Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A real estate development company, Shen Zhen New World I, LLC, owned by Chinese billionaire Wei Huang, was involved in a scheme to bribe Los Angeles City Councilmember Jose Huizar. Over nearly four years, Huang provided Huizar with extravagant Las Vegas trips, gambling chips, and prostitutes, seeking Huizar's support for redeveloping the L.A. Grand Hotel into Los Angeles's tallest skyscraper. Huang's strategy was to "give, give, give" to later make a "big ask" for Huizar's support on the project.A federal jury in the Central District of California convicted Shen Zhen on three counts of honest-services mail and wire fraud, one count of federal-program bribery, and four counts of interstate and foreign travel in aid of racketeering. The district court found sufficient evidence to support the convictions, rejecting Shen Zhen's argument that the Government failed to establish an agreement or official action by Huizar. The court also denied Shen Zhen's proposed jury instruction on quid pro quo, finding it legally unsound.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the convictions. The court held that sufficient evidence supported the jury's findings, noting that bribery under federal law does not require an explicit agreement with the public official. The court also upheld the district court's jury instructions, which correctly required the jury to find that Shen Zhen provided benefits intending to receive official acts in return. Additionally, the court found that California's bribery statutes, although broader than the Travel Act's generic definition, were proper predicates for the Travel Act convictions because the jury convicted Shen Zhen based on elements conforming to the generic definition of bribery. The court also concluded that any evidentiary errors were harmless and did not affect the verdict. View "USA V. SHEN ZHEN NEW WORLD I, LLC" on Justia Law

Christian Lopez, a native and citizen of Mexico, was brought to the United States by his mother at the age of two to escape domestic violence from his father. Lopez lived in the U.S. without lawful status for thirteen years before obtaining T-5 nonimmigrant status in 2013. In 2017, he inadvertently allowed his T-5 status to expire. In 2019, Lopez was arrested and later convicted of multiple offenses, including four counts of petit larceny under the Reno Municipal Code (RMC) § 8.10.040. Following his release from prison, the Department of Homeland Security (DHS) initiated removal proceedings against him.An immigration judge (IJ) found Lopez removable for committing crimes involving moral turpitude (CIMTs) and denied his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The IJ determined that Lopez's asylum application was untimely and that he failed to demonstrate a nexus between his fear of future harm and any protected ground. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, concluding that Lopez's municipal convictions involved CIMTs and that he did not qualify for an exception to the asylum filing deadline.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Lopez's petition for review. The court held that Lopez's petit larceny convictions under RMC § 8.10.040 are CIMTs, making him removable. The court also concluded that the BIA's interpretation of the statute regarding CIMTs was entitled to respect under Skidmore v. Swift & Co. Additionally, the court found that the lack of availability of a pardon for a conviction does not render the conviction an improper basis for removal. Finally, the court determined that substantial evidence supported the denial of withholding of removal, as Lopez did not demonstrate that he would face future persecution in Mexico based on his identity as his mother's son. View "LOPEZ V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Staff nurses employed by the City and County of San Francisco alleged that the City violated the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA) by not paying them time-and-a-half for overtime work. The City argued that the nurses were exempt from this requirement under the FLSA's professional-capacity exemption, claiming that the nurses were paid on a salary basis. The nurses contended that they were paid on an hourly basis, as their annual compensation was divided into hourly rates and they were paid only for hours worked.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the annual pay figures published in the salary ordinance provided definitive evidence that the nurses were compensated on a salary basis. The court found the nurses' hourly pay rates to be an administrative tool and dismissed the nurses' claims of improper pay deductions.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred by relying on the salary ordinance and not examining how the nurses were actually paid. The proper focus for the salary basis test is whether an employee receives a predetermined amount of compensation on a weekly or less frequent basis. The court found that material factual questions remained regarding whether the City satisfied the salary basis test in practice. Specifically, the court noted discrepancies in the payroll data that suggested the nurses might not have received their predetermined compensation in certain pay periods. The court also found that the City did not provide evidence of reimbursing the nurses for any improper deductions, which precluded the use of the "window of correction" defense. The case was remanded for further proceedings to resolve these factual issues. View "SILLOWAY V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO" on Justia Law

