Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A group of 53 California hospitals challenged the Secretary of Health and Human Services' (HHS) 2020 low-wage-index policy, which adjusted Medicare payment rates by inflating the rates for the lowest quartile of hospitals and reducing payments to all hospitals by a small percentage. The hospitals argued that the policy violated statutory provisions, was arbitrary and capricious, resulted from a faulty administrative procedure, and was unsupported by evidence.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied HHS's motion for summary judgment, granted the hospitals' motion for summary judgment, and remanded the matter to the Secretary without vacating the policy. The court held that HHS lacked authority to implement the low-wage-index policy under either the Wage Index Provision or the Exceptions and Adjustments Provision and found procedural defects in the policy's implementation.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's holding that the Secretary exceeded his statutory authority in establishing the 2020 wage index. The court held that the low-wage-index policy did not "reflect" area differences in hospital wage levels as required by the statute and that the Exceptions and Adjustments Provision could not independently authorize the policy. The court also vacated the district court's decision to remand the case without vacating the policy, stating that when an agency cannot issue the challenged policy in another way, the only appropriate remedy is vacatur. Judge Nguyen dissented, arguing that the low-wage-index policy was consistent with the statutory text and that the majority's decision would have negative repercussions for vulnerable communities. View "Kaweah Delta Health Care District v. Becerra" on Justia Law

Lawanda Small, a beneficiary and additional insured of her deceased husband's Allianz life insurance policy, filed a class action lawsuit against Allianz Life Insurance Company. She alleged that Allianz violated California Insurance Code sections 10113.71 and 10113.72 by failing to comply with notice procedures required to prevent policies from lapsing due to nonpayment of premiums. Small sought to represent two subclasses: the "Living Insured Subclass" seeking equitable relief to reinstate life insurance coverage, and the "Beneficiary Subclass" seeking damages from death benefits where the insured was deceased.The United States District Court for the Central District of California certified the class, finding that both subclasses satisfied the requirements of Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23(a) and 23(b). The court granted summary judgment for Small and the class on their breach of contract and declaratory relief claims, ruling that Allianz improperly lapsed the policies by failing to comply with the Statutes. Allianz appealed, arguing that the district court erred in certifying the class and that the summary judgment orders violated the one-way intervention prohibition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's order certifying the class and vacated the summary judgment orders. The appellate court held that to recover for alleged violations of the Statutes, plaintiffs must show not only that the insurer violated the notice requirements but also that the violation caused them harm. The court found that individual questions of causation and injury predominated over common questions, making class certification inappropriate. Additionally, the court determined that Small was not an adequate representative with typical questions to represent both subclasses. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "Small v. Allianz Life Insurance Co. of North America" on Justia Law

Ali Bahreman, a flight attendant for Allegiant Air, challenged the Collective Bargaining Agreement (CBA) between Allegiant and the Transport Workers Union (Union). The CBA required employees to either pay union dues or agency fees to maintain seniority-based bidding privileges for work schedules. Bahreman chose not to pay any fees and subsequently lost his bidding privileges. He argued that this arrangement violated the Railway Labor Act (RLA) by coercing employees to join the Union, deviating from the employment-termination remedy, and breaching the Union's duty of fair representation.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment in favor of Allegiant and the Union. The court found that the CBA did not violate the RLA's anti-coercion provision, as it did not induce employees to join the Union. The court also held that the RLA does not prohibit collective bargaining agreements with terms other than those explicitly permitted by the Act. Additionally, the court determined that the Union did not breach its duty of fair representation, as it enforced the CBA equally among all members of the bargaining unit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the RLA does not prohibit a collective bargaining agreement that conditions seniority-based bidding privileges on the payment of union dues or agency fees. The court found that the CBA did not induce union membership, as it treated union members and nonmembers alike regarding payment requirements. The court also concluded that the CBA's terms were permissible under the RLA and that the Union did not act arbitrarily, discriminatorily, or in bad faith in enforcing the agreement. View "Bahreman v. Allegiant Air, LLC" on Justia Law

