Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two former residents of Libby, Montana developed mesothelioma after being exposed to asbestos. The exposure was linked to asbestos-containing vermiculite transported by BNSF Railway Company from a nearby mine. Between 1922 and 1990, BNSF was required by federal law to ship this vermiculite to and from its Libby railyard. Evidence showed that asbestos dust escaped from sealed railcars during transit and switching operations, eventually accumulating in and around the railyard. Both plaintiffs resided or spent considerable time near the railyard during the relevant period.This litigation began when the personal representatives of the decedents’ estates brought negligence and strict liability claims against BNSF in the United States District Court for the District of Montana. BNSF moved for summary judgment on the strict liability claims, arguing that it was protected by the common carrier exception, but the district court denied the motion. After a jury trial, the jury found for BNSF on negligence but for the plaintiffs on strict liability, awarding compensatory damages. The district court subsequently denied BNSF’s renewed motion for judgment as a matter of law on the strict liability claims, prompting BNSF’s appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s interpretation of Montana law de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by applying the common carrier exception too narrowly. The appellate court concluded that BNSF’s transportation of asbestos-containing vermiculite, including the resulting accumulation of asbestos dust, was conducted pursuant to its federally mandated duty as a common carrier. Montana law, including recent precedent from the Montana Supreme Court, supported applying the common carrier exception to shield BNSF from strict liability in these circumstances. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded with instructions to enter judgment for BNSF. View "Wells v. BNSF Railway Co." on Justia Law

A group of wholesale businesses that purchased Clear Eyes Redness Relief eye drops from a manufacturer alleged that the manufacturer sold the product at unlawfully lower prices to their larger competitors, specifically Costco and Sam’s Club. The manufacturer provided these large buyers with discounts and customer rebates not offered to the wholesalers, resulting in a significant price advantage for Costco and Sam’s Club. The wholesalers claimed that this conduct made it impossible for them to compete effectively and sought relief under the Robinson-Patman Act, as well as California’s Unfair Practices Act and Unfair Competition Law.The case was tried in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The jury found in favor of the wholesalers on their federal claims and awarded damages, except for one wholesaler that was not found to be in direct competition with Costco. The district court also found in favor of the California-based wholesalers on the state claims, entered judgment for the wholesalers, awarded damages, and issued a permanent injunction against the manufacturer. The court also awarded attorney’s fees but reduced the requested amount based on the size of the plaintiffs’ law firm rather than prevailing market rates.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment in favor of the wholesalers on all substantive issues. The appellate court held that the district court properly instructed the jury, correctly included customer rebates in the price discrimination calculation, and appropriately issued a permanent injunction. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s award of attorney’s fees, holding that a law firm's size alone cannot determine the market rate for a lodestar calculation. The case was remanded for recalculation of attorney’s fees consistent with prevailing market rates. View "LA International Corp. v. Prestige Brands Holdings, Inc." on Justia Law

The defendant operated two companies that provided durable medical equipment, both of which were enrolled as Medicare providers under the names of her mother and nephew. The defendant orchestrated a scheme where patient information was used to submit fraudulent claims for unnecessary medical equipment and repairs, with the assistance of other employees and marketers. Over a ten-year period, the companies submitted more than $24 million in claims, of which Medicare paid approximately $13 million.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the case. The defendant was indicted and, after a second trial, convicted by a jury of conspiracy to launder monetary instruments, healthcare fraud, and aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), based on the use of her relatives’ names during the commission of health care fraud. The district court sentenced her to a total of 180 months in custody, including a mandatory consecutive two-year term for aggravated identity theft. The defendant appealed her convictions for aggravated identity theft.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The main issue on appeal was whether the use of her relatives’ names constituted aggravated identity theft under the standard clarified in Dubin v. United States, 599 U.S. 110 (2023). The Ninth Circuit held that the government failed to show that the use of the relatives’ names was “at the crux” of the fraud—meaning that the use itself was fraudulent or deceitful and critical to the scheme’s success, as required by Dubin. The court vacated the defendant’s sentence for aggravated identity theft and remanded the case to the district court for resentencing. The healthcare fraud and other convictions were not in dispute. View "USA V. MOTLEY" on Justia Law

