Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Silvana De Souza Silva, a native and citizen of Brazil, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) dismissing her appeal from an Immigration Judge's (IJ) order denying her asylum relief. De Souza Silva claimed past persecution and a well-founded fear of future persecution due to her practice of Candomblé, an Afro-Brazilian religion. She experienced harassment, vandalism, and a death threat, which forced her to practice her religion in hiding and eventually flee to the United States.The IJ found De Souza Silva credible but denied her relief, concluding that the harm she experienced did not rise to the level of persecution. The IJ reasoned that the death threat was not credible or sufficient to cause significant harm and that other incidents, such as vandalism and economic deprivation, amounted to discrimination rather than persecution. The IJ also held that De Souza Silva could safely relocate within Brazil to avoid future harm.The BIA affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing that the cumulative effect of De Souza Silva's experiences did not constitute persecution and that she could safely relocate within Brazil. The BIA did not consider the impact of her past experiences on her ability to practice her religion freely.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA and IJ erred by not considering the impact of De Souza Silva's past experiences on her religious practice. The court held that the agency's failure to consider this aspect was a legal error affecting the internal relocation analysis. The Ninth Circuit granted the petition and remanded the case for the agency to reconsider its past persecution determination and the remaining elements of De Souza Silva's asylum claim. View "DE SILVA V. BONDI" on Justia Law

The case involves a putative class action filed by Christine Pino on behalf of herself and others against Grant Cardone and his associated entities, alleging violations of the Securities Act of 1933. Pino claims that Cardone made misleading statements and omissions on social media about the internal rate of return (IRR) and distribution projections for real estate investment funds, and misstated material facts regarding the funds' debt obligations.The United States District Court for the Central District of California initially dismissed the case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6), concluding that Cardone and his entities were not "sellers" under § 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act and that the statements in question were not actionable. Pino appealed, and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding that Cardone and his entities could be considered statutory sellers and that some of the statements were actionable. The case was remanded for further proceedings.Upon remand, Pino filed a second amended complaint, and the district court again dismissed the claims without leave to amend, holding that Pino had waived subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and failed to plausibly allege subjective and objective falsity. The court also found that the omission of the SEC letter did not support a claim and that the debt obligation statement was not material.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Pino did not waive subjective falsity by disclaiming fraud and sufficiently alleged that Cardone subjectively disbelieved his IRR and distribution projections, which were also objectively untrue. The court also held that Pino stated a material omission claim under § 12(a)(2) by alleging that Cardone failed to disclose the SEC letter. Additionally, the court found that Pino sufficiently alleged that Cardone misstated material facts regarding the funds' debt obligations, which could be considered material to a reasonable investor. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's dismissal and allowed the claims to proceed. View "PINO V. CARDONE CAPITAL, LLC" on Justia Law

Jingshan Li, a citizen of China, arrived in the U.S. in 1997 on a B-1 visa. In 1999, he was charged with assisting others to enter the U.S. illegally. An Immigration Judge (IJ) found Li not credible and ordered his removal. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision in 2002. Li's attorney filed a petition for review with the Ninth Circuit but failed to file an opening brief, leading to the dismissal of the petition for failure to prosecute in 2003. In 2017, Li, with new counsel, filed a motion to reopen with the BIA, citing ineffective assistance of his former counsel.The BIA denied Li's motion, stating that the ineffective assistance claim pertained to his case before the Ninth Circuit, a different tribunal. The BIA noted it had discretion to consider such claims but declined to do so. Li then petitioned the Ninth Circuit for review of the BIA's decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and concluded that the BIA abused its discretion by failing to provide a reasoned explanation for its decision. The court noted that both BIA and circuit precedent established the BIA's authority to review ineffective assistance claims involving conduct before a different tribunal. The Ninth Circuit held that the BIA's failure to consider Li's claim or provide a reasoned explanation for its decision was arbitrary. The court granted Li's petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for further proceedings. View "LI V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A man named Yoon Suk Chang was injured at the American Memorial Park on Saipan when his foot got caught in a large hole in a grassy area. He suffered severe ankle injuries, which required surgery and led to significant medical expenses and financial losses. Chang filed a negligence claim under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA) against the United States, alleging that the National Park Service (NPS) allowed a dangerous hole to go unrepaired.The District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands dismissed Chang's complaint, citing the discretionary function exception of the FTCA. The court reasoned that the decisions on how to inspect and maintain the grassy areas involved policy considerations, such as safety, public access, and aesthetics. Therefore, the court concluded that the discretionary function exception applied, and the United States was immune from the lawsuit.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court's judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the discretionary function exception did not apply because the routine maintenance of a grassy lawn did not involve government employees balancing public policy considerations. The court emphasized that the NPS's failure to repair a hole in a regularly maintained grass area was a matter of routine maintenance, which is not protected by the discretionary function exception. The case was remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. View "Chang v. United States" on Justia Law

