Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

During a robbery at La Milpa Market in Yakima, Washington, two masked individuals stole approximately $16,000. In the course of the crime, one robber dropped an envelope and the other lost his left glove. Both items were later linked to Eduardo Valencia: the envelope was addressed to his parents’ home and the glove produced a DNA match. Valencia, who has tattoos on the backs of his hands, was arrested months later while driving a car matching the one seen near the crime scene. At trial, Valencia’s defense centered on surveillance footage that did not clearly show tattoos on the left hand of the robber who lost his glove.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington presided over Valencia’s trial. Valencia’s attorney sought to have him display his hands to the jury without testifying, arguing that this act was not testimonial and would not subject him to cross-examination. The district court rejected this, ruling that displaying his hands on the stand constituted testimony and required him to be subjected to cross-examination. Valencia took the stand, testified about his tattoos, and was cross-examined by the government, which then introduced additional evidence—a Facebook photo allegedly contradicting his testimony about the timing of his tattoos. The jury convicted Valencia of Hobbs Act robbery and brandishing a firearm.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that requiring Valencia to take the stand to display his tattoos violated his Fifth Amendment right not to testify, because displaying identifying physical characteristics is not testimonial evidence. This constitutional error was not harmless, as the government emphasized Valencia’s testimony and the jury focused on his hand tattoos. The court reversed the convictions and remanded for a new trial. View "USA V. VALENCIA" on Justia Law

Courthouse News Service, a nationwide news organization reporting on civil litigation, challenged the Idaho courts' policy of withholding newly filed civil complaints from public and press access until after manual processing by court clerks. Under Idaho’s e-filing system, complaints submitted electronically are placed in a queue and only made public after a clerk reviews and accepts them. This process results in delays ranging from minutes to several days before complaints are accessible to the public, affecting the ability of Courthouse News Service to timely report on new filings.The United States District Court for the District of Idaho reviewed cross-motions for summary judgment from both parties. The district court declined to abstain from exercising jurisdiction, finding that its involvement would not require ongoing supervision of Idaho’s judicial administration. It further concluded that the First Amendment right of public access to judicial documents attaches when a complaint is received by the court, not when it is accepted by a clerk, and that Idaho’s policy violated this right. Applying rigorous scrutiny, the district court determined Idaho’s justifications for delay were insufficient and ruled in favor of Courthouse News Service.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the First Amendment right of timely access to judicial documents attaches at the time a complaint is filed or received by the court. Idaho’s “process-first” policy was found unconstitutional because it failed the strict scrutiny standard established in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court; Idaho did not demonstrate that its delay substantially served compelling interests or that no reasonable alternatives existed. The Ninth Circuit clarified that delays in access to newly filed nonconfidential civil complaints must be justified under strict scrutiny, and Idaho’s current policy does not meet this requirement. The district court’s grant of summary judgment for Courthouse News Service was affirmed. View "COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE V. OMUNDSON" on Justia Law

The plaintiffs, projects focused on protecting water quality, brought a suit against a clay recycling facility located near Temescal Creek in California, alleging violations of stormwater-permit requirements under the Clean Water Act. The facility, operated by Corona Clay Company, discharged stormwater into Temescal Creek, a tributary of the Santa Ana River. Regulatory authorities had previously issued violation notices to Corona, but no enforcement action was taken by the state. The plaintiffs sought relief for both substantive discharge violations and procedural violations such as monitoring and reporting.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially found in favor of Corona following a trial. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed and remanded, citing an intervening Supreme Court decision, County of Maui v. Hawaii Wildlife Fund, which expanded the scope of the Clean Water Act to include indirect discharges that are the “functional equivalent” of direct discharges. On retrial, the plaintiffs prevailed, and Corona was assessed significant penalties. After the Supreme Court’s Sackett v. EPA decision, which narrowed the definition of “waters of the United States,” Corona moved to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction and alternatively sought a new trial. The district court denied both motions, holding that the jurisdictional requirement was met and the issue of whether Temescal Creek qualified as a water of the United States had been conceded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Corona’s post-judgment motion to dismiss for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction, holding that whether a waterbody qualifies as a “water of the United States” is a merits question, not a jurisdictional one. However, it reversed the denial of Corona’s motion for a new trial under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 59, concluding that the intervening Sackett decision rendered a previously foreclosed issue viable. The panel remanded for further proceedings to determine, under Sackett’s standard, whether Temescal Creek is a water of the United States. View "INLAND EMPIRE WATERKEEPER V. CORONA CLAY COMPANY" on Justia Law

