Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several chambers of commerce and business associations challenged two California statutes—the Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act (SB 253) and the Climate-Related Financial Risk Act (SB 261)—on First Amendment grounds. SB 253 requires large companies to annually disclose greenhouse gas emissions in three categories: Scope 1 (direct emissions from owned or controlled sources), Scope 2 (indirect emissions from purchased energy), and Scope 3 (indirect emissions throughout the company’s value chain, including suppliers and customers). SB 261 mandates covered companies to publicly disclose climate-related financial risk information, including assessments about their exposure to climate change and related business impacts.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court determined that both SB 253 and SB 261 regulate commercial speech and thus are not subject to strict scrutiny. Applying intermediate scrutiny and, for SB 253, the more deferential Zauderer standard, the district court found that both statutes reasonably advance California’s substantial interests such as providing investors with information and reducing emissions. It concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claims and failed to meet the other requirements for preliminary relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial as to SB 253’s Scope 1 and Scope 2 disclosure requirements, holding these provisions regulate commercial speech and withstand intermediate scrutiny. However, it reversed the denial as to SB 253’s Scope 3 disclosure requirement and SB 261 in its entirety. The court found that Scope 3 disclosures and SB 261 compel noncommercial speech subject to strict scrutiny, which the State could not satisfy. The case was remanded for the district court to determine whether SB 253’s Scope 3 disclosure provisions are severable. View "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. SANCHEZ" on Justia Law

A former member of the Los Angeles County Board of Supervisors was convicted for conspiracy, federal program bribery, and honest services mail and wire fraud. The case centered on a scheme where the then-Dean of the University of Southern California’s School of Social Work helped channel a $100,000 donation of university funds to a nonprofit employing the supervisor’s son. In exchange, the supervisor voted in favor of a county contract for telehealth services with USC. The evidence showed the supervisor valued the indirect transfer of funds for his son’s benefit, especially after previous attempts to provide direct funding raised concerns about nepotism.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over a sixteen-day trial. The jury convicted the supervisor on counts specifically related to the funneling of the $100,000 payment, while acquitting him on other counts tied to his son’s admission, scholarship, or professorship at USC. Following conviction, the supervisor appealed, challenging the Government’s theory of fraud and bribery, the legal validity of the “thing of value,” and the sufficiency of evidence for materiality and intent. He also contested the jury instructions and raised Batson challenges regarding the exclusion of Black female jurors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the funneling of $100,000 through USC for the son’s benefit was a “thing of value” sufficient to support convictions for honest services fraud and federal program bribery. The court found the evidence of intent and materiality sufficient, determined there was no error in the jury instructions, and rejected the extension of Batson to intersectional challenges. The convictions for conspiracy, federal program bribery, and honest services fraud were affirmed. View "USA V. RIDLEY-THOMAS" on Justia Law

The defendant was accused of participating in a plan to attack a public event in Garland, Texas, which was targeted for its association with controversial depictions of the Prophet Muhammad. The attack was carried out by two individuals, Simpson and Soofi, who were killed during the incident. Investigators uncovered evidence of the defendant’s close association with the attackers, his consumption of extremist propaganda, and his involvement in firearms training and procurement. The government argued that the defendant, along with Simpson and Soofi, conspired to provide material support to ISIS, specifically as “personnel” or by providing “services” in the form of the attack.After a trial in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona, a jury convicted the defendant on all counts, including conspiracy to provide material support to a foreign terrorist organization in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2339B (Count 5). The district court sentenced him to 360 months’ imprisonment. Post-trial, the defendant filed motions for acquittal and new trials, including arguments based on Brady violations, but relief was denied for Count 5. The government dismissed another count, and the district court resentenced him to the same term. The defendant timely appealed his conviction on Count 5, arguing insufficient evidence to support the jury’s finding.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the sufficiency of the evidence under the Jackson v. Virginia standard, regardless of whether the claim was preserved below. The court held that the government failed to present sufficient evidence that the defendant intended to join a conspiracy in which material support would be provided to ISIS, either as “personnel” acting under ISIS’s direction or as “services” beyond independent advocacy. The court reversed the conviction on Count 5, remanded for entry of acquittal and resentencing, and affirmed the district court’s rulings on all other issues. View "USA V. ABDUL KAREEM" on Justia Law

