Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Hector Cervantes-Torres was convicted in 2014 of being a felon in possession of a firearm, possessing a firearm as an alien unlawfully present in the United States, and being an alien found unlawfully present in the United States following deportation. Five years later, the Supreme Court ruled in Rehaif v. United States that a defendant’s knowledge of their status as a person barred from possessing a firearm is a necessary element of a § 922(g) conviction. Cervantes-Torres filed a coram nobis petition in 2021 to vacate his § 922(g)(1) and § 922(g)(5) convictions due to the lack of a Rehaif instruction at his trial.The district court granted the petition for the § 922(g)(1) conviction but denied it for the § 922(g)(5) conviction. The court found that there was a reasonable probability that the jury could have reached a different verdict regarding the § 922(g)(1) conviction due to the expungement of Cervantes-Torres’s felony drug conviction. However, for the § 922(g)(5) conviction, the court concluded that no reasonable jury could find that Cervantes-Torres was unaware of his unlawful status, given his deportation, false statements on his green card application, and a letter from USCIS informing him of his lack of lawful status.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s partial denial of Cervantes-Torres’s petition. The panel held that even under the standard of review for a direct appeal, Cervantes-Torres could not prevail. The court found that there was no reasonable probability that the jury would have reached a different result even if a Rehaif instruction had been given, due to the overwhelming evidence that Cervantes-Torres was aware of his unlawful status. Therefore, any error from the lack of a Rehaif instruction was not of the most fundamental character, and the district court’s decision was affirmed. View "Cervantes-Torres v. United States" on Justia Law

A plaintiff filed a putative class action against a dietary supplement company, alleging that the supplement Hydro BCAA was mislabeled. The plaintiff claimed that preliminary testing showed the supplement contained more carbohydrates and calories than listed on its FDA-prescribed label. The plaintiff tested the supplement using FDA methods but did not follow the FDA’s twelve-sample sampling process.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the complaint, holding that the Food, Drug, and Cosmetic Act preempted the claims because the plaintiff did not plead that he tested the supplement according to the FDA’s sampling process. The district court noted a divide among district courts on whether plaintiffs must plead compliance with the FDA’s testing methods and sampling processes to avoid preemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the plaintiff’s complaint allowed a reasonable inference that the supplement was misbranded under the Act, even without allegations of compliance with the FDA’s sampling process. The court found that the plaintiff’s preliminary testing of one sample, which showed significant discrepancies in carbohydrate and calorie content, was sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court emphasized that plaintiffs are not required to perform the FDA’s sampling process at the pleading stage to avoid preemption.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s dismissal, allowing the plaintiff’s state-law claims to proceed. The court concluded that the plaintiff’s allegations were sufficient to avoid preemption and stated a plausible claim that the supplement was mislabeled under the Act. View "SCHEIBE V. PROSUPPS USA, LLC" on Justia Law

CoStar Group, Inc. and CoStar Realty Information, Inc. (collectively, “CoStar”) and Commercial Real Estate Exchange, Inc. (“CREXi”) are online platforms competing in the commercial real estate listing, information, and auction markets. CoStar sued CREXi for copyright infringement, alleging that CREXi listed images and information hosted by CoStar without permission. CREXi counterclaimed on antitrust grounds, asserting that CoStar engaged in monopolistic practices to exclude competition.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed CREXi’s antitrust counterclaims and directed entry of final judgment on those claims under Fed. R. Civ. P. 54(b). The district court held that CREXi failed to show CoStar had monopoly power and that the agreements at issue were not exclusive. CREXi appealed the dismissal of its antitrust counterclaims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal of the antitrust counterclaims. The Ninth Circuit held that CREXi successfully stated claims under §§ 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act, California’s Cartwright Act, and the Unfair Competition Law. The court found that CREXi plausibly alleged CoStar had monopoly power in the relevant markets and engaged in anticompetitive conduct by entering into de facto exclusive deals with brokers and imposing technological barriers to entry. The court concluded that a monopolist using its power to exclude competitors and maintain monopoly power violates § 2 of the Sherman Act, and using exclusive deals to do so violates § 1 of the Sherman Act and the Cartwright Act. The court also held that CREXi stated claims under the “unfair” and “unlawful” prongs of the Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal of CREXi’s tortious interference claims as they were improperly raised. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "COSTAR GROUP, INC. V. COMMERCIAL REAL ESTATE EXCHANGE, INC." on Justia Law

