Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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In this case, Columbia Legal Services represented farmworkers in a class action against Stemilt AG Services, LLC, alleging forced labor and trafficking. During the litigation, the district court issued a protective order limiting Columbia's use of discovered information outside the case. The order required Columbia to seek court approval before using any discovery materials in other advocacy efforts.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over the initial case. The court issued two protective orders during the discovery process. The first order protected sensitive employment data from the Washington State Employment Security Division. The second order, which is the subject of this appeal, restricted Columbia from using Stemilt's financial and employment records in other advocacy without prior court approval. The district court adopted this order to prevent Columbia from using discovered information outside the litigation, citing concerns about Columbia's intentions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Columbia had standing to appeal the protective order because it directly affected Columbia's ability to use discovered information in its advocacy work. The court found that the district court abused its discretion by issuing a broad and undifferentiated protective order without finding "good cause" or identifying specific harm that would result from public disclosure. The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's protective order and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. The court emphasized that discovery is presumptively public and that protective orders require a showing of specific prejudice or harm. View "COLUMBIA LEGAL SERVICES V. STEMILT AG SERVICES, LLC" on Justia Law

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The Missoula Police Department received information from a reliable source that Shayden Bradley Westfall had recently received a distributable quantity of drugs at a Missoula hotel room. After corroborating the information, officers obtained a search warrant for the room, where they found methamphetamine, fentanyl, and a firearm. Based on this seizure and Westfall’s statements, officers obtained another warrant for Westfall’s Facebook records stored in California. Westfall was indicted for conspiracy to distribute and possess with intent to distribute fentanyl, possession with intent to distribute fentanyl, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime.The United States District Court for the District of Montana denied Westfall’s motion to suppress the evidence seized from the searches of his hotel room, vehicles, and phones. The court found that each search warrant was valid based on ample probable cause and that the issuing state court was authorized to issue a warrant for subscriber information outside Montana. Westfall entered a conditional guilty plea and was sentenced to 88 months of imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s denial of Westfall’s motion to suppress. The court held that law enforcement’s independent corroboration of information from a reliable source provided a substantial basis for the issuing judge to conclude there was sufficient probable cause for the hotel room search warrant. Additionally, the court held that a Montana district court judge has jurisdiction under the federal Stored Communications Act and Montana law to issue a search warrant for retrieving electronic records stored out-of-state. View "USA V. WESTFALL" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Defendants James Vlha and Travis Schlotterbeck were convicted for conspiring to manufacture firearms for sale without a federal license and for selling a firearm to a felon, respectively. They engaged in manufacturing and selling semiautomatic AR-15 firearms without a license in Bellflower, California, and sold these firearms to undercover agents and a confidential informant believed to be a felon. They were charged under 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) and § 922(d)(1). Defendants moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing the statutes violated the Second Amendment, but the district court denied their motion. They entered conditional pleas and appealed the decision.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the defendants' motion to dismiss the indictment. The defendants then entered conditional pleas, preserving their right to appeal the district court's decision. They timely appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that the Second Amendment does not protect the conduct regulated by 18 U.S.C. § 922(a)(1)(A) because requiring commercial firearm manufacturers to obtain licenses does not meaningfully constrain would-be purchasers from obtaining firearms. The court also held that Schlotterbeck’s facial and as-applied challenges to 18 U.S.C. § 922(d)(1) fail because the prohibition on selling firearms to felons does not meaningfully constrain the possessory rights of felons, who do not have possessory rights under the Second Amendment. The court concluded that the text of the Second Amendment does not cover the conduct regulated by these statutes, and thus, the defendants' constitutional challenges fail. The convictions were affirmed. View "USA V. VLHA" on Justia Law

