Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Several individuals and two retailers challenged California’s statutory scheme regulating switchblade knives, arguing that these laws violate the Second Amendment. The relevant regulations define switchblades as certain knives with blades of at least two inches that open automatically, and prohibit, among other conduct, carrying such knives concealed in public. The plaintiffs brought a facial constitutional challenge, asserting a right to keep and bear switchblades under the Second Amendment.In the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, the judge granted summary judgment in favor of the state. The district court concluded that switchblades are not protected by the Second Amendment because they are not commonly used for self-defense and are considered dangerous and unusual. Although this finding was deemed dispositive, the district court also found that California failed to show its regulations were consistent with the nation’s history and tradition of arms regulation, but nonetheless upheld the law based on the initial analysis.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the summary judgment de novo. Applying the framework from New York State Rifle & Pistol Association v. Bruen, the Ninth Circuit assumed, without deciding, that the Second Amendment’s text covered the plaintiffs’ conduct. At the historical inquiry step, the court held that switchblades are relevantly similar to Bowie knives and other weapons historically regulated due to their association with violence and crime, and that California’s prohibition on concealed carry of switchblades is analogous to longstanding restrictions on the concealed carry of such weapons. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment, holding that plaintiffs’ facial challenge failed because they could not show that the switchblade regulations are unconstitutional in all their applications. View "Knife Rights, Inc. v. Bonta" on Justia Law

A fire broke out on the passenger dive boat M.V. Conception during a scuba diving excursion in September 2019, resulting in the deaths of thirty-four people who were trapped below deck. The Coast Guard had inspected the vessel multiple times before the incident and had found it fit for service, not identifying any safety hazards related to electrical wiring, plastic trash cans, or plastic chairs. Personal representatives of the deceased and one injured survivor filed suit against the United States, alleging that the Coast Guard’s negligent inspection and failure to identify these hazards caused the tragedy.The United States District Court for the Central District of California was the first to review the case. The government moved to dismiss the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, arguing that the discretionary function exception to the Suits in Admiralty Act (SIAA) applied. The district court agreed, finding that the relevant statutes and regulations gave Coast Guard inspectors discretion in how to conduct vessel inspections and in determining what constituted hazardous conditions. As a result, plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the discretionary function exception, and the suit was dismissed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that its prior precedent, Earles v. United States, which applies the discretionary function exception from the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) to the SIAA, remained binding and had not been overruled by the Supreme Court’s decision in Thacker v. Tennessee Valley Authority. The court further found that no specific statute, regulation, or policy required the Coast Guard to identify the hazards alleged by plaintiffs, and that the inspection process involved discretionary, policy-based decisions. Accordingly, the discretionary function exception barred the suit, and dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction was proper. View "Fiedler v. United States" on Justia Law

After Volkswagen AG became the subject of a criminal investigation by the U.S. Department of Justice (DOJ) for its use of defeat device software to evade emissions standards—a scandal widely known as “Dieselgate”—the company agreed to a plea deal with the DOJ. As part of the investigation, Volkswagen, through its law firm Jones Day, produced approximately six million documents to federal prosecutors in response to a grand jury subpoena. Lawrence Kalbers, a university professor, subsequently filed a Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) request seeking all documents Volkswagen provided to the DOJ during the investigation, specifically referencing materials described in Volkswagen’s 2017 Annual Report.The DOJ denied the FOIA request, citing exemptions for law enforcement records and information protected by statute, including Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 6(e), which safeguards grand jury materials. Kalbers challenged this denial in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court ordered the DOJ to produce all responsive documents and a Vaughn index, later appointing a special master due to the volume of records. The special master recommended disclosure, reasoning the documents did not clearly reveal grand jury deliberations. The district court overruled DOJ and Volkswagen’s objections and ordered disclosure, prompting both parties to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo. It held that nearly all the requested documents are exempt from FOIA disclosure under Exemption 3 because they were obtained solely via a grand jury subpoena and their release would reveal matters occurring before the grand jury, thus compromising grand jury secrecy protected by Rule 6(e). The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order requiring disclosure of these documents, but vacated and remanded as to four documents not marked as grand jury materials, instructing further review to determine their status. View "Kalbers v. Department of Justice" on Justia Law