Jonathan Corbett, an attorney specializing in civil litigation against the Transportation Security Administration (TSA), submitted two Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) requests to TSA. The first request, made on June 13, 2021, sought incident reports and video footage related to a pat-down search of Kelly Joyner. TSA responded by asking Corbett to complete a "Certification of Identity" form, which he did not do, leading TSA to close the request. The second request, submitted on March 6, 2022, sought records regarding an alleged search of an unnamed client. TSA again asked for the form, which Corbett did not provide, and the request was closed.Corbett filed suit in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California after TSA missed its twenty-day deadline to respond to his FOIA requests. TSA issued final responses after the lawsuit was filed, stating that they could neither confirm nor deny the existence of the requested records without the third-party subject’s consent. TSA moved for summary judgment, arguing that Corbett’s claims were moot and that he had failed to exhaust administrative remedies by not appealing within the agency. The district court granted TSA’s motion, construing it as a motion to dismiss, and held that Corbett should have pursued administrative appeals.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and vacated the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that once a FOIA suit is properly initiated based on constructive exhaustion, an agency’s post-lawsuit response does not require dismissal for failure to exhaust. The court emphasized that exhaustion under FOIA is a prudential consideration rather than a jurisdictional one, and district courts have limited discretion to require exhaustion only if an agency shows exceptional circumstances. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "CORBETT V. TSA" on Justia Law

In 1988, a California jury sentenced Jerry Grant Frye to death for the first-degree murders of Robert and Jane Brandt. Frye and his girlfriend, Jennifer Warsing, had moved to Amador County to grow marijuana. Warsing testified that Frye, after seeing the devil and feeling threatened, forced her to accompany him to the Brandts' cabin, where he shot and killed them. They then stole the Brandts' valuables and fled to South Dakota, where Frye was later arrested and confessed to the murders. The prosecution's case relied heavily on Warsing's testimony, corroborated by physical evidence and Frye's own statements.The California Supreme Court affirmed Frye's conviction and sentence in 1998. Frye filed a state habeas petition in 2000, claiming his due process rights were violated when jurors saw him shackled during the trial. The California Supreme Court summarily denied the petition on the merits in 2001. Frye then sought federal habeas relief, and in 2022, the district court granted a writ of habeas corpus on the shackling claim, concluding that the shackling prejudiced Frye at both the guilt and penalty phases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit held that Frye did not overcome the significant deference owed to an unreasoned state court decision on the merits under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA). The court rejected the argument that the right to be free from unjustified guilt-phase shackling was not clearly established federal law at the time of the state court's decision. However, given the limited shackling evidence and the guilt evidence before the state court, the Ninth Circuit concluded that every fairminded jurist would not agree that the state court's harmlessness decision was objectively unreasonable. The case was remanded for further proceedings on Frye's remaining claims. View "FRYE V. BROOMFIELD" on Justia Law

Debbie O'Gorman, facing foreclosure by creditor Grant Reynolds, transferred her property to the Lovering Tubbs Trust for no consideration. This transfer was intended to hinder Reynolds' foreclosure efforts. The Lovering Tubbs Trust and other entities involved in the transfer argued that the Chapter 7 Trustee lacked Article III standing to bring a claim under 11 U.S.C. § 548 because O'Gorman's creditors were not harmed by the transfer.The Bankruptcy Court granted summary judgment to the Trustee, finding that O'Gorman's transfer was fraudulent under § 548(a)(1)(A). The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed this decision, noting that the Trustee had established a prima facie case of fraudulent transfer and that the appellants failed to present any admissible evidence to create a genuine dispute of material fact.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BAP's decision. The court held that the Trustee had Article III standing because the transfer depleted the estate's assets, causing an injury-in-fact that was redressable by the avoidance sought. The court also clarified that actual harm to creditors is not an element of a fraudulent transfer claim under § 548. The court found that the bankruptcy court properly granted summary judgment, as the Trustee provided direct and circumstantial evidence of O'Gorman's fraudulent intent, and the appellants failed to present any evidence to dispute this.The Ninth Circuit also upheld the bankruptcy court's denial of the appellants' request for a continuance to conduct discovery, noting that the appellants did not comply with the requirements of Rule 56(d) by failing to submit an affidavit or declaration specifying the facts they hoped to elicit through further discovery. The court concluded that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in this regard. View "IN RE: THE LOVERING TUBBS TRUST V. HOFFMAN" on Justia Law

