Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, was convicted of attempting to elude police in violation of RCW Section 46.61.024 in 2016 and 2018. An Immigration Judge and the BIA concluded that RCW Section 46.61.024 is categorically a crime involving moral turpitude and found Petitioner removable for having been convicted of two crimes involving moral turpitude not arising out of a single scheme of criminal misconduct. The BIA relied on Matter of RuizLopez, 25 I. & N. Dec. 551 (BIA 2011).    The Ninth Circuit granted Petitioner’s petition for review. The panel concluded that the BIA failed to address substantive changes the Washington Legislature made to the statute and subsequent Washington case law interpreting the revised statute and remanded. Applying the categorical approach, the panel identified the elements of statute of conviction. As relevant here, the version of the statute at issue in Matter of Ruiz-Lopez required driving with “wanton or willful disregard for the lives or property of others.” However, in 2003, the Washington Legislature altered that element: the current version requires proof that the vehicle was driven “in a reckless manner.” The panel explained that although the term “reckless manner” is not defined by statute, the Washington Supreme Court has held that operating a motor vehicle in a “reckless manner” means operating it in “a rash or heedless manner, indifferent to the consequences.” The panel explained that, in some circumstances, “reckless” may be the equivalent of “willful or wanton,” but under current Washington law, “reckless manner” is not the equivalent of “recklessness,” and “reckless manner” is the required mens rea in Petitioner’s statute of conviction. View "ZHOVTONIZHKO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was ordered by an immigration judge (IJ) to be removed from the United States after the IJ ruled that Petitioner’s application for relief from removal was untimely. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) agreed with the IJ and dismissed Petitioner’s appeal. Petitioner timely petitioned for review, arguing that the rejection of his relief application violated his due process rights.   The Ninth Circuit granted the petition. The panel held that the IJ’s rejection of the opportunity to file a relief application on December 18 deprived Petitioner of a full and fair opportunity to be heard. The panel concluded that Petitioner’s immigration proceedings were fundamentally unfair because (1) the purported deadline to submit a relief application was ambiguous; (2) Petitioner’s counsel offered to submit the application on the day of the apparent deadline while the IJ was still on the bench, making any delay in the proceeding practically nonexistent; and (3) the IJ’s denial of a continuance so that Petitioner’s recently-retained counsel could submit the application was an abuse of discretion. The panel concluded that the IJ’s rejection of Petitioner’s application clearly affected the outcome of the proceedings and thus caused him prejudice because the merits of his application were never considered by the agency at all. View "ARIZMENDI-MEDINA V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Petitioner was born in 1967 in Western Samoa to a Western Samoan father and an American Samoan mother. His mother is now a non-citizen national, but she only became eligible under the 1986 amendments and did not attain her status until after Petitioner was born. Petitioner sought a declaration that his mother’s status qualifies him to be a non-citizen national. The district court held that Petitioner’s mother’s status as a national commenced only on the date it was conferred and was not retroactive to her date of birth. The court, therefore, found Petitioner did not qualify to be a non-citizen national.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s grant of the Government’s motion to dismiss. The panel explained that Congress has extended citizenship to individuals born in every United States territory except American Samoa, meaning that those with ties to American Samoa are the only group eligible for noncitizen national status. The status of an American Samoan is a hybrid. The panel concluded that the text of the 1986 amendments makes clear that Congress intended for the addition to apply retroactively and to bestow the same status on those born before, on, or after the date of enactment: “national, but not citizen, of the United States at birth.” The panel concluded that Petitioner’s mother’s non-citizen national status extends back to her birth and, as a result, that Petitioner qualifies for non-citizen national status too. View "ILAI KOONWAIYOU V. ANTONY BLINKEN, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Thousands of copyrighted photos on Zillow’s site come from VHT, a professional real estate photography studio. Zillow used VHT’s photos on its real estate “Listing Platform,” which is the primary display of properties, and on a home design section of the website called “Digs.” Following summary judgment rulings, a jury trial, and various post-trial motions, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court in large part in prior appeal Zillow I. Essentially, the panel agreed with the district court that Zillow was not liable for direct, secondary, or contributory infringement.   Back on remand, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision in full. The panel held that the district court properly excused VHT’s failure to meet Section 411(a)’s non-jurisdictional exhaustion requirement because copyright registration was wholly collateral to whether Zillow infringed on VHT's copyright, dismissing VHT’s claim after the statute of limitations had already expired would cause irreparable harm, and excusal would not undermine the purpose of administrative exhaustion. The panel affirmed the district court’s ruling, on remand, that the 2,700 VHT photos remaining at issue were not a compilation, which would entitle VHT to only a single award of statutory damages under 17 U.S.C. Section 504(c), but rather, each individual photo constituted an infringement. The photos were part of VHT’s master photo database, and the VHT group registered its images as a “compilation.” But VHT also registered the underlying individual images and licensed these images on a per-image or per-property basis. The panel held that the photos had independent economic value separate from the database and did not qualify as “one work.” View "VHT, INC. V. ZILLOW GROUP, INC., ET AL" on Justia Law

