Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Milliman, Inc. operates a service that compiles consumer medical and prescription reports, which are then sold to insurers for underwriting decisions. The named plaintiff, James Healy, applied for life insurance, but Milliman provided a report to the insurer containing another person's medical records and social security number. This erroneous report flagged Healy as high risk for several serious medical conditions he did not actually have, resulting in the denial of his insurance application. Healy attempted to correct the report, but Milliman did not timely investigate or remedy the errors.Healy filed a class action in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington, alleging that Milliman’s procedures violated the Fair Credit Reporting Act by failing to ensure maximum possible accuracy. The district court certified an “inaccuracy class” for those whose reports included mismatched social security numbers and risk flags. Milliman moved for partial summary judgment, arguing that Healy needed to show class-wide standing at this stage. The district court agreed, finding under TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413 (2021), that Healy had failed to present direct evidence of concrete injury on a class-wide basis, and dismissed the inaccuracy class.On interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that, following class certification in damages actions, both named and unnamed class members must present evidence of standing at summary judgment. However, the court clarified that plaintiffs may rely on either direct or circumstantial evidence, and need only show that a rational trier of fact could infer standing, not that standing is conclusively established. The panel reversed the district court’s partial summary judgment and remanded for reconsideration under the correct summary judgment standard. View "HEALY V. MILLIMAN, INC." on Justia Law

Seagate Technology LLC, a California-based manufacturer of hard disk drives, and two of its foreign subsidiaries (in Thailand and Singapore) brought antitrust claims against NHK Spring Co., Ltd., a Japanese supplier of suspension assemblies—critical hard drive components. NHK pleaded guilty in a separate federal criminal proceeding to conspiring with competitors to fix the prices of these suspension assemblies, which were sold both in the United States and abroad. The majority of the price-fixed assemblies purchased by Seagate’s foreign entities occurred outside the United States, with only finished hard drives being imported into the country.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California initially found that the Sherman Act did not apply to Seagate’s claims related to suspension assemblies purchased abroad, ruling that these were “wholly foreign transactions” outside the reach of U.S. antitrust law. The court also determined that the Foreign Trade Antitrust Improvements Act (FTAIA) import commerce exclusion did not apply since the assemblies themselves were not directly imported into the United States, and that Seagate could not show the necessary domestic effect giving rise to its foreign injury. The district court granted NHK’s motion for partial summary judgment in full and denied Seagate leave to amend its complaint for indirect purchaser claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment order. The appellate court held that while the import commerce exclusion did not apply, Seagate alleged a viable theory under the FTAIA’s domestic effects exception: NHK’s price-fixing in the United States led to higher prices domestically, which then directly caused Seagate’s foreign entities to pay inflated prices abroad. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for the district court to determine whether Seagate had presented sufficient evidence of proximate cause to survive summary judgment. View "SEAGATE TECHNOLOGY LLC V. NHK SPRING CO., LTD." on Justia Law

The case involves the death of Ramon Timothy Lopez following an encounter with Phoenix Police Department officers. After receiving reports of erratic behavior, officers pursued Lopez in a foot chase, subdued him, and restrained him with handcuffs and a RIPP hobble device. This restraint bent Lopez’s body into a hogtied position while he was face down. Despite Lopez's distress and visible signs of medical need, officers transported him in the back of a patrol vehicle in this position. He became unresponsive during transport and was later pronounced dead at the hospital. The medical examiner attributed his death to cardiac arrest in the context of methamphetamine intoxication, heart disease, and physical restraint.Plaintiff Laura Gonzalez, Lopez’s mother, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona against the City of Phoenix and several officers, asserting claims under federal and state law, including excessive force under the Fourth Amendment. The district court granted summary judgment in part, dismissing claims of false arrest, Monell liability, and others, but denied summary judgment on the excessive force claim related to the officers’ actions after the RIPP restraint was applied, including the transportation of Lopez in the prone, hogtied position.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial, holding that a reasonable jury could find the officers’ use of the RIPP restraint and the manner of transport unreasonable and excessive, given Lopez’s lack of resistance and medical distress. The court found that precedent in the Ninth Circuit clearly established that continued use of force or refusal to alleviate its harmful effects against a helpless detainee constitutes excessive force. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "GONZALEZ V. CITY OF PHOENIX" on Justia Law

