Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries
AQUARIAN FOUNDATION, INC. V. LOWNDES
Aquarian Foundation, Inc., a non-profit religious organization, alleged that Bruce Lowndes infringed on its copyrights by uploading spiritual teachings of its late founder, Keith Milton Rhinehart, to various websites. Lowndes claimed he had a license from Rhinehart, granted in 1985, to use the materials. Rhinehart passed away in 1999, bequeathing his estate, including the copyrights, to Aquarian.The United States District Court for the Western District of Washington granted partial summary judgment, confirming that Rhinehart's copyrights were properly transferred to Aquarian via his will. After a bench trial, the court ruled against Aquarian on its claims of copyright infringement, trademark infringement, and false designation of origin. The court found that Rhinehart created the works as his own, not as works for hire, and that he had validly licensed them to Lowndes. The court also determined that Lowndes did not breach the licensing agreement and that Aquarian could not terminate the license under 17 U.S.C. § 203(a). The court denied attorneys’ fees to both parties.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s findings that Rhinehart’s works were not created as works for hire, that he validly licensed the works to Lowndes, and that Lowndes did not breach the licensing agreement. The court also affirmed the decision not to award Lowndes attorneys’ fees under the Lanham Act. However, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s determination regarding the termination of the license, holding that Aquarian’s termination letter in May 2021 was effective. The case was remanded for further proceedings to address any infringement that may have occurred after the license termination, as well as the denial of injunctive relief and attorneys’ fees under the Copyright Act. View "AQUARIAN FOUNDATION, INC. V. LOWNDES" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Business Law, Contracts, Copyright, Intellectual Property, Non-Profit Corporations, Trademark
DOERR V. SHINN
Eugene Allen Doerr was convicted in 1996 by a jury for the kidnapping, sexual assault, and murder of Karen Bohl, and was sentenced to death by an Arizona state court judge. After his conviction and sentence were affirmed by the Arizona Supreme Court, Doerr filed a federal habeas petition, which was partially denied by the district court. Doerr then moved for a stay and abeyance to present new claims in state court, including ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins v. Virginia.The district court initially denied Doerr’s federal habeas petition, finding his claim of ineffective assistance at sentencing procedurally defaulted. The court held that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel did not constitute cause to excuse the procedural default. Doerr appealed, and while his appeal was pending, the Supreme Court decided Martinez v. Ryan, which held that ineffective assistance of state postconviction counsel could excuse procedural default. The Ninth Circuit remanded the case to the district court to reconsider Doerr’s ineffective assistance claim in light of Martinez. On remand, the district court again denied relief on the ineffective assistance claim but granted relief on another claim. Doerr appealed the partial denial.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and granted Doerr’s motion to remand to the district court with instructions to stay and abey the federal habeas petition. The court held that the criteria for a stay and abeyance under Rhines v. Weber were met, allowing Doerr to present his claims of ineffective assistance of counsel at sentencing and intellectual disability under Atkins to the state court. The court found that Doerr had good cause for not previously bringing these claims, that the claims were potentially meritorious, and that there was no indication of intentionally dilatory litigation tactics. The case was remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "DOERR V. SHINN" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law
In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated July 21, 2023
An individual, referred to as "Client," became the target of a criminal investigation into alleged tax evasion. The grand jury issued a subpoena to Client, who invoked his Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination and refused to produce documents. Subsequently, the grand jury subpoenaed the law firm that had represented Client in tax matters, requesting documents related to that representation and instructing the firm to provide a privilege log if any documents were withheld. The law firm declined to produce certain documents or provide a privilege log, citing attorney-client privilege, the work-product doctrine, and Client’s Fifth Amendment rights.The United States District Court for the Central District of California ordered the law firm to provide the Government with a privilege log, rejecting the firm's assertion of Client’s Fifth Amendment rights. The district court temporarily stayed enforcement of its order, and Client filed an interlocutory appeal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that an attorney cannot be compelled to provide the Government with a privilege log of documents protected under Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976). The court explained that providing a privilege log would reveal the existence, authenticity, and Client’s custody of the documents, thus undermining Client’s Fifth Amendment act-of-production privilege. The court determined that to assess whether the documents are indeed protected under Fisher, the district court should conduct an in camera review.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s order and remanded the case for further proceedings, instructing the district court to conduct an in camera review to determine the applicability of the Fisher privilege. View "In re Grand Jury Subpoena, Dated July 21, 2023" on Justia Law
JOHNSON V. HDSP
