Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A woman participated in an employee pension plan governed by the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA). After being diagnosed with cancer and while hospitalized, she initiated an online election to receive her accrued pension benefits as a lump sum and designated her sister as the beneficiary. She died three days later, before completing a required second step of confirming her election and beneficiary designation, according to the plan’s administrative process. After her death, her sister submitted a claim seeking the lump sum benefit.The plan administrator denied the claim, reasoning that the decedent had not finalized her election and beneficiary designation, and that “substantial compliance” with the plan’s requirements was not sufficient under ERISA. On administrative appeal, the committee upheld the denial for the same reasons. The sister then filed suit in the United States District Court for the Northern District of California, alleging entitlement to the benefits. The district court dismissed her complaint with prejudice, holding that the complaint did not plausibly allege that she was entitled to the benefits, even under a substantial compliance theory.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the state law doctrine of substantial compliance is available under ERISA for benefit elections, just as it is for beneficiary designations, consistent with its previous decision in Becker v. Williams, 777 F.3d 1035 (9th Cir. 2015). The court clarified that the Supreme Court’s decision in Kennedy v. Plan Administrator for DuPont Savings & Investment Plan, 555 U.S. 285 (2009), did not eliminate the doctrine of substantial compliance. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the plaintiff’s complaint plausibly alleged substantial compliance with the plan’s requirements and reversed the district court’s dismissal, remanding for further proceedings. View "LIU V. KAISER PERMANENTE EMPLOYEES PENSION PLAN FOR THE PERMANENTE MEDICAL GROUP, INC." on Justia Law

The case concerns a longstanding dispute over tribal fishing rights in western Washington, originating from Judge Boldt’s 1974 decision interpreting treaties that guaranteed tribes the right to fish at their usual and accustomed grounds and stations (U&A). The Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe sought a determination that its U&A included the Skagit River, Baker River, and certain marine waters, arguing that these locations had not been specifically determined in the original Final Decision I or subsequent proceedings. The Tribe relied on historical and anthropological evidence, including materials produced after Final Decision I, to support its claim for expanded fishing rights.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington dismissed Sauk-Suiattle’s request for determination under Paragraph 25(a)(6) of the permanent injunction, finding it lacked subject-matter jurisdiction. The court concluded that Sauk-Suiattle’s U&A had been specifically determined in Final Decision I, thereby excluding any unnamed waters from further consideration. The dismissal was also alternatively supported by collateral estoppel grounds. The district court denied Sauk-Suiattle’s motion for reconsideration, which included additional evidence and expert testimony.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of Sauk-Suiattle’s claim to U&A on the Skagit River, holding that this issue was precluded by its prior decision in Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Sauk-Suiattle Indian Tribe, 66 F.4th 766 (9th Cir. 2023). However, the Court reversed the district court’s dismissal as to the Baker River and marine waters, finding that Judge Boldt had not specifically determined Sauk-Suiattle’s rights to those locations. The Ninth Circuit remanded for the district court to exercise jurisdiction and consider Sauk-Suiattle’s Baker River and marine waters claims. View "SAUK-SUIATTLE INDIAN TRIBE V. STATE OF WASHINGTON" on Justia Law

A family from Guatemala fled to the United States after a gang leader who had previously murdered a family member threatened to kill them as well. Despite relocating within Guatemala, the gang quickly found them and continued the threats. The local police refused to intervene unless the gang leader was caught in the act. Fearing for their lives, the family left Guatemala and eventually entered the United States between ports of entry.Upon seeking asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture, an Immigration Judge and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied their applications. The BIA determined that the family was ineligible for asylum under the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule, which imposed a presumption of ineligibility for most non-Mexican asylum seekers who entered the United States between ports of entry during a specific period. The BIA also found that the family did not establish that their membership in certain proposed social groups was a central reason for the harm they experienced or feared.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The Ninth Circuit held that the Circumvention of Lawful Pathways Rule was inconsistent with the asylum statute because the statute guarantees the right to seek asylum regardless of the manner of entry into the United States. The court reaffirmed its prior decisions that the government cannot restrict asylum eligibility based on how a noncitizen entered the country. The Ninth Circuit also found that the BIA committed legal error by not applying the complete “mixed motives” framework when considering whether a protected ground was at least one central reason for the persecution. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "MORALES V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

