Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Individuals Plaintiffs, Uber, Inc. (Uber) and Postmates, Inc. (Postmates, and collectively Plaintiffs) appealed the district court’s orders denying their motion for a preliminary injunction and dismissing their Second Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs filed this action to enjoin the State of California and the Attorney General of California (Defendants), from enforcing California Assembly Bill 5, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 296 (A.B. 5), as amended by California Assembly Bill 170, 2019 Cal. Stats. Ch. 415 (A.B. 170) and California Assembly Bill 2257, 2020 Cal. Stats. Ch. 38 (A.B. 2257, and collectively A.B. 5, as amended), against them. A.B. 5, as amended, codified the “ABC test” adopted by the Supreme Court of California in Dynamex Operations West, Inc. v. Superior Court of Los Angeles, 4 Cal. 5th 903 (2018).1 A.B. 5, as amended, however, incorporated numerous exemptions into its provisions.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part district court orders dismissing Plaintiffs’ Second Amended Complaint and denying Plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction and remanded. The panel first held that, even under the fairly forgiving rational basis review, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that A.B. 5, as amended, violated the Equal Protection Clause for those engaged in app-based ride-hailing and delivery services. Thus, Plaintiffs plausibly alleged that the primary impetus for the enactment of A.B. 5 was the disfavor with which the architect of the legislation viewed Uber, Postmates, and similar gig-based business models. The panel held that the district court correctly dismissed Plaintiffs’ due process claims because Plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege that A.B. 5, as amended, completely prohibited them from exercising their “right to engage in a calling.” View "LYDIA OLSON, ET AL V. STATE OF CALIFORNIA, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Petitioner petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”) order upholding the immigration judge’s (“IJ”) denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (“CAT”). He also challenged the BIA’s determinations that defects in the Notice to Appear (“NTA”) did not require termination of his proceedings and that the BIA lacked authority to administratively close his case.   The Ninth Circuit dismissed the defective NTA claim for lack of jurisdiction and denied the petition as to the CAT claim. The panel granted the petition and remanded as to the administrative closure issue, given the government’s recommendation that the panel does so based on an intervening decision by the Attorney General. The panel granted the petition and remanded as to the asylum and withholding of removal claims because the BIA applied the wrong standard in reviewing the IJ’s determination that the evidence failed to establish the requisite nexus between a protected ground and past or future harm. The panel concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner failed to establish the requisite government involvement or government acquiescence to any torture View "JOSUE UMANA-ESCOBAR V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Plaintiff delivery drivers sued their employer, an ondemand delivery service, alleging violation of various state and federal employment laws. The parties agreed that all claims are subject to mandatory arbitration. Accordingly, the district court granted Intelliserve’s motion to compel arbitration, but also dismissed the lawsuit without prejudice. Plaintiffs argue that the district court should have stayed the action pending arbitration rather than dismissing it.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting Defendants’ motion to compel arbitration of all claims in an employment law action and dismissing the action without prejudice, rather than staying the action pending arbitration. The panel held that, although the plain text of the Federal Arbitration Act appears to mandate a stay pending arbitration upon application of a party, binding Ninth Circuit precedent establishes that district courts may dismiss when, as here, all claims are subject to arbitration. The panel concluded that this precedent was not abrogated by Badgerow v. Walters, 142 S. Ct. 1310 (2022). The panel held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in dismissing rather than staying the action because the district court did not misstate the law, misconstrue the facts, or otherwise act arbitrarily. View "WILLIAM FORREST, ET AL V. KEITH SPIZZIRRI, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs alleged that during the class period, Defendants made false or misleading statements about Forescout’s past financial performance, presently confirmed sales, and prospects for future sales. They alleged that Defendants misled investors with respect to (1) the strength of Forescout’s sales pipeline, meaning its presently booked sales and prospects for future sales; (2) the experience of Forescout’s sales force; (3) the business Forescout lost with certain business partners, or “channel partners,” when it announced a merger with Advent International, Inc.; and (4) the likelihood that the merger would close.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal of a securities fraud class action under Sections 10(b) and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act and Rule 10b-5. The panel held that Plaintiffs adequately pleaded both falsity and scienter as to some of the challenged statements and that the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act’s safe harbor for forward-looking statements did not preclude liability as to some of these statements. The panel affirmed the district court’s dismissal as to certain statements, and it reversed and remanded for further proceedings as to other challenged statements regarding the sales pipeline and the Advent acquisition. View "GLAZER CAPITAL MANAGEMENT, L.P, ET AL V. FORESCOUT TECHNOLOGIES, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

