Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The dispute centers on insurance coverage for environmental remediation costs incurred by a county at an airport property it owned. The activities causing contamination began during and after World War II, including industrial waste disposal and manufacturing by various tenants. In the 1990s and beyond, state authorities ordered the county to investigate and clean up hazardous groundwater pollution. The county sought coverage under a series of insurance policies issued by its insurer between 1966 and 1975, which provided both excess and umbrella liability coverage. The core disagreement was whether the insurer’s liability for property damage was limited to $9 million per occurrence, as the county argued, or subject to a $9 million annual aggregate limit, as the insurer contended.Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of California allowed the insurer to withdraw an admission that no aggregate limit applied. The district court ultimately sided with the insurer, holding that the policies imposed an annual aggregate limit on property damage claims and relying on a California appellate decision, Garamendi v. Mission Insurance Co., to support this view. After granting the insurer’s motion, the district court dismissed the county’s claim for declaratory relief, reasoning that no further controversy existed and that any determination of future benefits would be speculative.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, under California law, the aggregate limit provisions in these policies were ambiguous regarding whether they applied to property damage. The court found that Garamendi did not bind its interpretation, considering the policies’ language and extrinsic evidence, including industry practice and the insurer’s own statements. Concluding the policies did not specify an aggregate limit for property damage, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment and remanded for further proceedings. View "COUNTY OF SAN BERNARDINO V. INSURANCE COMPANY OF THE STATE OF PENNSYLVANIA" on Justia Law

A hotel guest, who was staying at a lodge as part of a cruise package, fell in his bathroom after tripping over a raised shower ledge situated close to the toilet. He alleged that the bathroom’s configuration was unreasonably dangerous, and that the cruise line and hotel operator were negligent in constructing or maintaining that configuration. The guest asserted both a traditional maritime negligence claim and an alternative theory of negligence per se, arguing that the bathroom violated applicable plumbing codes.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment for the defendants on both theories. Regarding the negligence claim, the district court ruled that the plaintiff had not provided evidence that the defendants had actual or constructive notice of the alleged dangerous condition. On the negligence per se theory, the district court found that there was insufficient evidence that a plumbing code violation caused the plaintiff’s injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The appellate court held that, because the defendants owned and constructed the lodge’s bathroom, there was no dispute that they knew or should have known the configuration existed. It found that the plaintiff’s expert evidence created a genuine dispute about whether the defendants knew or should have known that the configuration was unreasonably dangerous. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s summary judgment on the maritime negligence claim. However, the appellate court agreed with the district court that the defendants were entitled to summary judgment on the negligence per se theory, concluding that a movable shower curtain did not violate the cited plumbing code. The Ninth Circuit affirmed summary judgment for the defendants on negligence per se and remanded the general negligence claim for further proceedings. View "PETREY V. PRINCESS CRUISE LINES, LTD." on Justia Law

California enacted the No Vigilantes Act, which requires non-uniformed federal law enforcement officers operating in the state to visibly display identification while performing enforcement duties, with certain exceptions. Officers who fail to comply face potential criminal prosecution under California law. The law also provides a safe harbor: if a law enforcement agency maintains and posts a written policy requiring visible identification, the agency and its personnel are exempt from the identification mandate and associated penalties.The United States filed suit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging the constitutionality of the Act’s identification requirement (Section 10) and related provisions, arguing that these provisions violate the Supremacy Clause by attempting to directly regulate federal operations. The district court declined to enjoin enforcement of Section 10 against federal agencies and officers, reasoning that the United States had not shown that the state’s identification requirement interfered with or controlled essential federal law enforcement operations.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s refusal to grant preliminary injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit held that Section 10 of the No Vigilantes Act attempts to directly regulate the federal government in its performance of governmental functions, which the Supremacy Clause forbids. The court explained that states may not directly regulate the conduct of the federal government or its officers, regardless of whether the regulation is minimal or aligns with state requirements for state officers. Concluding that the United States is likely to succeed on the merits of its claim, and that the remaining preliminary injunction factors favored the United States, the Ninth Circuit granted an injunction pending appeal, enjoining California from enforcing Section 10 against federal agencies and officers. View "USA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law