Steven Zinnel was convicted of bankruptcy fraud, money laundering, and other financial crimes. He was sentenced to 152 months in prison and ordered to pay over $2.5 million in restitution and fines. The government sought to garnish funds from Zinnel's TD Ameritrade Individual Retirement Account to satisfy the unpaid restitution and fines. Zinnel objected to the garnishment and requested that the proceedings be transferred to the District of Oregon, where he claimed to reside.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied Zinnel's motion to transfer the proceedings, ruling that venue was proper in the Eastern District of California. The court overruled Zinnel's objections to the writ of garnishment and ordered TD Ameritrade to disburse funds to cover the unpaid restitution, fines, and a litigation surcharge. Zinnel appealed the final garnishment order.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court erred in denying Zinnel's motion to transfer the garnishment proceedings. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Sixth and Eleventh Circuits that the plain language of the Federal Debt Collection Procedures Act (FDCPA) imposes a mandatory obligation on the district court to transfer the proceedings upon the debtor's timely request. The court also held that the district court's failure to transfer the proceedings was not subject to harmless error analysis, as it necessarily affected the debtor's substantial rights.The Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's final order of garnishment and remanded the case, allowing Zinnel to litigate the proceedings in the district where he now resides. The court concluded that the appeal was not moot, as a partial remedy could still be fashioned by directing the United States to return the funds to TD Ameritrade. View "United States v. Zinnel" on Justia Law

Edward B. Spencer, an indigent and incarcerated individual, filed multiple lawsuits against various California prison officials. He initially proceeded in forma pauperis (IFP) in each case. Spencer had previously filed numerous lawsuits while incarcerated, and he conceded that two of those actions resulted in strikes under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA). However, he disputed whether two other actions, which he voluntarily dismissed, should count as strikes.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California revoked Spencer's IFP status in four cases, finding that he had four strikes, including the two voluntary dismissals. The district court adopted the magistrate judge's findings and recommendations, which concluded that the voluntary dismissals counted as strikes under the PLRA.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status. The Ninth Circuit held that voluntary dismissals under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 41(a)(1) do not constitute strikes under the PLRA. The court reasoned that the "on the grounds that" clause in 28 U.S.C. § 1915(g) requires grounds to be decided by a court, and voluntary dismissals do not have grounds decided by a court. Therefore, Rule 41(a)(1) voluntary dismissals cannot count as strikes because they are never "on the grounds that" the case was frivolous, malicious, or failed to state a claim.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's revocation of Spencer's IFP status in each of the four cases on appeal and remanded for further proceedings. The court did not address any other issues urged by the parties. View "Spencer v. Milan" on Justia Law

Richard Mooney sued his former employer, Roller Bearing Company of America (RBC), alleging violations of the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA) and the Washington Family and Medical Leave Act (WFMLA). Mooney claimed his termination was due to his age, depression, and decision to take leave under the FMLA, while RBC argued it was due to a reduction in force in response to the COVID-19 pandemic. Mooney filed the lawsuit in King County Superior Court, and RBC removed the case to federal court under federal question and diversity jurisdiction. The jury found RBC liable and awarded Mooney $160,000 in damages.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington calculated prejudgment interest based on a fluctuating federal rate. Mooney appealed, arguing that the higher state rate should have applied. The district court concluded it had discretion to select the appropriate rate and chose the federal rate, finding it the most accurate way to compensate Mooney for the lost use of his wages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that when a judgment is based equally on both state and federal claims, the district court has discretion to select a proper prejudgment interest rate. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, agreeing that the fluctuating federal rate was appropriate given the circumstances, including Mooney's litigation strategy and the combined nature of the state and federal claims. The court found no error in the district court's application of the federal rate and affirmed the judgment. View "Mooney v. Roller Bearing Company of America" on Justia Law