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Petitioner entered the United States without inspection. In 1993, he was served an OSC, the charging document that initiated immigration proceedings prior to the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (“IIRIRA”). Petitioner’s OSC did not list the time and place of his proceedings. Petitioner sought suspension of deportation, a form of relief available prior to IIRIRA. IIRIRA provided that continuous physical presence is deemed to end when the applicant is served with a notice to appear (“NTA”). Under IIRIRA’s transitional rules, which apply to individuals like Petitioner, whose proceedings were pending when IIRIRA was enacted, this stop-time rule applies retroactively to proceedings initiated by an OSC.   Accordingly, Petitioner’s continuous physical presence was deemed to end when he was served his OSC—only four years after his arrival, and thus short of the required seven years. Petitioner contended that the Supreme Court’s decision in Pereira v. Sessions, 138 S. Ct. 2105 (2018), instructs that his OSC was statutorily defective and that the stop-time rule was therefore inapplicable.   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner’s petition for review of the BIA’s decision, the panel held that: 1) an OSC that fails to disclose the time and place of an immigrant’s deportation proceedings is sufficient to trigger the stop-time rule in a transitional rules case; 2) Petitioner’s OSC triggered the stop-time rule, making him ineligible for suspension of deportation; and 3) substantial evidence supported the denial of withholding of removal and protection under the CAT. View "WINSTON GUTIERREZ-ALM V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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The State of Alaska Department of Fish and Game brought this action against the Board and several federal officials, alleging that the changes violated the Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act (“ANILCA”) and the Administrative Procedure Act. Before the district court issued its decision, the Kake Hunt ended, and the district court deemed the challenge to it moot. And while this appeal was pending, the partial Unit 13 closure expired.   The Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s decision in an action challenging the Federal Subsistence Board’s approval in 2020 of two short-term changes to hunting practices on federal public lands in Alaska, specifically (1) the Board’s opening of an emergency hunt for Intervenor, the Organized Village of Kake; and (2) the Board’s partial temporary closure of public lands in game management Unit 13 to nonsubsistence users.   The panel first held that Alaska’s claim that the Board violated ANILCA by opening the 60-day emergency Kake hunt without statutory authority was not moot because it fit within the mootness exception of being capable of repetition yet evading review. Alaska’s claim that ANICLA did not authorize the federal government to open emergency hunting seasons raised a question of first impression in this circuit and required resolution of complicated issues of statutory interpretation. Noting that the district court had not reached the merits, the panel remanded this claim to the district court. With regard to Alaska’s partial Unit 13 closure claim, the panel vacated the part of the district court’s order that addressed the claim. View "STATE OF ALASKA DEPARTMENT OF V. FEDERAL SUBSISTENCE BOARD, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff called 911 seeking emergency mental health assistance for the mother of his children, with whom he lived and had five children. This call set in motion a chain of events that ultimately led to the death of Plaintiff’s ten-month-old twin sons at their mother’s own hand.   Plaintiff brought a Section 1983 involving the application of the “state-created danger” doctrine in the context of a welfare check; the Ninth Circuit reversed in part and vacated in part the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ action for failure to state a claim, and remanded. The panel first made clear that the only two exceptions to the general rule against failure-to-act liability for Section 1983 claims presently recognized by this court were the special-relationship exception and the state-created danger exception. The panel, therefore, rejected Plaintiffs’ assertion that the failure to comply with a legally required duty can give rise to a substantive due process claim. The panel further held that the district court correctly held that the special-relationship exception did not apply here.   