A child attended the Ventura Unified School District from 2012 to 2021. During this time, the district performed several psychoeducational assessments, identifying the child as having a specific learning disability but failing to assess for autism. The child’s parents, aware of his persistent academic and behavioral struggles, repeatedly collaborated with the district, sought private assessments, and requested additional services, which were denied. The child was ultimately diagnosed with autism in 2021, after which the parents initiated legal action seeking remedies for allegedly inadequate education dating back to 2012.After the parents filed a due process complaint in 2021, an Administrative Law Judge concluded that claims for services before April 8, 2019, were time-barred under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act’s (IDEA) two-year statute of limitations, finding the parents knew or should have known of the district’s failure to assess for autism and of the child’s inadequate education before that date. The ALJ awarded relief only for the period after April 8, 2019. The parents then sought further review in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, which reversed the ALJ. The district court held that the statute of limitations did not begin until the autism diagnosis in 2021, reasoning the parents lacked the requisite knowledge to challenge the district’s actions earlier. The court also found both statutory exceptions to the limitations period applied and awarded remedies for the 2012–2019 period.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court. The court held that the IDEA’s two-year statute of limitations begins when parents knew or should have known both of the district’s action or inaction and that their child was being denied a free appropriate public education. It concluded that the parents’ claims for pre-2019 educational services were untimely. The appellate court vacated the district court’s remedial orders and remanded for further proceedings regarding attorneys’ fees. View "J. R. V. VENTURA UNIFIED SCHOOL DISTRICT" on Justia Law

A nonprofit political advocacy organization challenged a set of municipal campaign finance rules adopted by a California city after a history of local government scandals involving city officials and local business interests. The ballot measure, approved by 82% of city voters, imposed per candidate contribution limits for individuals and political action committees, as well as aggregate contribution limits, for city elections. The measure was adopted in response to a series of incidents where city officials accepted valuable gifts or travel from local business figures and subsequently took official actions arguably benefiting those providers. A district attorney’s investigation and report, media coverage, and a resident survey indicating strong public demand for accountability preceded the measure.After the measure took effect, the advocacy organization sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, arguing that the per candidate and aggregate contribution limits violated the First and Fourteenth Amendments. Both sides filed for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment for the city, holding that the per candidate limits were justified by a sufficiently important governmental interest and closely drawn to that interest, and that the aggregate limits did not impermissibly discriminate against candidates who also supported ballot measures. The court also upheld a related gift ban, but the plaintiffs did not appeal that aspect.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, sitting en banc, affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the city established an important governmental interest in preventing quid pro quo corruption or its appearance, and that the contribution limits were closely drawn, not unconstitutionally low, and comparable to other cities’ limits. The court further found that the aggregate limits were constitutional, as they did not apply to ballot measure committees. Thus, the city’s campaign finance limits were upheld. View "MOVING OXNARD FORWARD, INC. V. LOPEZ" on Justia Law

Shahriyar Bolandian was convicted of insider trading based on allegations that he traded on nonpublic information regarding the mergers of two companies, information allegedly obtained from a friend, Ashish Aggarwal, who worked at J.P. Morgan. Bolandian executed trades in the stocks of PLX Technologies and ExactTarget before their respective acquisitions, ultimately earning substantial profits. These trades occurred while Aggarwal, though not assigned to the deals, worked in the relevant banking group. The case revolved around whether Aggarwal had improperly shared confidential information, and whether Bolandian knowingly traded on it.Initially, the United States District Court for the Central District of California severed Aggarwal’s trial from that of Bolandian and another co-defendant, Sadigh, due to the risk of antagonistic defenses. Aggarwal was ultimately acquitted by a jury. Afterward, a superseding indictment charged only Bolandian and Sadigh, and eventually Bolandian alone proceeded to trial. During Bolandian’s trial, a juror (Juror No. 6) expressed uncertainty about his ability to be impartial due to a family connection to J.P. Morgan. The district court questioned Juror No. 6 briefly, but allowed him to remain on the jury after both parties did not object.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Bolandian’s conviction and focused on the issue of juror bias. The court held that the district court failed in its independent duty to investigate credible allegations of juror bias after Juror No. 6 expressed doubt about his impartiality. The panel concluded that defense counsel’s agreement to keep Juror No. 6 did not waive Bolandian’s right to challenge for bias, as a proper investigation is a prerequisite to waiver. The Ninth Circuit found plain error, vacated Bolandian’s conviction, and remanded for a new trial. View "USA V. BOLANDIAN" on Justia Law

The case concerns a fatal helicopter crash during a sightseeing tour in Hawaii, resulting in the deaths of all aboard, including the plaintiffs’ daughter. The helicopter, manufactured by Robinson Helicopter Company in 2000, had its main rotor hub and blades replaced with new, identical parts from Robinson in December 2018, which was over eighteen years after the helicopter’s initial delivery. The plaintiffs alleged that defects in the replaced rotor hub and blades caused the crash, and brought claims for negligence, strict products liability, and failure to warn.The United States District Court for the District of Hawaii heard the case first. Robinson invoked the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), which generally bars actions against manufacturers eighteen years after delivery of the aircraft. The plaintiffs argued for exceptions under GARA’s “rolling provision”—which restarts the repose period for newly replaced parts—and the “fraud exception”—which removes the bar if the manufacturer concealed or misrepresented material information to the FAA. The district court granted summary judgment for Robinson, holding that the rolling provision did not apply because the replacement parts were not substantively altered from the originals, and that the plaintiffs failed to plead fraud with the necessary specificity. The court also denied the plaintiffs’ motion to further amend their complaint.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in requiring a “substantive alteration” for the rolling provision to apply, as GARA only requires that a new part replaces an old one. The Ninth Circuit reversed the grant of summary judgment in part and remanded for a new causation analysis regarding the replaced parts. However, the court affirmed the lower court’s determinations that the plaintiffs failed to meet the requirements for the fraud exception and that denying leave to amend was not an abuse of discretion. View "MCAULIFFE V. ROBINSON HELICOPTER COMPANY" on Justia Law

