Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The plaintiff, Mya Noelia Fallon, applied for Supplemental Security Income (SSI) under the Social Security Act, citing epileptic seizures and cognitive and behavioral limitations. Her application included assessments from her neurologist, Dr. Joseph Drazkowski, and licensed professional counselor (LPC) Terry Galler, who noted significant cognitive impairments and anxiety disorders. An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) found Fallon not disabled, giving minimal weight to the opinions of Dr. Drazkowski and LPC Galler, and discrediting other medical and lay testimony.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona partially reversed the ALJ's decision, finding errors in the discounting of some witnesses but agreeing with the ALJ's assessment of Dr. Drazkowski's and LPC Galler's opinions. The case was remanded for further consideration. On remand, the ALJ again found Fallon not disabled, incorporating the prior evaluations. Fallon appealed, and the district court affirmed the ALJ's decision, refusing to revisit its prior conclusions about the medical opinions based on the law-of-the-case doctrine.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the law-of-the-case doctrine applies in the social security context, meaning that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to reconsider the evaluations of Dr. Drazkowski and LPC Galler. The court explained that a social-security applicant has two options to preserve the right to appeal: immediately appeal the remand order or proceed on remand, understanding that the district court may decline to revisit settled issues. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision, noting that Fallon forfeited her ability to challenge the evaluations by not raising the issue in her first appeal. View "FALLON V. DUDEK" on Justia Law

Defendants, alleged victims of a Ponzi scheme perpetrated by John Woods, sought to bring claims against Woods's employer, Oppenheimer & Co. Inc., in a FINRA arbitration forum. Defendants claimed they were customers of Oppenheimer because they transacted with Woods, an associated person of Oppenheimer. Oppenheimer filed a federal action seeking a declaration that Defendants were not its customers and a permanent injunction to prevent arbitration.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted summary judgment in favor of Oppenheimer, concluding that Defendants were not customers of Oppenheimer or Woods. The court found that Defendants had no direct relationship with Oppenheimer and that their investments were facilitated by Michael Mooney, not Woods. The court also issued a permanent injunction prohibiting Defendants from arbitrating their claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that a "customer" under FINRA Rule 12200 includes any non-broker and non-dealer who purchases commodities or services from a FINRA member or its associated person. However, the court agreed with the district court that Defendants did not transact with Woods, as their investments were facilitated by Mooney. The court also rejected Defendants' "alter ego" theory, which suggested that their investments in an entity controlled by Woods made them Woods's customers.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Defendants were not entitled to arbitrate their claims against Oppenheimer under FINRA Rule 12200 and upheld the permanent injunction. The court found no errors in the district court's analysis or factual findings and affirmed the decision in full. View "OPPENHEIMER & CO. INC. V. MITCHELL" on Justia Law

Three criminal defendants in San Francisco, on behalf of themselves and a putative class, challenged the constitutionality of the San Francisco Sheriff's Office (SFSO) Pre-Trial Electronic Monitoring program (PTEM). They specifically contested Rule 5, which requires enrollees to submit to warrantless searches, and Rule 11, which allows SFSO to share participants’ location data with other law enforcement agencies without a warrant and to retain the data. The plaintiffs were divided into two subclasses: those enrolled in the program before May 2023 ("original rules subclass") and those enrolled after May 2023 ("revised rules subclass").The United States District Court for the Northern District of California granted a preliminary injunction in favor of the plaintiffs, finding that the Program Rules likely violated their rights under the United States and California constitutions. The court enjoined the enforcement of the challenged Program Rules for both subclasses. The Sheriff appealed the injunction, particularly the prohibition on enforcing the location sharing provision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction over the appeals and that abstention was not warranted. The court found that the plaintiffs were unlikely to succeed on their facial challenges to Rule 11’s location sharing requirement for the revised rules subclass. The court determined that the Superior Court exercises a core judicial power in imposing PTEM and that the Sheriff’s program does not create separation-of-powers issues. The court also found that the location sharing provision was reasonable under the Fourth Amendment and the California Constitution when ordered by the Superior Court following an individualized determination. The court vacated the preliminary injunction as to the revised rules subclass but affirmed it for the original rules subclass due to the lack of a clear record that location sharing was a condition of PTEM enrollment. The court also granted the Sheriff’s motion to stay the district court’s subsequent order enforcing the preliminary injunction. View "SIMON V. CITY AND COUNTY OF SAN FRANCISCO" on Justia Law

