Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several environmental protection organizations challenged the policies governing oil and gas lease sales conducted by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) on protected sage-grouse habitat. In 2015, BLM amended its land use management plans to prioritize oil and gas leasing outside of sage-grouse habitat. In 2018, BLM revised its guidance documents, limiting the prioritization requirement to situations with a backlog of expressions of interest and shortening public comment periods.The District Court for the District of Montana found that the 2018 Instruction Memorandum (IM) violated the Federal Land Policy and Management Act (FLPMA) and vacated the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale. The District Court for the District of Idaho found that the lease sales violated the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) and FLPMA due to inadequate public participation and vacated the lease sales.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the cases. It held that the Montana district court's vacatur of the 2018 IM was not injunctive and thus not appealable, but the vacatur of the lease sales was injunctive and appealable. The court affirmed that the 2018 IM was inconsistent with the 2015 Plan and that the June 2018 Wyoming lease sale violated FLPMA. The court also affirmed that the Idaho lease sales violated NEPA and FLPMA due to insufficient public participation.The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Montana district court did not abuse its discretion in vacating the lease sales. However, it found that the Idaho district court abused its discretion in vacating the lease sales and remanded the case, directing the BLM to reconsider the leasing decisions with proper public participation while enjoining surface-disturbing activities in the interim. The court also held that neither district court violated the due process rights of intervenors by vacating the leases. View "MONTANA WILDLIFE FEDERATION V. HAALAND" on Justia Law

Julian Omidi and his business, Surgery Center Management, LLC (SCM), were involved in a fraudulent scheme called "Get Thin," which promised weight loss through Lap-Band surgery and other medical procedures. Omidi and SCM defrauded insurance companies by submitting false claims for reimbursement, including fabricated patient data and misrepresented physician involvement. The scheme recruited patients through a call center, pushing them towards expensive medical tests and procedures regardless of medical necessity.A grand jury indicted Omidi and SCM for mail fraud, wire fraud, money laundering, and related charges. After extensive pretrial litigation and a lengthy jury trial, both were convicted on all charges. The district court sentenced Omidi to 84 months in prison and fined SCM over $22 million. The government sought forfeiture of nearly $100 million, arguing that all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were derived from fraud. The district court agreed, finding that even proceeds from legitimate procedures were indirectly the result of the fraudulent scheme.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed the district court's forfeiture judgment, holding that under 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(C), all proceeds directly or indirectly derived from a health care fraud scheme must be forfeited. The court rejected the argument that only proceeds from fraudulent transactions should be forfeited, noting that the entire business was permeated with fraud. The court concluded that there is no "100% Fraud Rule" in forfeiture cases seeking proceeds of a fraud scheme, and all proceeds from the Get Thin scheme were subject to forfeiture. View "United States V. Surgery Center Management, LLC" on Justia Law

In the 1950s, the Tucson Unified School District (the District) operated a dual school system for Black and non-Black students. In 1974, class action lawsuits were filed on behalf of African American and Latino students, leading to a 1978 settlement agreement and desegregation decree. Over the years, the District undertook numerous efforts to remedy past discrimination. In 2011, the Ninth Circuit reversed a district court's preliminary finding of unitary status, remanding the case for further supervision. A Unitary Status Plan (USP) was created in 2013 to guide the District towards unitary status.The District Court for the District of Arizona found partial unitary status in 2018, retaining jurisdiction over unresolved issues. By 2021, the court found the District had achieved unitary status in most areas, except for two subsections of the USP. In 2022, after further revisions and compliance, the district court declared the District had achieved full unitary status and ended federal supervision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the District had achieved unitary status, meaning it had complied in good faith with the desegregation decree and eliminated the vestiges of past discrimination to the extent practicable. The court found no error in the district court's conclusions regarding student assignments, transportation, staff diversity, quality of education, student discipline, family and community engagement, and transparency and accountability. The Ninth Circuit emphasized that perfect implementation of the USP was not necessary for unitary status and that the District had demonstrated a lasting commitment to the USP and the Constitution. View "MENDOZA V. TUCSON UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