The case involves two transgender girls, Jane Doe and Megan Roe, who wish to participate in girls' sports at their respective schools in Arizona. Both girls have not undergone male puberty due to puberty-blocking medication and hormone therapy. Arizona enacted the Save Women’s Sports Act, which prohibits "students of the male sex," including transgender women and girls, from participating in women’s and girls’ sports. The plaintiffs argue that this Act violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and Title IX.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona reviewed the case and granted a preliminary injunction, preventing the enforcement of the Act against the plaintiffs. The court found that the Act was adopted with the purpose of excluding transgender girls from girls' sports teams and concluded that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on their equal protection and Title IX claims. The court determined that before puberty, there are no significant differences in athletic performance between boys and girls and that transgender girls who receive puberty-blocking medication do not have an athletic advantage over other girls.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s order, agreeing that the Act discriminates based on transgender status and is subject to heightened scrutiny. The court held that the Act’s categorical ban on transgender girls from participating in girls' sports is not substantially related to the state’s objectives of ensuring competitive fairness and equal athletic opportunities for female student-athletes. The court also found that the plaintiffs would suffer irreparable harm without the injunction and that the balance of equities and public interest favored granting the preliminary injunction. View "DOE V. HORNE" on Justia Law

Raizel Blumberger filed a medical malpractice lawsuit against Dr. Ian Tilley, alleging that he failed to provide proper medical care during childbirth, resulting in her injuries. Dr. Tilley was an employee of Eisner Pediatric and Family Medical Services, a federally funded health center deemed a Public Health Service (PHS) employee for 2018. The Attorney General appeared in state court, stating that Dr. Tilley's status was under consideration. A year later, the Attorney General advised that Dr. Tilley was not a deemed employee, leading Dr. Tilley to remove the case to federal court under 28 U.S.C. § 1442 and 42 U.S.C. § 233(l)(1).The United States District Court for the Central District of California remanded the case, finding Dr. Tilley's removal untimely under § 1442 and concluding that the Attorney General satisfied its advice obligations under § 233(l)(1). Dr. Tilley appealed, arguing that the Attorney General failed to properly advise the state court of his deemed status, thus making removal appropriate.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the district court analyzed the timeliness of Dr. Tilley's § 1442 removal under the wrong legal standard and remanded on that basis. The court determined it had jurisdiction to review the district court’s § 233 analysis, despite potential untimeliness. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the Attorney General was obligated under § 233(l)(1) to advise the state court that Dr. Tilley had been a deemed employee during the relevant period. The court reversed the district court’s conclusion that the Attorney General’s notice satisfied § 233(l)(1) and held that the government was obligated to remove the case to federal court. The case was vacated and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "BLUMBERGER V. TILLEY" on Justia Law

Kate Adams, the former Chief of Police for the City of Rancho Cordova, was forced to resign over allegations that she sent racist text messages while working for the Sacramento County Sheriff’s Office. The messages, sent in 2013, included offensive images forwarded to two friends during a private conversation. Adams claimed she was merely expressing disapproval of the images. After her resignation, the messages were publicized, leading to further professional and personal repercussions for Adams.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed Adams’s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims, ruling that her speech did not address a matter of public concern. The court found that the private nature of the text messages and their content did not relate to broader societal issues or public interest.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Adams’s private text messages, which were part of a casual conversation and not intended for public dissemination, did not constitute speech on a matter of public concern under the Pickering v. Board of Education standard. The court emphasized that the content, form, and context of the messages indicated they were of personal interest rather than public interest. Consequently, Adams’s First Amendment retaliation and conspiracy claims were dismissed, and the case was remanded for further proceedings on other unresolved claims. View "ADAMS V. COUNTY OF SACRAMENTO" on Justia Law

The case involves a class action lawsuit against the City of Los Angeles, challenging the constitutionality of a $63 late fee imposed for failing to pay a parking meter fine within 21 days. The plaintiffs argue that this late fee, which matches the amount of the original fine, violates the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause. The plaintiffs incurred at least one parking meter citation and late fee, and they assert that the late fee is both facially unconstitutional and unconstitutional as applied to individuals who cannot afford to pay it within the specified time frame.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially granted summary judgment in favor of the City, finding that the $63 parking fine was not "grossly disproportionate" to the offense of overstaying a parking meter. The court also rejected the challenge to the $63 late fee without providing a detailed rationale. The plaintiffs appealed, and the Ninth Circuit previously upheld the initial fine but remanded the case to determine whether the late fee violated the Excessive Fines Clause.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment for the City regarding the late fee. The Ninth Circuit found that a genuine factual dispute exists about the City's basis for setting the late fee at 100 percent of the parking fine. The court noted that the City provided no evidence on how it determined the $63 late fee amount, making it impossible to conclude as a matter of law that the fee is not "grossly disproportional" to the harm caused by the untimely payment. The court declined to incorporate means-testing into the Excessive Fines Clause analysis, rejecting the plaintiffs' argument that the fee should consider individuals' ability to pay. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "PIMENTEL V. CITY OF LOS ANGELES" on Justia Law