Two individuals active in a right-wing political organization alleged that government officials and entities in Portland, Oregon, conspired to arrest and prosecute them without probable cause in order to suppress their political speech. The plaintiffs claimed that city and county officials, various prosecutors, and a police detective orchestrated the investigation and charges after a confrontation at a bar, focusing their efforts on the plaintiffs while allegedly ignoring violent acts by left-wing activists. The plaintiffs were indicted and arrested before a planned protest, but ultimately acquitted at trial. They then sued, asserting violations of federal civil rights statutes and state tort law, including claims of conspiracy, malicious prosecution, and selective enforcement.After the plaintiffs’ acquittal, they filed their action in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon. The district court dismissed the complaint, holding that it was a “shotgun pleading” that failed to satisfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8 because it lumped together claims and factual allegations without specifying which defendants were responsible for which acts. The court also ruled, in the alternative, that several defendants were immune from suit: the Multnomah County District Attorney’s Office (“MCDA”) and prosecutors in their official capacities under the Eleventh Amendment; the prosecutors in their individual capacities under absolute immunity; and the police detective for his grand jury testimony.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part. The court held that the complaint was properly dismissed as a shotgun pleading, but that plaintiffs must be allowed to amend. The court affirmed dismissal with prejudice of all claims against MCDA and prosecutors in their official capacities on sovereign immunity grounds, and against the prosecutors in their individual capacities to the extent their actions were prosecutorial. However, the court reversed the dismissal of claims against a deputy prosecutor for allegedly filing false affidavits, holding that such conduct is not protected by absolute immunity and is not shielded by qualified immunity if false statements were knowingly made to obtain a warrant. The court also reversed dismissal of certain state-law claims against Multnomah County and remanded for further proceedings, allowing plaintiffs to replead those claims not based on the acts of the immune parties. It affirmed immunity for the detective regarding his grand jury testimony. The disposition was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded with instructions to permit amendment of the complaint. View "Gibson v. City of Portland" on Justia Law

An association of independent private schools and several of its members sought to prevent the enforcement of an Idaho law, known as the Children’s School and Library Protection Act. This law prohibits schools and public libraries from making certain “harmful” content available to minors, newly imposing civil liability on these institutions. The statute defines “harmful to minors” using an expansive framework, and introduces a private right of action, allowing minors, parents, or guardians to sue for violations. The plaintiffs challenged the statute on First Amendment grounds, arguing the law exceeded the limits of federal obscenity law as set out in Miller v. California.After the plaintiffs filed their lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Idaho, the district court dismissed some plaintiffs for lack of standing but allowed the private school plaintiffs’ First and Fourteenth Amendment claims to proceed. The district court ultimately denied the motion for a preliminary injunction, holding the plaintiffs had not shown a likelihood of success on their facial constitutional challenges to the statute.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiffs had shown a likelihood of success on their claim that the statute’s “context clause” was unconstitutionally overbroad. This clause requires evaluation of a work’s serious value for minors “in context in which it is used,” which the court found threatens to regulate a substantial amount of protected speech and is not readily susceptible to a constitutional narrowing construction. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of preliminary injunction, holding that the context clause is facially overbroad, and remanded for consideration of the appropriate scope of limited injunctive relief. View "Northwest Association of Independent Schools v. Labrador" on Justia Law

A Nevada state prisoner claimed that, during the COVID-19 pandemic, staff at High Desert State Prison denied him outdoor exercise, even while requiring him and other inmates in his unit to work together in a prison industry warehouse. He alleged that inmates in other units were permitted outdoor yard time, and that the denial of exercise caused him physical and psychological harm. The plaintiff, housed in a protective segregation unit, asserted that these actions violated his rights under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments, as well as similar state constitutional provisions.After filing grievances that were denied at each level by prison officials, the inmate brought a lawsuit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada against the warden and other prison staff under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court screened the complaint and allowed certain claims, including those regarding denial of outdoor exercise and equal protection, to proceed against the warden. On summary judgment, the district court denied qualified immunity to the warden for both the Eighth Amendment and Fourteenth Amendment claims, prompting the warden to appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. The court held that the district court correctly denied qualified immunity on the Eighth Amendment claim, finding that the right to outdoor exercise was clearly established and that there were triable issues as to whether the warden’s actions constituted deliberate indifference. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of qualified immunity on the Fourteenth Amendment claim, concluding that the plaintiff did not provide evidence that ruled out all rational justifications for the difference in yard time between his unit and others. The court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "Cardenas-Ornelas v. Johnson" on Justia Law

A group of plaintiffs, including individual Temporary Protected Status (TPS) beneficiaries and an organization, challenged actions taken by the Secretary of Homeland Security. These actions included vacating and terminating Venezuela’s TPS designation and partially vacating Haiti’s TPS designation. TPS provides eligible nationals of designated countries temporary protection from deportation and work authorization due to conditions such as armed conflict or environmental disaster in their home countries. The Secretary’s actions resulted in many TPS holders losing their protection and work authorization, leading to job loss, detention, deportation, and family separation.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California. The district court initially postponed the effectiveness of the Venezuela TPS vacatur and later granted partial summary judgment for the plaintiffs. The district court held that the Secretary exceeded her statutory authority under 8 U.S.C. § 1254a by vacating and terminating the Venezuela TPS designation and partially vacating Haiti’s TPS designation. The court also found these actions arbitrary and capricious under the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) and set them aside. The government appealed these rulings to the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the TPS statute does not grant the Secretary authority to vacate an existing TPS designation or to partially vacate a TPS extension. The court further held that the Secretary’s attempted vacatur and terminations were in excess of statutory authority and invalid. The Ninth Circuit also concluded that setting aside these actions under the APA was appropriate and not barred by statutory limitations on judicial review or injunctive relief. The court affirmed full vacatur of the Secretary’s actions, restoring the prior TPS designations and extensions. View "National TPS Alliance v. Noem" on Justia Law

