Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Two police officers attempted to execute a felony arrest warrant for a man believed to be affiliated with a local gang. The officers were aware of a recent incident in which the man had fled a traffic stop and believed he was an active fugitive wanted for serious drug-related offenses. Although the warrant had been recalled days before, the police database had not been updated, and the officers were unaware of this development. They located the man in a backyard, approached from ten to twenty feet away with their guns drawn, and ordered him to climb a fence and submit to arrest. The man claims both officers aimed their guns at his head, causing him fear and shock, but he complied without incident.After the arrest, the man was detained and later released when it was confirmed the warrant was no longer active. He filed a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, alleging the officers used excessive force in violation of his Fourth Amendment rights. The district court denied the officers’ motion for summary judgment, finding that a reasonable juror could conclude they used excessive force by aiming their weapons at the man’s head, and that this conduct was a clear violation of an established constitutional right.Reviewing the case, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision. The appellate court held that, under the circumstances, the officers did not violate the Fourth Amendment by approaching with weapons drawn, given their reasonable belief that the man was a serious and potentially dangerous fugitive who might resist or flee. The court further found that, even if excessive force had been used, there was no clearly established law making the officers’ conduct unlawful in these circumstances. The case was remanded with instructions to enter judgment for the officers. View "MEDRANO V. ACOSTA" on Justia Law

A Mexican citizen who entered the United States without inspection in 2000 faced removal proceedings initiated by the Department of Homeland Security in 2019. He admitted to the factual allegations and conceded removability. He applied for cancellation of removal and, alternatively, voluntary departure. The immigration judge denied cancellation of removal but granted voluntary departure, requiring him to post a $500 bond within five business days and depart within 60 days. The petitioner paid the bond the next day. When he appealed the denial of cancellation of removal to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA), he included proof of bond payment.The BIA dismissed the appeal and declined to reinstate the voluntary departure period, stating the record did not reflect timely proof of bond payment. This meant the alternate order of removal became effective. The BIA’s decision was issued more than 60 days after the immigration judge’s decision, so reinstatement of voluntary departure was necessary for the petitioner to depart voluntarily. The petitioner sought review from the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, arguing that the BIA failed to consider the proof of payment that was properly submitted.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that it had jurisdiction to review legal errors under 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(D), even though factual determinations underlying discretionary relief are generally unreviewable under Patel v. Garland, 596 U.S. 328 (2022). The court determined that the BIA’s failure to consider the dispositive evidence of bond payment constituted a legal error, not a factual determination. The court granted the petition for review in part and remanded for the BIA to consider the record evidence and decide whether to reinstate the voluntary departure period. The petition was denied as to cancellation of removal in a separate memorandum disposition. View "PEREZ-GARCIA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A registered nurse employed by a hospital system in Oregon requested a religious exemption from her employer’s mandatory COVID-19 vaccination policy. She objected on two grounds: concerns about vaccine safety for pregnant women and a religious objection to the use of fetal cells derived from abortions in vaccine development, citing her Christian beliefs and relevant biblical passages. After submitting her exemption request, the employer placed her on indefinite unpaid leave, leaving her without health insurance or income during her third trimester of pregnancy.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon reviewed her complaint, which referenced but did not attach the exemption letter. The hospital moved to dismiss, arguing the complaint failed to plausibly allege a conflict between the vaccination policy and the nurse’s bona fide religious beliefs. A magistrate judge recommended denying the motion, finding the allegations sufficient at the pleading stage, but the district court disagreed. It dismissed the complaint as too conclusory, without leave to amend and without considering the exemption letter attached to the plaintiff’s opposition to the motion to dismiss. Judgment was entered, and the plaintiff appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in dismissing the complaint. The appellate court ruled that the exemption letter was central to the plaintiff’s claim and should have been considered under the incorporation-by-reference doctrine. Upon review of the letter, the Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff had plausibly alleged a prima facie Title VII religious discrimination claim. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded for further proceedings. View "RIDINGS V. PEACEHEALTH" on Justia Law

The City of Los Angeles received millions in federal housing grants over a period of years, certifying compliance with federal housing accessibility laws as a condition of those funds. Mei Ling and the Fair Housing Council of the San Fernando Valley (FHC) brought a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA), alleging that the City had falsely represented its compliance with accessibility requirements. The United States later intervened in the case. Separately, the Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD) investigated the City for noncompliance and, after its own findings, entered into a Voluntary Compliance Agreement (VCA) with the City. Under the VCA, the City agreed to spend at least $200 million over ten years to remediate or build accessible housing, but the VCA explicitly excluded the FCA claims at issue in the litigation.The United States District Court for the Central District of California presided over years of discovery and litigation. Eventually, the United States, FHC, and the City agreed to settle the FCA claims for $38,266,989. The district court approved the settlement as fair, adequate, and reasonable, and dismissed all claims against the City, with relators entitled to a statutory share of the settlement proceeds. Mei Ling appealed, arguing that the VCA constituted an “alternate remedy” under the FCA, which would entitle her to a share of the VCA’s value.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the VCA was not an alternate remedy within the meaning of 31 U.S.C. § 3730(c)(5) because it did not take the place of the FCA suit or settlement. The VCA addressed the City’s civil rights violations, not the alleged fraud underlying the FCA action, and expressly carved out the FCA claims. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s approval of the FCA settlement. View "LING V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law