A mother and son, both debtors, repeatedly filed for bankruptcy under Chapter 13 after a lender, Milestone Financial, LLC, foreclosed on a property for which they had not made any mortgage payments. After foreclosure, Milestone sought to evict them, but local eviction moratoria delayed the process. As the unlawful detainer action approached trial, both debtors filed new Chapter 13 petitions, which triggered an automatic stay and halted eviction. Their bankruptcy petitions were incomplete, lacking required schedules and documents. Despite receiving an extension to file the missing documents, the debtors did not comply, but instead filed motions for voluntary dismissal under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b) on the final day of the extension.The United States Bankruptcy Court for the Northern District of California dismissed both cases for failure to comply with its order to file the missing documents, rather than on the debtors’ request for voluntary dismissal. It also imposed a one-year bar prohibiting the debtors from refiling for bankruptcy. The debtors’ motions for reconsideration were denied, and they appealed. The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed the imposition of the one-year refiling bar but certified the question of the length of such a bar for direct appeal to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b), a debtor has an absolute right to voluntarily dismiss a Chapter 13 case, even if the case was filed in bad faith, and the bankruptcy court erred by dismissing for failure to comply with a court order instead of granting the voluntary dismissal request. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the one-year refiling bar, concluding that the bankruptcy court had authority under 11 U.S.C. § 349(a) to impose such a sanction for cause, and that the statutory 180-day bar in § 109(g) does not limit the court’s authority to impose a longer bar for repeated bad faith filings. View "SRINIVASAN V. MILESTONE FINANCIAL, LLC" on Justia Law

During a protest at San Jose City Hall, the plaintiff attended as a peaceful participant. At one point in the evening, after some protestors threw bottles and objects at the police, an officer equipped with a 40mm projectile impact weapon responded by firing into the crowd. The plaintiff, who did not throw anything or engage with the police, was struck behind the knee by a foam baton round and subsequently developed a pulmonary embolism as a result of his injury.After these events, the plaintiff filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California against the officer and the City of San Jose, alleging violations of his constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 and California’s Bane Act, as well as common law claims. The case proceeded to trial, where the plaintiff argued that the officer fired indiscriminately into the crowd rather than targeting a specific threat. The jury found in favor of the plaintiff on all claims against the officer, awarding damages, and specifically found that the officer fired indiscriminately. The district court denied the officer’s post-verdict motion for judgment as a matter of law on the Fourth Amendment and Bane Act claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court concluded that the officer’s actions constituted a seizure and that the use of force was excessive, thus violating the plaintiff’s Fourth Amendment rights. However, the court held that the law was not clearly established for purposes of qualified immunity because prior precedent, particularly Nelson v. City of Davis, was materially distinguishable from the circumstances present here. As a result, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of qualified immunity on the Fourth Amendment claim, vacated the award of attorneys’ fees, and remanded for recalculation pending resolution of the state law claim, which was certified to the California Supreme Court. View "JOHNSON V. ADGAR" on Justia Law

A Canadian company that creates and publishes online content used several Facebook pages and Meta’s self-serve advertising service for more than ten years. Over that period, the company submitted more than 500,000 ads to Meta, of which over 18,000 were rejected for reasons such as sensational content, focusing excessively on body parts, or using deceptive practices. In October 2020, Meta canceled the company’s Facebook pages for repeatedly violating its terms and policies.After Meta’s cancellation of its pages, the company brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, raising claims including conversion and fraudulent inducement. The conversion claim was based on Meta’s decision to “unpublish” the company’s Facebook pages, which the company argued amounted to interfering with its property right. The district court dismissed the conversion claim, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shielded Meta from liability for publishing third-party content.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that Section 230 barred the conversion claim because Meta acted as a publisher when it terminated the company’s Facebook account. The court clarified that simply framing a claim in contractual terms does not create an exception to Section 230 if the claim still rests on publishing activity. The court distinguished this case from others where a distinct contractual promise unrelated to publishing was at issue, and concluded that Meta’s actions fell squarely within its editorial discretion as a publisher protected by Section 230. The dismissal of the conversion claim was therefore affirmed. View "SHARED PARTNERSHIP V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