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Counsel filed a class action lawsuit on behalf of copyright holders of musical compositions and recovered a little over $50,000 for the class members from Defendant Rhapsody International, Inc. (now rebranded as Napster), a music streaming service. The class members obtained no meaningful injunctive or nonmonetary relief in the settlement of their action. The district court nonetheless authorized $1.7 in attorneys’ fees under the “lodestar” method.   The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s award of attorneys’ fees to Plaintiffs’ counsel and remanded. The panel held that the touchstone for determining the reasonableness of attorneys’ fees in a class action under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23 is the benefit to the class. Here, the benefit was minimal. The panel held that the district court erred in failing to calculate the settlement’s actual benefit to the class members who submitted settlement claims, as opposed to a hypothetical $20 million cap agreed on by the parties. The panel held that district courts awarding attorneys’ fees in class actions under the Copyright Act must still generally consider the proportion between the award and the benefit to the class to ensure that the award is reasonable. The panel recognized that a fee award may exceed the monetary benefit provided to the class in certain copyright cases, such as when a copyright infringement litigation leads to substantial nonmonetary relief or provides a meaningful benefit to society, but this was not such a case. The panel instructed that, on remand, the district court should rigorously evaluate the actual benefit provided to the class and award reasonable attorneys’ fees considering that benefit. View "DAVID LOWERY, ET AL V. RHAPSODY INTERNATIONAL, INC." on Justia Law

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The eight plaintiffs in this action (collectively, “Sharp”) are former employees of apparel manufacturer S&S Activewear (“S&S”). Seven are women, and one is a man. Sharp alleges that S&S permitted its managers and employees to routinely play “sexually graphic, violently misogynistic” music throughout its 700,000-square-foot warehouse in Reno, Nevada. Sharp eventually filed suit, alleging that the music and related conduct created a hostile work environment in violation of Title VII. The district court granted S&S’s motion to dismiss and denied leave to amend the music claim, reasoning that the music’s offensiveness to both men and women and audibility throughout the warehouse nullified any discriminatory potential. The court countenanced S&S’s argument that the fact that “both men and women were offended by the work environment” doomed Sharp’s Title VII claim.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s dismissal. The panel disagreed with the district court’s reasoning that the music’s offensiveness to both men and women and audibility throughout the warehouse nullified any discriminatory potential. The panel vacated the district court’s dismissal, with prejudice and without leave to amend, of Plaintiffs’ music-based claim and instructed the district court to reconsider, on remand, the sufficiency of Plaintiffs’ pleadings in light of two key principles: First, harassment, whether aural or visual, need not be directly targeted at a particular plaintiff in order to pollute a workplace and give rise to a Title VII claim. Second, the challenged conduct’s offensiveness to multiple genders is not a certain bar to stating a Title VII claim. View "STEPHANIE SHARP, ET AL V. S&S ACTIVEWEAR, L.L.C." on Justia Law