The defendants, Namrata Patnaik and Kartiki Parekh, served as the chief executive officer and human resources manager of a semiconductor chip design consulting and staffing company, respectively. They were charged with submitting fraudulent H-1B visa applications by falsely stating that the visa applicants would be working on internal projects on-site, while in reality, they were contracted out to other companies. The government alleged that these false statements were material misrepresentations that could influence the U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) in granting the visas.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the indictment, accepting the defendants' argument that the false statements could not be materially false because it was unlawful for the government to ask for such information. The district court relied on the ITServe All., Inc. v. Cissna decision and a USCIS memorandum that suggested USCIS could not require details about specific projects or work assignments.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment. The appellate court held that lying on H-1B visa applications constitutes visa fraud even if the government asked questions it was not legally entitled to ask, as long as the misrepresentations could have influenced USCIS at the time they were made. The court emphasized that the government may protect itself against fraud regardless of whether it had the right to ask the questions. The case was remanded for reinstatement of the criminal charges against the defendants. View "USA V. PATNAIK" on Justia Law

Tangle, Inc. holds copyright registrations for seven kinetic and manipulable sculptures made from 17 or 18 identical, connected, 90-degree curved tubular segments that can be twisted or turned 360 degrees. Aritzia, Inc. owns and operates retail stores and used similar sculptures in their store windows. Tangle alleged that Aritzia's sculptures infringed on their copyrighted works and also claimed trade dress infringement under the Lanham Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Tangle's initial copyright infringement claim for failure to state a claim but allowed Tangle to amend its complaint. Tangle filed an amended complaint, which was again dismissed. Tangle then filed a Second Amended Complaint, adding a trade dress infringement claim. The district court dismissed both claims, giving Tangle leave to amend. Tangle chose not to amend further and instead appealed the dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of Tangle’s copyright claim, holding that Tangle adequately alleged valid copyrights in its kinetic and manipulable sculptures. The court found that the sculptures were sufficiently "fixed" in a tangible medium for copyright purposes, despite their ability to move into various poses. The court also held that Tangle plausibly alleged that Aritzia's sculptures were substantially similar to Tangle's protected works under the "extrinsic test."However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of Tangle’s trade dress infringement claim. The court agreed that Tangle failed to provide a complete recitation of the concrete elements of its alleged trade dress, which is necessary to give adequate notice of the asserted trade dress.The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with the Ninth Circuit's opinion. View "TANGLE, INC. V. ARITZIA, INC." on Justia Law

The petitioner, Emerson Levi Godoy-Aguilar, a native and citizen of El Salvador, entered the United States in 2009 as a permanent resident. In 2015, he was charged and subsequently convicted under California Penal Code (CPC) § 136.1(c)(1) for dissuading a witness by force or threat. He was sentenced to 365 days in Los Angeles County Jail. Following his conviction, the U.S. Department of Homeland Security served him with a Notice to Appear, charging him with removability for having committed an aggravated felony as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S), relating to obstruction of justice.An Immigration Judge (IJ) determined that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction under CPC § 136.1(c)(1) constituted an aggravated felony of obstruction of justice and issued a removal order. Godoy-Aguilar appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), which dismissed the appeal, concluding that the state offense categorically fell within the federal definition of an offense relating to obstruction of justice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court analyzed whether CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is a categorical match for the generic federal offense of an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(S). The court concluded that CPC § 136.1(c)(1) is indeed a categorical match, as it involves specific intent conduct aimed at obstructing justice, and no pending investigation or proceeding is required. The court found that the elements of the underlying crimes in CPC § 136.1(a)(1)-(2) and (b)(1)-(3) do not sweep more broadly than the generic federal offense. Consequently, the court held that Godoy-Aguilar's conviction and sentence constituted an aggravated felony relating to obstruction of justice and denied the petition for review. View "GODOY-AGUILAR V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Manley Barton, a registered member of the Navajo tribe, applied for relocation benefits from the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR) based on his residence at his grandparents' homesite on the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL). The Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act required individuals residing on land partitioned to the tribe of which they were not a member to relocate. To be eligible for benefits, applicants had to show they were residents of the land partitioned to the other tribe on December 22, 1974, and were heads of household when they moved away. Manley claimed he lived at the HPL homesite until 1986, despite being away for education and employment.ONHIR denied Manley's application, and the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) upheld the denial, concluding that Manley's residence at the HPL homesite ended in 1984 when his grandparents relocated. The IHO did not consider other evidence of Manley's intent to reside at the HPL homesite, such as his testimony and that of his family members about his continued use of the homesite for ceremonies and chores. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of ONHIR, finding the IHO's decision was supported by substantial evidence and not arbitrary or capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's summary judgment. The court held that the IHO improperly applied the "temporarily away" exception, which allows applicants who are away for education or employment to establish residency through intent and manifestations of intent. The IHO's reliance solely on the grandparents' relocation to determine Manley's legal residence was arbitrary and capricious. The court remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "BARTON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

The Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (CFPB) brought an action against CashCall, Inc., alleging that CashCall engaged in unfair, deceptive, or abusive practices by attempting to collect interest and fees it was not legally entitled to. The CFPB sought legal restitution for the affected consumers. CashCall argued that the restitution order triggered its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted partial summary judgment to the CFPB on liability and conducted a bench trial to determine the appropriate remedy. The court imposed a civil penalty but declined to order restitution. Both parties appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the finding of liability but vacated the civil penalty and remanded for further proceedings regarding restitution.On remand, the district court ordered CashCall to pay over $134 million in legal restitution. CashCall appealed again, contending that the restitution order violated its Seventh Amendment right to a jury trial. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that CashCall had a right to a jury trial but concluded that CashCall had waived that right by voluntarily participating in the initial bench trial and not objecting to the second bench trial. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the doctrines of judicial estoppel and waiver did not preclude the CFPB from seeking legal restitution. Additionally, the court found that the district court did not overstate CashCall’s unjust gains and properly used CashCall’s net revenues as a basis for measuring unjust gains. Finally, the court rejected CashCall’s argument that the CFPB’s funding mechanism violated the Appropriations Clause.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "CONSUMER FINANCIAL PROTECTION BUREAU V. CASHCALL, INC." on Justia Law

Andrew Grimm parked his car on a downtown street in Portland, Oregon, and paid for parking through a mobile app for a limited time. He left the car there for seven days, during which City parking enforcement officers issued multiple parking citations and placed them on the car’s windshield. After five days, an officer added a red slip warning that the car would be towed if not moved. Grimm did not move the car, and two days later, the car was towed.Grimm sued the City of Portland, claiming that the City’s procedures for notifying him of the impending tow were deficient under the Fourteenth Amendment’s Due Process Clause. The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted summary judgment in favor of the City, holding that the City’s notice procedures were reasonable. The court found that although the accumulation of citations might have indicated that Grimm did not receive notice, no other form of notice was practicable.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the City’s notice, which included a red warning slip placed on the car’s windshield two days before the tow, was reasonably calculated to inform Grimm of the impending tow, satisfying the requirements of the Fourteenth Amendment. The court further held that the City did not have actual knowledge that its attempt to provide notice had failed simply because the citations and warning slip remained undisturbed on the car’s windshield. Therefore, the City was not required to take additional steps to notify Grimm. The court affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment to the City. View "GRIMM V. CITY OF PORTLAND" on Justia Law

Shawn Sheltra, an inmate with the Idaho Department of Corrections (IDOC), filed a formal grievance in March, identifying safety concerns and threats from other inmates in his housing unit. He warned that he would be attacked in April if he did not make an extortion payment. Despite being briefly isolated, Sheltra was returned to his housing unit and was attacked by another inmate in April. He subsequently filed a lawsuit, asserting violations of the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments due to the defendants' failure to protect him from a known harm.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted summary judgment for the defendants, dismissing the action for failure to exhaust administrative remedies because Sheltra did not file a formal grievance after the April attack. The court also granted summary judgment for the defendants on Sheltra's official-capacity claims, as they were barred by the Eleventh Amendment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and adopted the continuing-violations doctrine for purposes of administrative exhaustion under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). The court held that a properly exhausted prison grievance asserting one continuing harm or a single course of conduct can exhaust events arising out of the same alleged violation that occur after the grievance was made. Applying this doctrine, the court concluded that Sheltra's attack was part of the same continuing harm or course of conduct described in his prison grievance before the attack. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment on Sheltra's individual-capacity claims against the defendants. However, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the defendants on Sheltra's official-capacity claims due to Eleventh Amendment immunity. View "SHELTRA V. CHRISTENSEN" on Justia Law