AliveCor, a medical-technology company, developed a software feature called SmartRhythm to detect atrial fibrillation (Afib) using the Apple Watch. SmartRhythm depended on heart rate data generated by Apple’s original Workout Mode algorithm, known as HRPO. In 2018, Apple updated its Watch operating system and replaced HRPO with a new algorithm, HRNN, which improved exercise monitoring. Apple shared HRNN data with third-party developers but stopped sharing HRPO data, making SmartRhythm ineffective and leading AliveCor to discontinue the feature. Around the same time, Apple launched its own heart rhythm analysis feature, Irregular Rhythm Notification (IRN), using a different algorithm and shared that data as well. AliveCor alleged that Apple’s conduct intentionally disabled competing software features, thereby monopolizing the market for heart rhythm analysis apps on the Apple Watch.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment for Apple, finding that Apple’s changes constituted a lawful product improvement under Allied Orthopedic Appliances, Inc. v. Tyco Health Care Group LP. The court held that the update to the Workout Mode was a genuine product improvement and that the associated incompatibility with SmartRhythm was not separate anticompetitive conduct.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the judgment, but on different grounds. The Ninth Circuit held that Apple’s refusal to continue sharing HRPO data with third-party developers constituted a “refusal to deal,” which under antitrust law does not impose a duty to share with competitors unless specific exceptions apply. The court found that AliveCor had not shown that an exception, such as the Aspen Skiing exception or the essential-facilities doctrine, applied. Therefore, AliveCor’s Section 2 Sherman Act claims failed as a matter of law, and summary judgment for Apple was affirmed. View "ALIVECOR, INC. V. APPLE INC." on Justia Law

Border Patrol agents observed a suspicious vehicle near the U.S.-Mexico border in Southern California. After the driver, Alex Ruiz, failed to stop for marked Border Patrol units, agents deployed spike strips and eventually apprehended him. Nearby, four individuals without legal immigration status were found hiding. Evidence at trial established that Ruiz transported these individuals, and a co-defendant testified to having coordinated the pickup with Ruiz.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California presided over Ruiz’s trial. The government introduced a prior conviction Ruiz had for transporting illegal aliens, redacting prejudicial details. Ruiz objected, arguing its admission was improper under Federal Rule of Evidence 404(b) and that it was unconstitutional. The district court admitted the prior conviction to show knowledge and lack of mistake, provided limiting instructions to the jury, and took further steps to minimize prejudice, such as not allowing the documents into the jury room during deliberations. The jury convicted Ruiz on all counts, and he was sentenced to thirty-three months in prison and three years of supervised release.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the district court abused its discretion in admitting evidence of Ruiz’s prior conviction under Rule 404(b) and whether its probative value was substantially outweighed by unfair prejudice under Rule 403. The court held the prior conviction was properly admitted to prove knowledge, was not too remote in time, was supported by sufficient evidence, and was sufficiently similar to the charged conduct. The appellate court also found that any prejudice did not substantially outweigh the conviction’s probative value and that Ruiz waived his constitutional arguments by not raising them below. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. RUIZ" on Justia Law

A Christian ministry in Washington State, organized as a private nonprofit, operates various social service programs such as shelters, health clinics, and meal services, with a central mission to spread the Gospel. The organization requires all employees to adhere to its religious beliefs and practices, including those regarding marriage and sexuality. When hiring for non-ministerial positions (such as IT technician and operations assistant), it screens applicants for agreement with its religious tenets and only hires co-religionists. Anticipating the need to fill numerous non-ministerial roles, the ministry faced applicants who disagreed with its faith-based requirements.After the Washington Supreme Court’s decision in Woods v. Seattle’s Union Gospel Mission, which interpreted the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD) exemption for religious organizations as limited to ministerial positions, the ministry filed a pre-enforcement federal action against the Washington State Attorney General and Human Rights Commission. The Eastern District of Washington initially dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded, finding the ministry had standing. On remand, the district court granted a preliminary injunction, holding the ministry was likely to succeed on its First Amendment claim and enjoining the State from enforcing WLAD against it for hiring only co-religionists in non-ministerial positions. The State appealed.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The court held that the church autonomy doctrine, rooted in the First Amendment’s Religion Clauses, protects religious organizations’ decisions to hire co-religionists for non-ministerial roles when those decisions are based on sincerely held religious beliefs. The holding does not extend to discrimination on other grounds and is limited to religious organizations. The Ninth Circuit found all preliminary injunction factors favored the ministry and affirmed the injunction. View "UNION GOSPEL MISSION OF YAKIMA WASHINGTON V. BROWN" on Justia Law

JB Viva Vegas, L.P. challenged the assessment of withdrawal liability imposed by the Nevada Resort Association-International Alliance of Theatrical Stage Employees and Moving Picture Machine Operators of the US and Canada Local 720 Pension Trust under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA). JB had contributed to the Trust’s pension plan for stagehands working on a theatrical production, which later closed. The Trust asserted withdrawal liability, arguing that its plan no longer qualified for the entertainment industry exception due to a shift in employee work from entertainment to convention-related activities.After JB’s request for review went unanswered, it initiated arbitration. The arbitrator initially ruled in JB’s favor, finding the plan qualified for the entertainment exception and ordering rescission of the withdrawal liability. The Trust then sought to vacate the arbitration award in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada. The district court vacated the award, reasoning that the relevant year for determining the plan’s status was the year JB withdrew, not when it joined, and remanded to the arbitrator. On remand, the arbitrator granted summary judgment to the Trust, concluding that the MPPAA was ambiguous as to how much entertainment work was required and that the plan did not “primarily” cover entertainment employees because less than half earned most of their wages from entertainment work. The district court affirmed the arbitrator’s decision, granting summary judgment to the Trust.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s summary judgment de novo. The court held that the MPPAA’s entertainment industry exception does not require a minimum amount of entertainment work for an individual to qualify as an “employee in the entertainment industry.” Therefore, the Trust’s plan primarily covers such employees if a majority perform any entertainment work. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case. View "NEVADA RESORT ASSOCIATION-INTERNATIONAL ALLIANCE OF THEATRICAL STAGE EMPLOYEES AND MOVING PICTURE MACHINE OPERATORS OF THE US AND CANADA LOCAL 720 PENSION TRUST V. JB VIVA VEGAS, LP" on Justia Law

