Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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An inmate incarcerated in Nevada suffered a facial fracture after being struck by a softball in June 2018. He received prompt surgery and continued to be treated by prison medical staff, initially by Dr. Kim Adamson and, after Dr. Adamson’s departure, by Dr. Dana Marks. Over the following years, the inmate reported ongoing symptoms including pain, vertigo, and vision issues, some of which he believed were related to his original injury. While both doctors provided various treatments and medications, and ordered tests, they did not refer him to outside specialists despite persistent complaints. Eventually, after the inmate filed suit and obtained a preliminary injunction, he saw both a neurologist and an ear, nose, and throat specialist, resulting in new diagnoses and a revised treatment plan.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied summary judgment to Drs. Adamson and Marks, holding that they were not entitled to qualified immunity because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether their failure to refer the inmate to outside specialists constituted deliberate indifference to his medical needs. The court relied on earlier Ninth Circuit precedent that generally requires prison doctors to either treat medical problems or refer prisoners to others who can.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the denial of qualified immunity. It held that there was no clearly established law, under Supreme Court and Ninth Circuit precedent, specifying when a delay in making an outside referral by prison doctors rises to the level of deliberate indifference under the Eighth Amendment. Because existing precedent did not provide the required specificity to put the doctors on notice that their conduct was unconstitutional, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s ruling and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to Drs. Adamson and Marks. View "BROWN V. ADAMSON" on Justia Law

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A San Diego resident, who was a member of the Boozefighters Motorcycle Club, had his concealed-carry weapon (CCW) license revoked in December 2023 by the San Diego County Sheriff. The Sheriff cited the “good moral character” requirement in California law, stating that his association with the Boozefighters—a group characterized by the Sheriff as a “criminal street gang”—justified the revocation. The individual, who had no criminal record, was not given an opportunity to challenge this decision before his license was revoked, though he could seek reconsideration. Shortly after, California replaced the “good moral character” requirement with a new standard focused on dangerousness.The plaintiff sued both the County of San Diego and the Sheriff in her official capacity under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging violations of his First Amendment right to free association and his Second Amendment right to keep and bear arms. The United States District Court for the Southern District of California dismissed the claims, holding that the Sheriff was protected by Eleventh Amendment immunity as an “arm of the state,” that the County was not liable because the revocation was a state policy, and that the plaintiff had not sufficiently pleaded a First Amendment claim. The district court also found the Second Amendment claim moot after the license expired and the law changed.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed. The court held that the San Diego County Sheriff is not an “arm of the state” and thus is not entitled to sovereign immunity under the Eleventh Amendment. The court also ruled that revocation of a CCW license under the “good moral character” requirement was a county policy, making the County potentially liable under § 1983. The court found that the Second Amendment claim was not moot because effective relief, such as destruction of revocation records, remained possible. Finally, the court determined that the plaintiff adequately pleaded a First Amendment violation by alleging his license was revoked solely due to his lawful association with the club, absent evidence of criminal wrongdoing. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SHILLING V. COUNTY OF SAN DIEGO" on Justia Law

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A group of employee-chauffeurs sued several business entities and individuals collectively known as “Driver Provider,” alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), the Arizona Minimum Wage Act (AMWA), and the Arizona Wage Act (AWA). The plaintiffs claimed they were not fully compensated for required work performed before and after scheduled trips, including pre- and post-trip duties such as vehicle inspections and cleaning. Driver Provider paid chauffeurs according to a commission plan based on the type of vehicle and ride, but did not compensate for certain tasks, and used software to track only driving time, not pre- and post-trip work.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted judgment on the pleadings for Driver Provider on the plaintiffs’ AWA overtime claims and AMWA civil penalties claim, finding that those were preempted by the FLSA and not subject to private enforcement. The court also denied class certification for the AWA straight time claims, reasoning there was insufficient commonality among chauffeurs due to differing understandings of compensation. The parties settled remaining claims, but the settlement did not resolve or release putative class members’ AWA straight time claims, AWA overtime claims, or AMWA civil penalties claims. Intervenors who had not settled their AWA straight time claims were added as named plaintiffs.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s judgment regarding the AWA overtime claims, holding that the FLSA does not preempt AWA overtime claims. It also found the district court abused its discretion in denying class certification for the AWA straight time claims because all chauffeurs were paid under the same commission plan, satisfying commonality. The Ninth Circuit further held that private parties may enforce AMWA civil penalty provisions, reversing the district court’s contrary ruling. Driver Provider’s cross-appeal was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction as it concerned settled claims. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "SALAZAR V. DRIVER PROVIDER PHOENIX, LLC" on Justia Law

