Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A law-abiding resident of Siskiyou County, California, who wished to openly carry a firearm for self-defense, challenged California’s laws that prohibit open carry in counties with populations over 200,000. As a result of these statutes, approximately 95% of California’s population cannot lawfully open carry, while those in less populous counties may theoretically apply for an open-carry license valid only within their county of residence. The plaintiff, after being informed by local authorities that open-carry licenses would not be issued in his county, filed suit against the California Attorney General, raising claims under the Second and Fourteenth Amendments. The complaint contested both the urban open-carry ban and the rural county licensing scheme.Initially, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied the plaintiff’s motion for preliminary injunction and ultimately granted summary judgment to the Attorney General. The district court concluded that the Second Amendment did not protect the plaintiff’s desired conduct and that California’s regulatory scheme was consistent with the nation’s historical firearm tradition. The district court also dismissed as-applied challenges to the rural licensing scheme for lack of standing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. Applying the historical tradition test outlined in New York State Rifle & Pistol Ass’n v. Bruen, the court held that California’s ban on open carry in urban counties is inconsistent with the Second Amendment, as there is no historical tradition justifying such a broad prohibition. The court reversed the district court’s grant of summary judgment on the urban open-carry ban, remanding with instructions to enter judgment for the plaintiff on that issue. The panel affirmed the district court’s judgment as to the rural licensing scheme, finding that the as-applied challenge was waived and the facial challenge failed under Bruen’s recognition of shall-issue licensing regimes. The district court’s judgment was thus affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. View "BAIRD v. BONTA" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, which are corporate entities owned by Kenneth Gay, challenged cannabis dispensary licensing schemes in Washington State and the City of Sacramento. Both jurisdictions require applicants to have been residents of the respective area for a specified period to be eligible for a dispensary license, or to receive priority in licensing. Plaintiffs applied for licenses in both places, but their applications were rejected solely for failing to meet the residency requirements, despite fulfilling all other criteria. Plaintiffs then filed lawsuits, alleging that these residency preferences violate the dormant Commerce Clause by discriminating against out-of-state economic interests in the cannabis market.In the Western District of Washington and the Eastern District of California, the district courts dismissed the actions at the Rule 12(b)(6) stage and denied preliminary injunctions. Both courts found that the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to residency requirements for cannabis dispensaries because marijuana remains illegal under federal law. They reasoned that the constitutional protection of interstate commerce does not extend to a market Congress has expressly prohibited.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the consolidated appeals. It affirmed both district courts’ dismissals, holding that the dormant Commerce Clause does not apply to state or local laws restricting licensing in a market (cannabis) that Congress has deemed illegal. The Ninth Circuit declined to extend dormant Commerce Clause protections to interstate commerce in a federally prohibited drug market, noting that Supreme Court precedent counsels “extreme caution” before exercising implied authority in this area. The panel found insufficient basis to use the judge-made dormant Commerce Clause to create a constitutional right to interstate cannabis commerce that is unlawful under federal law. Thus, both judgments were affirmed. View "PERIDOT TREE WA, INC. v. WASHINGTON STATE LIQUOR AND CANNABIS CONTROL BOARD" on Justia Law

Several trusts and entities purchased properties in Nevada that were subject to deeds of trust held by Fannie Mae or Freddie Mac. After unsuccessful attempts in state court to extinguish the deeds of trust and quiet title, each property remained encumbered. Between 2022 and 2024, foreclosure proceedings were initiated on these properties, with Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac acting through their conservator, the Federal Housing Finance Agency (FHFA). In response, the plaintiffs brought suit against the FHFA and its Director, seeking to prevent foreclosure and challenging the constitutionality of the FHFA’s funding mechanism under the Appropriations Clause and the nondelegation doctrine.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada reviewed the case. The district court denied the plaintiffs’ motions for preliminary relief, then dismissed their amended complaint with prejudice, finding that the FHFA’s funding structure was constitutional. The court determined that the Recovery Act, which created the FHFA and provides for its funding via regulatory assessments rather than Congressional appropriations, met constitutional standards by specifying both a source and purpose for the funds. The court also found that the Recovery Act’s limitation to “reasonable costs” provided an intelligible principle, satisfying the nondelegation doctrine. Leave to amend was denied as futile.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The appellate court held that the plaintiffs had Article III standing, but rejected their arguments on the merits. It concluded that the FHFA’s funding mechanism, as established by the Recovery Act, does not violate the Appropriations Clause because it identifies a source and purpose for expenditures, consistent with the Supreme Court’s decision in Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Association of America, Limited. It further held the mechanism does not violate the nondelegation doctrine, as the statute provides an intelligible principle. The judgment of dismissal was affirmed. View "DAISEY TRUST v. FEDERAL HOUSING FINANCE AGENCY" on Justia Law