A construction company in southern Nevada ceased contributing to a multiemployer pension plan after it stopped operating in the state. The pension plan’s trustees assessed the company for withdrawal liability, asserting the company owed over $2.8 million under the Multiemployer Pension Plan Amendments Act (MPPAA). The company challenged the assessment, arguing it was exempt from liability because its asbestos abatement work qualified for the “building and construction industry” exception in the MPPAA. The company pointed out that asbestos abatement involves removing or remediating hazardous materials from buildings, including demolition and substantial alterations to structures.An arbitrator initially ruled in favor of the pension plan’s trustees, interpreting the “building and construction industry” narrowly to include only work that literally builds new structures, and finding that asbestos abatement did not meet this definition. The company then brought suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada to vacate or modify the arbitration award. The district court rejected the arbitrator’s and trustees’ narrow construction, instead adopting a broader understanding of the industry that includes maintenance, repair, alteration, and demolition. The district court granted summary judgment to the company, holding that its asbestos abatement work qualified for the statutory exception, and ordered the return of payments made toward the assessed liability.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the phrase “building and construction industry” in the MPPAA incorporates the definition established by the National Labor Relations Board under the Taft-Hartley Act, which includes erection, maintenance, repair, and alteration of buildings and structures. Applying this definition, the court ruled that asbestos abatement is covered by the exception, exempting the company from withdrawal liability. View "WALKER SPECIALTY CONSTR., INC. V. BD. OF TR. OF THE CONSTR. INDUS. AND LABORERS JOINT PENSION TRUST" on Justia Law

A law-abiding resident of Siskiyou County, California, who wished to openly carry a firearm for self-defense, challenged California’s laws that prohibit open carry in counties with populations over 200,000. As a result of these statutes, approximately 95% of California’s population cannot lawfully open carry, while those in less populous counties may theoretically apply for an open-carry license valid only within their county of residence. The plaintiff, after being informed by local authorities that open-carry licenses would not be issued in his county, filed suit against the California Attorney General, raising claims under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint contested both the urban open-carry ban and the rural county licensing scheme.Initially, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and ultimately granted summary judgment to the Attorney General. The district court concluded that the Second Amendment did not protect the plaintiff’s desired conduct and that California’s regulatory scheme was consistent with the nation’s historical firearm tradition. The district court also dismissed as-applied challenges to the rural licensing scheme for lack of standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. Applying the historical tradition test outlined in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the court held that California’s ban on open carry in urban counties is inconsistent with the Second Amendment, as there is no historical tradition justifying such a broad prohibition. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the urban open-carry ban, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that issue. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment as to the rural licensing scheme, finding that the as-applied challenge was waived and the facial challenge failed under Bruen’s recognition of shall-issue licensing regimes. The district court’s judgment was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "BAIRD v. BONTA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, which are corporate entities owned by Kenneth Gay, challenged cannabis dispensary licensing schemes in Washington State and the City of Sacramento. Both jurisdictions require applicants to have been residents of the respective area for a specified period to be eligible for a dispensary license, or to receive priority in licensing. Plaintiffs applied for licenses in both places, but their applications were rejected solely for failing to meet the residency requirements, despite fulfilling all other criteria. Plaintiffs then filed lawsuits, alleging that these residency preferences violate the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state economic interests in the cannabis market.In the Western District of Washington and the Eastern District of California, the district courts dismissed the actions at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage and denied preliminary injunctions. Both courts found that the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to residency requirements for cannabis dispensaries because marijuana remains illegal under federal law. They reasoned that the constitutional protection of interstate commerce does not extend to a market Congress has expressly prohibited.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. It affirmed both district courts’ dismissals, holding that the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to state or local laws restricting licensing in a market (cannabis) that Congress has deemed illegal. The Ninth Circuit declined to extend dormant Commerce Clause protections to interstate commerce in a federally prohibited drug market, noting that Supreme Court precedent counsels “extreme caution” before exercising implied authority in this area. The panel found insufficient basis to use the judge-made dormant Commerce Clause to create a constitutional right to interstate cannabis commerce that is unlawful under federal law. Thus, both judgments were affirmed. View "PERIDOT TREE WA, INC. v. WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR AND CANNABIS CONTROL BOARD" on Justia Law