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A noncitizen, who was born in Mexico and later convicted of rape, challenged his removal from the United States. He claimed that he first entered the United States in 1994 as a child, when he was allegedly “waved through” a port of entry while asleep in a friend’s car. He later became a lawful permanent resident in 2015. In 2017, he committed the crime that led to his removal proceedings. The government charged him as removable for having committed a crime involving moral turpitude within five years after the “date of admission,” as defined by federal law.The Immigration Judge (IJ) held a hearing to determine when the noncitizen was “admitted” to the United States. The IJ found that the noncitizen failed to prove his 1994 entry was procedurally regular and instead concluded his “admission” occurred in 2015, when he became a lawful permanent resident. The IJ cited inconsistencies in the record, including earlier statements in immigration forms where the noncitizen claimed to have entered “without inspection.” The IJ also found that the evidence supporting the 1994 “wave-through” entry consisted largely of hearsay and unsworn statements.The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissed the noncitizen’s appeal, holding that he bore the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence, that his 1994 entry was a procedurally regular admission. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied the petition for review. The court held that, under 8 U.S.C. § 1361, the noncitizen had the burden to prove the time, place, and manner of his entry, and that substantial evidence supported the BIA’s determination that he failed to meet that burden. Thus, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the BIA’s dismissal and the order of removal. View "URZUA V. BLANCHE" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Victor Grandy was convicted by a jury in 1993 for distributing at least fifty grams of crack cocaine, violating 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). He was sentenced to life imprisonment and a ten-year term of supervised release, as required by the statute at the time. After serving over twenty-six years in prison, Grandy’s sentence was reduced in 2019 under the First Step Act, and he began his supervised release. During supervised release, Grandy demonstrated successful reintegration, maintaining stable employment, volunteering, and pursuing a flourishing art career. However, the conditions of supervised release limited his ability to travel for art shows. In February 2025, Grandy moved for early termination of supervised release, citing his exemplary conduct and professional burdens.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Grandy’s motion. The court reasoned that the mandatory minimum term of supervised release imposed under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) precluded early termination. It further determined Grandy had not shown extraordinary circumstances warranting early termination, relying on extrarecord sources: a 2022 U.S. Sentencing Commission recidivism study and an outdated Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts’ Guide. The court misinterpreted statistics from the study and applied an obsolete nine-factor test, concluding Grandy’s ongoing success justified continued supervision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. It held that 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1) does not prohibit early termination of supervised release under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), as the government conceded. The Ninth Circuit found the district court abused its discretion by misinterpreting extrarecord evidence, relying on outdated guidance, and treating Grandy’s success as a reason for continued supervision. The court reversed the denial of Grandy’s motion and remanded for further proceedings, declining to reassign the case to a different judge. View "USA V. GRANDY" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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A Sedona resident, who has obsessive-compulsive disorder, often sleeps in her car because her disability prevents her from entering her apartment. The City of Sedona has a criminal ordinance prohibiting sleeping in a vehicle on public or private property. The resident was twice warned by police for sleeping in her car and requested reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) to exempt her from enforcement of this ordinance. The city denied her requests, and her landlord threatened not to renew her lease if she continued sleeping in her car. She alleges that the city’s actions caused her emotional distress and loss of income, and she continues to sleep in her car several times a week.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona dismissed her claims for lack of standing, finding that the prior police warnings were insufficient to support a specific threat of prosecution and that she failed to allege a history of enforcement against similarly situated individuals. The district court addressed only her standing to seek injunctive relief, despite her claims for damages as well. Her requests to amend her complaint were denied, and she appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that she had Article III standing to bring an ADA claim for both damages and injunctive relief, based on the city’s denial of her request for accommodation and a credible threat of future enforcement. The court further held that Title II of the ADA applies to requests for reasonable accommodation to comply with municipal criminal ordinances. The ADA claim was remanded for further proceedings, allowing her to amend her complaint, while the dismissal of her Eighth Amendment claim was affirmed. View "BERAM V. CITY OF SEDONA" on Justia Law

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Five individuals, who were either peaceful protesters or independent journalists, attended demonstrations at the U.S. Immigration and Customs Enforcement facility in Portland, Oregon. During these events, they were exposed to tear gas and pepper balls used by federal agents to disperse crowds. The protests involved both peaceful activities and significant unrest, including vandalism, blocking entrances, and attacks on law enforcement. The plaintiffs claimed that federal agents specifically targeted them in retaliation for exercising their First Amendment rights.The plaintiffs filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Oregon against federal officials and the Department of Homeland Security. After discovery and an evidentiary hearing, the District Court issued a preliminary injunction restricting the use of non-lethal munitions to situations involving an imminent threat of physical harm, prohibiting their use on certain parts of the body, imposing limits on pepper spray, and requiring redesign of agent uniforms for better identification. Additionally, the District Court provisionally certified a class of all individuals who had protested or reported on DHS activities at the Portland ICE facility. The government’s motion to stay the injunction pending appeal was denied by the District Court but granted by the Ninth Circuit.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit vacated both the preliminary injunction and the provisional class certification. The court held that the plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on the merits of their First Amendment retaliation claim, as law enforcement may use non-lethal force to clear crowds and restore order without facing an imminent threat of physical harm. The record did not support claims of an unwritten policy or intent to retaliate against First Amendment activity. The court also found the injunction overbroad and unworkable, and the class failed to meet Rule 23’s commonality and indivisible remedy requirements. The preliminary injunction and class certification were vacated. View "DICKINSON V. TRUMP" on Justia Law