Maris Oscar, a Haitian national, sought asylum in the United States, claiming persecution by the Parti Haïtien Tèt Kale (PHTK) in Haiti. Oscar testified that PHTK members attacked him in 2014 after he refused to join them. He fled Haiti in November 2014 and resettled in Chile in January 2015, where he lived for six years, attended university, worked, and received health coverage. Oscar and his family were granted permanent residence in Chile, as indicated by their Chilean identification cards. Oscar reported experiencing racism in Chile but did not claim any harm from the Chilean government.An immigration judge (IJ) denied Oscar's application for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), citing the firm resettlement bar due to his permanent residence in Chile. The IJ found that Oscar's reports of racism did not qualify him for an exception to the firm resettlement bar. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, leading Oscar to petition for review.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and denied Oscar's petition. The court held that the Chilean government's issuance of an identification card with "Visa: PERMANENT RESIDENCE" constituted direct evidence of a firm offer of resettlement. Oscar failed to show that the firm resettlement bar did not apply, as his argument that his Chilean residence status had been revoked was insufficient. Additionally, the court found that Oscar did not experience substantial discrimination that would qualify for an exception to the firm resettlement bar, and there was no evidence that the Chilean government consciously restricted his residence. Thus, the firm resettlement bar rendered Oscar ineligible for asylum. View "OSCAR V. BONDI" on Justia Law

A sheriff's deputy in San Bernardino County, California, pursued a suspect who fled from a traffic stop. The suspect, Richard Delacruz, ran towards the backyard of Michael Newman's home. The deputy, Todd Underhill, lost sight of Delacruz but believed he might have entered the house. Underhill and other deputies entered the home without a warrant, found Newman, and eventually located and arrested Delacruz inside the house.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the defendants, ruling that the deputies did not violate the Fourth Amendment because the hot-pursuit exception to the warrant requirement applied. The court found that the deputies had probable cause to believe Delacruz was inside the house and that the pursuit was immediate and continuous.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the deputies had probable cause to enter the home, as a reasonable person would believe there was a fair probability that Delacruz was inside. The court also determined that the pursuit was immediate and continuous, despite a nine-minute delay between losing sight of Delacruz and entering the home. The court concluded that the hot-pursuit exception justified the warrantless entry, as the deputies were in immediate and continuous pursuit of a fleeing suspect who had committed a felony. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the summary judgment in favor of the defendants. View "NEWMAN V. UNDERHILL" on Justia Law

Two environmental organizations challenged a July 2020 Final Environmental Assessment (EA) and Decision and Finding of No Significant Impact (FONSI) issued by Wildlife Services, an agency within the U.S. Department of Agriculture. The EA and FONSI authorized a predator damage and conflict management program in Wilderness Areas and Wilderness Study Areas in Nevada. The plaintiffs argued that the program violated the Wilderness Act and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA).The United States District Court for the District of Nevada granted summary judgment in favor of Wildlife Services. The court concluded that predator control in Wilderness Areas to support pre-existing grazing operations was permissible under the Wilderness Act. The court also found that the agency's statewide analysis of the environmental impacts was reasonable and that the agency had adequately considered the potential impacts on public health, Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty regarding lethal predator damage management (PDM).The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's summary judgment on the Wilderness Act claim, holding that lethal PDM is permissible in Wilderness Areas when conducted in support of pre-existing grazing operations. However, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's summary judgment on the NEPA claim. The court found that the EA failed to take the required "hard look" at the environmental impacts, particularly regarding the geographic scope of the PDM program, the potential impacts on public health, the unique characteristics of Wilderness Areas, and the scientific uncertainty surrounding lethal PDM. The court remanded the case to the district court to direct the agency to reconsider whether an Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) is required and to produce either a revised EA or an EIS. View "WILDEARTH GUARDIANS V. UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE ANIMAL AND PLANT HEALTH INSPECTION WILDLIFE SERVICES" on Justia Law