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Petitioner testified that she was afraid to return to Guatemala because a woman had attempted to rob her after she withdrew money from a bank. The woman told Petitioner that she targeted her because Petitioner had family in the United States and a lot of money. The woman also threatened that Petitioner’s son would “pay for it” due to Petitioner’s refusal to give her the money. Petitioner and her son asserted that she had suffered past persecution and had a well-founded fear of future persecution on account of her political opinion of refusing to submit to violence by criminal groups or gangs and their claimed membership in three particular social groups: “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector,” “Guatemalan women,” and “immediate family members of Petitioner.”   The Ninth Circuit denied Petitioner and her son’s petition for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ dismissal of their appeal of an immigration judge’s denial of asylum and related relief. The panel held that Petitioner failed to show that the agency erred in concluding that her proposed social group comprised of “Guatemalan families that lack an immediate family male protector” was not cognizable. The panel also concluded that substantial evidence supported the agency’s determination that Petitioner had not expressed a political opinion. The panel explained that Petitioner’s refusal to give money to the threatening robber was not evidence of a “conscious and deliberate” decision that would naturally result in attributing a political position to her and that she instead simply reacted to being robbed. View "DORIS RODRIGUEZ-ZUNIGA, ET AL V. MERRICK GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Defendant was arrested after two officers discovered a handgun concealed in his vehicle. At the time of this encounter, Defendant was a registered gang member on California state parole and was subject to a suspicionless search condition that has been upheld by the Supreme Court. After entering a plea of guilty and preserving his right to appeal, Defendant appealed the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress evidence, arguing that the officers did not have advance knowledge that he was on parole at the time of this encounter.   The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of Defendant’s motion to suppress evidence. The panel held that a law enforcement officer must have probable cause to believe that a person is on active parole before conducting a suspicionless search or seizure pursuant to a parole condition. Consistent with case law and with general Fourth Amendment principles, the officer must possess advance knowledge of an applicable parole condition before they may detain or search a parolee. The officer need not be absolutely certain, with ongoing day-by-day or minute-by-minute awareness of the subject’s parole status. Instead, it is sufficient for the officer to find that the individual to be searched is on active parole and an applicable parole condition authorizes the search or seizure at issue. Applying this standard, the panel concluded that the arresting officers had probable cause to believe that Defendant remained on active parole when he was detained and searched. The panel further held that this encounter did not violate California’s independent prohibition on arbitrary, capricious, or harassing searches. View "USA V. CHRISTIAN ESTRELLA" on Justia Law

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Petitioner, a Mexican citizen, petitioned for habeas relief after being held in immigration detention for over a year without a bond hearing. A district court judge granted Petitioner’s petition for relief and ordered the Government to provide her with a bond hearing on statutory grounds, relying on Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, 535 F.3d 942 (9th Cir. 2008). The Government appealed on the ground that Casas-Castrillon is no longer good law.   The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s grant of habeas relief and remand for consideration of Petitioner’s remaining constitutional argument. The court explained that t Jennings’s reasoning is “clearly irreconcilable” with Casas-Castrillon’s detention-shifting framework and held that Jennings abrogated this portion of Casas-Castrillon. Next, the panel explained that Subsection A provides the Government with authority to detain noncitizens “pending a decision on whether the alien is to be removed from the United States” and that Jennings provides that Subsection C authorizes detention during the same period as Subsection A, but does not define that period. The panel looked to Prieto-Romero v. Clark, 534 F.3d 1053 (9th Cir. 2008), and held that detention authority under Subsection A continues through judicial review. The panel held that the authority under Subsection C likewise continues through judicial review. Finally, the district court declined to reach Petitioner’s alternative argument that she was entitled to habeas relief as a matter of due process. The panel remanded to the district court to consider this question in the first instance. View "LEXIS HERNANDEZ AVILEZ V. MERRICK GARLAND, ET AL" on Justia Law

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Disputes over the allocation of water within the Klamath Basin in southern Oregon and northern California, particularly during the recent period of severe and prolonged drought, have prompted many lawsuits in this and other courts. In this episode, Klamath Irrigation District (“KID”) petitions for a writ of mandamus to compel the district court to remand KID’s motion for preliminary injunction to the Klamath County Circuit Court in Oregon. The motion had originally been filed by KID in that Oregon court but was removed to federal district court by the U.S. Bureau of Reclamation (“Reclamation”), a federal agency within the U.S. Department of Interior. Reclamation was identified by KID as the respondent for KID’s motion.   The Ninth Circuit denied KID’s petition for writ of mandamus. The panel considered the five factors in Bauman v. U.S. District Court, 557 F.3d 813, 817 (9th Cir. 2004), in determining whether mandamus was warranted. The panel began with the third factor—clear error as a matter of law— because it was a necessary condition for granting the writ of mandamus. The panel rejected KID’s attempt to circumvent KID II, the Tribes’ rights, and the effect of the ESA by characterizing the relief it sought as an application of the ACFFOD. The panel expressed no views on the merits of KID’s underlying motion for preliminary injunction and concluded only that the district court did not err in declining to remand the motion for preliminary injunction to the state court. The panel held that it need not consider the remaining Bauman factors because the third factor was dispositive. View "IN RE: KLAMATH IRRIGATION DISTRICT V. USDC-ORM" on Justia Law