Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

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A longshoreman, Robert Tower, who worked at the Port of Seattle, experienced hearing loss in one ear and bilateral tinnitus due to occupational noise exposure. An audiogram revealed a 9.375% hearing loss in his left ear and 0% in his right ear, with additional tinnitus. Tower sought compensation under the Longshore and Harbor Workers’ Compensation Act, claiming benefits for hearing loss in both ears due to the tinnitus.An Administrative Law Judge (ALJ) ruled that Tower was only entitled to compensation for hearing loss in one ear under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A), rejecting the claim for bilateral hearing loss compensation. The Benefits Review Board vacated this decision, holding that Tower should be compensated for hearing loss in both ears under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) due to the tinnitus, which the AMA Guides suggest should be added to a binaural hearing impairment.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court held that the Longshore Act does not permit monaural hearing loss to be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(B) for bilateral hearing loss, even when the claimant also has tinnitus. The court emphasized that the Act distinguishes between monaural and binaural hearing loss and that tinnitus, while a significant condition, does not convert a monaural hearing loss into a binaural one for compensation purposes. The court vacated the Board’s decision and remanded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion, noting that Tower should be compensated under 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(13)(A) for his monaural hearing loss. The court did not express a view on whether tinnitus might be compensable under the catch-all provision, 33 U.S.C. § 908(c)(21). View "TOTAL TERMINALS INTERNATIONAL, LLC V. DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF WORKER'S COMPENSATION PROGRAMS" on Justia Law

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The case involves Denys Korotkiy, the Chief Engineer of a foreign-flagged ship, who was charged with violating U.S. regulations by failing to maintain accurate records of bilge-water operations in the ship's Oil Record Book. The ship, MV Donald, dumped oily bilge water on the high seas and made misleading entries in the Oil Record Book to cover it up. Upon arriving in the U.S., the Coast Guard inspected the ship and found the records to be inaccurate and incomplete.The United States District Court for the Southern District of California denied Korotkiy's motion to dismiss the indictment. Korotkiy argued that the regulation did not require accurate records, that Congress and the international community did not intend for such prosecutions, and that only shipmasters, not chief engineers, should be charged. The district court, relying on precedents from other circuits, found that Korotkiy could be charged for failing to maintain an accurate Oil Record Book while in U.S. waters.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the district court's decision. The Ninth Circuit held that 33 C.F.R. § 151.25 requires ships to maintain accurate records in their Oil Record Books while in U.S. waters. The court joined other circuits in interpreting the regulation to impose a duty on foreign-flagged vessels to ensure the accuracy of their records upon entering U.S. territorial waters. The court also rejected Korotkiy's argument that only shipmasters could be charged, noting that chief engineers can be prosecuted for aiding and abetting the failure to maintain accurate records. The court concluded that the regulation's plain language and the legislative purpose of preventing oceanic pollution supported the prosecution. View "USA V. KOROTKIY" on Justia Law

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The case involves a challenge to Montana House Bill 702 (HB 702), which prohibits discrimination based on vaccination status. Plaintiffs, including health care providers and individuals with compromised immune systems, argued that HB 702 is preempted by the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA) and the Occupational Health and Safety Act (OSH Act) and violates the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. They sought to invalidate HB 702 in all health care settings, claiming it prevents employers from knowing employees' vaccination status, thus hindering ADA-required accommodations and OSH Act compliance.The United States District Court for the District of Montana ruled in favor of the plaintiffs, holding that HB 702 is preempted by the ADA and the OSH Act and violates the Equal Protection Clause. The court issued a permanent injunction against the enforcement of HB 702 in health care settings, reasoning that the law conflicts with federal requirements for reasonable accommodations and workplace safety.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court's decision and vacated the injunction. The Ninth Circuit held that neither the ADA nor the OSH Act facially preempts HB 702 in health care settings. The court found that the plaintiffs did not demonstrate a genuine conflict between HB 702 and the ADA or OSH Act in any specific case, much less in all health care settings. The court also held that HB 702 does not violate the Equal Protection Clause, as the classification and differential treatment of facilities could rationally reflect Montana's interest in balancing personal privacy and public health.The Ninth Circuit reserved judgment on whether the ADA and the OSH Act could preempt HB 702 on a narrower, as-applied basis in future cases. The court deemed moot the portion of the district court's order related to interim CMS regulations, as those regulations have been rescinded. The court concluded that HB 702 is not facially invalid under the ADA, OSH Act, or Equal Protection Clause and vacated the district court's injunction in full. View "MONTANA MEDICAL ASSOCIATION V. KNUDSEN" on Justia Law