A group of DirecTV subscribers, both residential and commercial, brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the National Football League (NFL) and its member teams engaged in anticompetitive conduct. The subscribers claimed that the NFL’s interlocking agreements—including pooling telecast rights, exclusive distribution through DirecTV, and arrangements with networks—suppressed competition for out-of-market NFL games. These agreements allegedly forced subscribers to pay inflated prices for the “Sunday Ticket” package, which bundled NFL games not otherwise available in their local markets.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially allowed the case to proceed, certifying classes and admitting expert testimony by the plaintiffs’ economists. After trial, a jury found the NFL liable on antitrust grounds and awarded substantial damages to the subscribers. However, the district court later excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, finding it unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the NFL. In the alternative, the district court conditionally ordered a new trial on damages, concluding the jury’s damages calculation was not supported by the evidence and was improperly derived.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, ruling that while experts’ methods and opinions may be impeachable, such disputes are for the jury to resolve unless the methods are fundamentally unreliable or speculative. However, the appellate court agreed that a new trial on damages was warranted because the jury’s award was based on an improper calculation method. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, affirmed the order granting a new trial on damages, remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury’s liability verdict, and directed a new trial limited to the issue of damages. View "NINTH INNING INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, INC." on Justia Law

California enacted a law (Senate Bill 399) that prohibits employers from subjecting, or threatening to subject, employees to adverse employment actions if those employees decline to attend employer-sponsored meetings or communications meant to express the employer’s opinion on political or religious matters. Three industry groups representing California employers sued the state officials responsible for enforcing the law, arguing that it violates their First Amendment rights and is preempted by federal labor law. The Western Growers Association, one of the groups, asserted that its members regularly hold “all-hands” meetings to discuss political issues, and that SB 399 would chill this practice due to the threat of enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California found that the industry groups had standing and granted a preliminary injunction, preventing California from enforcing SB 399. The district court concluded that the groups were likely to succeed both on their First Amendment claim and the preemption argument. California appealed, contending that the groups lacked standing for a pre-enforcement challenge and were unlikely to prevail on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the Western Growers Association had associational standing because its members intended to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by SB 399, and faced a credible threat of enforcement. The court determined that SB 399 is subject to First Amendment scrutiny because it targets expressive conduct based on content and speaker. Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that California had not identified a compelling interest sufficient to justify the law’s content-based restrictions. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction, holding that the industry groups are likely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. The court did not address the preemption claim. View "CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. BONTA" on Justia Law

The case concerns two ranching entities in Nevada that challenged plans issued by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to gather and remove excess wild horses from specified areas—the Little Fish Lake Joint Management Area and the Stone Cabin Complex. After BLM determined that the populations of wild horses in these areas significantly exceeded the established Appropriate Management Levels (AML), it developed multi-year Gather Plans that detailed procedures for removal, population control, and subsequent maintenance actions. The plaintiffs asserted that these plans failed to satisfy the requirement of the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act, which directs BLM to “immediately remove excess animals from the range so as to achieve appropriate management levels.”The United States District Court for the District of Nevada consolidated the plaintiffs’ challenges and reviewed them under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government officials, concluding that the Gather Plans did not violate the immediacy requirement of the Wild Horses Act. The plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the statutory language “immediately remove excess animals” to mean removal as promptly as logistically and reasonably possible, taking into account humane treatment and other statutory considerations. The court held that the Act does not require BLM to set a specific timeframe for removal nor prohibit BLM from considering practical constraints in its maintenance actions. The Ninth Circuit found that both Gather Plans complied with the Act’s immediacy requirement and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "COLVIN AND SON, LLC V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Two companies that operate platforms connecting app-based workers with customers, primarily for delivery services, challenged a Seattle city ordinance that restricts “unwarranted deactivations” of worker accounts. The ordinance requires network companies to provide written notice to workers about their deactivation policies and mandates that these policies be “reasonably related” to safe and efficient operations. The companies argued that these requirements violate their First Amendment rights by compelling speech and that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.After the ordinance was enacted, the companies sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court concluded that the ordinance primarily regulated conduct and any impact on speech was incidental. It also held that the term “reasonable” was not unconstitutionally vague and that the companies had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or a balance of equities in their favor. Accordingly, the district court denied the request for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. Assuming, without deciding, that the ordinance regulates speech, the court determined that any regulated speech was commercial in nature. Applying the standard from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court found the ordinance’s disclosure and policy requirements to be reasonably related to substantial governmental interests and not unduly burdensome or controversial. The court also rejected the companies’ vagueness challenge, holding the ordinance provided adequate notice of what conduct was required. Because the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. View "UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law