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Several tenants of an apartment complex located across the street from a federal Immigration and Customs Enforcement (ICE) facility in Portland, Oregon, claimed harm from exposure to tear gas used by federal law enforcement officers to disperse disruptive crowds during demonstrations. The plaintiffs, including individuals and entities associated with the apartment complex, argued that the government’s deployment of tear gas infringed their substantive-due-process rights under the Fifth Amendment.The United States District Court for the District of Oregon granted a preliminary injunction, enjoining several federal agencies from using tear gas for crowd control outside the ICE facility. The district court found that the plaintiffs were likely to succeed on the merits of their substantive-due-process claim and determined that the government’s actions could violate a constitutional right to bodily integrity.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s preliminary injunction. Applying de novo review to the underlying legal issues, the Ninth Circuit reaffirmed its prior stay of the injunction and concluded that the plaintiffs lacked a substantive-due-process right to be free from incidental exposure to tear gas used for non-lethal crowd control. The court held that such a right is not deeply rooted in the nation’s history and tradition nor implicit in the concept of ordered liberty, as required by Supreme Court precedents, including Washington v. Glucksberg and Dobbs v. Jackson Women’s Health Organization. The panel further clarified that a substantive-due-process challenge to executive action requires both conscience-shocking conduct and deprivation of a historically rooted right, rejecting the plaintiffs’ argument that only the shocks-the-conscience standard should apply. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s preliminary injunction. View "REACH COMMUNITY DEVELOPMENT V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY" on Justia Law

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Eight former employees of a space technology company were dismissed shortly after they circulated an open letter to management expressing concerns about workplace conduct they believed constituted sexual harassment. The letter specifically criticized the company founder’s posts on social media, which the plaintiffs alleged created a hostile work environment. After their termination, the plaintiffs filed suit asserting claims under California law, including hostile work environment sexual harassment, gender discrimination, failure to prevent discrimination and retaliation, and retaliatory termination for opposing alleged sexual harassment.The plaintiffs originally brought their case in state court. The defendant responded by filing an answer and then removed the case to the United States District Court for the Central District of California, asserting diversity jurisdiction. Once in federal court, the defendant moved to compel arbitration, citing arbitration agreements signed by each plaintiff as part of their employment contracts. The defendant argued that the Ending Forced Arbitration of Sexual Assault and Sexual Harassment Act of 2021 (EFAA) did not exempt the plaintiffs’ claims from arbitration, contending that the statute required “adequately alleged” sexual harassment—allegations sufficient to survive a federal motion to dismiss.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of the motion to compel arbitration de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the EFAA exempts the plaintiffs’ case from arbitration. The court ruled that the EFAA’s definition of a “sexual harassment dispute” is satisfied when the complaint asserts conduct alleged to amount to sexual harassment, without requiring allegations sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. The court affirmed the district court’s order, concluding that the plaintiffs properly invoked the EFAA and that their case “relates to” a sexual harassment dispute. Thus, the arbitration agreements are not enforceable for this case. View "HOLLAND-THIELEN v. SPACEX" on Justia Law

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Several chambers of commerce and business associations challenged two California statutes—the Climate Corporate Data Accountability Act (SB 253) and the Climate-Related Financial Risk Act (SB 261)—on First Amendment grounds. SB 253 requires large companies to annually disclose greenhouse gas emissions in three categories: Scope 1 (direct emissions from owned or controlled sources), Scope 2 (indirect emissions from purchased energy), and Scope 3 (indirect emissions throughout the company’s value chain, including suppliers and customers). SB 261 mandates covered companies to publicly disclose climate-related financial risk information, including assessments about their exposure to climate change and related business impacts.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied the plaintiffs’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court determined that both SB 253 and SB 261 regulate commercial speech and thus are not subject to strict scrutiny. Applying intermediate scrutiny and, for SB 253, the more deferential Zauderer standard, the district court found that both statutes reasonably advance California’s substantial interests such as providing investors with information and reducing emissions. It concluded that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their First Amendment claims and failed to meet the other requirements for preliminary relief.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial of injunctive relief. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the denial as to SB 253’s Scope 1 and Scope 2 disclosure requirements, holding these provisions regulate commercial speech and withstand intermediate scrutiny. However, it reversed the denial as to SB 253’s Scope 3 disclosure requirement and SB 261 in its entirety. The court found that Scope 3 disclosures and SB 261 compel noncommercial speech subject to strict scrutiny, which the State could not satisfy. The case was remanded for the district court to determine whether SB 253’s Scope 3 disclosure provisions are severable. View "UNITED STATES OF AMERICA CHAMBER OF COMMERCE V. SANCHEZ" on Justia Law