also upheld the finding of bad faith, noting that the attorneys' behavior and timing in bringing the motion for a preliminary injunction were reckless. View "Lake v. Gates" on Justia Law

Two plaintiffs, Todd Yukutake and David Kikukawa, challenged two provisions of Hawaii's firearms laws, arguing they violated the Second Amendment. The first provision, Hawaii Revised Statutes § 134-2(e), required that a handgun be acquired within a narrow time window (originally 10 days, later amended to 30 days) after obtaining a permit. The second provision, § 134-3, mandated that gun owners physically bring their firearms to a police station for inspection within five days of acquisition as part of the registration process.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, ruling that both provisions were facially unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court permanently enjoined the enforcement of these provisions. The State of Hawaii appealed, arguing that recent legislative amendments to the challenged provisions rendered the case moot. However, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals denied the State's motion to dismiss the appeal as moot, finding that the amended versions of the provisions were sufficiently similar to the previous versions.The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the short timeframe for completing a firearms purchase after obtaining a permit was unconstitutional under the Second Amendment. The court reasoned that the purchase and acquisition of firearms are protected by the Second Amendment, and the State failed to justify the short temporal limit on firearms acquisition permits. The court also affirmed the district court's conclusion that the in-person inspection requirement violated the Second Amendment, noting that the government did not provide sufficient evidence that the requirement materially advanced the objectives of the registration system. The case was remanded to the district court to revise its permanent injunction in light of the recent amendments to the challenged provisions. View "Yukutake v. Lopez" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, who are California residents and cardroom operators, challenged the constitutionality of California Business and Professions Code §§ 19858(a) and 19858.5. These statutes make a person ineligible for a California cardroom license if they own more than a 1% financial interest in a business that engages in casino-style gambling or if they have control over such a business. Plaintiffs argued that these provisions violate the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against interstate commerce, regulating extraterritorially, and unduly burdening interstate commerce.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California initially dismissed the complaint as untimely, but the Ninth Circuit reversed that decision. On remand, the district court rejected plaintiffs' dormant Commerce Clause claims, concluding that the statutes did not discriminate against interstate commerce, did not regulate extraterritorially, and did not unduly burden interstate commerce. Plaintiffs appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment. The court held that the cardroom licensing restrictions do not violate the dormant Commerce Clause. The court found that the statutes are not facially discriminatory, do not have a discriminatory purpose or effect, and do not favor in-state economic interests. The court also concluded that the statutes do not regulate extraterritorially because they condition a state license for conducting in-state activities on plaintiffs foregoing certain business interests, whether within or outside the state. Finally, the court determined that plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a significant or substantial burden on interstate commerce under the Pike balancing test. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment in favor of the California officials. View "Flynt v. Bonta" on Justia Law

Elizabeth Perez, a former employee of Rose Hills Company, filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of herself and similarly situated employees, alleging violations of California wage-and-hour laws. The complaint did not specify the amount in controversy or the frequency of the alleged violations. Rose Hills removed the case to federal court under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA), which allows removal if the amount in controversy exceeds $5 million.The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case to state court, stating that Rose Hills did not meet CAFA’s $5 million amount-in-controversy requirement. The district court found that Rose Hills failed to provide evidence justifying its assumed violation rate, which was used to calculate the amount in controversy.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a removing defendant under CAFA is permitted to rely on reasonable assumptions based on the plaintiff’s complaint to calculate the amount in controversy. The court found that Rose Hills’ approach, which included assumptions about the violation rate tethered to the language of the complaint, was reasonable. The district court erred by requiring Rose Hills to provide evidence supporting its assumed violation rate.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s remand order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to evaluate whether Rose Hills’ violation-rate assumption was a reasonable interpretation of the complaint. The court emphasized that assumptions need not be proven with evidence if they are reasonable interpretations of the complaint’s allegations. View "Perez v. Rose Hills Company" on Justia Law