The defendant engaged in a long-running scheme to illegally export components for night-vision and thermal-vision rifle scopes, which are classified as “defense articles” under federal law, from California to Russia. He did so without obtaining the required export license from the U.S. State Department and concealed his activities through offshore banking. Over nearly a decade, his illicit exports generated over $9 million in international wire transfers.After federal investigators uncovered the operation, the United States District Court for the Northern District of California charged him with conspiracy to export defense articles without a license under the Arms Export Control Act (AECA) and its implementing regulations, as well as two counts of money laundering. The defendant pleaded guilty to all three counts without a plea agreement and was sentenced to nine years in prison. His conviction and sentence were affirmed on direct appeal by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit, and the Supreme Court denied certiorari.Subsequently, the defendant filed a motion to vacate his sentence under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing ineffective assistance of counsel. He claimed his lawyer failed to challenge the validity of the conspiracy regulation under which he was convicted and did not properly inform him about the money-laundering charges. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of this motion de novo. The court held that the AECA authorized the State Department to promulgate regulations criminalizing conspiracies to violate export restrictions, so counsel’s failure to challenge the regulation was not deficient. The factual record also foreclosed the defendant’s claim regarding the money-laundering pleas. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of the § 2255 motion and declined to expand the certificate of appealability to include additional claims. View "USA V. MORGOVSKY" on Justia Law

KalshiEX, LLC operates a platform it describes as offering legal sports betting across all 50 states. Its business model involves offering “sports event contracts” on a designated contract market (DCM) registered with the Commodity Futures Trading Commission (CFTC). These contracts allow users to buy and sell positions based on outcomes of sporting events, such as who will win the Super Bowl or specific in-game occurrences, resembling traditional sports betting. In 2025, the Nevada Gaming Control Board sent Kalshi a cease-and-desist letter, stating that Kalshi’s operations violated Nevada’s gaming laws by effectively functioning as an unlicensed sportsbook.Kalshi responded by filing suit in the United States District Court for the District of Nevada, seeking a preliminary injunction to prevent Nevada from enforcing its gaming laws against its sports and election event contracts. The district court initially granted the injunction, siding with Kalshi’s argument that its platform was subject only to federal regulation under the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA) and not state gaming law. However, following conflicting decisions in other federal courts and further briefing, the district court dissolved the injunction, ruling that Kalshi’s sports event contracts were not “swaps” under the CEA and thus not subject to the CFTC’s exclusive jurisdiction; therefore, Nevada’s gaming laws could apply.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part the district court’s dissolution of the preliminary injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that Kalshi’s sports event contracts were not “swaps” as defined in the CEA, and that CFTC regulations currently prohibit DCMs from listing contracts involving gaming. As a result, the CEA is unlikely to preempt Nevada’s gaming regulations as applied to Kalshi’s sports event contracts. The court remanded for further consideration of Kalshi’s election contracts. The court’s disposition was to affirm in part and remand in part. View "KALSHIEX, LLC V. ASSAD" on Justia Law

A group of Angolan nationals, including the lead petitioner, entered the United States without authorization in September 2022. The lead petitioner applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), alleging persecution based on his political activity as a member of UNITA, an opposition party in Angola. He described multiple incidents of harm and threats from Angolan police and military, including being injured during a protest, detained and tortured at a police compound, and threatened following his public denunciation of government abuses. After these events, the family hid in Angola before fleeing to the United States.An Immigration Judge (IJ) conducted merits hearings at which the lead petitioner testified pro se. The IJ found him not credible, citing perceived inconsistencies and omissions in his account, and denied all forms of relief. The IJ also determined that the record did not establish a particularized risk of torture independent of the petitioner’s testimony and found that internal relocation within Angola was possible. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the appeal and affirmed the IJ’s findings, including the adverse credibility determination and denial of CAT protection.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed both the IJ and BIA decisions. The court held that the agency’s adverse credibility determination was not supported by substantial evidence, as it relied on trivial inconsistencies and failed to account for significant translation difficulties during the hearings. The court also concluded that the agency committed reversible legal errors in its analysis of the petitioner’s CAT claim, specifically regarding the petitioner’s particularized risk of torture and ability to internally relocate. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition for review, reversed the adverse credibility finding, and remanded for further proceedings, accepting the petitioner’s testimony as credible. View "MBUENO-VITA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A native and citizen of El Salvador, the petitioner was placed in removal proceedings in the United States in 2023. He sought protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), arguing that if removed to El Salvador, he would be subject to torture due to his criminal history, gang affiliations, and tattoos, all of which would make him a target under El Salvador’s “State of Exception”—a government policy involving mass detentions and documented abuses in prisons.Initially, an Immigration Judge denied his application for CAT protection in February 2024. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the Immigration Judge to consider certain country conditions evidence and to explain the weight given to an expert report. After further hearings, the Immigration Judge again denied relief, and the BIA affirmed this denial. While the petitioner’s appeal was pending, he filed a motion to reopen based on new, material evidence regarding torture and conditions in El Salvador’s prisons. The BIA equitably tolled the filing deadline due to prior ineffective assistance of counsel but denied the motion on the merits, finding that the petitioner had not provided the “quantitative evidence” it deemed necessary to satisfy CAT’s standard.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the BIA’s denial of the motion to reopen. The court held that the BIA had erred by imposing a requirement for “quantitative evidence” of torture, which is not mandated by CAT’s implementing regulations. The court also found that the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to the petitioner’s expert reports. The Ninth Circuit concluded that the petitioner had established a reasonable likelihood of succeeding on his CAT claim if proceedings were reopened and therefore ordered the BIA to grant the motion to reopen and conduct a full merits hearing. View "CALDERON V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A Jamaican citizen, Jacques, entered the United States as a teenager and overstayed his visa. In 2021, he was arrested in Utah during a traffic stop and pleaded guilty to misdemeanor possession of marijuana with intent to distribute. After serving a suspended sentence and probation, he was detained by Immigration and Customs Enforcement. Jacques applied for withholding of removal, arguing his return to Jamaica would place him in danger due to his mother’s political activities and murder. An Immigration Judge twice granted Jacques’s application for withholding of removal, finding his conviction was not a particularly serious crime barring relief.The Department of Homeland Security (DHS) appealed both grants to the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA). In both instances, the BIA or DHS failed to send notices of appeal and briefing schedules to the correct detention address, despite having updated information on Jacques’s location. As a result, Jacques was excluded from participating in both appellate proceedings, and did not respond to the appeals or submit briefs. The BIA reversed the Immigration Judge’s decisions each time, determining that Jacques’s conviction constituted a particularly serious crime and denying him withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that Jacques’s due process rights were violated because the government failed to serve him with reasonably calculated notice of DHS’s appeals, excluding him from participating in the proceedings. The court further held that Jacques was prejudiced by this deprivation, as the outcome of the appeals may have been affected had he been given notice and an opportunity to respond. The Ninth Circuit granted Jacques’s petition, vacated the BIA’s orders, and remanded with instructions to re-notice the appeal and reissue a briefing schedule to the correct address. View "JACQUES V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