Three inmates in a California state prison jointly filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging Eighth Amendment violations and false imprisonment due to being forced to stand in unsanitary conditions for nearly nine hours. One inmate also claimed excessive force. They applied to proceed in forma pauperis (IFP).The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California denied their request for joinder and severed their claims, requiring each inmate to file separately. The court reasoned that the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA) required each prisoner to pay the full filing fee, and allowing joint actions would result in fees exceeding statutory limits. The court also cited practical issues with pro se prisoner lawsuits, such as potential transfers and communication difficulties, as reasons for denying joinder.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the PLRA does not prohibit prisoners from proceeding together in lawsuits, but it does require each prisoner to pay the full filing fee. The district court erred by interpreting the PLRA's fee provisions in isolation and failing to harmonize them. The Ninth Circuit also found that the district court abused its discretion in denying permissive joinder under Rule 20 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure based on hypothetical concerns not supported by the record.The Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision, allowing the inmates to proceed jointly under the PLRA, provided each pays the full filing fee. View "JOHNSON V. HDSP" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Civil Rights
VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY
Romio Villagomez, a native and citizen of the Federated States of Micronesia, was convicted of felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm under Nevada Revised Statutes § 200.481(2)(b). Following his conviction, the Department of Homeland Security sought to remove him, arguing that his conviction qualified as a crime of violence under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(F).An Immigration Judge determined that Villagomez’s conviction was indeed a crime of violence and ordered his removal. Villagomez appealed to the Board of Immigration Appeals, which dismissed his appeal. He then petitioned for review by the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit.The Ninth Circuit reviewed whether Villagomez’s conviction under Nevada law qualified as a crime of violence. The court noted that a crime of violence under 18 U.S.C. § 16(a) requires the use, attempted use, or threatened use of physical force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court referenced its previous decision in United States v. Fitzgerald, which held that the attempt version of the same Nevada statute is categorically a crime of violence.Villagomez argued that the Nevada statute criminalizes mere unwanted touching and allows for conviction where substantial bodily harm occurs recklessly. The court rejected these arguments, holding that causing substantial bodily harm in Nevada necessarily requires Johnson-level force, which is force capable of causing physical pain or injury. The court also held that Nevada law requires intentional conduct for battery resulting in substantial bodily harm, and thus, the statute does not encompass injuries caused by reckless deployments of force.The Ninth Circuit concluded that Nevada felony battery resulting in substantial bodily harm is categorically a crime of violence and affirmed the Board’s removability determination. The petition for review was denied. View "VILLAGOMEZ V. MCHENRY" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Criminal Law, Immigration Law
ARIZONA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE V. MAYES
The case involves a challenge to an Arizona law that requires criminal defense attorneys and their agents to initiate any contact with crime victims through the prosecutor’s office. The plaintiffs, a group of criminal defense attorneys and their association, argue that this law violates the First Amendment's Speech Clause by restricting their ability to communicate directly with victims.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona initially dismissed the case for lack of standing, but the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed that decision, allowing the case to proceed. On remand, the district court held a bench trial and concluded that the law was unconstitutional on its face, issuing a permanent injunction against its enforcement. The district court found that the law's requirement for defense attorneys to communicate through the prosecutor's office was a content- and viewpoint-based regulation of speech.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s judgment. The Ninth Circuit held that the plaintiffs' facial challenge failed because they did not challenge the law's primary application to victim-interview requests, which remain regulated under a similar Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure. The court noted that the unchallenged applications of the law, which include requests for victim interviews, are substantial and legitimate. Therefore, the challenged applications related to non-interview contacts are not substantial enough to render the entire statute unconstitutional.The Ninth Circuit vacated the permanent injunction and remanded the case for entry of judgment in favor of the defendants, concluding that the facial challenge to the Victim Contact Limit, as framed by the plaintiffs, must fail. View "ARIZONA ATTORNEYS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE V. MAYES" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Constitutional Law, Criminal Law
NEVIN V. COLVIN
The plaintiff filed two successive applications for disability benefits under Title XVI of the Social Security Act. Her first application, alleging disability beginning June 24, 2017, was denied by an Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) on September 18, 2018. While appealing this denial to the district court, she filed a second application for benefits for a later period. Washington State Disability Determination Services (DDS) reviewed the second application and awarded benefits, determining she was disabled starting September 19, 2018, the day after the ALJ denied her first application.The district court partially ruled in her favor on the first application and remanded it for further proceedings. The Appeals Council remanded the case to the ALJ with instructions. On June 23, 2021, the ALJ reopened the second application and denied the benefits previously granted by DDS. The ALJ concluded that the plaintiff was disabled beginning July 14, 2020, on her first application. The district court held it lacked jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s reopening and denial of benefits on the second application.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision, holding that the district court had jurisdiction to review the ALJ’s reopening of the second application. The Appeals Council did not reopen the second application, and the ALJ’s reopening occurred more than two years after the award, which is only permissible in cases of fraud or similar fault. Finding no evidence of fraud or similar fault, the Ninth Circuit held that the ALJ erred in reopening and reversing the award of benefits on the second application. The court remanded for the district court to direct the agency to award benefits according to DDS’s decision. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision on the first application, concluding that the ALJ’s finding that the plaintiff was not disabled between June 24, 2017, and September 19, 2018, was supported by substantial evidence. View "NEVIN V. COLVIN" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Government & Administrative Law, Public Benefits