Two individuals who are heirs to the author of a 1983 magazine article about the United States Navy Fighter Weapons School, known as “Top Gun,” brought suit against a film studio. They alleged that a 2022 film, which is a sequel to an earlier movie inspired by the article, unlawfully copied their copyrighted work and breached a contractual obligation to credit the original author.After the 1983 article was published, the author assigned all rights to the studio in exchange for compensation and a promise that he would be credited in any movie “substantially based upon or adapted from” the article. The studio produced an initial film in 1986, which acknowledged the article. Decades later, the heirs terminated the copyright grant under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a)(3)—a statutory right for authors’ heirs. The studio released the sequel without crediting or compensating the heirs. The heirs filed claims for copyright infringement and breach of contract in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court granted summary judgment for the studio, finding that the new film did not share substantial amounts of the article’s original expression and excluded the plaintiffs’ expert’s opinion for failing to filter out unprotectable elements.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that the sequel did not share substantial similarity in protectable expression with the article, as required for copyright infringement. It also found no original and protectable selection and arrangement of elements, and concluded that the district court properly excluded the plaintiffs’ expert and admitted the studio’s expert. The court further held that the studio did not breach the 1983 agreement, because the new film was not produced under the rights conferred by that agreement. The judgment for the studio was affirmed. View "YONAY V. PARAMOUNT PICTURES CORPORATION" on Justia Law

A former assistant principal at a middle school in the Central Valley School District posted a Facebook comment about the Democratic National Convention that included epithets, slurs, and violent language. The post, though made on his private account and shared with Facebook friends, was seen by other school district employees and quickly forwarded to administrators. Within days, the assistant principal was placed on paid administrative leave, prohibited from contacting district staff or students, and ultimately transferred to a non-administrative teaching position. The school district’s investigation revealed additional concerns about derogatory comments he had made at work. The district offered him a voluntary transfer if he signed a release of claims, which he rejected, leading to further administrative proceedings and the final transfer decision.Previously, the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington reviewed the case. The court initially denied summary judgment to individual administrators on qualified immunity, a decision affirmed by the Ninth Circuit on interlocutory appeal. After further discovery and cross-motions for summary judgment, the district court granted summary judgment to the school district and the individual administrators. The court found the plaintiff had established a prima facie First Amendment retaliation claim but held that the district’s interests outweighed the plaintiff’s under the Pickering balancing test. Qualified immunity was also found to apply to the individual defendants.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rulings. It held that while the plaintiff’s Facebook post was private speech on a matter of public concern and he made a prima facie case for retaliation, the school district showed a reasonable prediction of disruption and its interest in maintaining a safe and inclusive environment outweighed the plaintiff’s First Amendment interests. The court also affirmed qualified immunity for the individual administrators. View "Thompson v. Central Valley School District No 365" on Justia Law

Joneca Company, LLC, and InSinkErator, LLC, are direct competitors in the garbage disposal market. InSinkErator alleged that Joneca marketed its disposals using horsepower designations that misrepresented the actual output power of the motors, thereby misleading consumers. InSinkErator claimed that industry and consumer standards understood horsepower to refer to the motor’s mechanical output, not merely the electrical input, and that Joneca’s advertising was causing it to lose sales and goodwill. InSinkErator tested Joneca’s products and found the output horsepower to be substantially less than advertised, prompting it to seek injunctive relief.The United States District Court for the Central District of California reviewed these allegations in the context of a motion for a preliminary injunction. After considering expert declarations and industry standards, the district court found that Joneca’s horsepower claims were literally false by necessary implication, as consumers would interpret horsepower designations as referring to output. The court also found that these claims were material to consumer purchasing decisions and that InSinkErator was likely to suffer irreparable harm absent an injunction. As a result, the court ordered Joneca to place disclaimers on its packaging and sales materials and required InSinkErator to post a $500,000 bond. Joneca appealed, challenging the district court’s findings on falsity, materiality, irreparable harm, balancing of hardships, and public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that InSinkErator was likely to succeed on the merits of its Lanham Act false advertising claim, that Joneca’s horsepower claims were materially misleading, and that InSinkErator faced irreparable harm. The Ninth Circuit found no abuse of discretion in the district court’s balancing of equities, bond requirement, or determination that the injunction served the public interest. View "INSINKERATOR, LLC V. JONECA COMPANY, LLC" on Justia Law

Amazon was accused of unfair labor practices under the National Labor Relations Act for refusing to recognize and bargain with the Teamsters Amazon National Negotiating Committee, which represented a group of former Amazon delivery drivers. After Amazon terminated its contract with a delivery service whose drivers were represented by the union, the Teamsters alleged that Amazon and the contractor were joint employers and demanded bargaining rights. Amazon declined, prompting the Teamsters to file unfair labor practice charges with the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). The NLRB’s General Counsel filed a complaint against Amazon, alleging threats, retaliation, and refusal to bargain.Following the initiation of the NLRB administrative proceedings, Amazon sued in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, seeking to enjoin the Board from continuing those proceedings. Amazon argued that the Board’s structure and adjudicative procedures were unconstitutional and requested a preliminary injunction. The Teamsters intervened in the case to represent the interests of the drivers. The district court denied Amazon’s motion, holding that it lacked jurisdiction under the Norris-LaGuardia Act, which prohibits federal courts from issuing injunctions in cases involving or growing out of labor disputes.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit addressed whether Amazon’s constitutional challenge “involved or grew out of” a labor dispute, as defined by the Norris-LaGuardia Act. The Ninth Circuit held that both the parties and the underlying dispute satisfied the requirements of the Act, as Amazon’s claims were directly connected to a labor dispute between an employer and a union. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction, concluding that federal courts lack jurisdiction to issue such relief in this context. View "AMAZON.COM SERVICES, LLC V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" on Justia Law