A noncitizen from Mexico was placed in removal proceedings based on the government's charge that he entered the United States without admission or parole. In response, his attorney filed a written pleading admitting to all the government’s factual allegations, including the manner of his entry, and conceded removability. Some time later, before his merits hearing, the noncitizen sought to amend his earlier admissions, asserting that his previous answer was incorrect because he actually entered the United States lawfully with a visa. He moved to amend his pleading and requested an opportunity to testify to this effect.The case was first reviewed by an Immigration Judge (IJ), who denied the motion to amend without allowing the noncitizen to present evidence or testify regarding the alleged error in the initial admission. During the hearing, when the noncitizen attempted to explain the circumstances of his entry, the IJ prevented him from doing so, relying solely on the attorney’s original admission in finding him removable. The noncitizen appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) and also moved to remand for the purpose of presenting new evidence, including an affidavit and a copy of his border crossing card. The BIA dismissed the appeal and denied the remand, concluding that the new evidence was insufficient and conflicted with the existing record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion by affirming the IJ’s denial of the motion to amend without allowing the noncitizen to present evidence that his attorney’s factual admission was untrue. The court further found that the BIA improperly made factual determinations that should have been made by the IJ. The court granted the petition in part, remanding for the IJ to allow live testimony and determine whether the noncitizen may withdraw the challenged admission, and, if so, whether he is nonetheless removable. The remainder of the petition was denied. View "URIAS-GAXIOLA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A woman participated in an employee pension plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). After being diagnosed with cancer and while hospitalized, she initiated an online election to receive her accrued pension benefits as a lump sum and designated her sister as the beneficiary. She died three days later, before completing a required second step of confirming her election and beneficiary designation, according to the plan’s administrative process. After her death, her sister submitted a claim seeking the lump sum benefit.The plan administrator denied the claim, reasoning that the decedent had not finalized her election and beneficiary designation, and that “substantial compliance” with the plan’s requirements was not sufficient under ERISA. On administrative appeal, the committee upheld the denial for the same reasons. The sister then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging entitlement to the benefits. The district court dismissed her complaint with prejudice, holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege that she was entitled to the benefits, even under a substantial compliance theory.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state law doctrine of substantial compliance is available under ERISA for benefit elections, just as it is for beneficiary designations, consistent with its previous decision in Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). The court clarified that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009), did not eliminate the doctrine of substantial compliance. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleged substantial compliance with the plan’s requirements and reversed the district court’s dismissal, remanding for further proceedings. View "LIU V. KAISER PERMANENTE EMPLOYEES PENSION PLAN FOR THE PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

The case concerns a longstanding dispute over tribal fishing rights in western Washington, originating from Judge Boldt’s 1974 decision interpreting treaties that guaranteed tribes the right to fish at their usual and accustomed grounds and stations (U&A). The Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe sought a determination that its U&A included the Skagit River, Baker River, and certain marine waters, arguing that these locations had not been specifically determined in the original Final Decision I or subsequent proceedings. The Tribe relied on historical and anthropological evidence, including materials produced after Final Decision I, to support its claim for expanded fishing rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed Sauk-Suiattle’s request for determination under Paragraph 25(a)(6) of the permanent injunction, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that Sauk-Suiattle’s U&A had been specifically determined in Final Decision I, thereby excluding any unnamed waters from further consideration. The dismissal was also alternatively supported by collateral estoppel grounds. The district court denied Sauk-Suiattle’s motion for reconsideration, which included additional evidence and expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Sauk-Suiattle’s claim to U&A on the Skagit River, holding that this issue was precluded by its prior decision in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, 66 F.4th 766 (9th Cir. 2023). However, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal as to the Baker River and marine waters, finding that Judge Boldt had not specifically determined Sauk-Suiattle’s rights to those locations. The Ninth Circuit remanded for the district court to exercise jurisdiction and consider Sauk-Suiattle’s Baker River and marine waters claims. View "SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

