Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Programmers who published open-source code on GitHub sued GitHub, Microsoft, and various OpenAI entities, alleging that GitHub Copilot and Codex—AI tools trained on publicly available code from GitHub—reproduce portions of their code without attribution. These programmers claimed that the AI’s omission of copyright management information (CMI), such as attribution and license terms required by open-source licenses, violated the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), specifically 17 U.S.C. § 1202(b). Plaintiffs alleged that Copilot’s outputs sometimes consist of verbatim or near-verbatim reproductions of their code, but the AI-generated outputs do not include the original CMI.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California reviewed the case and dismissed the DMCA claims under Rule 12(b)(6, first with leave to amend and then with prejudice, concluding that plaintiffs failed to allege that Copilot’s outputs were “identical” to their code and that only identical copies from which CMI had been removed could support a DMCA claim. The court allowed breach of contract claims to proceed. It certified the DMCA dismissal for interlocutory appeal under 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b), noting the issue of whether § 1202(b) imposes an identicality requirement.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal. The court held that plaintiffs had Article III standing due to a plausible risk of injury. However, it determined that under their “output” theory, Copilot and Codex do not “remove or alter” CMI from copies of existing protected works; instead, they generate new works that never contained CMI. The court declined to consider the plaintiffs’ “input” theory as it was forfeited. The main holding is that generating new works without CMI does not violate § 1202(b) of the DMCA. View "DOE V. GITHUB, INC." on Justia Law

Louis Mendonsa pleaded guilty in April 2024 to seven counts of distribution and one count of possession of child pornography, stemming from activities on several “dark web” websites between July and November 2022. Decades earlier, Mendonsa was convicted in California state court for multiple child sex abuse offenses, including lewd and lascivious acts and oral copulation with minors he supervised as newspaper delivery boys. Most of these prior convictions involved the same victim and resulted in a 14-year prison sentence.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California, in calculating Mendonsa’s federal sentence, applied a five-level enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 2G2.2(b)(5) for engaging in a pattern of activity involving the sexual abuse or exploitation of a minor. The original presentence report did not recommend this enhancement, but following the government’s objection and submission of evidence from Mendonsa’s 1993 convictions, the final report included it. Mendonsa objected, arguing both that the enhancement should not apply to conduct from thirty years prior and that the evidence was insufficient to establish two separate qualifying incidents. At sentencing, the district court found multiple distinct instances of sexual abuse based on state-court documents and applied the enhancement. Mendonsa was sentenced to 292 months in prison and appealed.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that § 2G2.2(b)(5) is ambiguous regarding whether it covers conduct outside the offense of conviction, and that the Sentencing Guidelines commentary reasonably interprets the enhancement to include such conduct. The court further concluded that the categorical approach does not apply since the enhancement focuses on conduct, not convictions, and found no clear error or abuse of discretion in the district court’s reliance on hearsay evidence or its factual findings. The sentence was affirmed. View "USA V. MENDONSA" on Justia Law

Two federally recognized tribes sued several entities, including Kalshi and Robinhood, alleging that Kalshi’s “event contracts”—which pay based on sports outcomes—amounted to unauthorized sports betting offered on tribal lands. The tribes argued this violated the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) and their own gaming ordinances, since only tribally authorized gaming is lawful under secretarial procedures that stand in place of a tribal-state compact. They also challenged Kalshi’s advertisement claiming sports betting was legal nationwide on its platform under the Lanham Act.The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied the tribes’ motion for a preliminary injunction. The court concluded that the transactions did not occur on Indian lands, found Kalshi not bound by any tribal compact or procedures, and determined that the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act (UIGEA) controlled Kalshi’s conduct. The court reasoned that UIGEA exempted Kalshi’s contracts because they were regulated by the Commodity Exchange Act (CEA). The Lanham Act claim was rejected as the challenged advertisement was deemed a nonactionable opinion about legality.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the denial of the preliminary injunction in part. The court held that the tribes were likely to succeed on their IGRA claims, finding Kalshi’s sports contracts constituted class III gaming, occurred on Indian lands when entered into from tribal territory, and were unauthorized under the tribes’ ordinances and secretarial procedures. The court determined that neither UIGEA nor CEA displaced IGRA’s remedies or barred the tribes’ claim. However, the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s rejection of the Lanham Act claim, holding Kalshi’s advertisement was a lay opinion. The case was remanded for consideration of the remaining preliminary injunction factors. View "BLUE LAKE RANCHERIA V. KALSHI, INC." on Justia Law

