Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

After a jury trial, the defendant was convicted of attempting to kidnap a federal officer and assaulting a family member of a federal official. During sentencing in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, the court heard arguments from counsel for both the defense and the government, but did not ask the defendant if he wished to speak personally before sentencing—a procedural requirement known as allocution, mandated by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.Shortly after imposing concurrent maximum sentences for both counts, the government realized the allocution right had been overlooked and promptly moved to reopen sentencing under Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35(a), which allows correction of “arithmetical, technical, or other clear error” within 14 days of sentencing. The district court granted the government’s motion over the defendant’s objection, vacated the original sentence, and set a new sentencing hearing. At the subsequent hearing, the defendant was allowed to address the court and allocute. The district court then reimposed the same sentences as before.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered whether the district court had the authority to correct its failure to afford allocution by reopening sentencing under Rule 35(a). The Ninth Circuit held that the failure to allow a defendant the right to allocute under Rule 32 constitutes “other clear error” correctable under Rule 35(a). The court concluded that resentencing after a belated allocution is permissible under Rule 35(a), even if it requires the exercise of judicial discretion. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. DEPAPE" on Justia Law

The defendant pleaded guilty in 2024 to being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the government sought an increased base offense level under the U.S. Sentencing Guidelines, which applies if the defendant has at least two prior felony convictions for a crime of violence. The defendant conceded that a previous conviction for third-degree assault in Oregon counted as one predicate crime of violence, but contested whether his 2021 Oregon conviction for attempted first-degree assault qualified as a second predicate.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon concluded that attempted first-degree assault under Oregon law does qualify as a crime of violence and increased the defendant’s base offense level accordingly. The court calculated a Guidelines range of 108 to 135 months and sentenced the defendant to 80 months’ imprisonment. The defendant appealed, arguing that the attempt statute in Oregon is broader than the federal definition of attempt and should not qualify under the “force clause” of the Sentencing Guidelines.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. Applying its precedent, the court held that the “attempted use” of physical force, as required by the force clause in the Sentencing Guidelines, means taking a substantial step toward the use of physical force. Because Oregon law requires a substantial step toward causing serious physical injury for a conviction of attempted first-degree assault, the Ninth Circuit concluded that such a conviction qualifies as a crime of violence. The court rejected the argument that a narrower “probable desistance” test should apply and affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. CHAVEZ-ECHEVERRIA" on Justia Law

The case concerns the National Marine Fisheries Service’s (NMFS) designation of critical habitat in 2022 for two species of Arctic seals, following their listing as threatened under the Endangered Species Act (ESA) in 2012. The designated areas covered waters off Alaska’s north coast and were based on findings that those areas contained physical and biological features essential to the conservation of the seal species. Alaska opposed these designations, contending that they were too broad and provided minimal benefit, and requested that certain coastal areas be excluded due to economic impacts. NMFS excluded an area used by the Navy for training but declined to exclude others requested by Alaska and the North Slope Borough, finding no significant economic impact.The United States District Court for the District of Alaska largely agreed with Alaska, holding that the critical habitat designations were unlawful. The court vacated the rules and remanded the matter to NMFS, concluding that NMFS had not adequately explained why the entire designated area was necessary for the seals’ conservation, had failed to consider foreign conservation efforts and foreign habitat, and had abused its discretion by not considering certain exclusions. The Center for Biological Diversity intervened as a defendant and appealed the district court’s decision. The district court did, however, reject Alaska’s argument that NMFS had failed to comply with the ESA’s “prudency” requirement.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that it had jurisdiction, reversed the district court’s rulings that the designations were unlawful, and affirmed the court’s ruling on the ESA’s prudency requirement. The Ninth Circuit held that NMFS’s designations complied with the ESA, that the agency was not required to consider foreign conservation efforts or habitat, and that the decision not to exclude certain coastal areas was within its discretion. The critical habitat designations were reinstated, and the case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the Center and NMFS. View "STATE OF ALASKA V. NATIONAL MARINE FISHERIES SERVICE" on Justia Law