A company that operates a website hosting digitized yearbooks, allowing users to search for names and view yearbook pages, was sued by a California resident whose name and photo appeared in a yearbook on the site. The plaintiff alleged that the company violated California’s right-of-publicity statute by using individuals’ names without consent to advertise paid subscriptions. The plaintiff advanced a theory that simply making individuals’ names searchable on the site, even if no one actually searched for them, constituted a commercial use requiring consent under the statute.Previously, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the company’s motion to dismiss, finding the plaintiff plausibly alleged a direct commercial use. The court then conditionally certified both damages and injunctive classes consisting of California residents whose names were searchable on the site, had never registered as users, and had not donated yearbooks. The company challenged class certification, arguing that individual issues predominated and that the lead plaintiff would not adequately represent the classes.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that, for class certification purposes, whether being “searchable” is sufficient for liability under the statute is a merits question not to be resolved at the certification stage. The court further found that injury could be shown by common evidence of economic harm, and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in managing potential individualized issues regarding class membership. The appellate court also rejected the company’s adequacy challenges, noting that the lead plaintiff could represent both classes. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order certifying the classes. View "NOLEN V. PEOPLECONNECT, INC." on Justia Law

A family rented military housing located within the Naval Amphibious Base Coronado in California, managed by San Diego Family Housing (SDFH) and Lincoln Military Property Management. During their tenancy, the family experienced repeated water intrusion and mold contamination, which allegedly caused health issues and property damage. After reporting these problems, remediation was attempted, but the family was dissatisfied with the response and subsequent actions. They ultimately vacated the property and brought claims in California state court for negligence and other state law issues against SDFH, Lincoln, and InDepth, a mold remediation company.SDFH and Lincoln removed the action to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, asserting federal enclave, federal agency, and federal officer jurisdiction. The district court denied the defendants’ motion to dismiss based on derivative sovereign immunity and later, after supplemental briefing and a Statement of Interest from the United States, rejected all grounds for federal jurisdiction. The district court found no evidence that the federal government had exclusive jurisdiction over the property, no sufficient nexus for federal officer removal, and insufficient grounds for federal agency status. The court remanded the case to state court.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s remand order after the Supreme Court remanded for consideration in light of Chevron USA Inc. v. Plaquemines Parish, Louisiana. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that no basis for federal jurisdiction existed: (1) federal enclave jurisdiction was not established due to lack of evidence of federal government assent to exclusive jurisdiction; (2) federal officer removal requirements were not satisfied, as defendants were not “acting under” a federal officer; and (3) SDFH did not qualify as a federal agency. The district court’s remand to state court was affirmed. View "CHILDS V. SAN DIEGO FAMILY HOUSING, LLC" on Justia Law

The claimant worked for over a decade as a hospital patient care technician, a physically strenuous job. She developed fibromyalgia, migraines, and degenerative disc disease as early as 2007, but reported that her symptoms worsened significantly in 2016, ultimately leading her to accept a voluntary layoff when she could no longer perform her duties. She applied for Disability Insurance Benefits, asserting that her conditions caused severe limitations, including constant muscle weakness, difficulty with fine motor skills, inability to stand for more than 15 minutes, and restricted lifting capacity. Her application included her own testimony, corroborating statements from family and a coworker, and opinions from treating physicians documenting her impairments.A Social Security Administrative Law Judge concluded that the claimant was not disabled under the Social Security Act. The ALJ found her eligible for benefits and recognized severe impairments but determined she could perform light work available in the national economy. The ALJ discounted the claimant’s testimony and third-party statements due to her prior work history, activities of daily living, treatment history, and objective medical evidence, and gave little weight to her treating physicians’ opinions, deeming them conclusory.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington affirmed the ALJ’s decision. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ erred in evaluating the claimant’s subjective testimony and the lay evidence. The Ninth Circuit found that the ALJ improperly relied on past work history and daily activities, failed to properly address medication effectiveness, and wrongly discounted lay testimony simply for being consistent with the claimant’s statements. However, the court concluded that the ALJ’s rejection of the treating physicians’ opinions was supported by substantial evidence. The judgment was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "COLLARD V. BISIGNANO" on Justia Law