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Juan Carlos Bejar-Guizar was spotted by U.S. Border Patrol agents walking along a divided highway near the U.S.-Mexico border in San Diego. The agents noticed that Bejar-Guizar had muddy legs and boots, suggesting he had recently crossed the Tijuana River. He admitted to the agents that he was in the United States unlawfully. Bejar-Guizar was subsequently convicted of unlawful entry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1).The United States District Court for the Southern District of California convicted Bejar-Guizar. He appealed, arguing that the Border Patrol agents lacked reasonable suspicion to detain him and that his admissions of alienage were not sufficiently corroborated by independent evidence under the doctrine of corpus delicti.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Border Patrol agents had reasonable suspicion to briefly detain Bejar-Guizar based on the totality of the circumstances, including his proximity to the border, the time of day, and his muddy appearance. The court also held that Bejar-Guizar's admissions of alienage were sufficiently corroborated by circumstantial and other evidence, including his prior deportation and the consistency of his statements. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, upholding Bejar-Guizar's conviction. View "USA V. BEJAR-GUIZAR" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Wardy Alfonso Liberato, a Dominican national previously removed from the United States in 2007, was arrested near the U.S.-Mexico border fence in January 2023. He was part of a group of suspected noncitizens. A jury convicted him of entering and being found in the United States after removal, in violation of 8 U.S.C. § 1326(a). Liberato appealed, arguing that the government failed to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that he was free from official restraint before his apprehension.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Liberato’s motion for judgment of acquittal and entered a judgment of conviction. Liberato then appealed to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reversed Liberato’s conviction, holding that the government’s evidence was insufficient to establish that Liberato was free from official restraint at any point before his apprehension. The court emphasized that for a conviction under § 1326(a), the government must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was free from official restraint after physically entering U.S. territory. The court found that there was no evidence that Liberato’s group was ever anywhere other than immediately next to the border fence, and no testimony about where Liberato was or what he was doing when first observed in the United States. The court concluded that no rational jury could have inferred beyond a reasonable doubt that Liberato was at any point free from official restraint. Consequently, the court reversed the conviction and remanded for entry of a judgment of acquittal. View "USA V. LIBERATO" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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In 2002, Tracy Allen Hampton was convicted of killing Charles Findley, Tanya Ramsdell, and Ramsdell’s unborn child. A jury sentenced him to death. The Arizona Supreme Court affirmed Hampton’s convictions and sentences on direct appeal and denied his petition for state post-conviction relief. Hampton then filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, which the district court denied.Hampton raised four certified claims on appeal. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that each lacked merit. The court found that the State did not violate Brady v. Maryland or Napue v. Illinois in connection with the testimony of a jailhouse informant, George Ridley. Hampton was not prejudiced by his trial counsel’s alleged failure to obtain evidence that could have been used to impeach Ridley. The court also held that Hampton’s defense counsel were not constitutionally ineffective at the guilt or sentencing phases of his trial. Additionally, the district court acted within its discretion in denying Hampton’s request for evidentiary development on his Brady, Napue, and ineffective assistance of counsel claims. The court declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include Hampton’s uncertified claims.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Hampton’s federal habeas petition. The court found that the state court’s decision was not contrary to or an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law, nor was it based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. The court also denied Hampton’s motion for reconsideration as moot. View "HAMPTON V. SHINN" on Justia Law

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Christopher Obrien applied for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income, claiming various medical conditions rendered him disabled since August 2010. He reported past work as a telemarketer in 2003 and 2009 and as a door-to-door salesperson in 2013 and 2014. The Social Security Administration (SSA) denied his claim, and an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) upheld this decision, concluding Obrien could perform his past relevant work as a telemarketer and sales representative.Obrien challenged the ALJ's decision in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing his telemarketing work was too old or insubstantial to count as past relevant work. The Commissioner conceded that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's finding regarding Obrien's ability to perform his past work as a sales representative. However, the district court upheld the denial of benefits, finding Obrien's objections to the ALJ's determination regarding his telemarketing work both forfeited and meritless.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court rejected the Commissioner's argument that Obrien had forfeited his objections by not raising them before the ALJ, noting that SSA ALJ hearings are informal and nonadversarial, and ALJs are required to fully investigate the issues. The court held that substantial evidence did not support the ALJ's determination that Obrien's telemarketing work in 2003 and 2009 counted as past relevant work. The 2003 work was outside the 15-year period required by the regulations, and there were ambiguities regarding the average monthly wages for the 2009 work, necessitating further record development by the ALJ.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's judgment and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "OBRIEN V. BISIGNANO" on Justia Law

