Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michael Hogan, a death row inmate in Nevada, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Hogan challenged the district court's denial of relief on two certified issues and sought to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) on five additional issues. The case predates the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.Hogan's first certified claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failing to investigate his 1971 Iowa manslaughter conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in his Nevada penalty proceeding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Hogan's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to challenge the Iowa conviction in Nevada rather than in Iowa. The court also found that Hogan could not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to challenge the Iowa conviction as a crime of violence under Nevada law.Hogan's second certified claim argued that the procedural default of his trial-court IAC claims should be excused under Martinez v. Ryan. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasons for concluding that Hogan failed to establish "cause" under Martinez. The court held that Martinez applies to procedural defaults based on state timeliness rules and that Hogan's failure to raise the trial IAC claims in his second petition did not preclude Martinez relief. The court remanded Claims 2(A)-(G) and (I)-(O) to the district court for further proceedings.The Ninth Circuit granted Hogan's motion to expand the COA to include whether the district court erred in dismissing his challenges to the aggravating circumstances (Claims 5(A) and (B)) as procedurally defaulted. The court held that these claims were properly exhausted and that Nevada's procedural rules were not consistently applied as of 1990, allowing federal review of the merits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits of these claims.The Ninth Circuit declined to expand the COA to cover four other issues, including Hogan's Confrontation Clause claim, jury instructional errors, lethal injection claim, and cumulative errors claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on these issues. View "Hogan v. Bean" on Justia Law

Two yoga teachers, Steven Hubbard and Amy Baack, challenged the City of San Diego's ordinance prohibiting teaching yoga to four or more persons at the City’s shoreline parks or beaches. They argued that this prohibition violated their First Amendment rights. The ordinance defined teaching yoga as a non-expressive activity and prohibited it without the City’s permission, even if offered for free. Hubbard and Baack, who offered free yoga classes in these parks, were stopped by City park rangers and issued infraction tickets for violating the ordinance.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied their motion for a preliminary injunction. The court found that teaching yoga was not protected speech under the First Amendment and that the City’s prohibition was a valid time, place, and manner restriction. The court also concluded that issuing an injunction was not in the public interest, as the City had not banned yoga entirely but had restricted it to non-shoreline parks.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that teaching yoga is protected speech under the First Amendment because it involves communicating and disseminating information about yoga’s philosophy and practice. The court found that the City’s ordinance was content-based, as it specifically targeted yoga, and thus failed strict scrutiny. The City did not demonstrate a compelling interest or narrow tailoring to justify the prohibition. The court concluded that Hubbard and Baack were likely to succeed on the merits of their as-applied First Amendment claim, would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction, and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the injunction. The case was remanded with instructions to enter a preliminary injunction in favor of Hubbard and Baack. View "HUBBARD V. CITY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

Antoine Johnson was convicted of conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, and the use and discharge of a firearm causing death during a crime of violence. The charges stemmed from the robbery of an armored truck in which a guard was fatally shot. Johnson argued that his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) was unlawful because intervening Supreme Court case law invalidated § 924(c)’s residual clause, and thus, the jury must have based his conviction on invalid crime-of-violence predicates.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Johnson’s motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255. The district court held that Johnson’s § 924(c) conviction was based on at least one valid predicate pursuant to the elements clause: Hobbs Act robbery. The court also ruled that any error in the jury instructions was harmless because no reasonable juror could have found Johnson guilty of § 924(c) based solely on his participation in the conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery and not the commission of the robbery itself.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling on two alternative grounds. First, the Ninth Circuit held that there was no error in the jury instructions because the district court correctly instructed the jury that it could rely on either of two valid predicate crimes of violence: the direct commission of Hobbs Act robbery or Hobbs Act robbery under a Pinkerton theory of liability. Second, the Ninth Circuit concluded that even if the trial court had instructed the jury that it could rely on one invalid predicate in addition to the valid theories of Hobbs Act robbery, the error would have been harmless on the facts of this case. View "JOHNSON V. USA" on Justia Law

