Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A Canadian company that creates and publishes online content used several Facebook pages and Meta’s self-serve advertising service for more than ten years. Over that period, the company submitted more than 500,000 ads to Meta, of which over 18,000 were rejected for reasons such as sensational content, focusing excessively on body parts, or using deceptive practices. In October 2020, Meta canceled the company’s Facebook pages for repeatedly violating its terms and policies.After Meta’s cancellation of its pages, the company brought suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, raising claims including conversion and fraudulent inducement. The conversion claim was based on Meta’s decision to “unpublish” the company’s Facebook pages, which the company argued amounted to interfering with its property right. The district court dismissed the conversion claim, ruling that Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act shielded Meta from liability for publishing third-party content.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that Section 230 barred the conversion claim because Meta acted as a publisher when it terminated the company’s Facebook account. The court clarified that simply framing a claim in contractual terms does not create an exception to Section 230 if the claim still rests on publishing activity. The court distinguished this case from others where a distinct contractual promise unrelated to publishing was at issue, and concluded that Meta’s actions fell squarely within its editorial discretion as a publisher protected by Section 230. The dismissal of the conversion claim was therefore affirmed. View "SHARED PARTNERSHIP V. META PLATFORMS, INC." on Justia Law

A group of DirecTV subscribers, both residential and commercial, brought a class action lawsuit alleging that the National Football League (NFL) and its member teams engaged in anticompetitive conduct. The subscribers claimed that the NFL’s interlocking agreements—including pooling telecast rights, exclusive distribution through DirecTV, and arrangements with networks—suppressed competition for out-of-market NFL games. These agreements allegedly forced subscribers to pay inflated prices for the “Sunday Ticket” package, which bundled NFL games not otherwise available in their local markets.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially allowed the case to proceed, certifying classes and admitting expert testimony by the plaintiffs’ economists. After trial, a jury found the NFL liable on antitrust grounds and awarded substantial damages to the subscribers. However, the district court later excluded the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, finding it unreliable under Federal Rule of Evidence 702, and granted judgment as a matter of law in favor of the NFL. In the alternative, the district court conditionally ordered a new trial on damages, concluding the jury’s damages calculation was not supported by the evidence and was improperly derived.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the district court abused its discretion by excluding the plaintiffs’ expert testimony, ruling that while experts’ methods and opinions may be impeachable, such disputes are for the jury to resolve unless the methods are fundamentally unreliable or speculative. However, the appellate court agreed that a new trial on damages was warranted because the jury’s award was based on an improper calculation method. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment as a matter of law, affirmed the order granting a new trial on damages, remanded with instructions to reinstate the jury’s liability verdict, and directed a new trial limited to the issue of damages. View "NINTH INNING INC. V. NATIONAL FOOTBALL LEAGUE, INC." on Justia Law

California enacted a law (Senate Bill 399) that prohibits employers from subjecting, or threatening to subject, employees to adverse employment actions if those employees decline to attend employer-sponsored meetings or communications meant to express the employer’s opinion on political or religious matters. Three industry groups representing California employers sued the state officials responsible for enforcing the law, arguing that it violates their First Amendment rights and is preempted by federal labor law. The Western Growers Association, one of the groups, asserted that its members regularly hold “all-hands” meetings to discuss political issues, and that SB 399 would chill this practice due to the threat of enforcement.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California found that the industry groups had standing and granted a preliminary injunction, preventing California from enforcing SB 399. The district court concluded that the groups were likely to succeed both on their First Amendment claim and the preemption argument. California appealed, contending that the groups lacked standing for a pre-enforcement challenge and were unlikely to prevail on the merits.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that the Western Growers Association had associational standing because its members intended to engage in conduct arguably proscribed by SB 399, and faced a credible threat of enforcement. The court determined that SB 399 is subject to First Amendment scrutiny because it targets expressive conduct based on content and speaker. Applying strict scrutiny, the court concluded that California had not identified a compelling interest sufficient to justify the law’s content-based restrictions. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s preliminary injunction, holding that the industry groups are likely to succeed on their First Amendment claim. The court did not address the preemption claim. View "CALIFORNIA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. BONTA" on Justia Law

