Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gina Champion-Cain operated a Ponzi scheme through her company ANI Development, LLC, defrauding over 400 investors of approximately $389 million. The SEC initiated a civil enforcement action, freezing Cain’s and ANI’s assets, appointing a receiver for ANI, and temporarily staying litigation against ANI. Defrauded investors then sued third parties, including Chicago Title Company and the Nossaman law firm, alleging their involvement in the scheme.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California approved a global settlement between the Receiver and Chicago Title, which included a bar order preventing further litigation against Chicago Title and Nossaman related to the Ponzi scheme. Kim Peterson and Ovation Fund Management II, LLC, whose state-court claims against Chicago Title and Nossaman were extinguished by the bar orders, challenged these orders.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court had the authority to enter the bar orders because the claims by Peterson and Ovation substantially overlapped with the Receiver’s claims, seeking recovery for the same losses stemming from the Ponzi scheme. The bar orders were deemed necessary to protect the ANI receivership estate, as allowing the claims to proceed would interfere with the Receiver’s efforts and deplete the receivership’s assets.The Ninth Circuit also concluded that the Anti-Injunction Act did not preclude the bar orders, as they were necessary in aid of the district court’s jurisdiction over the receivership estate. The court rejected Peterson’s argument that the bar order was inequitable, noting that Peterson had the opportunity to file claims through the receivership estate but was determined to be a net winner from the Ponzi scheme. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s bar orders. View "USSEC V. CHICAGO TITLE COMPANY" on Justia Law

Brandon Wade Kurns, a convicted felon, began working at Modern Pawn & Consignment in Helena, Montana, in June 2021, where he sold firearms and ammunition. In July 2021, after an investigation linked stolen gunpowder to the shop, ATF agents searched Modern Pawn and found evidence that Kurns had possessed several firearms. Kurns was indicted and pleaded guilty to being a felon in possession of a firearm.The United States District Court for the District of Montana sentenced Kurns to 36 months in prison, applying a base offense level of 20 under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(a)(4)(B)(i)(I) for possessing a semiautomatic firearm capable of accepting a large capacity magazine, and a four-level enhancement under § 2K2.1(b)(1)(B) for possessing eight or more firearms. Kurns objected, arguing that the evidence was insufficient to support these enhancements and that the court violated his Fifth Amendment rights by drawing an adverse inference from his silence during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The court held that the evidence, including surveillance footage and ATF transfer forms, supported the finding by a preponderance of the evidence that Kurns possessed a semiautomatic firearm with a large capacity magazine and at least eight firearms. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as there was no indication that the district court drew an adverse inference from Kurns' silence. Additionally, the court declined to consider Kurns' Second Amendment challenge based on New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, as it was raised for the first time after the completion of appellate briefing. View "USA V. KURNS" on Justia Law

Gregory W. Pheasant was charged with driving an off-road vehicle on public lands at night without a taillight, violating 43 C.F.R. § 8341.1(f)(5). This regulation was issued by the Secretary of the Interior under the Federal Land Policy and Management Act of 1976 (FLPMA). Pheasant allegedly refused to stop for Bureau of Land Management rangers, made obscene gestures, and sped away before being apprehended. He was indicted on three counts, including the taillight violation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada dismissed the taillight count, ruling that section 303(a) of the FLPMA was an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The court held that the statute gave the Secretary of the Interior too much authority without sufficient guidance or restraint, violating Article I of the Constitution, which vests all legislative powers in Congress.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court's dismissal, holding that section 303(a) of the FLPMA satisfies the "intelligible principle" test established by the Supreme Court. The Ninth Circuit found that the FLPMA provides clear guidance by requiring the Secretary to manage public lands under principles of multiple use and sustained yield, ensuring the land's value is realized sustainably. The court concluded that these constraints are sufficient to meet constitutional requirements, and thus, section 303(a) does not constitute an unconstitutional delegation of legislative power. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "USA V. PHEASANT" on Justia Law