Several individuals alleged that Google collected and misused the private browsing data of Chrome users who utilized Incognito mode, despite Google’s representations about the privacy of this feature. In June 2020, five plaintiffs brought a putative class action on behalf of these users, seeking both injunctive relief and damages. After extensive discovery, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California certified a class for injunctive relief but denied certification for a damages class, finding the plaintiffs had not shown that common issues predominated over individual ones.Following the denial of damages class certification, the named plaintiffs sought review in the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit under Rule 23(f), but the petition was denied. The case proceeded, and as trial approached, the parties settled: Google agreed to change its policies, the named plaintiffs would arbitrate their individual damages claims, and they waived their rights to appeal the denial of damages class certification. The settlement explicitly stated that absent class members were not releasing damages claims or appellate rights. Several months after the settlement, a group of 185 Chrome users, referred to as the Salcido plaintiffs, moved to intervene to preserve absent class members’ appellate rights regarding damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the intervention motion. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in finding the intervention motion untimely. Applying the circuit’s traditional three-part test for intervention—considering the stage of the proceedings, prejudice to other parties, and the reason for and length of delay—the court found that intervention at this late stage would prejudice the existing parties, that the delay was unjustified, and that the timing weighed against intervention. The denial of the motion to intervene was therefore affirmed. View "BROWN V. SALCIDO" on Justia Law

A consumer purchased a set of bed sheets from a major retailer, choosing a more expensive option because the packaging stated the sheets were made of “100% cotton” and had an “800 Thread Count.” After using the sheets, he believed the quality did not match the advertised thread count. He later had the sheets tested by an expert, who determined the actual thread count was much lower. The consumer alleged that it is physically impossible for 100% cotton fabric to reach the advertised thread counts and claimed that the retailer’s labeling was false and misleading.The consumer initially brought a class action in California state court, alleging violations of California’s Unfair Competition Law and Consumer Legal Remedies Act. The retailer removed the suit to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California. The retailer moved to dismiss the complaint, arguing that the consumer failed to adequately plead his claims and that the impossibility of the claimed thread count meant no reasonable consumer would be misled. The district court agreed and dismissed the case with prejudice, relying on the Ninth Circuit’s decision in Moore v. Trader Joe’s Co., interpreting it to mean that literally impossible claims cannot deceive reasonable consumers as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The court held that the district court erred in its interpretation of Moore. The appellate court clarified that claims of literal falsity are actionable under California consumer protection laws and that even physically impossible claims may deceive reasonable consumers. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, holding that the consumer’s allegations were sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. View "PANELLI V. TARGET CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A consumer purchased a Brita water filter product, alleging that the product’s labeling and packaging led him to believe it would remove or reduce hazardous contaminants in tap water to below laboratory-detectable levels. He contended that the packaging conveyed the impression that the product would eliminate a broad range of harmful substances, but did not clearly or conspicuously state that it would not do so. The consumer claimed that he would not have purchased the product or would have paid less if he had known its actual capabilities, and asserted that reasonable consumers would have similar expectations based on the labeling.After Brita removed the lawsuit to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, the district court dismissed the complaint in its entirety without leave to amend. The district court found that the plaintiff’s claims for affirmative misrepresentation and material omission failed, applying the reasonable consumer standard and concluding that no reasonable consumer would interpret Brita’s packaging as promising removal of all hazardous contaminants to below lab-detectable limits. The district court also found the plaintiff lacked standing for certain statutory claims and determined that amendment would be futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal and affirmed the decision. The appellate court held that no reasonable consumer would expect Brita’s water filter products to remove or reduce all hazardous contaminants to below laboratory-detectable levels, especially in light of Brita’s disclosures about the products’ capabilities and limitations. The court further held that the omission claim failed as a matter of law under the reasonable consumer standard. Finally, the appellate court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by denying leave to amend, as amendment would not cure the defect. Judgment was affirmed. View "BROWN V. THE BRITA PRODUCTS COMPANY" on Justia Law