A group of premium cigar manufacturers and trade associations challenged California’s Unflavored Tobacco List statute, which requires tobacco products to be approved and listed by the California Attorney General before they may be sold to consumers, retailers, or wholesalers in the state. To be listed, manufacturers must submit detailed applications and pay fees, certifying their products lack any characterizing flavor. The plaintiffs argued that the law would impose considerable compliance costs, particularly burdensome for the premium cigar industry where products are hand-made in smaller batches and change blends frequently. They asserted that their premium cigars, by federal definition, do not contain flavoring additives, and that the application and fee requirements would force them to reduce their product offerings in California.The plaintiffs sought a preliminary injunction against enforcement of the statute in the United States District Court for the Central District of California. They contended that the federal Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (TCA) expressly preempts California’s law as applied to premium cigars and that the statute’s presumption against flavoring based on manufacturers’ speech violates the First Amendment. The district court denied the motion, concluding the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on the merits of their claims.Upon review, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of a preliminary injunction. The appellate court held that the TCA’s Savings Clause exempts state requirements related to the sale of tobacco products from preemption, and the challenged statute falls within this exemption as it is directly tied to retail sales. The court also found that, based on the Attorney General’s representations, the statute imposes only a minimal burden on commercial speech and does not restrict speech more than necessary. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial of injunctive relief. View "ROCKY PATEL PREMIUM CIGARS, INC. V. BONTA" on Justia Law

Several federally licensed firearms dealers (FFLs), including both brick-and-mortar and home-based businesses, gun rights organizations, and private citizens challenged a California statute, Section 26806, which requires all FFLs to maintain a digital video and audio recording system on their business premises. The statute mandates 24/7 surveillance of specific areas, such as points of sale and firearm display areas, and limits when and how recordings may be released or accessed, including requirements for posting notification signs and annual certification of system functionality. Plaintiffs argued that this law infringed their rights under the First, Fourth, and Fifth Amendments by imposing surveillance burdens, chilling speech, violating privacy, and effecting a taking of property.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court found that Plaintiffs had not sufficiently alleged a likelihood of success on the merits of any claims, denied injunctive relief, and granted leave to amend. Plaintiffs eventually chose not to further amend and requested final judgment, which the district court entered, leading to this appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that Plaintiffs failed to allege a cognizable Fourth Amendment claim because there was no physical government intrusion or access to recordings, nor did mere compliance with the statute transform FFLs into state actors. The court also found no Fifth Amendment violation, as the statute did not result in a physical or regulatory taking; FFLs retained ownership and control over their recording systems, and the economic impact did not rise to a taking. Finally, the court ruled that the First Amendment theories advanced by Plaintiffs—overbreadth, violations of the right to anonymity and association, and chilling of speech—were unsupported because the statute did not regulate or compel speech or disclosure, nor did it plausibly chill protected expression. The Ninth Circuit therefore affirmed the district court’s judgment. View "RICHARDS V. NEWSOM" on Justia Law