Late at night, Anchorage police officers responded to reports of a domestic disturbance involving Kristopher Handy and his girlfriend. Dispatchers informed the officers that Handy had assaulted his girlfriend, may have discharged a firearm, and was seen waiting for the police outside his apartment, armed with a shotgun. Upon arrival, officers announced themselves and ordered Handy to come out and drop his weapon. Handy exited with the shotgun, refused repeated instructions to disarm, and advanced toward the officers while waving his shotgun overhead and cursing. As Handy stepped off the curb, officers fired, fatally shooting him.Plaintiffs, relatives of Handy, filed suit in the United States District Court for the District of Alaska, alleging excessive force in violation of the Fourth Amendment and deprivation of familial association. Defendants moved to dismiss on grounds of qualified immunity. The district court denied the motion, reasoning that, viewed in the light most favorable to plaintiffs, Handy’s actions did not necessarily constitute an immediate threat warranting deadly force. The court cited Ninth Circuit precedents suggesting an officer may not use deadly force against an armed suspect unless the suspect makes a threatening gesture, and found that factual disputes about Handy’s behavior precluded dismissal.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit determined it had jurisdiction over the interlocutory appeal and reviewed the facts de novo. The court held that, considering the totality of the circumstances and the incorporated video evidence, the officers acted reasonably and did not violate Handy’s or plaintiffs’ federal rights. The court also found no clearly established law requiring officers to hold fire until a suspect aimed a weapon at them. Accordingly, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s denial of qualified immunity and remanded with instructions to grant qualified immunity to the officers. View "HANDY V. JONES" on Justia Law

The defendant was convicted in 2006 for robbing a liquor and convenience store in Hawaii, during which he assaulted the store owner and stole cash from the premises. He was found guilty by a jury on four counts: conspiracy to commit Hobbs Act robbery, Hobbs Act robbery, brandishing a firearm during a violent crime, and being a felon in possession of a firearm. At sentencing, the United States District Court for the District of Hawaii applied several enhancements under the Sentencing Guidelines, including a career-offender enhancement based on prior state burglary convictions, resulting in a total sentence of 24 years.Following sentencing, the United States Sentencing Commission enacted four amendments to the Guidelines, three of which were not retroactive. If all had applied retroactively, the defendant’s sentence would have been significantly shorter. In 2024, the defendant moved for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i), arguing that the disparity between his sentence and what he would receive under current Guidelines constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for sentence reduction. The district court denied the motion, citing the policy statement in U.S.S.G. § 1B1.13, which precludes consideration of nonretroactive Guidelines changes as extraordinary and compelling reasons.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s denial for abuse of discretion and the interpretation of statutes and Guidelines de novo. The court held that the Sentencing Commission acted within its statutory authority in promulgating the policy statement, which validly bars courts from considering nonretroactive Guideline amendments—whether individually or in combination—as extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s denial of the defendant’s motion. View "USA V. TROIANO" on Justia Law

A group of more than 150 U-visa petitioners in the United States challenged the United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) over delays and denials related to their pending U-visa petitions. Due to a statutory cap on U visas, these petitioners faced long waits. Some were placed on a waiting list (“WLD Plaintiffs”), while others received only a “bona fide determination” (“BFD Plaintiffs”). All had deferred action and work authorization but lacked advance parole, which would allow them to travel abroad and return. The plaintiffs argued that USCIS unlawfully withheld or delayed waiting list decisions (Claim 1), unlawfully withheld or delayed consideration for advance parole (Claim 2), and arbitrarily and capriciously denied advance parole to those on the waiting list (Claim 3).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California dismissed Claims 2 and 3 for all plaintiffs, finding that the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary agency actions and that the plaintiffs did not plead or prove that they requested and were denied parole. The court allowed only Claim 1, brought by BFD Plaintiffs, to proceed, but later granted summary judgment to USCIS, holding that the BFD Plaintiffs lacked standing because being waitlisted would not independently entitle them to parole.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit concluded that granting parole to waitlisted U-visa petitioners is discretionary under 8 C.F.R. § 214.14(d)(2), not mandatory. The panel affirmed dismissal of the WLD Plaintiffs’ claims for lack of statutory jurisdiction, as the APA does not permit courts to compel discretionary action and there was no final agency action on parole denials. The panel also affirmed the district court’s rejection of the BFD Plaintiffs’ parole-related injury theory for standing, but reversed and remanded for consideration of their alternative injury theories and, if necessary, the merits of Claim 1. View "U VISA APPELLANTS V. DIRECTOR, U.S. CITIZENSHIP AND IMMIGRATION SERVICES" on Justia Law

In this case, a non-citizen was apprehended by a United States Border Patrol agent near the U.S.-Mexico border and charged with misdemeanor attempted illegal entry under 8 U.S.C. § 1325(a)(1). During the bench trial before a magistrate judge, the defendant requested evidence regarding the government’s witnesses’ involvement in a Facebook group where Border Patrol agents had posted offensive content. The government at first denied any witness involvement but later disclosed that two witnesses were members of the group. The defendant renewed his request for additional discovery related to this issue, but the magistrate judge denied it. The trial proceeded, and the magistrate judge admitted immigration documents over hearsay objections to establish the defendant’s citizenship status. After testimony from three agents, the defendant was convicted and sentenced to time served.The defendant appealed to the United States District Court for the Southern District of California, arguing that the magistrate judge erred in denying discovery requests for Brady and Rule 16 material and improperly admitted hearsay evidence. The district court affirmed the conviction, finding any error in denying discovery requests harmless because Agent Copenhaver’s testimony and the removal documents sufficed to prove the offense. The district court also determined the removal documents were admissible under the public records exception to hearsay.Upon appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case de novo for Brady issues and for abuse of discretion on discovery and evidentiary rulings. The court held that the magistrate judge abused her discretion by denying further discovery regarding the witnesses’ Facebook group activity, as the government was obligated to disclose such material under Brady and Rule 16. The court also found that the removal documents contained inadmissible hearsay and should not have been relied upon to prove alienage. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order, conditionally vacated the conviction, and remanded for further proceedings to determine whether undisclosed evidence might have affected the verdict. View "USA V. TOVAR-DURAN" on Justia Law