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Reginald Elmore was convicted in 2019 for using or possessing a firearm during a murder in aid of racketeering, violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(j)(1). The predicate crime for this conviction was a VICAR (Violent Crimes in Aid of Racketeering) murder under 18 U.S.C. § 1959(a)(1), which itself required a violation of state or federal law. Elmore challenged his conviction under 28 U.S.C. § 2255, arguing that the VICAR murder did not qualify as a crime of violence under the elements clause of § 924(c)(3)(A).The United States District Court for the Northern District of California denied Elmore’s motion to vacate his conviction. The court held that VICAR murder is categorically a crime of violence under the elements clause and thus a valid predicate for Elmore’s § 924(j)(1) conviction. The court did not address the government’s procedural arguments and granted a certificate of appealability on the issue of the proper mode of analysis for determining whether a VICAR offense constitutes a crime of violence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s decision. The Ninth Circuit held that the VICAR statute is divisible, requiring the application of the modified categorical approach to determine the elements of Elmore’s charged VICAR offense. The court concluded that Elmore was charged with VICAR murder predicated on California murder. The Ninth Circuit determined that courts should look through to the elements of the state-level predicate violation to decide if the VICAR offense constitutes a crime of violence under § 924(c)(3)(A). The case was remanded to the district court to consider whether California murder involves the requisite force to be a valid predicate for a § 924(j)(1) conviction and to address the government’s procedural arguments. View "USA V. ELMORE" on Justia Law

Posted in: Criminal Law
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Briseyda Meza Diaz and her minor daughter, Gabriela Segundo Meza, fled Mexico after experiencing severe violence and threats from cartel members. Meza Diaz's brother was murdered, her husband was kidnapped and tortured, and she received numerous death threats. In 2016, armed men invaded her home, beat her unconscious, and threatened her life. The local police, unable to ensure her safety, advised her to flee the country, which she did, seeking asylum in the United States.An Immigration Judge (IJ) and the Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) denied Meza Diaz's applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). They concluded that her experiences did not constitute past persecution and that she failed to establish a well-founded fear of future persecution. The IJ and BIA also determined that the harm she suffered was not on account of a protected ground and that the Mexican government was not unable or unwilling to control her persecutors.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and found that the record evidence compelled the conclusion that Meza Diaz experienced past persecution by forces that Mexican authorities are either unable or unwilling to control. The court held that the BIA erred by failing to consider key evidence, including the attackers' statements and the police report, which linked the harm to her family status. The court granted the petition for review and remanded the case for further proceedings on Meza Diaz's claims of future persecution and withholding of removal. View "Diaz v. Garland" on Justia Law

Posted in: Immigration Law
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Jaswinder Singh, a native of India, sought asylum in the United States, claiming persecution due to his political activities with the Mann Party, which advocates for a separate Sikh state. Singh testified that he was attacked twice by members of the opposition Indian National Congress Party (INC) in 2017 and faced threats and police inaction. He fled to the U.S. in 2018 and applied for asylum.The Immigration Judge (IJ) denied Singh's application, citing concerns about the credibility of his testimony due to similarities with other asylum seekers' declarations from India. The IJ also found that Singh could safely relocate within India. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed the IJ's decision, agreeing with the adverse credibility determination and the internal relocation analysis.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case. The court found that the BIA and IJ misapplied Matter of R-K-K-, which allows for adverse credibility determinations based on strikingly similar affidavits in unrelated proceedings. The court held that the agency erred by relying solely on non-unique factual similarities without considering linguistic or grammatical cues that would suggest plagiarism. The court also noted due process concerns, as Singh could not meaningfully address the redacted declarations used against him.Additionally, the court found that the agency's internal relocation analysis was flawed. The government failed to prove that Singh could safely engage in Mann Party activities outside of Punjab. The IJ's conclusions were based on speculation and did not adequately consider the potential for persecution by local authorities or other actors in different regions of India.The Ninth Circuit granted Singh's petition for review and remanded the case to the BIA for a renewed credibility determination and a more individualized analysis of the feasibility of internal relocation. View "SINGH V. GARLAND" on Justia Law

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Derrick Patterson pleaded guilty to one count of Hobbs Act robbery and one count of identity theft. Patterson met his victim through Grindr, a dating application, and during their encounter, he took the victim’s phone and used it to withdraw money from the victim’s bank accounts.The United States District Court for the Central District of California sentenced Patterson to 111 months in prison, including a three-level enhancement for hate crime motivation under U.S.S.G. § 3A1.1. The district court rejected Patterson’s argument that the enhancement required a finding that he was motivated by hate. Patterson appealed the sentence.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with Patterson that the language of the enhancement was ambiguous. The court held that the enhancement requires a finding beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant was motivated by hate or animus. The court concluded that the district court erred by imposing the enhancement without such a finding. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated Patterson’s sentence and remanded the case for resentencing. View "USA V. PATTERSON" on Justia Law