International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 v. National Labor Relations Board
The case involves the International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 (the Union), Macy’s Inc., and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, Union members rejected Macy’s final offer and went on strike. After three months, the Union ended the strike and offered to return to work unconditionally. Macy’s responded by locking out the Union members, leading the Union to file a charge with the NLRB, alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Union, finding that Macy’s violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by locking out employees without providing a clear and complete offer outlining the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings and ordered Macy’s to reinstate the employees and compensate them for any losses incurred due to the lockout.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction because the Union was a "person aggrieved" by the NLRB's decision. The court found substantial evidence supporting the NLRB's conclusion that Macy’s failed to clearly inform the Union of the conditions necessary for reinstatement, making the lockout unjustified. The court also upheld the NLRB's decision to deny the Union's request for additional extraordinary remedies, finding that the traditional remedies were sufficient.The court enforced the NLRB's order, including the make-whole relief for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms suffered by the employees due to the lockout. The court concluded that the NLRB did not abuse its discretion in its remedial order and denied both the Union's and Macy’s petitions for review. View "International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 v. National Labor Relations Board" on Justia Law
Posted in:
Labor & Employment Law
MACY’S INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD
The case involves a dispute between the International Union of Operating Engineers, Stationary Engineers, Local 39 (the Union), Macy’s Inc., and the National Labor Relations Board (NLRB). During negotiations for a new collective bargaining agreement, Union members rejected Macy’s final offer and went on strike. After three months, the Union ended the strike and offered to return to work unconditionally. Macy’s responded by locking out the Union members, which led the Union to file a charge with the NLRB, alleging that the lockout was an unfair labor practice.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled in favor of the Union, finding that Macy’s violated the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by locking out employees without providing a clear and complete offer outlining the conditions necessary to avoid the lockout. The NLRB adopted the ALJ’s findings and ordered Macy’s to reinstate the employees and compensate them for any losses incurred due to the lockout. Macy’s and the Union both petitioned for review of the NLRB’s decision.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that it had jurisdiction because the Union was a “person aggrieved” by the NLRB’s decision. The court found that substantial evidence supported the NLRB’s conclusion that Macy’s lockout was unlawful because the Union was not clearly and fully informed of the conditions necessary for reinstatement. The court also upheld the NLRB’s remedial order, including the make-whole relief for direct or foreseeable pecuniary harms, finding no clear abuse of discretion.The Ninth Circuit denied both the Union’s and Macy’s petitions for review and granted the NLRB’s cross-application for enforcement of its final order. The court concluded that the NLRB’s actions were within its broad discretion to effectuate the policies of the NLRA. View "MACY'S INC. V. NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS BOARD" on Justia Law
GPP, INC. V. GUARDIAN PROTECTION PRODUCTS, INC.
In this case, G.P.P., Inc. (GIS) sued Guardian Protection Products, Inc. (Guardian) and RPM Wood Finishes Group, Inc. (RPM) for breach of contract and other claims related to nine warehousing distributor agreements (WDAs). GIS alleged that Guardian wrongfully terminated three WDAs and threatened to terminate the remaining six. GIS sought damages and other relief, while Guardian countersued for declaratory relief and breach of contract.The United States District Court for the Eastern District of California conducted two trials. In the first trial, the jury rejected all claims and counterclaims. GIS appealed, and the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's summary judgment on certain claims, leading to a second trial. In the second trial, the jury awarded GIS $6 million in damages. GIS then sought attorney’s fees from Guardian, while Guardian and RPM sought fees from GIS.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the district court's award of over $4 million in attorney’s fees to GIS. The Ninth Circuit found that the district court correctly deemed GIS the prevailing party against Guardian, as GIS successfully defended against Guardian’s counterclaims and won significant damages. However, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court erred in its analysis of RPM’s entitlement to fees. The district court had deemed certain claims voluntarily dismissed, but the Ninth Circuit concluded that GIS did not provide adequate notice of its intent to abandon those claims. Therefore, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court’s decision regarding the abandoned claims and remanded for further determination of fees due to RPM.The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s methodology and equitable considerations in deeming GIS the prevailing party against Guardian but reversed and remanded the decision regarding RPM’s entitlement to fees. View "GPP, INC. V. GUARDIAN PROTECTION PRODUCTS, INC." on Justia Law
Posted in:
Civil Procedure, Contracts