Island Industries, Inc. filed a lawsuit under the False Claims Act (FCA) against Sigma Corporation, alleging that Sigma made false statements on customs forms to avoid paying antidumping duties on welded outlets imported from China. Island claimed that Sigma falsely declared that the products were not subject to antidumping duties and misrepresented the products as steel couplings instead of welded outlets. The jury found in favor of Island, concluding that Sigma was liable under the FCA.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over the case. Sigma requested a scope ruling from the Department of Commerce, which determined that Sigma’s welded outlets fell within the scope of the antidumping duty order on certain carbon steel butt-weld pipe fittings from China. The Court of International Trade and the Federal Circuit affirmed this ruling. Sigma’s appeal was stayed pending the Federal Circuit’s decision, which ultimately affirmed the scope ruling.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction over the case and that the action did not need to be initiated in the Court of International Trade. The court also held that 19 U.S.C. § 1592, which provides a mechanism for the United States to recover fraudulently avoided customs duties, does not displace the FCA. The court rejected Sigma’s argument that it lacked an “obligation to pay” antidumping duties under the FCA and concluded that Island’s theory that Sigma violated the FCA by knowingly falsely declaring that no antidumping duties were owed was legally valid and supported by sufficient evidence. The court also found that the evidence at trial was sufficient to support the jury’s verdict under either of Island’s theories of liability. View "ISLAND INDUSTRIES, INC. V. SIGMA CORPORATION" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, including individuals and organizations, challenged California's "one-gun-a-month" law, which restricts the purchase of more than one firearm within a 30-day period. They argued that this law violates the Second Amendment. The law, initially targeting concealable handguns, was expanded over time to include all firearms. Plaintiffs sought to purchase multiple firearms within the restricted period, claiming the law infringed on their constitutional rights.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that the law facially violates the Second Amendment. The court found that the law imposes a meaningful constraint on the right to acquire firearms, which is protected by the Second Amendment. The court also determined that the law is not supported by historical precedent.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the Second Amendment protects the right to possess multiple firearms and the ability to acquire them without meaningful constraints. The court applied the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, which requires historical precedent to justify modern firearm regulations. The court found that California's law lacks historical support, as there is no tradition of similar regulations. The court concluded that the law is facially unconstitutional and affirmed the district court's summary judgment in favor of the plaintiffs. View "Nguyen v. Bonta" on Justia Law

A public benefit corporation, Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions (LFRA), challenged local rules of federal district courts in the Ninth Circuit. These rules require attorneys seeking general admission to be members in good standing of the bar of the state where the district court is located. LFRA argued that these rules prevent its members, who are barred in states outside the Ninth Circuit and do not wish to join another state bar, from seeking general admission to these federal district courts.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed LFRA’s amended complaint with prejudice. The court found that LFRA had standing to bring claims on behalf of its members, except for the Sixth Amendment claim, which lacked standing. The court dismissed the remaining claims for failure to state a claim, concluding that the Admission Rules did not violate constitutional, statutory, or procedural grounds as alleged by LFRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit held that the Admission Rules are constitutional and do not violate separation of powers, federalism principles, the Privileges and Immunities Clauses, the Equal Protection Clause, the First Amendment, the Full Faith and Credit Act, the Rules Enabling Act, or procedural due process. The court also found that Rules 1 and 83 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not create a private right of action. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing the amended complaint without leave to amend, as the complaint could not be saved by amendment. The court also upheld the denial of LFRA’s motion for judgment on the pleadings as procedurally premature. View "Lawyers for Fair Reciprocal Admissions v. United States" on Justia Law

Environmental organizations challenged the EPA's decision not to revise technology-based pollution limits, guidelines, and standards (ELGs) for seven specific industrial categories under the Clean Water Act (CWA). The petitioners argued that the ELGs for these categories were outdated and did not reflect advances in pollution control technology.The EPA's decision was based on its Effluent Guidelines Program Plan 15, which used a Category Ranking Analysis to prioritize ELGs for revision. This analysis ranked industries based on the concentration and total load of pollutants discharged, using data from discharge monitoring reports (DMR data) from direct dischargers. The EPA did not consider data from indirect dischargers or unregulated pollutants in this analysis. The EPA concluded that revising the ELGs for the seven categories was not a priority based on this analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the EPA's refusal to revise the ELGs constituted final agency action and was reviewable under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The court found that the EPA's reliance on the Category Ranking Analysis was arbitrary and capricious because it failed to consider advances in pollution control technology, pretreatment standards for indirect dischargers, and unregulated pollutants. The court also found that the EPA's decision regarding the plastics molding and forming category was arbitrary and capricious due to inadequate explanation.The court granted the petition for review in part, remanding the case to the EPA to reconsider its decision or provide a fuller explanation. The court emphasized that the EPA must offer a reasoned justification for its decisions consistent with the CWA and APA. View "Waterkeeper Alliance v. Environmental Protection Agency" on Justia Law