Karl Hansen sued Tesla, Inc., its CEO Elon Musk, and U.S. Security Associates (USSA), alleging retaliation for reporting misconduct at Tesla. Hansen, initially hired by Tesla, was later employed by USSA. He reported thefts, narcotics trafficking, and improper contracts at Tesla, and filed a report with the SEC. After Musk saw Hansen at the Gigafactory and demanded his removal, USSA reassigned Hansen, which he claimed was retaliatory.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada ordered most of Hansen’s claims to arbitration, except his Sarbanes-Oxley Act (SOX) claim. The arbitrator dismissed Hansen’s non-SOX claims, finding no contractual right to work at the Gigafactory and no reasonable belief of securities law violations. The district court confirmed the arbitration award and dismissed Hansen’s SOX claim, holding that the arbitrator’s findings precluded relitigation of issues essential to the SOX claim.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that while an arbitrator’s decision cannot preclude a SOX claim, a confirmed arbitral award can preclude relitigation of issues underlying such a claim. The court found that the arbitrator’s decision, which concluded Hansen had no reasonable belief of securities law violations, precluded his SOX claim. The court also held that the arbitrator’s findings on Hansen’s state law claims had a preclusive effect, as they were confirmed by the district court. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Hansen’s complaint. View "Hansen v. Musk" on Justia Law

Lloyd Gerald Napouk was fatally shot by two Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department officers after they responded to reports of a man behaving suspiciously in a residential neighborhood with what appeared to be a long, bladed weapon. The officers attempted to engage Napouk, who refused to follow their commands and advanced towards them multiple times. When Napouk came within nine feet of one of the officers, both officers fired their weapons, killing him. The weapon turned out to be a plastic toy fashioned to look like a blade.Napouk’s parents and estate sued the officers and the Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment, deprivation of familial relations in violation of the Fourteenth Amendment, municipal liability based on Monell v. Department of Social Services, and Nevada state law claims. The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment for the defendants, determining that the officers’ use of force was reasonable as a matter of law.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s summary judgment. The court held that the officers were entitled to qualified immunity from the Fourth Amendment excessive force claim because Napouk posed an immediate threat to the officers, and no rational jury could find the officers’ mistake of fact regarding the weapon unreasonable. The court also held that the plaintiffs’ Fourteenth Amendment claim failed because there was no evidence that the officers acted with anything other than legitimate law enforcement objectives. Additionally, the plaintiffs’ Monell claims failed due to the absence of a constitutional violation, and the state law claims failed because the officers were entitled to discretionary-function immunity under Nevada law. View "Napouk v. Las Vegas Metropolitan Police Department" on Justia Law

Ahmad Abouammo, a former employee of Twitter, was accused of providing confidential information about dissident Saudi Twitter users to Bader Binasaker, an associate of Saudi Crown Prince Mohammed bin Salman. In exchange, Abouammo received a luxury wristwatch and substantial payments. A jury convicted Abouammo of acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government, conspiracy to commit wire and honest services fraud, wire and honest services fraud, international money laundering, and falsification of records to obstruct a federal investigation.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California presided over the initial trial. Abouammo was found guilty on multiple counts, including acting as an unregistered agent and falsifying records. He was sentenced to 42 months in prison, three years of supervised release, and forfeiture of $242,000. Abouammo appealed his convictions and sentence, arguing insufficient evidence, improper venue, and that some charges were time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court affirmed Abouammo’s convictions, holding that sufficient evidence supported his conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 951 for acting as an unregistered agent of a foreign government. The court found that Abouammo acted under the direction and control of the Saudi government, regardless of whether Binasaker was a foreign "official." The court also rejected Abouammo’s statute of limitations argument, holding that the superseding indictment was timely under 18 U.S.C. § 3288. Additionally, the court held that venue for the falsification of records charge was proper in the Northern District of California, where the obstructed federal investigation was taking place.The Ninth Circuit vacated Abouammo’s sentence and remanded for resentencing, but affirmed his convictions on all counts. View "USA V. ABOUAMMO" on Justia Law

Ohio House, LLC operates a sober-living facility in Costa Mesa, California, within a multiple-family residential (MFR) zone. The City of Costa Mesa notified Ohio House that it was subject to Ordinance 15-11, which mandates that group homes with over six residents in MFR zones obtain a conditional-use permit and meet a separation requirement. Ohio House's application for a permit was denied due to non-compliance with the separation requirement, and its request for a reasonable accommodation was also denied.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted partial summary judgment to the City on Ohio House's disparate-impact claim and denied Ohio House's post-verdict motions. The jury found in favor of the City on Ohio House's remaining claims, including disparate treatment, discriminatory statements, interference with fair housing rights, and reasonable accommodation. The district court also ruled that Ohio House's claim under California Government Code § 65008 was time-barred.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's rulings. The court held that Ohio House failed to establish facial disparate treatment as a matter of law because the City's group-living regulations facially benefit disabled individuals. The court also affirmed the summary judgment for the City on the disparate-impact claim, agreeing that Ohio House did not prove a significant, adverse, and disproportionate effect on a protected group. The court upheld the jury's verdict on the discriminatory statements claim, finding no unlawful discriminatory statements by the City. The court also affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the interference claim, concluding that Ohio House failed to prove a causal link between its protected activity and the City's actions. Finally, the court affirmed the denial of judgment as a matter of law on the reasonable accommodation claim, agreeing that the requested accommodation was unreasonable as it would fundamentally alter the City's zoning scheme. The court also upheld the district court's ruling that Ohio House's § 65008 claim was time-barred. View "THE OHIO HOUSE, LLC V. CITY OF COSTA MESA" on Justia Law