In this case, the defendant, a Mexican citizen residing in the United States, traveled to Hawaii in June 2023, where he rented a studio apartment. A suspicious package addressed to a name similar to his arrived at the property owner’s residence. After the owner opened the package and suspected it contained drugs, she turned it over to law enforcement. The package was later confirmed to contain nearly 5 kilograms of a methamphetamine mixture. The defendant was arrested and interviewed, during which he admitted to being recruited to pick up and deliver a package and to wire money linked to drug trafficking, though he claimed not to know the specific type or quantity of drugs involved.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii presided over the trial. A jury convicted the defendant on charges of conspiracy to possess and attempted possession with intent to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine. The district court sentenced him to concurrent ten-year prison terms. The defendant appealed, arguing that the jury instructions were improper regarding his knowledge of the drug’s type and quantity, and that religious images and expert testimony admitted at trial were prejudicial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under United States v. Hunt, the government must prove the defendant’s specific intent to possess the particular drug type and quantity to trigger the heightened penalty under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(A)(viii). The district court’s jury instruction relieving the government of this burden was not harmless error. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence for attempted possession but not the conviction itself, remanding for resentencing. The court affirmed the convictions, finding that any error in admitting expert testimony about “narco saints” was harmless. The judgment was thus affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "USA V. ALAVEZ" on Justia Law

David Ho-Romero was stopped at the border near San Diego in February 2021, and authorities discovered over 11 kilograms of methamphetamine in his vehicle. He was subsequently indicted for importing methamphetamine. During the investigation, prosecutors called Witness 1, Ho-Romero’s former romantic partner, to testify before a grand jury. After learning of Witness 1’s involvement from his roommate, Ho-Romero contacted Witness 1 and her friend (Witness 2), making statements that the government interpreted as threats. Based on these communications, Ho-Romero was charged with witness tampering but pled guilty only to drug importation, not to tampering. The parties agreed to dismiss the tampering charges in exchange for Ho-Romero stipulating to the admissibility of Witness 1 and Witness 2’s grand jury testimony.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California ordered a presentence report recommending an obstruction of justice enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Defense counsel objected, arguing Ho-Romero did not willfully obstruct justice. At sentencing, the district court applied the enhancement, interpreting “willfulness” as an objective standard without requiring a finding of specific intent to obstruct justice. The court found only that Ho-Romero’s statements could be understood as threats. With the enhancement, the Guidelines range increased, but the court imposed a downward departure, sentencing Ho-Romero to 60 months imprisonment and five years of supervised release. Ho-Romero appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo for legal error. The court held that § 3C1.1 requires a finding that the defendant acted with the specific intent to obstruct justice, citing United States v. Lofton as controlling law. The district court erred by not making such a mens rea finding. The Ninth Circuit vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing, requiring proper findings as to Ho-Romero’s conscious purpose to obstruct justice. View "United States v. Ho-Romero" on Justia Law

Bryan Brandenburg remotely participated in divorce proceedings at a courthouse in Salt Lake City, Utah. Following the proceedings, Brandenburg sent increasingly hostile emails to court staff, which ultimately escalated to threats of bombing the courthouse and other government and educational institutions, as well as various targets elsewhere. His threats prompted extensive security responses at the courthouse, including enhanced screenings, patrols, surveillance reviews, and coordination with law enforcement. Additionally, threats to journalists led to security measures at the University of Utah and Hall Labs, including evacuations, sweeps, and diversion of law enforcement resources during significant campus events.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii presided over Brandenburg’s criminal trial. A jury convicted him of transmitting threats in interstate commerce and making threats or false statements about explosives. At sentencing, the government requested a sentencing enhancement under U.S. Sentencing Guideline § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A), arguing that Brandenburg’s actions caused a substantial disruption of governmental functions. The district court agreed, finding that the courthouse security staff’s extensive response constituted such a disruption, and imposed the enhancement. Brandenburg appealed both his conviction and the sentencing enhancement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that a non-public-facing security response to a threat can qualify as a substantial disruption of governmental functions under § 2A6.1(b)(4)(A). The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court properly evaluated the scope and duration of the disruption and did not abuse its discretion in applying the enhancement. The court affirmed the district court’s decision, upholding the sentencing enhancement for substantial disruption of governmental functions. View "USA V. BRANDENBURG" on Justia Law

Susan Cox, a resident of Albion, Washington, died from an overdose of medications prescribed by her primary care physician, Dr. Patricia Marciano. Dr. Marciano, along with Gritman Medical Center, both based in Idaho near the Washington border, had treated Susan for several years. Although Susan lived in Washington, her medical treatment occurred in Idaho. At Susan’s request, her prescriptions were regularly transmitted to pharmacies in Washington. Susan’s husband, Mark Cox, and her estate brought a wrongful death and survivor action in the Eastern District of Washington, alleging that Susan’s death resulted from negligent over-prescription of pharmaceuticals.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied the plaintiffs’ request for jurisdictional discovery regarding general personal jurisdiction over Gritman and dismissed the case for lack of personal jurisdiction. The district court found that Washington’s long-arm statute did not confer jurisdiction and that exercising specific jurisdiction would violate due process, as the defendants had not purposefully availed themselves of the Washington forum. The district court did not reach the question of venue.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal. The court of appeals held that the district court’s exercise of personal jurisdiction over the Idaho defendants was proper under Washington’s long-arm statute and consistent with the Due Process Clause because the defendants maintained ongoing, deliberate relationships with Washington residents and regularly sent prescriptions to Washington pharmacies in compliance with state law. The court also held that venue was proper in the Eastern District of Washington since a substantial part of the events underlying the claims occurred there. The case was remanded for further proceedings, with dismissal affirmed only for one defendant whom the plaintiffs conceded was properly dismissed. View "COX V. GRITMAN MEDICAL CENTER" on Justia Law

