Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of eighteen minors residing in California filed a lawsuit against the U.S. Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) and other federal officials, claiming that the government’s policy of discounting future costs and benefits in cost-benefit analyses for greenhouse gas (GHG) regulations discriminates against children. The plaintiffs alleged this practice favors present-day consumption, benefiting adults over minors, and leads to under-regulation of GHG emissions. They argued this under-regulation contributes to climate change, which, in turn, causes them various harms including property damage, health issues, and psychological distress.The case was first heard in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. That court dismissed the action, ruling that the plaintiffs lacked Article III standing. The court found that the plaintiffs’ claims did not establish a cognizable injury-in-fact, that the alleged environmental harms were not fairly traceable to the government’s discounting policies, and that the requested declaratory relief would not redress their injuries. The district court allowed the plaintiffs one opportunity to amend their complaint, but after the plaintiffs did so, the court again dismissed the case and denied further leave to amend, finding further amendment would be futile.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs failed to allege a viable injury to their equal protection rights, as the government’s discounting policies were not shown to be motivated by discriminatory intent toward children. The court also found the alleged environmental harms too attenuated and speculative to be fairly traceable to the challenged policies. Additionally, circuit precedent foreclosed the requested declaratory relief, as it would not redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. The Ninth Circuit concluded that denying further leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. View "G.B. V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

The case concerns a man convicted of the 1989 murders of his girlfriend and her daughter in Arizona. He was found guilty by a jury and subsequently sentenced to death by a judge. The sentencing judge identified multiple aggravating factors, including the especially cruel nature of the crimes, multiple victims, and prior violent felonies. The judge also found statutory and non-statutory mitigating factors, such as the defendant’s impaired capacity, troubled childhood, and psychological issues. After his conviction and sentencing were affirmed on direct appeal by the Arizona Supreme Court, the defendant sought postconviction relief in state court through three separate petitions. His first petition did not raise an ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) claim and was handled by counsel later conceded to be ineffective. A second petition, raising the IAC claim, was denied as untimely. A third petition argued he was intellectually disabled and therefore ineligible for execution, but that claim was rejected after an evidentiary hearing.In federal court, the petitioner’s IAC claim was initially deemed procedurally defaulted by the United States District Court for the District of Arizona. Subsequent Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit decisions, including Martinez v. Ryan, allowed for the possibility that ineffective postconviction counsel could excuse such defaults. The Ninth Circuit originally remanded for an evidentiary hearing, but the United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that federal courts may not expand the state court record based on ineffective state postconviction counsel.On remand, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit considered only evidence properly submitted in state court under procedural rules. The Ninth Circuit found the petitioner demonstrated “cause” to excuse the procedural default but failed to show “prejudice,” as his underlying IAC claim was not “substantial.” Although counsel’s performance was deficient, the new mitigating evidence was unlikely to have changed the sentencing outcome, given the weight of aggravating factors and Arizona precedent. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "RAMIREZ V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

A group of environmental organizations, Native tribes, and individual plaintiffs sought to prevent a land exchange in Southeast Arizona’s Tonto National Forest, mandated by the Southeast Arizona Land Exchange and Conservation Act. This exchange would transfer nearly 2,500 acres of federal land, including Oak Flat—a site of religious significance to the Apache—and a large copper deposit to Resolution Copper Mining LLC. In return, the company would provide over 5,000 acres of equally appraised land to the federal government. Plaintiffs raised concerns under several statutes, including the Land Exchange Act, the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA), the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA), and the Free Exercise Clause, alleging procedural and substantive flaws in the exchange.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied motions for preliminary injunctions, finding that plaintiffs failed to show likely success or serious questions on the merits of their claims relating to appraisal, NEPA compliance, tribal consultation, and religious liberty. In a related case, Apache Stronghold v. United States, the district court’s denial of an injunction on religious liberty grounds was affirmed by the Ninth Circuit and not disturbed by the Supreme Court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing and that their NEPA claims were justiciable as “final agency action.” However, it concluded that plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their appraisal, NEPA, consultation, or religious liberty claims. The court further determined that existing precedent foreclosed the RFRA and Free Exercise arguments. The court did not address other injunction factors and dissolved the administrative stay. View "BROWN LOPEZ V. USA" on Justia Law

