Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A staff psychologist at a federal prison discovered that a corrections lieutenant operated an Instagram account with sexually offensive content, some of which targeted her. When she reported this to prison leadership, her complaints were dismissed, and the lieutenant's posts became more aggressive. Despite her repeated complaints, the prison's response was slow and ineffective, leading her to feel unsafe and eventually leave her job.The United States District Court for the Central District of California granted summary judgment in favor of the government, concluding that the psychologist had not shown an objectively hostile work environment and that the prison had taken reasonable remedial actions. The court limited its consideration to five specific posts and determined that these did not occur within the physical workplace.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision. The appellate court held that the district court erred by not considering the totality of the circumstances, including the broader context of the harassment and the prison's inadequate response. The Ninth Circuit reaffirmed that evidence of sexually harassing conduct, even if not expressly targeting the plaintiff, and non-sexual conduct that could be seen as retaliatory or intimidating, should be considered. The court also rejected the notion that only conduct occurring inside the physical workplace is actionable, especially given the prevalence of social media. The court found that the plaintiff had raised triable issues of fact regarding the hostile work environment and the prison's failure to take prompt and effective remedial measures. The case was reversed and remanded for further proceedings. View "OKONOWSKY V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Hedge funds Walleye Opportunities Master Fund Ltd. and Walleye Manager Opportunities LLC sued large shareholders of Intelsat S.A., alleging that the shareholders engaged in insider trading by using material non-public information obtained from a meeting between Intelsat and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC). The plaintiffs claimed that the shareholders sold Intelsat stock during an after-hours block sale based on this information, which was not disclosed to the public.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed the complaint, finding that Walleye failed to adequately plead that the defendants possessed material non-public information and acted with scienter. The court also held that Walleye had statutory standing under Section 20A of the Securities Exchange Act, which requires that plaintiff-buyers trade contemporaneously with defendant-sellers. Walleye amended the complaint, but the district court dismissed the second amended complaint on similar grounds.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The Ninth Circuit held that Walleye had Article III standing to sue because it sufficiently pleaded both injury and causation by alleging that it bought Intelsat stock at a price inflated due to the defendants’ failure to disclose material information. The court also held that Walleye had statutory standing under Section 20A, even though it traded on the public market and did not buy the Intelsat shares sold during the after-hours block trade.However, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Walleye failed to adequately plead that the defendants possessed material non-public information. The court found that Walleye did not specifically allege how Silver Lake, BC Partners, or David McGlade learned of the FCC meeting or what material non-public information they possessed. The court also held that the alleged information was not material, as it did not significantly alter the total mix of information available to the public. The judgment of the district court was affirmed. View "WALLEYE OPPORTUNITIES MASTER FUND LTD. V. SILVER LAKE GROUP, L.L.C." on Justia Law

The case involves a coalition of states led by Washington suing the FDA over its 2023 REMS, which eliminated in-person dispensing requirements for the abortion drug mifepristone. Washington argues that the FDA should have further reduced restrictions on the drug, claiming that the remaining requirements impose unnecessary hurdles. Idaho, leading another coalition of states, sought to intervene, arguing that the elimination of the in-person dispensing requirement would harm its interests by making the drug easier to obtain and harder to police, potentially increasing Medicaid costs and endangering maternal health and fetal life.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of Washington denied Idaho's motion to intervene. The court found that Idaho did not have a significantly protectable interest that would be impaired by the litigation, as its complaint concerned different aspects of the 2023 REMS. The court also denied permissive intervention, concluding that Idaho's claims did not share common questions of law or fact with Washington's claims.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's denial of Idaho's motion to intervene as of right. The Ninth Circuit held that Idaho must independently satisfy the requirements of Article III standing because it sought different relief from Washington. The court concluded that Idaho's complaint did not establish a cognizable injury-in-fact that was fairly traceable to the FDA's revised safe-use restrictions. Idaho's alleged economic injuries, law enforcement burdens, and quasi-sovereign interests were deemed too speculative or indirect to confer standing. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction the portion of the appeal concerning the denial of permissive intervention. View "STATE OF WASHINGTON V. FDA" on Justia Law