The panel next held that Plaintiffs’ state-created danger claim against deputies failed because Plaintiffs failed to allege facts from which one could plausibly conclude that Defendants created or enhanced any danger to the twins. The panel held that Plaintiffs adequately stated their Section 1983 claims against the City of Tulare Police Sergeant under the state-created danger exception. Finally, because the panel reversed the dismissal of some of Plaintiffs’ Section 1983 claims against the social worker and Sergeant, the panel reversed the district court’s dismissal of Plaintiffs’ Monell claims against the County and City of Tulare. View "JOSE MURGUIA V. HEATHER LANGDON, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Plaintiff brought a civil rights suit alleging that he was asked racially and religiously biased questions in a psychological evaluation required for his parole review. He claimed that the psychologists were prejudiced against him as an African-American Muslim man, which influenced their conclusion that Plaintiff presented a “high” risk of future violence. The psychologists contended that they were absolutely immune from suit because they performed a discretionary function integral to the Board of Parole Hearings (“Board”) quasi-judicial decision-making.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of absolute immunity to California Board of Parole Hearings psychologists who prepare comprehensive risk assessment reports for the parole board. Applying the functional approach laid out in the watershed case Antoine v. Byers & Anderson, Inc., 508 U.S. 429 (1993), the panel declined to extend absolute immunity in this case. The panel held that the psychologists’ assessments, while informative, were neither binding nor controlling in any way, nor did the psychologists function in a judicial decision-making capacity. Thus, while the psychologists provided a risk level based on their clinical experience, they had no power of decision in the judicial sense; the psychologists were not members of the Board, and the Board made its own determination about an inmate’s current risk of dangerousness if released to the community. The panel did not address whether qualified immunity was available, leaving the question for the district court to consider. View "OMAR GAY V. AMY PARSONS, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Defendant LuLaRoe, a multilevel-marketing company that sells clothing to purchasers across the United States through “fashion retailers” located in all fifty states, allegedly charged sales tax to these purchasers based on the location of the retailer rather than the location of the purchaser. LuLaRoe eventually refunded all the improper sales tax it collected, but it did not pay interest on the refunded amounts. Plaintiff, an Alaska resident who paid the improperly charged sales tax to LuLaRoe, brought this class action under Alaska law on behalf of herself and other Alaskans who were improperly charged, for recovery of the interest on the now-refunded amounts collected and for recovery of statutory damages. The district court certified the class under Rule 23(b)(3) and LuLaRoe appealed under Rule 23(f).   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s order certifying the class of Alaska purchasers and remanded for further proceedings. The panel first rejected LuLaRoe’s argument that class certification was improper because the small amount of money currently owed to some class members was insufficient to support standing and the presence of these class members in the class made individualized issues predominant over class issues. The panel next rejected LuLaRoe’s assertion that some purchasers knew that the sales tax charge was improper but nevertheless voluntarily paid the invoice which contained the improperly assessed sales tax amount, and thus, under applicable Alaska law, no deceptive practice caused any injury for these purchasers. Finally, the panel held that LuLaRoe’s third argument, that class certification should be reversed because some fashion retailers offset the improper sales tax through individual discounts, had merit. View "KATIE VAN V. LLR, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

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This is an international child custody dispute between Respondent and Petitioner over their minor children. While the family was residing in Germany, Respondent took the children to the United States and refused to return them. The Hague Convention generally requires children to be returned to the state of habitual residence so that the country’s courts may adjudicate the merits of any custody disputes. The Ninth Circuit previously vacated and remanded the district court’s first order to return the children to Germany. Because the Supreme Court issued its decision in Golan while the court was considering Respondent’s appeal of the second return order, the court also remanded that order for the district court’s reconsideration. The district court then granted the petition a third time.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order granting, on a second remand, Petitioner’s petition against Respondent for the return, pursuant to the Hague Convention, of the parties’ two children to Germany. Agreeing with other circuits, the panel held that, in cases governed by the Hague Convention, the district court has discretion as to whether to conduct an evidentiary hearing following remand and must exercise that discretion consistent with the Convention. The panel held that, on the second remand, the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to hold a third evidentiary hearing when the factual record was fully developed. The panel held that, in making determinations about German procedural issues, the district court neither abused its discretion nor violated Respondent’s due process rights by communicating with the State Department and, through it, the German Central Authority View "BOGDAN RADU V. PERSEPHONE JOHNSON SHON" on Justia Law