The case concerns two ranching entities in Nevada that challenged plans issued by the Bureau of Land Management (BLM) to gather and remove excess wild horses from specified areas—the Little Fish Lake Joint Management Area and the Stone Cabin Complex. After BLM determined that the populations of wild horses in these areas significantly exceeded the established Appropriate Management Levels (AML), it developed multi-year Gather Plans that detailed procedures for removal, population control, and subsequent maintenance actions. The plaintiffs asserted that these plans failed to satisfy the requirement of the Wild Free Roaming Horses and Burros Act, which directs BLM to “immediately remove excess animals from the range so as to achieve appropriate management levels.”The United States District Court for the District of Nevada consolidated the plaintiffs’ challenges and reviewed them under the Administrative Procedure Act. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of the government officials, concluding that the Gather Plans did not violate the immediacy requirement of the Wild Horses Act. The plaintiffs timely appealed the district court’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. The Ninth Circuit interpreted the statutory language “immediately remove excess animals” to mean removal as promptly as logistically and reasonably possible, taking into account humane treatment and other statutory considerations. The court held that the Act does not require BLM to set a specific timeframe for removal nor prohibit BLM from considering practical constraints in its maintenance actions. The Ninth Circuit found that both Gather Plans complied with the Act’s immediacy requirement and rejected the plaintiffs’ arguments. The court affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "COLVIN AND SON, LLC V. BURGUM" on Justia Law

Two companies that operate platforms connecting app-based workers with customers, primarily for delivery services, challenged a Seattle city ordinance that restricts “unwarranted deactivations” of worker accounts. The ordinance requires network companies to provide written notice to workers about their deactivation policies and mandates that these policies be “reasonably related” to safe and efficient operations. The companies argued that these requirements violate their First Amendment rights by compelling speech and that the ordinance is unconstitutionally vague.After the ordinance was enacted, the companies sought a temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction in the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The district court concluded that the ordinance primarily regulated conduct and any impact on speech was incidental. It also held that the term “reasonable” was not unconstitutionally vague and that the companies had not demonstrated a likelihood of success on the merits, irreparable harm, or a balance of equities in their favor. Accordingly, the district court denied the request for injunctive relief.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. Assuming, without deciding, that the ordinance regulates speech, the court determined that any regulated speech was commercial in nature. Applying the standard from Zauderer v. Office of Disciplinary Counsel of the Supreme Court of Ohio, the court found the ordinance’s disclosure and policy requirements to be reasonably related to substantial governmental interests and not unduly burdensome or controversial. The court also rejected the companies’ vagueness challenge, holding the ordinance provided adequate notice of what conduct was required. Because the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits, the court affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. View "UBER TECHNOLOGIES, INC. V. CITY OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

A Russian citizen who identifies as bisexual sought asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture in the United States. He based his application on his membership in a social group defined by sexual orientation, specifically “the LGBT community” or “queer Russian men.” The petitioner described a history of abuse and discrimination in Russia, including physical violence from his mother’s partner, harassment and assaults by classmates, discrimination and violence at work, threats of compulsory conversion therapy, a violent attack by classmates, dismissive responses from law enforcement, and continued threats after fleeing Russia.An Immigration Judge (IJ) denied all claims for relief. The IJ did not make an adverse credibility finding but concluded the petitioner had not provided credible evidence proving his bisexuality and had not shown he suffered significant harm amounting to persecution due to his sexual orientation. The IJ’s reasoning rested in part on the fact that the petitioner had never had sexual relations with a man or woman, reflecting a misunderstanding of how sexual orientation is defined. The IJ also faulted the petitioner for lacking corroborative evidence, but did not notify him that such evidence was required until issuing the decision.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s denial, finding the petitioner’s evidence insufficient to satisfy his burden of proof for membership in the claimed social group or for past or future persecution.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review and remanded the case. The court held that the agency fundamentally misunderstood the petitioner’s proposed social group, specifically misapprehending the nature of bisexuality. Additionally, the agency violated statutory notice-and-opportunity requirements by failing to inform the petitioner of the need for specific corroborating evidence before denying relief, thereby depriving him of a meaningful opportunity to provide such evidence or explain its unavailability. View "A.M. V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A defendant was investigated after a private investigator discovered a memory card containing surreptitious recordings of his stepdaughter undressing in her bedroom. Law enforcement executed a search warrant at the defendant’s home, uncovering a hidden camera disguised as a charger in the victim’s room and multiple explicit videos and images of the minor, recorded over a period of several years. The defendant had organized these materials and stored them in a concealed media vault on his phone.The defendant was indicted in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California for sexual exploitation of a minor under 18 U.S.C. § 2251(a). He moved to dismiss the indictment, arguing it was insufficiently specific and did not provide adequate notice of the charges. The district court denied the motion, finding the indictment adequately alleged the essential elements. After a jury trial resulted in a guilty verdict, the district court imposed a 252-month sentence, ordered restitution to the victim, and entered a personal forfeiture money judgment representing the proceeds from the sale of the defendant’s house, where the offense occurred.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed three main issues. First, it affirmed the district court’s denial of the motion to dismiss, holding that the indictment sufficiently tracked the statutory language and included all necessary elements. Second, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the forfeiture order, concluding that even if the district court erred by not inquiring whether the jury should determine forfeitability, any error was harmless because the use of the house to commit the offense was uncontested and indisputable. Third, the Ninth Circuit vacated the restitution order due to a mathematical error and remanded for recalculation and clarification regarding certain housing expenses. The judgment was affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. View "USA V. MUMMA" on Justia Law

