Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

KalshiEX, LLC operates a platform it describes as offering legal sports betting across all 50 states. Its business model involves offering “sports event contracts” on a designated contract market (DCM) registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). These contracts allow users to buy and sell positions based on outcomes of sporting events, such as who will win the Super Bowl or specific in-game occurrences, resembling traditional sports betting. In 2025, the Nevada Gaming Control Board sent Kalshi a cease-and-desist letter, stating that Kalshi’s operations violated Nevada’s gaming laws by effectively functioning as an unlicensed sportsbook.Kalshi responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Nevada from enforcing its gaming laws against its sports and election event contracts. The district court initially granted the injunction, siding with Kalshi’s argument that its platform was subject only to federal regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and not state gaming law. However, following conflicting decisions in other federal courts and further briefing, the district court dissolved the injunction, ruling that Kalshi’s sports event contracts were not “swaps” under the CEA and thus not subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction; therefore, Nevada’s gaming laws could apply.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the district court’s dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that Kalshi’s sports event contracts were not “swaps” as defined in the CEA, and that CFTC regulations currently prohibit DCMs from listing contracts involving gaming. As a result, the CEA is unlikely to preempt Nevada’s gaming regulations as applied to Kalshi’s sports event contracts. The court remanded for further consideration of Kalshi’s election contracts. The court’s disposition was to affirm in part and remand in part. View "KALSHIEX, LLC V. ASSAD" on Justia Law

A group of Angolan nationals, including the lead petitioner, entered the United States without authorization in September 2022. The lead petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), alleging persecution based on his political activity as a member of UNITA, an opposition party in Angola. He described multiple incidents of harm and threats from Angolan police and military, including being injured during a protest, detained and tortured at a police compound, and threatened following his public denunciation of government abuses. After these events, the family hid in Angola before fleeing to the United States.An Immigration Judge (IJ) conducted merits hearings at which the lead petitioner testified pro se. The IJ found him not credible, citing perceived inconsistencies and omissions in his account, and denied all forms of relief. The IJ also determined that the record did not establish a particularized risk of torture independent of the petitioner’s testimony and found that internal relocation within Angola was possible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed the IJ’s findings, including the adverse credibility determination and denial of CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed both the IJ and BIA decisions. The court held that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on trivial inconsistencies and failed to account for significant translation difficulties during the hearings. The court also concluded that the agency committed reversible legal errors in its analysis of the petitioner’s CAT claim, specifically regarding the petitioner’s particularized risk of torture and ability to internally relocate. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review, reversed the adverse credibility finding, and remanded for further proceedings, accepting the petitioner’s testimony as credible. View "MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of El Salvador, the petitioner was placed in removal proceedings in the United States in 2023. He sought protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that if removed to El Salvador, he would be subject to torture due to his criminal history, gang affiliations, and tattoos, all of which would make him a target under El Salvador’s “State of Exception”—a government policy involving mass detentions and documented abuses in prisons.Initially, an Immigration Judge denied his application for CAT protection in February 2024. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Immigration Judge to consider certain country conditions evidence and to explain the weight given to an expert report. After further hearings, the Immigration Judge again denied relief, and the BIA affirmed this denial. While the petitioner’s appeal was pending, he filed a motion to reopen based on new, material evidence regarding torture and conditions in El Salvador’s prisons. The BIA equitably tolled the filing deadline due to prior ineffective assistance of counsel but denied the motion on the merits, finding that the petitioner had not provided the “quantitative evidence” it deemed necessary to satisfy CAT’s standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen. The court held that the BIA had erred by imposing a requirement for “quantitative evidence” of torture, which is not mandated by CAT’s implementing regulations. The court also found that the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to the petitioner’s expert reports. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the petitioner had established a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on his CAT claim if proceedings were reopened and therefore ordered the BIA to grant the motion to reopen and conduct a full merits hearing. View "CALDERON V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A Jamaican citizen, Jacques, entered the United States as a teenager and overstayed his visa. In 2021, he was arrested in Utah during a traffic stop and pleaded guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. After serving a suspended sentence and probation, he was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Jacques applied for withholding of removal, arguing his return to Jamaica would place him in danger due to his mother’s political activities and murder. An Immigration Judge twice granted Jacques’s application for withholding of removal, finding his conviction was not a particularly serious crime barring relief.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed both grants to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In both instances, the BIA or DHS failed to send notices of appeal and briefing schedules to the correct detention address, despite having updated information on Jacques’s location. As a result, Jacques was excluded from participating in both appellate proceedings, and did not respond to the appeals or submit briefs. The BIA reversed the Immigration Judge’s decisions each time, determining that Jacques’s conviction constituted a particularly serious crime and denying him withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jacques’s due process rights were violated because the government failed to serve him with reasonably calculated notice of DHS’s appeals, excluding him from participating in the proceedings. The court further held that Jacques was prejudiced by this deprivation, as the outcome of the appeals may have been affected had he been given notice and an opportunity to respond. The Ninth Circuit granted Jacques’s petition, vacated the BIA’s orders, and remanded with instructions to re-notice the appeal and reissue a briefing schedule to the correct address. View "JACQUES V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A group of premium cigar manufacturers and trade associations challenged California’s Unflavored Tobacco List statute, which requires tobacco products to be approved and listed by the California Attorney General before they may be sold to consumers, retailers, or wholesalers in the state. To be listed, manufacturers must submit detailed applications and pay fees, certifying their products lack any characterizing flavor. The plaintiffs argued that the law would impose considerable compliance costs, particularly burdensome for the premium cigar industry where products are hand-made in smaller batches and change blends frequently. They asserted that their premium cigars, by federal definition, do not contain flavoring additives, and that the application and fee requirements would force them to reduce their product offerings in California.The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. They contended that the federal Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) expressly preempts California’s law as applied to premium cigars and that the statute’s presumption against flavoring based on manufacturers’ speech violates the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, concluding the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the TCA’s Savings Clause exempts state requirements related to the sale of tobacco products from preemption, and the challenged statute falls within this exemption as it is directly tied to retail sales. The court also found that, based on the Attorney General’s representations, the statute imposes only a minimal burden on commercial speech and does not restrict speech more than necessary. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. View "ROCKY PATEL PREMIUM CIGARS, INC. V. BONTA" on Justia Law