Petitioners Joshua Davis and N.A. were victims of a cryptocurrency theft and extortion scheme. The defendants impersonated Davis to gain control of his cellphone number, hacked his email accounts, and stole both Davis's and N.A.'s Ether. Davis reported the crime to the FBI and filed a petition for remission, while N.A. also reported the theft and filed similar petitions. The government, however, failed to properly calculate the restitution amounts, leading to the district court ordering restitution that significantly understated the value of the stolen Ether.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California sentenced the defendants and ordered restitution of $43,000 to Davis and $40,000 to N.A., based on the government's incorrect calculations. Petitioners later discovered the errors and filed motions to reopen the restitution orders, arguing that the correct value of their stolen Ether was much higher. The district court acknowledged the government's mistakes but denied the motions, concluding that Petitioners did not "discover further losses subsequent to sentencing" under 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted the petitions for writs of mandamus. The court held that Petitioners were entitled to seek mandamus relief under the Crime Victims' Rights Act (CVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3771(d)(3), and that the limitations on motions to reopen a sentence set forth in § 3771(d)(5) do not apply to petitions to reopen restitution brought under § 3664(d)(5). The court concluded that the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. § 3664(d)(5), allows crime victims to petition to reopen restitution when they "subsequently discover" that a district court's restitution order failed to include recoverable losses. The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether Petitioners met the additional good cause and timing requirements set forth in the MVRA. View "A. V. UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT FOR THE NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

The case involves the State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game (Alaska) challenging the Federal Subsistence Board's (Board) authorization of an emergency subsistence hunt for the Organized Village of Kake (the Tribe) during the COVID-19 pandemic. The Board allowed the hunt due to significant food supply chain disruptions, permitting the Tribe to harvest two moose and five deer on federal public lands in Alaska. The hunt was conducted by hunters selected by the Tribe, and the yield was distributed to both tribal and non-tribal residents of Kake.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska initially dismissed Alaska's claims related to the Kake hunt as moot. Alaska appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal of Alaska's claim that the Board lacked authority to authorize the hunt, remanding that specific claim for further proceedings. On remand, the district court ruled that the Board's approval of the hunt did not violate the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (ANILCA) and denied Alaska's request for declaratory and permanent injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's judgment that the Board had the authority under ANILCA to authorize the emergency subsistence hunt. The court held that Section 811(a) of ANILCA provided the Board with the authority to ensure rural residents have reasonable access to subsistence resources on federal lands, which includes the power to authorize emergency hunts. The court also vacated the district court's judgment on Alaska's improper delegation claim, ruling that the district court exceeded its mandate by addressing this claim, and remanded with instructions to dismiss it. View "ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF FISH AND GAME V. FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE BOARD" on Justia Law

Two Korean spas, collectively referred to as "the Spa," had a policy of granting entry only to biological women, excluding men and preoperative transgender women. The Washington State Human Rights Commission (HRC) initiated an enforcement action against the Spa, alleging that this policy violated the Washington Law Against Discrimination (WLAD), which prohibits discrimination in public facilities based on sexual orientation, including gender expression or identity. The Spa did not challenge the statute's definition or argue that their conduct did not fit within it but claimed that enforcing WLAD against their policy violated their First Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the Spa's complaint with prejudice under Rule 12(b)(6). The court held that the Spa's conduct discriminated based on gender identity, thus falling within WLAD's scope. It also found that the HRC's enforcement did not impermissibly burden the Spa's First Amendment rights to free speech, free exercise of religion, or free association.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's dismissal. The court held that the Spa's entrance policy discriminated based on gender identity, which is included in WLAD's definition of sexual orientation. The court applied intermediate scrutiny to the Spa's free speech claim, concluding that WLAD imposed an incidental restriction on speech no greater than necessary to eliminate discriminatory conduct. The court also applied rational basis review to the Spa's free exercise claim, finding that WLAD was neutral and generally applicable, and that eliminating discrimination based on sex and transgender status is a legitimate government purpose. Finally, the court rejected the Spa's free association claim, determining that the Spa was neither an intimate nor an expressive association. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of the complaint. View "Olympus Spa v. Armstrong" on Justia Law

Yasiel Puig Valdes signed a pre-indictment plea agreement with the Government, agreeing to plead guilty to making false statements to federal officers in exchange for a reduced sentence and the Government's promise not to bring an additional charge of obstruction of justice. Puig later decided not to plead guilty, leading the Government to declare him in breach of the plea agreement and seek to enforce a provision waiving all evidentiary objections to the admission of the plea agreement’s factual basis at trial, including objections based on Rule 410 of the Federal Rules of Evidence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California ruled that Rule 410 remained applicable and excluded the factual basis of Puig’s plea agreement from being admitted at trial. The court held that the plea agreement was unenforceable because it had not been approved by the court, as required for agreements under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(A). The Government appealed this decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s ruling. The Ninth Circuit held that Puig’s waiver of the protections of Rule 410 was contingent on a court finding that there was a breach of an enforceable agreement. Since the plea agreement required court approval and such approval had not occurred, the agreement was not enforceable. Consequently, the waiver did not apply, and Rule 410 barred the admission of the factual basis of Puig’s plea agreement at trial. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court correctly excluded the factual basis under Rule 410. View "United States v. Puig Valdes" on Justia Law