The case involves individual falconers and the American Falconry Conservancy challenging state and federal regulations that require them to consent to unannounced, warrantless inspections as a condition for obtaining a falconry license. The plaintiffs argue that these regulations impose unconstitutional conditions on their right to obtain a license and violate the Fourth Amendment and the Administrative Procedures Act (APA).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California dismissed the plaintiffs' claims for lack of standing. The court concluded that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate injury in fact because they had not been subjected to a warrantless inspection under the challenged regulations and had not shown that future inspections were imminent. The district court also found that the American Falconry Conservancy lacked associational standing because it did not allege that its members faced immediate or threatened injury from unannounced inspections.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court reversed the district court’s dismissal of the plaintiffs' unconstitutional-conditions claim against the California Department of Fish and Wildlife (CDFW), holding that the plaintiffs had standing because they were forced to choose between retaining their Fourth Amendment rights and obtaining a falconry license. The court affirmed the dismissal of the remaining claims against CDFW and the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS), finding that the plaintiffs' claims against FWS were unripe and that the plaintiffs failed to demonstrate a sufficient likelihood of future injury to support their Fourth Amendment claims. The court also concluded that the American Falconry Conservancy had standing for its unconstitutional-conditions claim but not for its unannounced-inspection claim.The Ninth Circuit's main holding was that the plaintiffs had standing to challenge the unconstitutional conditions imposed by CDFW but lacked standing for their other claims. The case was affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings. View "PETER STAVRIANOUDAKIS V. USFWS" on Justia Law

Peng Shen, a Chinese citizen, applied for asylum, withholding of removal, and relief under the Convention Against Torture, claiming she was subjected to a forced abortion in China in 2003. Shen testified that a mandatory premarital health exam revealed her pregnancy, leading to the forced abortion. During cross-examination, DHS counsel suggested that the Chinese government had eliminated the premarital health check-up requirement by January 2003, causing Shen to become flustered and change her testimony.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Shen's application, finding her not credible based on her demeanor and inconsistencies in her testimony. The IJ noted Shen's initial confusion about the abortion date, her inconsistent statements about the premarital check-up, and discrepancies in her documentary evidence. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) upheld the IJ's decision, focusing on Shen's inconsistent testimony about the premarital check-up and the notarial certificate's incorrect date.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court determined that DHS counsel had misstated Chinese law regarding the premarital check-up requirement, which was repealed effective October 1, 2003. This misstatement likely affected the IJ's adverse credibility determination. The court concluded that Shen's flustered response to the incorrect information could have been due to the pressure of the situation rather than dishonesty.The Ninth Circuit granted Shen's petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the agency to reassess Shen's credibility without the influence of the incorrect legal information provided during cross-examination. The court emphasized the need to consider the totality of the circumstances in making credibility determinations. View "SHEN V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Darrel Eston Lee, an Arizona prisoner sentenced to death for murder and other offenses, filed a federal habeas petition claiming ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Lee argued that his counsel allowed him to testify falsely and failed to present mitigating evidence. He sought to introduce new evidence not presented in state court.The Arizona state postconviction relief court held a four-day evidentiary hearing and rejected Lee's claims. The court found no evidence that Lee had confessed to his attorney, Stephen Politi, and concluded that Politi's actions were reasonable given Lee's conflicting stories. The court also determined that Politi had conducted a reasonable mitigation investigation and that the lack of mitigating evidence was due to its nonexistence rather than Politi's incompetence. The Arizona Supreme Court summarily denied review.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona denied Lee's habeas petition, refusing to consider new evidence Lee presented for the first time in federal court. The court found that Lee's postconviction counsel had not acted diligently in state court, thus triggering the restrictions of 28 U.S.C. § 2254(e). The district court concluded that the state court's findings were reasonable based on the state-court record.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the state court reasonably rejected Lee's claim that Politi was ineffective for allowing him to testify falsely, as there was no clear evidence that Politi knew the alibi was false. The court also found that Lee failed to show that Politi's conduct fell below an objective standard of reasonableness or that he was prejudiced by it. Regarding the failure to present mitigating evidence, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lee did not qualify for an evidentiary hearing under § 2254(e)(2) and that the state court's rejection of this claim was not objectively unreasonable. View "LEE V. THORNELL" on Justia Law

Roberto Yepez, while serving a state sentence, was transferred to federal custody to face a federal drug trafficking charge. He was later convicted and sentenced in federal court. While serving his federal sentence, Yepez filed a pro se motion arguing for sentence credit for the time spent in federal custody before his federal sentencing. He later argued through counsel that this motion should be construed as one for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A). The district court held that a legal claim for sentence miscalculation must be brought through a habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. § 2241, not a compassionate release motion. The court dismissed the motion, noting it could not proceed as a § 2241 petition because Yepez was incarcerated in a different jurisdiction.Yepez appealed the district court's decision. However, before the appeal was fully briefed, he was released from prison and began serving his term of supervised release. The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and held that Yepez’s appeal became moot upon his release from prison. The court noted that the compassionate release provision under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A) could not be used to shorten Yepez’s term of supervised release. The court also rejected Yepez’s argument that the appeal was not moot because its outcome could affect a later motion under § 3583(e) for modification of his term of supervised release.The Ninth Circuit concluded that since Yepez was no longer incarcerated, the relief he sought—a reduction in his term of imprisonment—was no longer available. Additionally, the court determined that the compassionate release provision could not be used to alter the term of supervised release. Consequently, the appeal was dismissed as moot. View "USA V. YEPEZ" on Justia Law