A group of 169 individuals who worked at the Clark County Government Center in Las Vegas brought claims alleging that they suffered serious injuries due to exposure to toxic chemicals, including polychlorinated biphenyls (PCBs), at their workplace. The site of the Government Center had previously been used as a rail yard by Union Pacific Railroad, and plaintiffs alleged that Union Pacific dumped waste, including PCBs manufactured by the former Monsanto Company, at the site. Plaintiffs asserted that Monsanto’s corporate successors inherited liability for harms caused by the production, sale, and distribution of PCBs, which allegedly caused a range of health issues for those exposed.The plaintiffs initially filed suit in Nevada state court against multiple defendants, including Union Pacific, the Las Vegas Downtown Redevelopment Agency, and Monsanto’s successors. The claims sought compensatory and punitive damages for injuries stemming from the alleged contamination. Monsanto’s successors removed the action to the United States District Court for the District of Nevada under the Class Action Fairness Act (CAFA). The plaintiffs moved to remand the case back to state court, and the District Court granted the motion, finding that the local controversy exception to CAFA applied since the alleged injuries were localized to Clark County.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that CAFA’s local controversy exception did not apply because the principal injuries resulting from Monsanto’s conduct were not shown to have been incurred primarily in Nevada. The court found that plaintiffs’ allegations described nationwide distribution and harm from PCBs, with no facts indicating that Nevada experienced principal or unique injuries. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the District Court’s order remanding the case and ordered the case to proceed in federal court. View "EMPLOYEES AT THE CLARK COUNTY GOVERNMENT CENTER V. MONSANTO COMPANY" on Justia Law

The plaintiff held a variable-rate credit card issued by a bank, with an agreement specifying that the interest rate for each billing cycle would be determined by adding a constant margin to the U.S. Prime Rate as published in The Wall Street Journal on the last day of each month. When the Federal Reserve increased the Federal Funds Rate multiple times from March 2022 to July 2023, the Prime Rate—and consequently, the plaintiff’s credit card interest rate—increased significantly. The new, higher rate was applied to the cardholder’s outstanding balances for the entire billing cycle, including balances incurred before the Prime Rate increased. The plaintiff, dissatisfied with paying higher interest on previous balances, filed a class action alleging that the bank’s method of calculating and applying the interest rate violated the Credit Card Accountability Responsibility and Disclosure Act of 2009 (CARD Act) and California’s Unfair Competition Law.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the case under Rule 12(b)(6), concluding that the bank’s method fell within a statutory exception in the CARD Act. The court found that the credit card agreement’s use of the Prime Rate, which is publicly available and not controlled by the bank, satisfied the CARD Act’s exception for variable rates tied to an external index.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the dismissal de novo. The appellate court held that the agreement complied with 15 U.S.C. § 1666i-1(b)(2), as the only variable affecting the rate was the Prime Rate, which was not under the bank’s control. The court found no violation of the CARD Act and affirmed the district court’s dismissal, holding that the bank’s method of setting variable rates according to the Prime Rate was lawful under the statute’s exception. View "MILLIKEN V. BANK OF AMERICA, N.A." on Justia Law

The plaintiffs in this case acquired two parcels of property in Montana in 1991 and 2004, respectively. Both properties are subject to a 1962 easement their predecessors-in-interest granted to the United States for part of Robbins Gulch Road, which traverses their land before entering the Bitterroot National Forest. The easement was originally intended for timber harvesting activities, but over the decades, the public used the road to access the National Forest. The plaintiffs became concerned that public use of the easement interfered with their enjoyment of their property and, in 2018, brought suit against the United States seeking to quiet title, arguing the easement did not authorize general public access and that the Forest Service had failed to limit and patrol such use.After extensive discovery, the United States District Court for the District of Montana dismissed the plaintiffs’ claims as time-barred under the Quiet Title Act’s twelve-year statute of limitations. The plaintiffs appealed, and the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed, also upholding the conclusion that the statute of limitations was jurisdictional. The Supreme Court, however, reversed on the jurisdictional question, holding that the Quiet Title Act’s statute of limitations is a non-jurisdictional claims-processing rule, but did not disturb the lower courts’ findings regarding timeliness. On remand, the district court again granted summary judgment to the government, applying the law of the case doctrine and finding plaintiffs’ claims untimely. Plaintiffs appealed once more.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed. It held that the district court did not err in applying the law of the case doctrine, and, after a de novo review, concluded that the long history of public use of the easement put plaintiffs on notice well before the limitations period, rendering their 2018 claims untimely. The court also rejected plaintiffs’ equitable estoppel argument due to a lack of government affirmative misconduct and found that both claims accrued simultaneously. The district court’s judgment was affirmed. View "WILKINS V. USA" on Justia Law