Several individuals living within a five-mile radius of the Seattle-Tacoma Airport sued two major airlines and the Port of Seattle. They alleged that pollution from aircraft takeoffs and landings caused harm to their health and property, particularly from particulate matter and other pollutants released by aircraft engines and fuselages. Plaintiffs claimed the defendants had knowledge of studies linking these pollutants to negative health outcomes and property devaluation but failed to remediate or prevent further pollution. The affected community was described as disproportionately composed of minority, immigrant, and low-income residents.The plaintiffs initially brought their case in King County Superior Court, but the defendants removed it to the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. The plaintiffs advanced state tort and constitutional claims, seeking various remedies including damages, injunctive relief, and remediation. The defendants moved to dismiss, arguing that the claims were a collateral attack on federal agency actions, were expressly and impliedly preempted by federal law, and failed to state a claim. The district court denied the motions, finding that the complaint did not directly challenge any specific agency order and that preemption was not clearly established at this stage. The district court certified its order for interlocutory appeal.Reviewing the case on interlocutory appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court properly exercised jurisdiction because the collateral attack doctrine did not apply; defendants could not identify any specific agency orders inescapably implicated by the plaintiffs’ claims. However, the court held that the claims were expressly preempted by Section 233 of the Clean Air Act, which bars states from enforcing any emission standards for aircraft pollutants unless identical to federal standards. The court reversed the district court’s order denying the motion to dismiss and remanded the case. View "CODONI V. PORT OF SEATTLE" on Justia Law

Federal agents investigated an individual in Lodi, California, based on information from a confidential source indicating that the person was involved in large-scale methamphetamine trafficking, had previously possessed firearms, and had multiple felony convictions. Surveillance and a search of the individual's trash corroborated drug-related activity. Upon executing a search warrant at the residence, agents found evidence of methamphetamine being disposed of, drug paraphernalia, $5,972 in cash, and a loaded pistol magazine. Text messages on a seized phone further indicated ongoing drug transactions. The defendant admitted he should not have possessed ammunition due to his status as a felon.A grand jury indicted the defendant for possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine and possession of ammunition as a felon. The case went to trial in the United States District Court for the Eastern District of California. The district court admitted text messages as evidence of intent, excluded the defendant’s own recorded exculpatory statements as hearsay, and allowed a case agent to testify in a dual lay and expert capacity with appropriate jury instructions. The jury convicted the defendant on both counts and found the cash to be drug proceeds. The district court overruled most objections to the presentence report, converted the seized cash to its methamphetamine equivalent for sentencing, and applied a premises enhancement for maintaining a residence for drug distribution. The defendant was sentenced to 300 months’ imprisonment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the conviction and sentence. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in converting the cash, applying the premises enhancement, handling evidentiary rulings, or admitting and excluding challenged evidence. The panel also found no error in the district court’s management of dual-role testimony or in addressing objections to the presentence report. The court declined to reach the Second Amendment challenge to the ammunition conviction due to procedural default and affirmed the judgment. View "USA V. RIVERA" on Justia Law

The case centers on an incident during a Delta Air Lines domestic flight, where a passenger’s behavior prompted concerns among fellow travelers and flight attendants. After an off-duty pilot and other passengers reported the passenger’s conduct as suspicious, the lead flight attendant, following consultation with the captain, approached the passenger and attempted to ask him to remain seated. This interaction escalated into a physical confrontation, leading the flight attendant to request assistance from a federal law enforcement agent onboard. The agent, with the flight attendant’s help, restrained the passenger until the plane landed. The passenger later alleged that he suffered physical and emotional injuries as a result of the restraint.At trial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California, a jury found in favor of the passenger, awarding him substantial damages for bodily and emotional injuries. However, the district court vacated the verdict, citing excessive damages and the interdependence of liability and damages. The court subsequently granted summary judgment for Delta Air Lines, concluding that the airline was immune from liability under the Aviation and Transportation Security Act (ATSA) for any injuries sustained after the flight attendants reported the passenger’s behavior to law enforcement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision de novo. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s grant of summary judgment, holding that ATSA immunity applies not only to the initial disclosure of suspicious activity to law enforcement but also to subsequent conduct stemming from law enforcement’s decisions following such disclosure. The court found no genuine dispute of material fact regarding whether the passenger’s conduct was objectively suspicious or whether Delta was solely responsible for the injuries. As Delta was immune for all physical injuries, the passenger could not recover for any alleged emotional injuries under the Montreal Convention. View "BANDARY V. DELTA AIR LINES, INC." on Justia Law