A group of former and current employees of a staffing agency alleged that the company misclassified recruiters as exempt from state overtime laws and failed to provide required meal and rest breaks. After the employees filed a putative class action in state court, which the company removed to federal court, the parties engaged in over a year of discovery and completed class certification briefing. Shortly after class certification briefing closed, the company implemented a new, mandatory arbitration agreement for internal employees, including the putative class members. This agreement required class members to either quit their jobs or affirmatively opt out of arbitration if they wished to remain in the class, effectively reversing the typical opt-out structure of class actions under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 23.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted class certification and, after reviewing the company’s communications about the new arbitration agreement, found them misleading and potentially coercive. The court determined that the communications disparaged class actions, omitted key information, and confused recipients about their rights and deadlines, especially as the emails were sent during a holiday period. Consequently, when the company moved to compel arbitration against class members who had not opted out, the district court denied the motion, relying on its authority under FRCP 23(d) to ensure the fairness of class proceedings.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that district courts have broad authority under FRCP 23(d) to refuse to enforce arbitration agreements when a defendant’s conduct undermines the fairness of the class action process, especially where communications are misleading and subvert the opt-out mechanism. The court also held that the arbitration agreement’s delegation provision did not prevent the district court from ruling on enforceability in this context. View "AVERY V. TEKSYSTEMS, INC." on Justia Law

A man was convicted in California of first-degree murder and sentenced to death for the killing of a homeowner during a burglary in 1985. The prosecution established that the defendant entered the victim’s home, stole property, and shot the victim in the back as he was fleeing. The case against the defendant was supported by fingerprint evidence, eyewitnesses, and testimony about his actions and statements before and after the crime. At trial, the defense argued alternative theories, including that another individual was the actual killer and that the shooting lacked intent. During the penalty phase, the prosecution presented evidence of the defendant’s prior felonies, while the defense offered extensive mitigating evidence regarding his abusive childhood and mental health issues.On direct appeal, the Supreme Court of California affirmed the conviction and death sentence. The defendant subsequently filed state and federal habeas petitions, raising claims about his competency to stand trial, the effectiveness of his counsel, and alleged jury coercion. The California Supreme Court summarily denied these claims, and the United States District Court for the Central District of California denied his federal habeas petition.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the appeal. Applying the deferential standard required by the Anti-Terrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), the court held that the California Supreme Court could have reasonably concluded the evidence did not sufficiently support the defendant’s claims of incompetence or ineffective assistance of counsel. The Ninth Circuit also found no basis to conclude the trial court coerced the jury’s verdict or that California’s death penalty statute was unconstitutional. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of habeas relief. View "Beeler v. Broomfield" on Justia Law

A debtor filed for bankruptcy in 2017 and retained an attorney to serve as counsel in the Chapter 11 proceedings. The bankruptcy court appointed the attorney as counsel for the estate. In early 2018, a trustee was appointed due to concerns about liens on the debtor’s properties, and the trustee began liquidating assets. Following these events, the debtor sued her former bankruptcy attorney and his law firm in California state court for legal malpractice related to the bankruptcy representation.In state court, the attorney moved to dismiss the malpractice suit, arguing that the Barton doctrine, res judicata, and lack of standing barred the action. The Los Angeles County Superior Court dismissed the suit solely based on the Barton doctrine, which requires leave from the bankruptcy court before suing court-appointed officers in another forum. On appeal, the California Court of Appeal for the Second District held that the Barton doctrine applied to claims arising from the attorney’s actions while serving as debtor-in-possession counsel but not to actions taken after the trustee’s appointment. The appellate court allowed leave to amend for certain post-trustee claims if standing was established.The debtor then moved in bankruptcy court for leave to continue her malpractice suit under the Barton doctrine. The bankruptcy court granted leave for certain time periods but did not precisely tailor its order to the state appellate decision. The attorney appealed to the Ninth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP), which vacated the bankruptcy court’s order, holding it violated the Rooker-Feldman doctrine by modifying state court judgments. On further appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that granting Barton leave does not violate Rooker-Feldman, and the bankruptcy court may cure a jurisdictional defect after state court proceedings have begun. However, the Ninth Circuit found the bankruptcy court abused its discretion by not aligning its order with the state appellate decision and by granting Barton approval for claims not subject to the doctrine. The Ninth Circuit reversed the BAP, vacated in part, and remanded with instructions for the bankruptcy court to issue a tailored order consistent with the California appellate decision. View "Akhlaghpour v. Orantes" on Justia Law