Peter Schuman and William Coplin, former employees of Atmel Corporation, were terminated without cause after Microchip Technology Inc. acquired Atmel. They were offered severance benefits significantly lower than those promised under Atmel's Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA)-governed benefits plan, in exchange for signing a release of all potential claims. Schuman and Coplin signed the releases but later filed a class-action lawsuit on behalf of approximately 200 similarly situated former Atmel employees, alleging ERISA violations, including breach of fiduciary duty and denial of benefits, and challenging the enforceability of the releases.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted summary judgment in favor of Microchip against Schuman and Coplin, applying a six-part test to determine that the releases were signed knowingly and voluntarily. The court did not consider evidence of Microchip's alleged breach of fiduciary duties in its analysis. The district court denied summary judgment for the non-named plaintiffs, finding material disputes of fact regarding Microchip's knowledge of the Plan's intended interpretation. The court entered final judgment under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 54(b) for Schuman and Coplin, certifying the question of the appropriate legal test for determining the enforceability of the releases.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment against Schuman and Coplin, holding that courts must evaluate the enforceability of ERISA releases by considering the totality of the circumstances, including any alleged improper conduct by the fiduciary. The court enumerated nine non-exhaustive factors for this evaluation. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings consistent with this opinion. The Ninth Circuit dismissed Microchip's cross-appeal for lack of jurisdiction, as the issue raised was not inextricably intertwined with the primary appeal. View "Schuman v. Microchip Technology Inc." on Justia Law

Between 2007 and 2010, the taxpayer transferred millions of dollars between his business entities, characterizing them as loans. On December 31, 2010, he canceled many of these purported loans. On his 2010 income tax return, he reported $145 million of cancellation-of-debt (COD) income but excluded it due to his personal insolvency. He also reported a short-term capital loss of nearly $87 million due to a nonbusiness bad debt write-off, claiming that the discharged debt automatically rendered it worthless. The IRS disagreed and disallowed the deduction.The taxpayer challenged the IRS's decision in the United States Tax Court. The Tax Court found that the taxpayer had not established that the debts were worthless in 2010 and could not be deducted under 26 U.S.C. § 166. The court also found that the taxpayer had not proven the insolvency of the entities involved, which would have allowed the COD income to flow through to him. As a result, the Tax Court determined income tax deficiencies of over $5 million for the taxpayer.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Tax Court did not err in requiring the taxpayer to prove the worthlessness of his discharged debts and in declining to presume worthlessness because COD income arose from that discharge. The Ninth Circuit agreed with the Tax Court's interpretation of the relevant tax statutes and found that the taxpayer had failed to provide sufficient objective evidence to demonstrate the worthlessness of the debts. The court affirmed the Tax Court's decision, resulting in the taxpayer's appeal being denied. View "Kelly v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Michael Hogan, a death row inmate in Nevada, appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition. Hogan challenged the district court's denial of relief on two certified issues and sought to expand the certificate of appealability (COA) on five additional issues. The case predates the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996.Hogan's first certified claim alleged ineffective assistance of counsel (IAC) for failing to investigate his 1971 Iowa manslaughter conviction, which was used as an aggravating factor in his Nevada penalty proceeding. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, finding that Hogan's trial counsel made a reasonable strategic decision to challenge the Iowa conviction in Nevada rather than in Iowa. The court also found that Hogan could not demonstrate prejudice from his counsel's failure to challenge the Iowa conviction as a crime of violence under Nevada law.Hogan's second certified claim argued that the procedural default of his trial-court IAC claims should be excused under Martinez v. Ryan. The Ninth Circuit disagreed with the district court's reasons for concluding that Hogan failed to establish "cause" under Martinez. The court held that Martinez applies to procedural defaults based on state timeliness rules and that Hogan's failure to raise the trial IAC claims in his second petition did not preclude Martinez relief. The court remanded Claims 2(A)-(G) and (I)-(O) to the district court for further proceedings.The Ninth Circuit granted Hogan's motion to expand the COA to include whether the district court erred in dismissing his challenges to the aggravating circumstances (Claims 5(A) and (B)) as procedurally defaulted. The court held that these claims were properly exhausted and that Nevada's procedural rules were not consistently applied as of 1990, allowing federal review of the merits. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on the merits of these claims.The Ninth Circuit declined to expand the COA to cover four other issues, including Hogan's Confrontation Clause claim, jury instructional errors, lethal injection claim, and cumulative errors claim. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on these issues. View "Hogan v. Bean" on Justia Law