Insurance companies paid claims to policyholders whose Hyundai or Kia vehicles were stolen or damaged due to a vulnerability stemming from the lack of an engine immobilizer in certain models from 2011 to 2022. These companies, as subrogees, filed a nationwide class action alleging that the Korean manufacturers, Hyundai Motor Company and Kia Corporation, defectively designed these vehicles, making them prone to theft. The complaint also asserted claims for breach of warranties, violations of consumer protection statutes, fraud, unjust enrichment, and negligent failure to warn.Multiple lawsuits arising from this issue were consolidated into multidistrict litigation before the United States District Court for the Central District of California. The district court dismissed the claims against the Korean entities for lack of personal jurisdiction, concluding that the evidence did not establish intentional targeting of California by the manufacturers and that the claims did not arise from California-related conduct. The district court also denied leave to amend and jurisdictional discovery, entering final judgment under Rule 54(b) dismissing the Korean entities from the subrogation track.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court’s dismissal de novo. The Ninth Circuit held that the Korean manufacturers were subject to specific personal jurisdiction in California. The panel found that the manufacturers purposefully directed their activities toward California by sending thousands of shipments of vehicles through California ports and designing vehicles specifically for the U.S. market. The court further held that the claims arose out of these California contacts, as the injuries were caused by vehicles shipped to California. The panel reversed the district court’s dismissal and remanded the case for further proceedings, leaving the question of reasonableness of jurisdiction for the district court to resolve. View "IN RE: KIA HYUNDAI VEHICLE THEFT MARKETING, SALES PRACTICES, AND PRODUCTS LIABILITY LITIGATION" on Justia Law

The case concerns a long-term resident of the Commonwealth of the Northern Mariana Islands (CNMI) who applied to United States Citizenship and Immigration Services (USCIS) for NM-1 immigration status, a special status created by the Northern Mariana Islands Long-Term Legal Residents Relief Act. This status was designed to regularize the position of certain residents after federal immigration law was applied to the CNMI, which had previously operated under its own immigration system. The applicant’s request for NM-1 status was denied by USCIS on the grounds that he did not meet the required period of continuous, lawful residence. His request for administrative reconsideration was also denied.The applicant then filed suit in the District Court for the Northern Mariana Islands, seeking a declaration that his application satisfied the statutory criteria and an injunction ordering USCIS to approve his application. The government moved to dismiss the case, arguing that the Relief Act’s jurisdiction-stripping provision—specifically, 48 U.S.C. § 1806(e)(6)(D)—barred judicial review of the denial. The district court agreed with the government and dismissed the case for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction.On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed whether the jurisdictional bar in the Relief Act precluded review of decisions made by USCIS as the Secretary of Homeland Security’s delegate. The court held that the statute’s bar on judicial review of any “decision of the Secretary of Homeland Security” covers decisions made by USCIS pursuant to delegated authority. The court reasoned that delegation is a routine administrative practice and that Congress legislated against the backdrop of such delegation. The court further noted that precedent interpreting similar jurisdiction-stripping provisions supported this conclusion. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. View "BARMAN V. USA" on Justia Law

A church in Washington State challenged the validity of two state laws: the Reproductive Parity Act, which requires health insurance carriers to include coverage for all federally approved contraceptives and, if maternity care is covered, for abortions; and a longstanding conscience statute, which allows employers to object to purchasing coverage for specific healthcare services on religious or moral grounds. The church, as an employer providing health insurance to its employees, argued that these laws forced it to provide, pay for, or facilitate access to abortion and certain contraceptives in violation of its religious beliefs and right to religious autonomy.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington found that the church had standing to sue, but granted summary judgment in favor of the state defendants on the merits, concluding that the challenged laws did not violate the Free Exercise Clause or church autonomy doctrine. Both sides appealed. Previously, the Ninth Circuit vacated the district court’s judgment for lack of standing, but after the Supreme Court’s decision in Diamond Alternative Energy, LLC v. EPA, 606 U.S. 100 (2025), it vacated its own opinion and reheard the case.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit held that the church had Article III standing, as the laws caused it to facilitate abortion indirectly. Assuming, without deciding, that the laws burdened the church’s religious exercise, the court concluded that the laws are neutral and generally applicable. Therefore, rational basis review applied, and the church conceded the laws met that standard. The court affirmed summary judgment for the state defendants, holding that the laws do not violate the Free Exercise Clause or the church autonomy doctrine. View "CEDAR PARK ASSEMBLY OF GOD OF KIRKLAND, WASHINGTON V. KUDERER" on Justia Law