An underage user of the Grindr application, John Doe, filed a lawsuit against Grindr Inc. and Grindr LLC, alleging that the app facilitated his sexual exploitation by adult men. Doe claimed that Grindr's design and operation allowed him to be matched with adults despite being a minor, leading to his rape by four men, three of whom were later convicted. Doe's lawsuit included state law claims for defective design, defective manufacturing, negligence, failure to warn, and negligent misrepresentation, as well as a federal claim under the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act (TVPRA).The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed Doe's claims, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act (CDA) provided Grindr with immunity from liability for the state law claims. The court also found that Doe failed to state a plausible claim under the TVPRA, as he did not sufficiently allege that Grindr knowingly participated in or benefitted from sex trafficking.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 230 barred Doe's state law claims because they implicated Grindr's role as a publisher of third-party content. The court also agreed that Doe failed to state a plausible TVPRA claim, as he did not allege that Grindr had actual knowledge of or actively participated in sex trafficking. Consequently, Doe could not invoke the statutory exception to Section 230 immunity under the Allow States and Victims to Fight Online Sex Trafficking Act of 2018. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal of Doe's claims in their entirety. View "DOE V. GRINDR INC." on Justia Law

Edgar Murillo-Chavez, a lawful permanent resident (LPR) from Mexico, entered the United States as a child without being admitted or paroled. He was granted special immigrant juvenile (SIJ) status in 2010 and became an LPR in 2011. In 2016, he pleaded no contest to unlawful possession of a firearm in Oregon. In 2018, he was convicted of unlawful use of a weapon and first-degree criminal mistreatment, both in Oregon.An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Murillo removable for a firearms offense and for committing two crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs). The IJ also determined that Murillo was ineligible for cancellation of removal because he committed a CIMT within seven years of being admitted. Murillo appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed his appeal, agreeing with the IJ that his 2018 convictions were CIMTs and that he was admitted when he became an LPR in 2011. Murillo then filed a motion to reopen, claiming ineffective assistance of counsel, which the BIA denied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Murillo's 2016 conviction for unlawful possession of a firearm was a removable offense under 8 U.S.C. § 1227(a)(2)(C). The court also agreed with the BIA that Murillo was not "admitted" when he obtained SIJ status but when he became an LPR in 2011. Consequently, his 2018 conviction for first-degree criminal mistreatment, which occurred within seven years of his LPR admission, was a CIMT, making him ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court denied Murillo's petitions for review. View "MURILLO-CHAVEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A medical institute and its co-director sought to provide patients with psilocybin, a schedule I controlled substance, for therapeutic use. They requested the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) to exempt the co-director from registration under the Controlled Substances Act (CSA) or to waive the registration requirement. The DEA declined both requests, leading the petitioners to seek judicial review.Previously, the petitioners had asked the DEA for guidance on accommodating the Right to Try Act (RTT Act) for psilocybin use. The DEA responded that the RTT Act did not waive CSA requirements, and the petitioners' initial judicial review was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. The petitioners then made a concrete request to the DEA for exemption or waiver, which the DEA again denied, prompting the current appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction under 21 U.S.C. § 877 to review the DEA's final decision. The court found that the DEA's denial was not arbitrary and capricious. The DEA provided a reasonable explanation, stating that the RTT Act did not exempt the CSA's requirements and that the proposed use of psilocybin was inconsistent with public health and safety. The DEA also noted that the petitioners did not provide sufficient details for the proposed regulation. The court denied the petition for review, affirming the DEA's decision. View "ADVANCED INTEGRATIVE MEDICAL SCIENCE INSTITUTE, PLLC V. UNITED STATES DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMIN" on Justia Law

A nonprofit organization, Prutehi Litekyan: Save Ritidian, challenged the U.S. Air Force's decision to engage in hazardous waste disposal at Tarague Beach, Guam, without conducting a National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) review. The Air Force planned to dispose of unexploded ordnance through Open Burning/Open Detonation (OB/OD) operations. The nonprofit argued that the Air Force failed to take a "hard look" at the environmental impacts and did not engage the public as required by NEPA.The District Court of Guam dismissed the case, holding that Prutehi Litekyan lacked standing because its injury was not fairly traceable to the Air Force's actions. The court also found that there was no final agency action, making the case unripe for judicial review. Additionally, the court ruled that the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (RCRA) permitting process made NEPA review redundant, thus Prutehi Litekyan failed to state a claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal. The appellate court held that Prutehi Litekyan had standing because the Air Force's failure to conduct NEPA review could have influenced its decision on waste disposal methods, making the injury fairly traceable to the Air Force's actions. The court also determined that the Air Force's decision to apply for a RCRA permit and its detailed plans for OB/OD operations constituted final agency action, making the case ripe for judicial review.Furthermore, the Ninth Circuit held that NEPA applied to the Air Force's decision to conduct OB/OD operations at Tarague Beach. The court found that RCRA's permitting process did not displace NEPA's requirements, as the two statutes serve different purposes and are not redundant. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the appellate court's opinion. View "LITEKYAN V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE AIR FORCE" on Justia Law