Sumontinee Sridej, a Thai citizen, was accused of defrauding her employer in Thailand of approximately $4 million worth of electronics between 2013 and 2015. She left Thailand in January 2015 and moved to Las Vegas, Nevada. In 2022, Thailand requested her extradition under the extradition treaty between Thailand and the United States. The U.S. government filed a complaint seeking her arrest and extradition, and a magistrate judge certified her extradition in January 2023. Sridej then filed a habeas corpus petition challenging her extradition, which the district court denied, allowing her to renew her claim after the Secretary of State made a formal extradition determination.The United States District Court for the District of Nevada denied Sridej’s habeas corpus petition and her subsequent motion to reopen the case under Rule 60(b). The district court found that the Secretary of State had granted Thailand’s extradition request and that the Secretary had considered whether Sridej would face a risk of torture if extradited, as required by the Convention Against Torture (CAT) and its implementing regulations.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s order. The Ninth Circuit held that the Secretary of State had properly considered the risk of torture in compliance with CAT’s regulations. The court found that a declaration by an Attorney Adviser at the Office of the Legal Adviser for the Department of State was sufficient to establish that the Secretary had fulfilled his obligations. The court also held that the declaration did not need to be signed by the Secretary or a senior official and did not require a case-specific explanation for the extradition decision due to the doctrines of separation of powers and non-inquiry. The court affirmed the district court’s denial of Sridej’s Rule 60(b) motion. View "SRIDEJ V. BLINKEN" on Justia Law

The petitioner, Socorro Colin-Villavicencio, a native and citizen of Mexico, entered the United States lawfully in 1988. Her mother became a naturalized U.S. citizen in 1998. Colin-Villavicencio applied for adjustment of status but missed fingerprint appointments, leading to the abandonment of her application. In 2015, the Department of Homeland Security initiated removal proceedings after she was convicted of multiple felonies, including child abuse and drug possession. Representing herself, she claimed derivative citizenship based on her mother’s naturalization, but an Immigration Judge (IJ) denied this claim, finding she did not become a lawful permanent resident as a minor. The IJ also denied her relief under the Convention Against Torture (CAT).The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ’s decision, agreeing that Colin-Villavicencio did not establish a likelihood of torture if returned to Mexico. The BIA found that the country conditions and her brother’s attack did not sufficiently demonstrate a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The BIA also upheld the IJ’s determination that her prior convictions precluded asylum and withholding of removal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court denied Colin-Villavicencio’s derivative citizenship claim, concluding she did not meet the requirements under 8 U.S.C. § 1432(a)(3) because her parents never married, and her father’s paternity was established by legitimation under Baja California law. The court also found substantial evidence supporting the BIA’s denial of CAT relief, noting she did not show a particularized risk of torture or police acquiescence. The Ninth Circuit thus denied her petition for review. View "COLIN-VILLAVICENCIO V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

Danny Lopez, an airline fuel technician, filed a wage-and-hour lawsuit under California law against his employer, Menzies Aviation (USA), Inc. Lopez alleged that Menzies violated state requirements for meal periods, rest periods, overtime wages, minimum wages, and other employment conditions. Menzies sought to compel arbitration based on an arbitration agreement Lopez signed as part of his employment.The United States District Court for the Central District of California denied Menzies' motion to compel arbitration. The court found that Lopez, as a transportation worker engaged in foreign or interstate commerce, was exempt from the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) under 9 U.S.C. § 1. The court reasoned that Lopez’s role in fueling airplanes used in interstate and foreign commerce was integral to the transportation process, thus qualifying him for the exemption.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that a fuel technician who places fuel in planes used for foreign and interstate commerce is a transportation worker engaged in commerce. The court emphasized that such a worker plays a direct and necessary role in the free flow of goods across borders. The court clarified that there is no requirement for the worker to have hands-on contact with goods or be directly involved in their transportation to fall within the FAA exemption. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit concluded that Lopez was exempt from the arbitration requirements of the FAA and affirmed the district court’s denial of Menzies' motion to compel arbitration. View "LOPEZ V. AIRCRAFT SERVICE INTERNATIONAL, INC." on Justia Law