Several federally licensed firearms dealers (FFLs), including both brick-and-mortar and home-based businesses, gun rights organizations, and private citizens challenged a California statute, Section 26806, which requires all FFLs to maintain a digital video and audio recording system on their business premises. The statute mandates 24/7 surveillance of specific areas, such as points of sale and firearm display areas, and limits when and how recordings may be released or accessed, including requirements for posting notification signs and annual certification of system functionality. Plaintiffs argued that this law infringed their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments by imposing surveillance burdens, chilling speech, violating privacy, and effecting a taking of property.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court found that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a likelihood of success on the merits of any claims, denied injunctive relief, and granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs eventually chose not to further amend and requested final judgment, which the district court entered, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to allege a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim because there was no physical government intrusion or access to recordings, nor did mere compliance with the statute transform FFLs into state actors. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as the statute did not result in a physical or regulatory taking; FFLs retained ownership and control over their recording systems, and the economic impact did not rise to a taking. Finally, the court ruled that the First Amendment theories advanced by Plaintiffs—overbreadth, violations of the right to anonymity and association, and chilling of speech—were unsupported because the statute did not regulate or compel speech or disclosure, nor did it plausibly chill protected expression. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "RICHARDS V. NEWSOM" on Justia Law

Ernesto and Marilyn Patacsil operated group care homes, and in 2012, eight of their employees brought suit in federal district court alleging violations of California labor laws, including failure to provide breaks, pay lawful wages, and maintain accurate records. The employees sought damages and civil penalties under the California Private Attorneys General Act (PAGA). The jury found in favor of the plaintiffs, and the district court awarded substantial damages, attorney fees, and PAGA penalties. Of the PAGA penalties, 75% were designated for the California Labor and Workforce Development Agency (LWDA) and 25% for the aggrieved employees.Shortly after the judgment, the Patacsils filed for Chapter 7 bankruptcy. The employees (creditors) initiated an adversary proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court, seeking to have the PAGA judgment debts declared nondischargeable under 11 U.S.C. §§ 523(a)(6) and (7). The bankruptcy court determined that a trial was needed to resolve whether most of the judgment was nondischargeable under § 523(a)(6, which requires a showing of willful and malicious injury. Under § 523(a)(7), the court found that only the portion of PAGA penalties payable to the LWDA was excepted from discharge, not the 25% allocated to employees or the attorney fees.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California granted leave for an interlocutory appeal on the § 523(a)(7) issue, affirmed the bankruptcy court’s ruling, and remanded for further proceedings on the remaining issues. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal and determined that because the dischargeability proceeding was not yet final—trial on the § 523(a)(6) issue was still pending—it lacked jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1). The appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction. View "CABARDO V. PATACSIL" on Justia Law