Posted in: Public Benefits
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A group of current and former employees of Cracker Barrel Old Country Store, Inc. alleged that the company violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) regarding wages for tipped workers. They sought preliminary certification for a collective action to include all servers in states where Cracker Barrel attempts to take a tip credit over the last three years. Cracker Barrel objected, arguing that notice should not be sent to employees who are subject to arbitration agreements or to out-of-state employees with no ties to Arizona.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the plaintiffs' motion for preliminary certification and approved notice to the proposed group, including employees who might have entered into arbitration agreements and out-of-state employees. The court decided to reserve judgment on the arbitration issue until the second stage of proceedings and concluded that nationwide notice was permissible based on the participation of one Arizona-based plaintiff.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in following the two-step procedure for preliminary certification. It also held that where the existence and validity of an arbitration agreement are in dispute, the district court is not required to determine the arbitrability of absent employees' claims before authorizing notice. However, the Ninth Circuit joined other circuits in holding that the Supreme Court's decision in Bristol-Myers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California applies to FLSA collective actions in federal court. This means that for specific personal jurisdiction, the district court must assess whether each opt-in plaintiff's claim is sufficiently connected to the defendant's activities in the forum state. The court vacated the district court's order authorizing nationwide notice and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "HARRINGTON V. CRACKER BARREL OLD COUNTRY STORE, INC." on Justia Law

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Zayn Al-Abidin Muhammad Husayn, also known as Abu Zubaydah, was captured in Pakistan in March 2002, suspected of being an Al Qaeda leader. He was transferred to a CIA-operated secret prison where he was subjected to "enhanced interrogation techniques" by James Mitchell and John Jessen, psychologists contracted by the CIA. These techniques included waterboarding, sleep deprivation, and confinement in small boxes, which Zubaydah alleges amounted to torture. He was later transferred to Guantanamo Bay, where he remains detained as an enemy combatant.Zubaydah filed a lawsuit under the Alien Tort Statute seeking damages for the injuries he suffered during his detention and interrogations. The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington dismissed the case, citing lack of jurisdiction under the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 2006, which denies federal courts jurisdiction over certain actions relating to the detention and treatment of enemy combatants by the United States and its agents.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that the MCA deprived the district court of jurisdiction because Zubaydah's claims related to his detention and treatment by the defendants, who were considered agents of the United States. The court found that the CIA had authorized, controlled, and ratified the defendants' actions, thereby establishing an agency relationship. Consequently, the MCA barred the court from hearing Zubaydah's claims. The decision was affirmed. View "HUSAYN V. MITCHELL" on Justia Law

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Thomas Keller, a physician specializing in pain management, was convicted of prescribing controlled substances outside the scope of professional practice. Keller was known for prescribing large quantities of opioids, which led to a federal investigation. During the investigation, agents seized a journal from Keller's residence, which contained patient information and medical notes. Keller was subsequently indicted on federal charges, including unlawfully dispensing controlled substances and health care fraud. He was convicted on four counts of distributing controlled substances outside the scope of professional practice.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Keller's motion to suppress the journal, finding it fell within the scope of the search warrant and was supported by probable cause. The court also declined to hold an evidentiary hearing on the suppression motion, ruling that Keller's allegations did not establish contested issues of fact. Additionally, the court rejected Keller's argument that the charges violated the nondelegation doctrine, holding that the Attorney General's regulations were within the scope of authority delegated by Congress. Keller was sentenced to 30 months in prison and 3 years of supervised release.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed Keller's conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court did not err in denying the motion to suppress the journal, as it was properly seized under the search warrant. The court also found no abuse of discretion in the district court's decision not to hold an evidentiary hearing. The court upheld the constitutionality of the nondelegation doctrine as applied to Keller's charges. Finally, the court ruled that the district court correctly calculated Keller's sentencing range using the drug conversion ratio found in the Sentencing Guidelines commentary, as it was properly incorporated into the Guidelines. View "United States v. Keller" on Justia Law