Paul Engstrom pleaded guilty to conspiracy to distribute a controlled substance and money laundering conspiracy, admitting to involvement in distributing 500 grams or more of cocaine—an offense carrying a five-year mandatory minimum sentence. In his plea agreement, Engstrom acknowledged he was ineligible for safety valve relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f) and agreed not to seek such relief. At sentencing in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, the court imposed a 70-month sentence, below the guideline range but above the statutory minimum, citing Engstrom’s difficult pretrial detention and his coconspirators’ similar sentences.Following sentencing, the district court held a resentencing hearing pursuant to Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 35, aiming to correct a perceived technical error in considering the mandatory minimum after granting Engstrom safety valve relief. The court concluded that Engstrom was eligible for safety valve relief, finding that his statements in open court were sufficient, and imposed a 46-month sentence, below the statutory minimum. The government moved for reconsideration, arguing Engstrom had not satisfied the statutory debrief requirement and was ineligible under the Supreme Court’s decision in Pulsifer v. United States, issued during the appeal, which interpreted § 3553(f)(1) to preclude safety valve relief if any one of three criminal history criteria applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s resentencing decision for plain error and found no error in holding the Rule 35 hearing. However, the Ninth Circuit held that Engstrom was not eligible for safety valve relief because he did not provide a complete debrief to the government as required by § 3553(f)(5), and, under Pulsifer, his prior three-point conviction categorically precluded relief. The court reversed the district court, vacated Engstrom’s sentence, and remanded for resentencing without safety valve relief. View "USA V. ENGSTROM" on Justia Law

Funko, Inc., a company specializing in pop culture collectibles, experienced a significant decline in its share price after writing off millions of dollars in unsellable inventory. Shareholders who purchased Funko stock during the relevant period alleged that Funko and its key officers misled investors about the progress of relocating to a new warehouse, the quality and management of inventory, the status of its information technology upgrades, and its distribution capabilities. The plaintiffs claimed that these misrepresentations led them to buy stock at artificially inflated prices. The period in question was marked by Funko's transition to a larger distribution center and a planned upgrade of its enterprise resource planning software, both of which encountered serious operational difficulties that impacted inventory management and order fulfillment.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed the complaint, holding that the plaintiffs failed to sufficiently allege falsity and scienter—a necessary intent to mislead investors or recklessness to the risk of doing so. The district court found that most of the challenged statements were either not objectively false, constituted non-actionable puffery, or were protected as forward-looking statements under the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s safe harbor.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal in part and reversed in part. The Ninth Circuit held that while Funko’s affirmative statements about the distribution center operations, inventory quality, and distribution capabilities were not demonstrably false or actionable, certain risk disclosures in Funko’s SEC filings regarding inventory management and its use of existing information technology systems were misleading. The court found that these risk disclosures implied the risks were merely hypothetical when, in fact, they had already materialized. The court also found sufficient allegations of scienter, concluding that senior officers likely knew their statements were misleading. The court reversed the dismissal of claims related to those disclosures and remanded for further proceedings. View "Construction Laborers Pension Trust of Greater St. Louis v. Funko, Inc." on Justia Law

A California state prisoner, Maurice Lydell Harris, is a practicing Nichiren Buddhist who believes his faith requires him to eat “clean” food, including meat as close to its natural state as possible. Because the prison system did not offer a diet specifically aligned with his religious practice, Harris enrolled in the halal meat program (RMAP), based on advice from a prison chaplain that it most closely matched his requirements. Prison regulations require RMAP participants to refrain from buying non-halal foods from the commissary, but Harris purchased such items, including ramen and processed meats, citing health needs and cultural practices, which led to multiple violations and ultimately his removal from the program.Harris filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging that his removal from RMAP violated his rights under the First Amendment and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA). He sought preliminary injunctive relief to continue receiving the RMAP diet while supplementing with non-halal foods. The district court denied Harris’s requests twice, concluding that the RMAP diet was not required by Harris’s religion and that expulsion would not affect his ability to observe his faith.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred by evaluating the centrality of the halal diet to Harris’s beliefs, rather than whether Harris sincerely believed the diet best suited his religious needs. The Ninth Circuit held that Harris could demonstrate a substantial burden on his religious exercise and that, if so, the government must show its regulation is the least restrictive means of advancing a compelling interest. The court vacated the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction and remanded for further proceedings to reassess whether Harris’s religious exercise was substantially burdened. View "Harris v. Muhammad" on Justia Law