The case involves the Tohono O’odham Nation, the San Carlos Apache Tribe, Archaeology Southwest, and the Center for Biological Diversity (collectively, "Plaintiffs") who filed a lawsuit against the United States Department of the Interior, the Secretary of the Interior, and the Bureau of Land Management (collectively, "Department"). The Plaintiffs allege that the Department violated the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) by issuing two limited notices to proceed (LNTPs) for the construction of a transmission line by SunZia Transmission, LLC, before fulfilling its NHPA obligations. The Plaintiffs claim that the San Pedro Valley, through which the transmission line runs, is a historic property protected under the NHPA.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona allowed SunZia to intervene as a defendant. The district court denied the Plaintiffs' motion for a preliminary injunction and subsequently granted the Department's and SunZia's motions to dismiss under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The district court also denied the Plaintiffs leave to amend their complaint, deeming it futile. The Plaintiffs then appealed the district court's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order dismissing the action. The Ninth Circuit held that the LNTPs constituted final agency actions because they represented the Department's final decision that the requirements for a Programmatic Agreement (PA) had been satisfied, allowing SunZia to begin construction. The court found that the Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the Department violated the PA by failing to consult with the Plaintiffs on a historic property treatment plan that would evaluate whether the San Pedro Valley should be designated as a historic property. The court inferred that proper consultation would have likely resulted in the Valley being designated as such. Consequently, the Plaintiffs also plausibly alleged that the Department violated the PA by authorizing construction before properly identifying all historic properties affected by the project and ensuring that any adverse effects would be avoided, minimized, or mitigated. The Ninth Circuit reversed and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "TOHONO O'ODHAM NATION V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF THE INTERIOR" on Justia Law

Carroll Shelby Licensing, Inc. and Carroll Hall Shelby Trust filed a lawsuit against Denice Halicki and her associated entities, alleging that Halicki's copyright claims over the "Eleanor" Ford Mustangs were invalid. Halicki counterclaimed, asserting that Shelby's "GT-500CR" Mustangs infringed her copyright in Eleanor, a collection of Mustangs featured in four films. The dispute also involved claims of breach of a prior settlement agreement between the parties.The United States District Court for the Central District of California held that Eleanor was not entitled to character copyright protection and dismissed Halicki’s breach of contract claim based on the settlement agreement. The court also denied Shelby’s request for a declaration that the GT-500CR did not infringe any of Halicki’s rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s summary judgment that Eleanor was not entitled to character copyright protection. The Ninth Circuit applied the Towle test and concluded that Eleanor did not have conceptual qualities, consistent traits, or distinctive elements necessary for character copyright protection. The court also affirmed the district court’s judgment that Shelby did not violate the settlement agreement, which prohibited Shelby from copying only Eleanor’s distinctive hood and inset lights.However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of declaratory relief and remanded the case for the purpose of issuing the appropriate declaration. The appellate court held that a declaration would clarify and settle the legal relations between Shelby and Halicki and provide Shelby relief from the uncertainty that led to the proceedings. View "CARROLL SHELBY LICENSING, INC. V. HALICKI" on Justia Law

Namir Malik Ali Greene committed a series of convenience store and gas station robberies during a three-week period in March and April 2023. He used a BB gun to intimidate store clerks and stole between $100 and $2,000 from each location. Greene also stole three cars, two by using the BB gun to intimidate the owners and one by stealing the keys. He was eventually arrested after a high-speed pursuit. Greene was charged with nine counts of interference with commerce by robbery and one count of carjacking.Greene pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and stipulated to facts establishing seven additional Hobbs Act robberies and one car theft. The presentence report treated the car theft as a carjacking pseudo-count and calculated an adjusted offense level of 26 for that offense. The district court adopted the presentence report’s calculation, including the use of carjacking as the greater of the adjusted offense levels, and sentenced Greene to 120 months in prison.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case for plain error because Greene did not object to the district court’s reliance on carjacking to calculate his offense level. The Ninth Circuit agreed with Greene that the district court erred by using the carjacking pseudo-count because the elements of federal carjacking were not specifically established by his plea agreement. The stipulated facts did not establish that Greene acted with the intent to cause death or serious bodily harm, which is required for federal carjacking. The Ninth Circuit held that this error was plain and affected Greene’s substantial rights. The court exercised its discretion to correct the error and remanded the case for resentencing on an open record. View "USA V. GREENE" on Justia Law