The defendant was indicted for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and fentanyl, unlawful possession of a firearm, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime. After his motion to suppress evidence was denied, he pleaded guilty to possession with intent to distribute. As part of his plea agreement, he waived his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, and both he and his trial counsel affirmed that he had been advised of the agreement’s contents. Six months after sentencing, he filed a pro se motion under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, alleging ineffective assistance of counsel because his trial lawyer failed to file an appeal despite being directed to do so.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho ordered the government to respond and requested a declaration from the defendant’s trial counsel, who denied that the defendant asked him to file an appeal. The district court denied the § 2255 motion without holding an evidentiary hearing, concluding that the defendant merely “discussed” his desire to appeal after sentencing but did not directly instruct his counsel to file an appeal. The court also found that trial counsel’s affidavit contradicted any claim that the defendant had given such instructions, and determined that a hearing would be futile since the defendant had knowingly waived his appeal rights.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The panel held that the defendant’s pro se allegations, when liberally construed, sufficiently claimed ineffective assistance by asserting he directed counsel to appeal. The Ninth Circuit determined that the district court abused its discretion by resolving the credibility dispute between conflicting sworn statements without an evidentiary hearing. The panel vacated the district court’s order denying relief and remanded for an evidentiary hearing to assess the credibility of both the defendant and his trial counsel. View "USA V. ANDERSON" on Justia Law

Three individuals departed from Dana Point Harbor in Southern California at night, ostensibly for a lobster-fishing trip. When the boat returned, one person was missing, and his body was later found floating in the ocean with evidence of drowning, gunshot wounds, and blunt force trauma. Location data placed the incident within three nautical miles of the California coast. The surviving participants did not report the death. Following an investigation, federal authorities charged one of the surviving individuals with first-degree murder, conspiracy to commit murder, and possession of a firearm in furtherance of murder.The United States District Court for the Central District of California heard the case. The defense argued that the federal government lacked jurisdiction because the death occurred within the three-nautical-mile territorial sea, which they claimed was under California's exclusive criminal jurisdiction. The district court rejected this argument, finding that federal jurisdiction extended twelve nautical miles from shore under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996. At trial, the jury was instructed accordingly and convicted the defendant on all counts. During jury deliberations, a juror experiencing distress and mental health concerns, which were linked to pressure from other jurors regarding the verdict, was excused and replaced by an alternate, with the agreement of both parties. The reconstituted jury returned guilty verdicts.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the federal government’s jurisdiction under Title 18 did extend to the first three nautical miles from shore. However, the appellate court found that the removal of the juror violated the defendant’s Sixth Amendment right to a unanimous jury verdict because her dismissal stemmed from her views on the merits of the case. The Ninth Circuit vacated the convictions and remanded the case for further proceedings. View "USA V. LE" on Justia Law

California enacted the No Vigilantes Act, which, among other things, requires any non-uniformed federal law enforcement officer operating in the state to visibly display identification showing their agency and either a name or badge number while performing enforcement duties. This requirement, codified at California Penal Code § 13654, applies broadly to federal officers, subject to narrow exceptions, and provides for criminal penalties for willful violations. The Act also allows agencies to avoid these requirements by publicly posting a written identification policy that complies with the statute.After the Act was passed, the United States filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, challenging the constitutionality of the identification requirement before it had been enforced. The United States argued that the law violated the Supremacy Clause by directly regulating federal law enforcement operations. The district court denied the United States’ request for a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the identification requirement, finding the government had not shown that California’s law interfered with or controlled federal operations to a degree that would render it unconstitutional. The district court did, however, grant partial relief under a different statute, and ruled that the United States lacked standing to challenge other provisions.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the United States was certain to succeed on its Supremacy Clause claim because the Act directly regulated federal operations without congressional authorization, in violation of intergovernmental immunity. The court held that no set of circumstances existed under which the challenged requirement would be valid, and that the other factors for preliminary injunctive relief also favored the United States. The Ninth Circuit ordered the district court to enter a preliminary injunction barring enforcement of the identification requirement against the United States, its agencies, and officers. View "USA V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA" on Justia Law