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Jason Powell filed a Chapter 13 bankruptcy petition, certifying that he met the eligibility requirements. TICO Construction Company, a creditor, opposed the dismissal of Powell’s case and moved to convert it to a different chapter, arguing that Powell was ineligible for Chapter 13 relief and had filed in bad faith. The bankruptcy court granted Powell’s motion to dismiss without resolving TICO’s eligibility challenge.The Bankruptcy Appellate Panel (BAP) affirmed the bankruptcy court’s decision, holding that Powell had an absolute right to dismiss his Chapter 13 case under 11 U.S.C. § 1307(b), as interpreted by Nichols v. Marana Stockyard & Livestock Mkt., Inc. (In re Nichols). The BAP also noted that the bankruptcy court had other tools to address potential abuse, such as imposing conditions on dismissal.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and affirmed the BAP’s decision. The court held that under the plain text of § 1307(b), a debtor has an absolute right to dismiss a Chapter 13 case if the case has not been converted to another chapter. The court rejected TICO’s argument that the bankruptcy court must determine a debtor’s eligibility before granting a dismissal request. The court explained that a debtor’s certification of eligibility in the petition presumptively establishes that the debtor may be a debtor under Chapter 13, and the filing of the petition commences a Chapter 13 case under 11 U.S.C. § 301(a).The Ninth Circuit concluded that the bankruptcy court correctly dismissed Powell’s Chapter 13 case without further inquiry into his eligibility, affirming that Powell had an absolute right to dismiss under § 1307(b). View "IN RE: POWELL V. VAN METER" on Justia Law

Posted in: Bankruptcy
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A Californian plaintiff purchased several bottles of Banana Boat sunscreen between 2017 and 2020, including Ultra Sport SPF 100, SPF 50, and SPF 30. She later discovered that the SPF 50 bottle contained 0.29 parts per million (ppm) of benzene, a known carcinogen. She alleged that the products were falsely advertised as safe and that the presence of benzene was not disclosed on the labels. The plaintiff claimed she would not have purchased the products, or would have paid less for them, had she known about the benzene contamination.The United States District Court for the Central District of California dismissed the plaintiff’s suit for lack of Article III standing, concluding that she did not demonstrate a non-speculative increased health risk or actual economic harm. The court relied on FDA guidelines permitting up to 2 ppm of benzene in sunscreen, determining that the plaintiff’s allegations did not establish that 0.29 ppm of benzene posed a credible risk of harm or economic injury.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and reversed the district court’s dismissal. The appellate court held that the district court erred by resolving disputed facts in favor of the defendants and prematurely addressing merits issues intertwined with the jurisdictional question of standing. The Ninth Circuit found that the plaintiff adequately established an injury in fact for purposes of Article III standing, as she alleged economic harm from purchasing a product she would not have bought, or would have paid less for, absent the defendants’ misrepresentations. The court also determined that the plaintiff met the causation and redressability elements of standing, as her injury was likely caused by the defendants' alleged misrepresentations and could be redressed by judicial relief. The case was remanded for further proceedings. View "BOWEN V. ENERGIZER HOLDINGS, INC." on Justia Law

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Plaintiffs Jay and Siv Bennett, along with their corporation Kesha Marketing, Inc., were long-time associates of Isagenix International LLC, a multi-level marketing company. In May 2023, Isagenix informed the Bennetts that it would not renew their accounts, which were set to expire in June 2023. The Bennetts, whose sole income came from Isagenix commissions, sued the company and obtained a preliminary injunction to prevent the termination of their business relationship.The United States District Court for the District of Arizona granted the preliminary injunction, finding that the Bennetts were likely to succeed on the merits of their claims. The court concluded that the contracts between the Bennetts and Isagenix were likely bilateral and that the modifications allowing Isagenix to terminate the contracts at will were not valid under Arizona law. The district court also found that the Bennetts would suffer irreparable harm due to the contractual limitation on consequential damages.The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reviewed the case and agreed with the district court that the Bennetts had shown a likelihood of success on the merits. The Ninth Circuit held that the contracts were likely bilateral and that the modifications were not validly executed under Arizona law. However, the Ninth Circuit found that the district court erred in its analysis of irreparable harm. The appellate court held that a contractual limitation on consequential damages does not constitute irreparable harm for purposes of equity. Consequently, the Ninth Circuit vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded the case for further proceedings to address the Bennetts' other theories of irreparable injury. View "BENNETT V. ISAGENIX INTERNATIONAL LLC" on Justia Law