In this case, law enforcement learned from a confidential informant that Christian Ferrari was manufacturing and selling privately made firearms, commonly called “ghost guns,” without the required federal license or serial numbers, making the weapons untraceable. Between March and May 2023, Ferrari sold 22 unregistered AR-15 style rifles, including 20 short-barreled rifles, to undercover ATF agents in four separate cash transactions. During these sales, Ferrari failed to ask for or provide paperwork, complete background checks, or exchange identification. The agents told Ferrari that the guns were intended for use in protecting marijuana grows in Northern California and for transport to Mexico.Ferrari was charged in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California and pled guilty to four counts of willfully dealing firearms without a license. The Presentence Investigation Report recommended a sentencing enhancement for firearms trafficking under U.S.S.G. § 2K2.1(b)(5), based on Ferrari having “reason to believe” the guns would be used unlawfully. Ferrari objected, arguing there was no evidence he believed the agents were unlawful possessors or would use the guns unlawfully. The district court overruled his objection, finding the totality of circumstances gave Ferrari reason to believe in unlawful use, and applied the enhancement, resulting in a 37-month sentence.On appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, Ferrari changed his argument, claiming the Sentencing Guidelines required that the transferee in fact be an unlawful possessor or intend unlawful use. The Ninth Circuit, reviewing de novo, held that Application Note 13 to § 2K2.1(b)(5) does not require that what the defendant had reason to believe was actually true. Because Ferrari did not dispute he had reason to believe the agents were unlawful possessors, the district court correctly applied the enhancement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence. View "USA V. FERRARI" on Justia Law

A Mexican national attempted to enter the United States in 2003 using fraudulent documents and was removed under an expedited order. After re-entering the country illegally, he was discovered in 2024 and his prior removal order was reinstated. During the reinstatement proceedings, he expressed fear of returning to Mexico and received a reasonable-fear interview, but the asylum officer determined he did not have a reasonable fear of persecution or torture. The immigration judge reviewed and affirmed this negative reasonable-fear determination, meaning he was not eligible for further proceedings to seek withholding of removal or protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).After the immigration judge’s decision, the individual filed a petition for review with the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit. He did not challenge the original expedited removal order or the reinstated removal order, but instead sought review solely of the denial of CAT relief. The government did not argue that the petition was untimely, but the court requested additional briefing after the Supreme Court’s decision in Riley v. Bondi, which addressed jurisdiction over such petitions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it lacked jurisdiction to review a petition challenging only an order denying CAT relief when the petitioner did not also seek review of a final order of removal. The court concluded that, under current statutes and Supreme Court precedent, only final orders of removal are reviewable, and an order denying CAT relief does not qualify as a final order of removal nor does it merge into such an order. The court dismissed the petition for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petitioner’s request to amend his petition to add a nominal challenge to the removal order, as any such challenge would be baseless and futile. View "NAVARRETE V. BONDI" on Justia Law

An individual brought suit against her employer, a Delaware corporation, alleging various claims of discrimination based on age and disability under state and federal law. The employment contract between the parties included an arbitration provision, specifying that all employment-related disputes were to be resolved through binding arbitration under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), in accordance with procedures outlined in the California Arbitration Act. The contract also incorporated JAMS rules, which assign the arbitrator authority to resolve issues regarding the validity and enforceability of the arbitration agreement itself.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California reviewed the employer’s motion to compel arbitration. The court recognized that the arbitration agreement, by incorporating the JAMS rules, delegated questions about the agreement's validity to an arbitrator. However, relying on California state court decisions, the district court determined that the presence of a severability clause—allowing a court or other competent body to sever invalid provisions—negated a “clear and unmistakable” delegation to the arbitrator. Consequently, the district court concluded it was responsible for determining validity and found the arbitration agreement unconscionable, denying the motion to compel arbitration.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s judgment de novo. The appellate court held that the contract’s delegation clause, by clearly incorporating JAMS rules, unmistakably reserved the issue of the arbitration agreement’s validity for the arbitrator. The existence of a severability clause did not undermine this delegation. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration, vacated its unconscionability judgment, and remanded with instructions to compel arbitration and stay the case pending arbitration. View "SANDLER V. MODERNIZING MEDICINE, INC." on Justia Law

Three individuals were convicted under a federal law that prohibits those with prior misdemeanor convictions for domestic violence from possessing firearms or ammunition. Each had a history of violent conduct against intimate partners, and after their misdemeanor convictions under state law, they were later found in possession of firearms, leading to federal charges under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(9).Prior to this appeal, each defendant was convicted in a United States District Court—one in the Northern District of California and two in the District of Alaska—of violating § 922(g)(9). The convictions were based on evidence that after their state-level domestic violence misdemeanor convictions, they knowingly possessed firearms. Following their convictions, the defendants appealed, arguing that § 922(g)(9) is unconstitutional under the Second Amendment, both on its face and as applied to them.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court applied the framework established by New York State Rifle & Pistol Association, Inc. v. Bruen and United States v. Rahimi, and concluded that the plain text of the Second Amendment covers the appellants’ conduct but that the government demonstrated § 922(g)(9) is consistent with the nation’s historical tradition of firearm regulation. The court rejected both the facial and as-applied constitutional challenges, holding that Congress may categorically disarm those convicted of misdemeanor domestic violence without individualized findings of future dangerousness. The court further held that § 922(g)(9) is constitutional as applied to these appellants and affirmed the judgments of conviction. View "USA V. MARTINEZ" on Justia Law