An inmate at Airway Heights Corrections Center participated in a prison writing program sponsored by Eastern Washington University, which encouraged submissions to a university literary journal. The inmate wrote a short story containing a brief reference to sexual intimacy and submitted it for consideration. The prison’s Community Partnership Program Coordinator intercepted the submission, deeming it “inappropriate for publication” due to its “sexual content,” and returned it to the inmate. The inmate then mailed the story directly to the university and complained to the prison superintendent, who endorsed the decision to block the submission and warned that further unauthorized correspondence would result in removal from the program.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington granted summary judgment for the prison officials, concluding that they had not violated the inmate’s First Amendment rights and, even if they had, their actions were protected by qualified immunity. The court applied the deferential standard from Turner v. Safley, which governs regulations of prisoner conduct, and found no retaliation. The court also denied the inmate’s motions for additional discovery and to vacate the judgment.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s summary judgment, including its qualified immunity determination, and remanded for further proceedings. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred by applying the Turner standard instead of the standard from Procunier v. Martinez, which governs outgoing inmate correspondence. The panel determined that genuine disputes of fact existed and, if proven, could show that the prison officials’ refusal to transmit the inmate’s story constituted prohibited censorship under the First Amendment. The court also held that the district court erred in its analysis of the retaliation claim and instructed that it should be evaluated under Rhodes v. Robinson, which sets forth the elements for a First Amendment retaliation claim in the prison context. View "GRENNING V. KEY" on Justia Law

Google was accused of violating the privacy rights of users in the United States by continuing to track and store their location data even after users had disabled the “Location History” feature on their devices. The lawsuit, brought as a class action on behalf of approximately 247.7 million individuals, consolidated multiple complaints. The parties ultimately negotiated a settlement that included both injunctive relief—requiring Google to alter its practices—and a $62 million fund. This settlement fund was to cover attorneys’ fees, litigation costs, service awards for class representatives, and administrative expenses. The remaining funds were to be distributed to selected nonprofit organizations with a focus on internet privacy, rather than directly to class members.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California, after conducting a fairness hearing under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(e)(2), overruled objections from certain class members. These objectors argued that it was improper to distribute the settlement fund exclusively through the cy pres doctrine without first attempting a direct distribution to class members. The district court found that a direct distribution was infeasible because the pro rata share for each class member would be minimal (less than 25 cents) and administrative costs would further reduce any recovery. It approved the cy pres distribution, finding the selected nonprofit recipients had a substantial nexus to the class’s privacy interests.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order. The appellate court held that the district court properly considered the relevant factors under amended Rule 23(e), did not improperly presume the fairness of the settlement, and acted within its discretion in approving a cy pres-only monetary distribution where direct payments were deemed infeasible and not verifiable. The court also found the selection of cy pres recipients appropriate and declined to address new constitutional arguments not presented below. The holding is that cy pres-only distributions are permissible in class settlements when direct distribution is infeasible and the selected recipients have a substantial nexus to the interests of the class. View "PATACSIL V. GOOGLE LLC" on Justia Law

A company specializing in hybrid electric aircraft technology filed suit in Washington state court against a major aerospace manufacturer and its investment affiliate, alleging misappropriation of trade secrets, breach of contract, and tortious interference, among other state law claims. The plaintiff asserted that the defendant improperly used its confidential information, including by incorporating aspects of the plaintiff’s technology into two patents obtained by the defendant. The plaintiff’s claims involved several theories and more than 30 alleged trade secrets.The aerospace manufacturer responded by counterclaiming for a declaratory judgment that its employees were the sole inventors of one of the patents in question. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington based on this federal patent law counterclaim, and a second inventorship counterclaim was later added regarding another patent. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the defendant on both patent inventorship counterclaims. The remainder of the plaintiff’s claims proceeded to a jury, which returned a verdict awarding the plaintiff over $92 million for trade secret misappropriation and tortious interference. However, the district court granted the defendant’s post-trial motion for judgment as a matter of law and conditionally granted a new trial, vacating the jury award.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s post-trial rulings and remanded the case with instructions for reassignment to a different district judge. In a subsequent petition for rehearing, the defendant argued for the first time that appellate jurisdiction belonged exclusively to the Federal Circuit because the counterclaims were compulsory and arose under patent law. The Ninth Circuit held that the defendant’s counterclaims, though arising under federal patent law, were permissive—not compulsory—because they did not share the same operative facts as the plaintiff’s state law claims; thus, Ninth Circuit jurisdiction was proper. The court also held that the district court appropriately exercised supplemental jurisdiction over the state law claims, as they shared a common nucleus of operative fact with the federal counterclaims. The petition for rehearing was denied. View "ZUNUM AERO, INC. V. THE BOEING COMPANY" on Justia Law