A jurisdictional dispute arose between the International Longshore and Warehouse Union (ILWU) and the International Association of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) over maintenance work at SSA Terminals in the Port of Seattle. Both unions claimed the right to perform the work under their respective collective bargaining agreements. SSA initially assigned the work to ILWU, but IAM threatened economic action, prompting SSA to seek a resolution from the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB assigned the work to IAM, leading ILWU to pursue a grievance against SSA, which an arbitrator upheld.SSA then filed an unfair labor practice charge against ILWU, alleging that ILWU's pursuit of the grievance violated section 8(b)(4)(D) of the National Labor Relations Act. ILWU defended itself by invoking the work-preservation defense, which protects primary union activity. The NLRB rejected this defense, stating it was not applicable in pure jurisdictional disputes where multiple unions have valid contractual claims. The NLRB ordered ILWU to cease and desist from pursuing the maintenance work at Terminal 5.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the NLRB's position was foreclosed by its previous decision in International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. NLRB (Kinder Morgan), which established that a valid work-preservation objective provides a complete defense against alleged violations of section 8(b)(4)(D). The court vacated the NLRB's order and remanded the case for the NLRB to evaluate the merits of ILWU's work-preservation defense. The court also denied the petitions for review by IAM and the NLRB's cross-petition for enforcement. View "International Longshore and Warehouse Union v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law

The defendant, Eliel Nunez Sanchez, was charged with illegal reentry after removal under 8 U.S.C. § 1326. Nunez, a Mexican citizen, had entered the United States illegally as a child. In 2006, he was convicted of possession of methamphetamine while armed. In 2010, he was arrested again for possession of methamphetamine for sale, leading to removal proceedings. During these proceedings, Nunez waived his right to appeal and was deported. He reentered the U.S. illegally multiple times and was deported each time based on the original removal order.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Nunez's motion to dismiss the indictment, finding that he had not exhausted his administrative remedies because his waiver of the right to appeal was valid. Nunez then entered a conditional guilty plea, preserving his right to appeal the denial of his motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Nunez did not meet any of the three requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1326(d) to collaterally attack the removal order. First, Nunez did not exhaust his administrative remedies, as his waiver of appeal was considered and intelligent. Second, he was not deprived of the opportunity for judicial review because his waiver was valid. Third, the entry of the removal order was not fundamentally unfair, as Nunez's waiver of counsel was knowing and voluntary, and he was not prejudiced by the denial of voluntary departure.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Nunez's motion to dismiss the indictment. View "United States v. Sanchez" on Justia Law

Jeremiah Banks, a state prisoner, filed a habeas corpus petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2254 in January 2021, alleging nine claims. Two of these claims were exhausted, while the remaining seven were unexhausted. Banks also moved for a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber to return to state court and exhaust the unexhausted claims. However, after filing his federal petition, Banks took no action to exhaust his seven unexhausted claims for over a year.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Banks’s motion for a Rhines stay in April 2022, citing his failure to show good cause for his post-filing lack of diligence and intentional delay in reviewing his federal petition. The district court dismissed Banks’s two exhausted claims with prejudice and his seven unexhausted claims without prejudice.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that a district court does not abuse its discretion by considering a petitioner’s diligence in pursuing state court remedies after filing a federal petition when evaluating good cause under Rhines. The court emphasized that the district court must consider a petitioner’s post-filing diligence in pursuing state court remedies. The Ninth Circuit found that Banks failed to demonstrate good cause excusing his lack of diligence and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying the Rhines stay and abeyance.Additionally, the Ninth Circuit rejected Banks’s argument that the district court contravened Rose v. Lundy by not offering him the choice of withdrawing his entire mixed habeas petition. The court explained that Banks did not have such a choice because the district court dismissed his two exhausted claims with prejudice. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the Rhines stay and dismissal of Banks’s habeas petition. View "Banks v. Allison" on Justia Law