A resident living near a Los Angeles refinery operated by Ultramar Inc., a subsidiary of Valero Energy Corp., challenged the renewal of the refinery’s operating permit. The facility, located in Wilmington, is subject to Title V of the Clean Air Act, which requires certain air polluters to obtain operating permits. The resident argued that the permit should include additional conditions to address the potential for a catastrophic release of hydrogen fluoride or modified hydrofluoric acid. He pointed to alleged deficiencies in the refinery’s Risk Management Plan (RMP), Emergency Response Plan, Emergency Response Manual, and other documents, claiming these left the refinery unprepared for such an event.The South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD), acting as the Title V permitting authority, solicited public comments before issuing the permit. The petitioner submitted objections during this process, but SCAQMD rejected them and issued the permit. The petitioner then filed an administrative petition with the Administrator of the United States Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), asking the EPA to object to the permit. The EPA Administrator denied the petition, concluding that issues related to risk management plans and accidental release prevention fall under a separate regulatory program, not the Title V permitting process. The Administrator also found that the requirements referenced by the petitioner were not “applicable requirements” of the Clean Air Act for Title V purposes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the EPA’s decision. The court held that the Administrator’s denial was not arbitrary, capricious, or contrary to law. It concluded that the petitioner failed to show that additional permit conditions were required to ensure compliance with the Clean Air Act’s risk management requirements. The court also found that the petitioner’s arguments based on state law did not qualify as applicable federal requirements. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit denied the petition for review. View "ENG V. ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY" on Justia Law

A small convenience store in downtown Los Angeles, owned by an individual, participated in the Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (SNAP) and served many customers who used electronic benefit transfer (EBT) cards. In early 2022, the Food and Nutrition Service of the United States Department of Agriculture detected suspicious patterns in the store’s SNAP transactions. Over six months, the store processed hundreds of unusually large transactions, nearly 200 transactions that depleted a household’s monthly benefits in one day, numerous rapid consecutive transactions by the same household, and many transactions for the same dollar amount. Following a physical inspection and review of these patterns, the Agency charged the store with trafficking in SNAP benefits, meaning exchanging benefits for cash or non-eligible goods.After receiving a charge letter and providing a response that generally denied wrongdoing and offered explanations for customer behavior, the store was permanently disqualified from SNAP by the Agency. The owner and the store sought administrative review and submitted additional documents, including affidavits and receipts, but the Agency upheld its decision. The plaintiffs then filed for judicial review in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The government moved for summary judgment, and the plaintiffs relied on much of the same evidence previously submitted. The district court granted summary judgment for the government, finding that the plaintiffs failed to raise a genuine dispute of material fact as to whether trafficking had occurred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The court held that the government’s evidence established suspicious transaction patterns supporting an inference of SNAP trafficking and that the plaintiffs failed to provide sufficient evidence to create a genuine dispute as to the legitimacy of the flagged transactions. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of the government. View "BROTHERS MARKET LLC NO. 2 V. USA" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen entered the United States unlawfully several times between 2014 and 2015. After being denied entry and returning to Mexico multiple times, he eventually made a claim for protection, asserting fears of harm from a vigilante group in Mexico called the Defensores of Guerrero, who he said pressured him to join them or a rival cartel. He also cited threats following police contact and discrimination based on his sexual orientation, though he admitted he had not been physically harmed due to his sexuality. He expressed concerns about the safety of relocation within Mexico and referenced crimes against his father by unidentified individuals. The individual’s parents and siblings continued to live in Mexico without incident.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, finding no nexus between the alleged harm and a protected ground, insufficient evidence of past persecution, the reasonableness of internal relocation, and lack of likelihood of torture by or with government acquiescence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, agreeing that the individual failed to establish the necessary connections and that the claimed harms did not rise to the level of persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s decision. The court held that the petitioner had forfeited all arguments on the merits of his immigration claims by not raising them in his opening brief and had also failed to exhaust his procedural due process arguments before the BIA. The court denied the petition for review, ruling that none of the petitioner’s arguments warranted relief, and it would not reach the unexhausted due process claims. View "SANTANA-GONZALEZ V. BONDI" on Justia Law

The case concerns an incident that occurred at Lake Mead, where Bryce Tyrone Verhonich operated a jet ski with a passenger, Lily Hatcher, in the early morning hours. After taking a detour to view the sunrise, both Verhonich and Hatcher fell into the water under rough conditions. Verhonich, who was not wearing a life jacket or engine cut-off lanyard, was rescued, but Hatcher drowned. Subsequent investigation revealed that neither individual was wearing a personal flotation device and the engine cut-off switch lanyard was not attached to Verhonich. Surveillance and body camera footage confirmed these facts. Hatcher’s body was later recovered, and an autopsy found drowning as the cause of death, with drugs as contributing factors.The case was first tried before a United States magistrate judge, who found Verhonich guilty of negligent operation of a vessel, failure to wear a personal flotation device, and failure to attach the engine cut-off switch lanyard—all in violation of National Park Service regulations. The magistrate judge sentenced him to six months in custody and two years of probation. Verhonich appealed to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, arguing improper admission of evidence, insufficient evidence for conviction on negligent operation, and sentencing error. The district court affirmed the convictions and sentence.On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that failure to wear a life jacket and failure to attach a safety lanyard may both be considered in determining negligent operation under 36 C.F.R. § 3.8(b)(8). The court found sufficient evidence to support Verhonich’s conviction, determined that evidentiary objections did not survive plain error review, and upheld the sentence as reasonable. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "USA V. VERHONICH" on Justia Law