Johnnie Fuson, a registered member of the Navajo Tribe, was forced to relocate from his family’s home following the partition of the Joint Use Area (JUA) under the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act. Fuson applied for relocation assistance benefits, but his application was denied by the Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR). On appeal, the Independent Hearing Officer (IHO) also deemed Fuson ineligible for benefits, citing adverse credibility findings and determining that Fuson was not a resident of the Hopi Partitioned Lands (HPL) on the relevant date.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona upheld the IHO’s decision, granting summary judgment in favor of ONHIR and denying Fuson’s motion for summary judgment. The district court found that substantial evidence supported the IHO’s adverse credibility findings and that the IHO’s decision was not arbitrary and capricious.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the IHO’s adverse credibility findings were not supported by substantial evidence. The IHO had found every witness not credible due to inconsistencies with other witnesses, creating a circular reasoning that guaranteed adverse credibility findings for all witnesses. The Ninth Circuit also found that the IHO’s finding that Fuson was not a resident of the HPL homesite was arbitrary and capricious. The IHO relied almost exclusively on the Bureau of Indian Affairs enumeration roster without adequately considering contrary testimony about the roster’s reliability.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "FUSON V. OFFICE OF NAVAJO AND HOPI INDIAN RELOCATION" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs created accounts on justanswer.com and paid to ask questions. According to JustAnswer's Terms of Service, paying for answers automatically enrolled plaintiffs in a recurring monthly subscription. Plaintiffs alleged that JustAnswer violated the Electronic Funds Transfer Act and various state consumer protection laws by enrolling them in the subscription service without their consent and making cancellation difficult. JustAnswer sought to compel arbitration based on a provision in its Terms of Service, asserting that plaintiffs were put on inquiry notice of those terms and agreed to arbitrate any claims arising from their use of the site.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied JustAnswer's motion to compel arbitration. The court held that plaintiffs did not receive sufficient notice of JustAnswer's Terms of Service containing the arbitration clause, and thus no contract was formed. The court found that the payment pages and other advisals presented to plaintiffs were not sufficiently conspicuous to put them on inquiry notice of the terms, and the advisals did not explicitly inform users that clicking a button would constitute assent to the terms.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's order. The Ninth Circuit concluded that no contracts were formed between plaintiffs and JustAnswer under an inquiry theory of notice. The court held that the website did not provide reasonably conspicuous notice of the terms, and the advisals did not unambiguously manifest the plaintiffs' assent to those terms. Therefore, plaintiffs were not bound by the arbitration provision in JustAnswer's Terms of Service, and the motion to compel arbitration was denied. View "GODUN V. JUSTANSWER LLC" on Justia Law

Cristina Balan, an automotive design engineer, filed a defamation lawsuit against Tesla, Inc. and Elon Musk, alleging that Tesla made defamatory statements about her, including accusations of theft, after an article about her was published in the Huffington Post. Tesla moved to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement in Balan's employment contract. The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington partially granted Tesla's motion, compelling arbitration for part of the defamation claim. Balan then amended her arbitration demand to include a defamation claim against Musk.The Western District of Washington initially denied Tesla's motion to compel arbitration in part, but the Ninth Circuit reversed this decision, ruling that the entire defamation claim was subject to arbitration. Consequently, the district court dismissed the case. The arbitrator applied California law and dismissed Balan's defamation claims against Tesla and Musk based on the statute of limitations, issuing an award in favor of Tesla and Musk.Tesla and Musk petitioned the United States District Court for the Northern District of California to confirm the arbitration award. The district court granted the petition, confirming the award. Balan appealed, arguing that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the award.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to confirm the arbitration award. The Ninth Circuit cited the Supreme Court's decision in Badgerow v. Walters, which prohibits looking past the face of a petition under 9 U.S.C. § 9 to establish jurisdiction. Since Tesla's petition to confirm a zero-dollar award did not meet the amount in controversy requirement, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court's order and remanded the case with instructions to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction. View "TESLA MOTORS V. BALAN" on Justia Law

Plaintiff AirDoctor, LLC, sells air purifiers and replacement air filters, while Defendant Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd., sells replacement air filters primarily through Amazon.com. Plaintiff alleged that Defendant falsely advertised its air filters as compatible with Plaintiff’s air purifiers and offering equivalent filtration, which diverted sales from Plaintiff and harmed its reputation. Plaintiff filed a Complaint alleging violations of the Lanham Act, California’s Unfair Competition Law, and California’s False Advertising Law, seeking various forms of relief, including actual damages to be determined at trial, attorney’s fees, and an injunction.The United States District Court for the Central District of California entered default judgment in favor of Plaintiff after Defendant failed to appear or respond. However, the district court denied Plaintiff’s request for actual damages, reasoning that awarding damages would exceed what was demanded in the pleadings under Rule 54(c) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as the Complaint did not specify an amount of damages sought. The district court also denied attorney’s fees based on its local rules, which tied fees to the amount of damages awarded.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Rule 54(c) does not prohibit awarding actual damages in a default judgment when the pleadings sought such damages in an amount to be determined at trial. The court referenced its decision in Henry v. Sneiders, which allowed for damages to be awarded even if the exact amount was not specified in the complaint. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s denial of damages and remanded the case for further proceedings consistent with its opinion. View "AirDoctor, LLC v. Xiamen Qichuang Trade Co., Ltd" on Justia Law