The case involves Planned Parenthood and two physicians challenging the Idaho Attorney General's interpretation of Idaho Code § 18-622(1), which criminalizes performing or attempting to perform an abortion and imposes professional licensing penalties on healthcare providers who assist in performing or attempting to perform an abortion. The Attorney General issued an opinion letter stating that the statute prohibits medical providers from referring patients to out-of-state abortion providers. Plaintiffs argued that this interpretation violates their First Amendment rights by preventing them from providing information about abortion services in other states.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the Attorney General from enforcing his interpretation of the statute. The court found that the plaintiffs had standing, the case was ripe and not moot, and the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young. The court held that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and would suffer irreparable harm without an injunction.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs had established Article III standing, as they demonstrated a credible threat of prosecution under the Attorney General's interpretation. The case was deemed ripe and not moot despite the Attorney General's withdrawal of the opinion letter, as the withdrawal did not disavow the interpretation. The court also held that the Attorney General was a proper defendant under Ex parte Young due to his authority to assist in the enforcement of the statute. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the district court that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment claim and affirmed the preliminary injunction. The request for reassignment to a different district judge was denied. View "PLANNED PARENTHOOD GREAT NORTHWEST, HAWAII, ALASKA V. LABRADOR" on Justia Law

Barry Ray Knight was convicted of receipt and possession of child pornography. He frequently downloaded child pornography using a peer-to-peer file-sharing network called BitTorrent. In January 2021, undercover officers downloaded files from Knight’s computer that contained child pornography. A search warrant was executed at Knight’s home, revealing over 3,100 videos and 115,000 still images of child pornography on his electronic devices. Knight was convicted after a bench trial and sentenced to 192 months in prison, followed by a lifetime of supervised release.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada imposed several conditions of supervised release, including a special condition prohibiting Knight from viewing or possessing any visual depictions of sexually explicit conduct involving children or adults. Knight did not object to this condition at trial but later argued on appeal that it was overbroad, relying on United States v. Cope. The district court also failed to orally pronounce the standard conditions of supervised release during sentencing.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed Knight’s appeal. The court rejected Knight’s argument that the special condition was overbroad, distinguishing it from Cope because it only applied to visual depictions and not to materials describing child pornography. The court found no error in the special condition and concluded that it was not unduly restrictive. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the standard conditions of supervised release that were not orally pronounced and remanded the case to the district court for reconsideration of those conditions. The court otherwise affirmed Knight’s conviction and sentence. View "U.S. v. Knight" on Justia Law

Dominic Dorsey was convicted of multiple federal crimes related to a series of robberies committed by two disguised men. The evidence at trial included surveillance video footage of the robberies. A police detective, who had extensively reviewed the surveillance video, testified as a lay witness about details in the video that the jury might have missed. The detective also identified Dorsey and his co-defendant, Reginald Bailey, as the disguised robbers based on his comparison of the video footage and still images.The United States District Court for the Central District of California admitted the detective's testimony under Federal Rule of Evidence 701, which allows lay opinion testimony if it is helpful to determining a fact in issue. The jury found Dorsey guilty on all charges, and he was sentenced to 40 years in prison. Dorsey appealed, challenging the admissibility of the detective's identification testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the detective's narrative testimony about the details in the surveillance video was admissible because it helped the jury understand the evidence. However, the court found that the detective's identification of Dorsey and Bailey as the robbers was inadmissible under Rule 701. The court reasoned that the detective's identification opinions were not helpful because they were based on evidence already before the jury, and the detective did not have personal knowledge or experience that would make his identification more reliable than the jury's own assessment.Despite this error, the Ninth Circuit concluded that the admission of the detective's identification testimony was harmless. The court noted that there was overwhelming evidence of Dorsey's guilt, including witness testimony, cell phone records, and other corroborating evidence. Therefore, the court affirmed Dorsey's conviction. View "USA V. DORSEY" on Justia Law