The plaintiff entered into a lease agreement with a car dealership to lease a Jeep Grand Cherokee. The lease included an arbitration agreement containing a delegation clause, which specified that disputes about the scope of the arbitration agreement would be decided in arbitration. Later, the plaintiff filed a federal class action lawsuit against the vehicle’s manufacturer, alleging defects in the headrest. The manufacturer, however, was not a party to the lease agreement and did not claim to be an employee, agent, successor, or assign of the dealership.After the lawsuit was filed in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, the manufacturer moved to compel arbitration, arguing that the delegation clause required an arbitrator—not the court—to decide whether the manufacturer could enforce the arbitration agreement. In the alternative, the manufacturer asserted that either the plain language of the agreement or the doctrine of equitable estoppel entitled it to compel arbitration. The district court denied the motion, finding that the manufacturer could not enforce the arbitration agreement because it was not a party to the contract and none of the exceptions allowing enforcement by a non-signatory applied.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration. The appellate court held that, absent a relevant exception, a non-party to an arbitration agreement cannot enforce the agreement’s terms against a signatory. It found that the language of the arbitration agreement did not cover disputes with the manufacturer, and under California law, the manufacturer could not use equitable estoppel to compel arbitration because the plaintiff’s claims were not founded in or intertwined with the lease agreement. The court’s disposition was to affirm the district court’s order. View "OLSON V. FCA US, LLC" on Justia Law

This case involves several dialysis providers, a nonprofit organization, and individual patients challenging a California law (AB 290) aimed at regulating relationships between dialysis providers and nonprofits that assist patients with health insurance premiums. The law was enacted due to concerns that providers were donating to nonprofits to help keep patients on private insurance, which led to higher reimbursements for providers compared to public insurance. Key provisions of the law included capping provider reimbursements if they had a financial relationship with a nonprofit offering patient assistance, requiring disclosure of patients receiving such assistance, restricting nonprofits from conditioning assistance on patient treatment choices, mandating disclosure to patients of all insurance options, and a safe harbor for seeking federal advisory opinions.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted in part and denied in part motions for summary judgment. It upheld the constitutionality of the reimbursement cap, coverage disclosure requirement, and safe harbor provision, but found the anti-steering, patient disclosure, and financial assistance restriction provisions unconstitutional. The district court also ruled that the unconstitutional parts were severable from the remainder of the statute and rejected claims that federal law preempted the state law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the reimbursement cap, patient disclosure requirement, and financial assistance restriction violated the First Amendment because they burdened the rights of expressive association and were not narrowly tailored to serve the state’s interests. The court found the coverage disclosure requirement constitutional under the standard for compelled commercial speech, as it required only factual, uncontroversial information reasonably related to a state interest. However, it concluded that the unconstitutional provisions were not severable from the coverage disclosure requirement. The court also held challenges to the safe harbor provision moot. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and each party was ordered to bear its own costs. View "DOE V. BONTA" on Justia Law

A former employee filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act against her former employer, alleging that the company falsely certified compliance with federal mortgage program requirements. The Department of Housing and Urban Development would be responsible for defaulted loans under this program. The relator’s attorneys conducted an extensive investigation, including interviewing former employees, after the government declined to intervene and later sought to dismiss the action. Despite these challenges, the relator’s attorneys successfully opposed the motions to dismiss, and the case proceeded. The litigation ultimately resulted in a settlement exceeding $38 million, with the relator and her attorneys receiving a portion of the recovery.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California calculated attorneys’ fees using the lodestar method, finding the hourly rates and hours reasonable, and arrived at a lodestar amount of approximately $4.37 million for the relator’s main counsel. The district court then awarded a 1.75 multiplier, increasing the fee award to over $8.5 million. The court justified the enhancement by citing the “exceptional result” achieved—surviving dismissal against both the government and the employer—and the attorneys’ investigative efforts, but did not provide a detailed rationale for choosing the 1.75 figure.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by awarding a multiplier above the lodestar because the factors cited for the enhancement—exceptional results and investigative work—were already reflected in the lodestar calculation. The Ninth Circuit further found that the district court failed to provide a sufficiently reasoned explanation for selecting a 1.75 multiplier. The court reversed the enhanced fee award and remanded for further proceedings. View "THROWER V. ACADEMY MORTGAGE CORPORATION" on Justia Law