Ion Lapadat and his family, all of Roma ethnicity, sought asylum in the United States due to severe mistreatment in Romania. Ion testified that he was shot in the back while collecting firewood, and his family faced attempted kidnappings, threats, and violence. They also experienced pervasive discrimination, including denial of healthcare, employment, and access to public services. The Immigration Judge (IJ) found their testimony credible but denied their applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), concluding that their experiences did not rise to the level of persecution.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the mistreatment did not constitute persecution and that the Roma are not a disfavored group in Romania. The BIA also found that Ion failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. Ion then petitioned for review of the BIA's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA erred in its analysis. The court held that Ion's past experiences, including being shot and the severe assaults and threats faced by his family, collectively rose to the level of persecution. The court also determined that the BIA erred in concluding that the Roma are not a disfavored group in Romania, noting the long history of anti-Roma abuse and the Romanian government's documented persecutory conduct.The Ninth Circuit granted Ion's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion, instructing the BIA to address the remaining elements of Ion's asylum claim and to reconsider his fear of future persecution. View "Lapadat v. Bondi" on Justia Law

Vietnamese refugees and residents of San Diego County, Anh Thai and Don Doan, alleged that two law enforcement officers, Dulce Sanchez and William Villasenor, violated their constitutional rights by forcibly entering their homes and interrogating them about their disability benefits. Sanchez and Villasenor were Los Angeles District Attorney’s Office investigators assigned full-time to a joint federal-state task force, the Cooperative Disability Investigations (CDI) Unit, which investigates fraud in Social Security disability benefits applications. The plaintiffs claimed that the officers displayed guns and state badges, did not seek consent for the search, and failed to have an interpreter present during the investigations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Sanchez and Villasenor, concluding that the officers were acting under color of federal law, not state law, and therefore could not be held liable under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court found that the CDI Unit was implemented under federal authority, and the officers’ day-to-day work was supervised by a federal officer, Special Agent Glenn Roberts.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that because the CDI Unit was created under federal authority and supervised by a federal officer, Sanchez and Villasenor were acting under color of federal law. The court noted that the officers’ paychecks were reimbursed by the Social Security Administration, and their investigations took place outside of Los Angeles County, further indicating their federal role. Consequently, the officers were not subject to suit under § 1983, which applies to actions under color of state law. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "Thai v. County of Los Angeles" on Justia Law

A high school student, K.J., was involved in a fight on campus and was initially suspended for three days. After reviewing surveillance footage and learning about injuries sustained during the fight, school officials extended K.J.'s suspension and recommended his expulsion, without informing him of the new charges or evidence. K.J. was not given an opportunity to respond to these new allegations.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California found that the school officials violated K.J.'s procedural due process rights by not informing him of the new charges or evidence. However, the court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, holding that they were entitled to qualified immunity because the law was not clearly established regarding due process protections for suspension extensions. The court also held that K.J. lacked standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record, as it was speculative that the record would harm his reputation or future prospects.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment. The Ninth Circuit agreed that K.J.'s due process rights were violated, as he was not given notice of the new charges or an opportunity to respond. The court held that the defendants were not entitled to qualified immunity because the requirements for due process in school suspensions were clearly established in Goss v. Lopez. The court also held that K.J. had standing to seek expungement of his disciplinary record and that such relief was not barred by Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity. The case was remanded to the district court to consider K.J.'s claims for damages and expungement. View "K. J. V. JACKSON" on Justia Law