A family from Guatemala fled to the United States after a gang leader who had previously murdered a family member threatened to kill them as well. Despite relocating within Guatemala, the gang quickly found them and continued the threats. The local police refused to intervene unless the gang leader was caught in the act. Fearing for their lives, the family left Guatemala and eventually entered the United States between ports of entry.Upon seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied their applications. The BIA determined that the family was ineligible for asylum under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule, which imposed a presumption of ineligibility for most non-Mexican asylum seekers who entered the United States between ports of entry during a specific period. The BIA also found that the family did not establish that their membership in certain proposed social groups was a central reason for the harm they experienced or feared.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The Ninth Circuit held that the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule was inconsistent with the asylum statute because the statute guarantees the right to seek asylum regardless of the manner of entry into the United States. The court reaffirmed its prior decisions that the government cannot restrict asylum eligibility based on how a noncitizen entered the country. The Ninth Circuit also found that the BIA committed legal error by not applying the complete “mixed motives” framework when considering whether a protected ground was at least one central reason for the persecution. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MORALES V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

The defendant engaged in a long-running scheme to illegally export components for night-vision and thermal-vision rifle scopes, which are classified as “defense articles” under federal law, from California to Russia. He did so without obtaining the required export license from the U.S. State Department and concealed his activities through offshore banking. Over nearly a decade, his illicit exports generated over $9 million in international wire transfers.After federal investigators uncovered the operation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California charged him with conspiracy to export defense articles without a license under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and its implementing regulations, as well as two counts of money laundering. The defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts without a plea agreement and was sentenced to nine years in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his lawyer failed to challenge the validity of the conspiracy regulation under which he was convicted and did not properly inform him about the money-laundering charges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of this motion de novo. The court held that the AECA authorized the State Department to promulgate regulations criminalizing conspiracies to violate export restrictions, so counsel’s failure to challenge the regulation was not deficient. The factual record also foreclosed the defendant’s claim regarding the money-laundering pleas. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion and declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include additional claims. View "USA V. MORGOVSKY" on Justia Law

KalshiEX, LLC operates a platform it describes as offering legal sports betting across all 50 states. Its business model involves offering “sports event contracts” on a designated contract market (DCM) registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). These contracts allow users to buy and sell positions based on outcomes of sporting events, such as who will win the Super Bowl or specific in-game occurrences, resembling traditional sports betting. In 2025, the Nevada Gaming Control Board sent Kalshi a cease-and-desist letter, stating that Kalshi’s operations violated Nevada’s gaming laws by effectively functioning as an unlicensed sportsbook.Kalshi responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Nevada from enforcing its gaming laws against its sports and election event contracts. The district court initially granted the injunction, siding with Kalshi’s argument that its platform was subject only to federal regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and not state gaming law. However, following conflicting decisions in other federal courts and further briefing, the district court dissolved the injunction, ruling that Kalshi’s sports event contracts were not “swaps” under the CEA and thus not subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction; therefore, Nevada’s gaming laws could apply.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the district court’s dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that Kalshi’s sports event contracts were not “swaps” as defined in the CEA, and that CFTC regulations currently prohibit DCMs from listing contracts involving gaming. As a result, the CEA is unlikely to preempt Nevada’s gaming regulations as applied to Kalshi’s sports event contracts. The court remanded for further consideration of Kalshi’s election contracts. The court’s disposition was to affirm in part and remand in part. View "KALSHIEX, LLC V. ASSAD" on Justia Law

A group of Angolan nationals, including the lead petitioner, entered the United States without authorization in September 2022. The lead petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), alleging persecution based on his political activity as a member of UNITA, an opposition party in Angola. He described multiple incidents of harm and threats from Angolan police and military, including being injured during a protest, detained and tortured at a police compound, and threatened following his public denunciation of government abuses. After these events, the family hid in Angola before fleeing to the United States.An Immigration Judge (IJ) conducted merits hearings at which the lead petitioner testified pro se. The IJ found him not credible, citing perceived inconsistencies and omissions in his account, and denied all forms of relief. The IJ also determined that the record did not establish a particularized risk of torture independent of the petitioner’s testimony and found that internal relocation within Angola was possible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed the IJ’s findings, including the adverse credibility determination and denial of CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed both the IJ and BIA decisions. The court held that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on trivial inconsistencies and failed to account for significant translation difficulties during the hearings. The court also concluded that the agency committed reversible legal errors in its analysis of the petitioner’s CAT claim, specifically regarding the petitioner’s particularized risk of torture and ability to internally relocate. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review, reversed the adverse credibility finding, and remanded for further proceedings, accepting the petitioner’s testimony as credible. View "MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law