A claimant applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, alleging a range of physical and mental health impairments. After an initial denial and an earlier remand from the district court, the claimant appeared before a new administrative law judge (ALJ). At the hearing, a vocational expert (VE) testified about the number of jobs in the national economy that someone with the claimant’s limitations could perform. The VE identified three specific jobs and provided job-number estimates, relying on sources such as SkillTRAN and manufacturer databases. The claimant then submitted post-hearing objections and contrary job-number evidence, using similar data sources, including SkillTRAN and the U.S. Census Bureau, to show far fewer available jobs or, in some cases, none at all.The ALJ briefly acknowledged the claimant’s contrary evidence but found it unpersuasive, stating that the VE’s testimony was more reliable due to his professional experience. The Appeals Council denied review, and the claimant then challenged the decision in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The district court affirmed, reasoning that the claimant’s alternative job numbers lacked probative value because the evidence did not sufficiently explain the methodology or expertise involved in generating those numbers.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the claimant’s counter evidence was both significant and probative, as it was generated using data sources and methods frequently relied upon by the Social Security Administration and showed large discrepancies with the VE’s estimates. The Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ erred by failing to adequately address and resolve the inconsistencies between the competing job-number evidence. The court reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the matter to the agency for further proceedings to resolve these discrepancies. View "POWLEY V. BISIGNANO" on Justia Law

A healthcare provider operating as a covered entity under the federal Section 340B Drug Pricing Program purchased pharmaceuticals from several drug manufacturers. The provider alleged that these manufacturers engaged in a fraudulent scheme by knowingly charging prices for drugs that exceeded the statutory ceiling, resulting in inflated reimbursement claims submitted to Medicaid, Medicare, and other government-funded programs. The provider did not seek compensation for its own overcharges, but instead brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), seeking to recover losses on behalf of the federal and state governments.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint with prejudice. It reasoned that, under the Supreme Court’s holding in Astra USA, Inc. v. Santa Clara County, Section 340B does not confer a private right of action for covered entities to sue drug manufacturers over pricing disputes; such claims must instead be pursued through the Section 340B Administrative Dispute Resolution process. The district court concluded that the provider’s FCA claims were essentially attempts to enforce Section 340B and should therefore be barred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the provider’s FCA claims were not barred by the absence of a private right of action under Section 340B or by the Astra decision, because the action was brought to remediate fraud against the government and not to recover personal losses or enforce Section 340B directly. The court further found that the provider had plausibly pleaded falsity under the FCA. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case for further proceedings. View "ADVENTIST HEALTH SYSTEM OF WEST V. ABBVIE INC." on Justia Law

Cruz Torres-Gonzalez was convicted in 2014 for illegal reentry into the United States and for making false statements to federal officers. He received concurrent 35-month sentences for these offenses. In 2024, he was again convicted of illegal reentry. During sentencing for the 2024 conviction, the district court considered his prior convictions and applied sentencing enhancements under the United States Sentencing Guidelines, including an eight-level enhancement based on the 35-month sentence for his prior false-statement conviction.After his 2024 conviction in the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, Torres-Gonzalez objected to the eight-level enhancement. He argued that the sentence for his false-statement offense was not truly independent, as it had been grouped with his illegal reentry conviction in 2014, which carried the highest offense level. He asserted that this grouping made it impossible to determine the appropriate enhancement, and asked the court to apply a lesser, four-level enhancement instead. The district court acknowledged that the grouped sentence likely affected the length of the false-statement sentence but concluded that the guidelines, as written, required the eight-level enhancement. The court imposed a sentence of 51 months.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of the Sentencing Guidelines de novo. The appellate court held that the district court correctly applied the guidelines. It found no ambiguity in the relevant guideline provisions and determined that the length of the prior sentence, even if grouped, was the proper basis for the enhancement. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the sentence imposed by the district court. View "USA V. TORRES-GONZALEZ" on Justia Law