Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

United Medical Caregivers Clinic ("UMCC") prevailed in a civil forfeiture proceeding initiated by the United States. UMCC moved for an award of attorneys fees under the Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act ("CAFRA"), 28 U.S.C. 2465(b)(1)(A), and requested that the fee award be paid directly to counsel. At issue was whether the amount requested for attorneys fees was appropriate and whether CAFRA permitted that the fee award be paid directly to UMCC's counsel. The court referred the matter to the Appellate Commissioner and held that the lodestar method would be used to calculate the amount of an appropriate fee award and held that the actual fee agreement between UMCC and its attorney may be taken into account but was not by itself determinative in calculating the appropriate amount of the fee award. The court also held that attorney fee awards under CAFRA were payable to the claimant, UMCC, but not to the claimant's attorney.

Plaintiff, the Department of Fair Employment and Housing ("DFEH") and plaintiff-intervenor appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendant, Lucent Technologies, Inc. ("Lucent"), plaintiff-intervenor's former employer, on claims that he was terminated in violation of the California Fair Employment and Housing Act, ("FEHA"), Cal.Gov't Code 12920.5. DFEH also challenged the district court's finding of diversity jurisdiction and plaintiff-intervenor challenged the district court's denial of his motion to intervene. The court held that the district court correctly determined that it possessed jurisdiction where the statutory scheme did not support a finding that DFEH was a real party in the controversy for the purposes of diversity jurisdiction. The court also held that the district court's denial of plaintiff-intervenor's motion to intervene as a right was not in error where he failed to demonstrate that he was not adequately represented by California and that the court did not abuse its discretion in placing various limitations on him as a permissive intervenor. The court further held that summary judgment was proper where there was no genuine issue of material fact as to DFEH's claims and where DFEH failed to raise a genuine issue of material fact as to pretext. The court finally held that there was no genuine issue of material fact as to plaintiff-intervenor's wrongful termination claim where DFEH could not prevail on any of its claims under the FEHA.

Defendant filed a motion for acquittal where he was convicted for being an alien who reentered the United States after previously being deported. At issue was whether the district court properly instructed the jury that there was a presumption of defendant's alienage and that the burden of proof was shifted to defendant to establish that he had obtained American citizenship by having been born to a U.S. citizen father. The court held that defendant faced no burden to claim derivative citizenship in an effort to negate the government's charge that he was an alien. The court also held that the government did not have the burden of disproving each element of derivative citizenship but needed only to prove that "alienage" was among the elements of the crime. The court further held that it was possible that a rational trier of fact could consider the evidence of defendant's father's citizenship, determine that defendant might meet the requirements for derivative citizenship, but then concluded beyond a reasonable doubt that, based on his actions and admissions, he was not actually an American citizen. Therefore, the court affirmed the denial of defendant's motion to acquit and allowed for the possibility of retrial on remand.

Petitioner appealed the denial of his habeas corpus petition where he was convicted of aggravated murder in 1982 and was sentenced to an indeterminate life sentence with a 30 year minimum term. At issue was whether defendant had a liberty interest in becoming parole-eligible before the expiration of the minimum term of his sentence. Also at issue was whether petitioner's due process rights were violated when the Parole Board lacked "some evidence" to support its finding that he could not be rehabilitated within a reasonable period of time. The court held that the language of Oregon's murder review statute created a presumption in favor of early eligibility for a parole hearing when certain designated findings were made and thereby gave rise to a constitutional liberty interest. The court held that petitioner's due process rights were not violated when he was afforded access to his records in advance of the hearings, he was given the opportunity to submit information to the Parole Board and to make a statement during the hearing, and was eventually provided with a written statement for the reasons why he was denied early eligibility for parole.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") dismissing an appeal from an order of removal to Mexico. At issue was whether the government failed to meet its burden of proving that petitioner was removable where the BIA and the Immigration Judge ("IJ") were not permitted to rely on his counsel's admissions that he had been previously convicted of possession of cocaine for sale in 1997; whether a criminal docket from his 1997 conviction that was introduced into evidence by the government was sufficient to establish that he was removable where the document did not indicate what substance he possessed for sale; whether the government was estopped from removing him on the basis of his 1997 conviction where it knew about the conviction when it granted him Legal Permanent Resident ("LPR") status in 2003; and whether he was eligible for waiver of inadmissibility where his 1997 conviction predated his admission as an LPR in 2003. The court held that petitioner was removable when he admitted at the pleading stage that he was convicted of cocaine for sale; petitioner relieved the government of its burden of offering evidence to prove that he was removable; the government was not estopped by its error in granting him LPR status from correcting its mistake and ordering his removal, and petitioner's admission to the cocaine offense made him ineligible for a waiver of removability.

Plaintiffs, Ecuadorian members of a fishing boat, sued the United States for damages that resulted from the United States Coast Guard's ("Coast Guard") stop of plaintiffs' boat in international waters near the Galapagos Islands under suspicion of plaintiffs' involvement with smuggling drugs. The Coast Guard performed tests on plaintiffs' boat that yielded inconclusive results and the Ecuadorian government conducted further tests which resulted in no contraband and no charges filed against plaintiffs. At issue was whether the United States waived its sovereign immunity under numerous sources. The court held that non-congressional sources were not acts of Congress and did not effect a waiver of sovereign immunity. The court also held that the Military Claims Act, Alien Tort Statute, and a bilateral treaty concerning the Air Force base at Manta, Ecuador did not waive sovereign immunity. The court further held that the Public Vessels Act ("PVA"), Suits in Admiralty Act, and Federal Tort Claims Act provided waivers of sovereign immunity. The court finally held that if a suit falls within the scope of the PVA, 46 U.S.C. 31102, plaintiffs must meet the reciprocity requirement of the PVA regardless of the type of claim they assert. Therefore, the court vacated and remanded to give the parties and the district court additional opportunity to determine whether reciprocity exists under Ecuadorian Law.

Plaintiffs sued Atlas Van Lines, Inc. ("Atlas") and Pickens Kane Moving & Storage Co. ("Pickens") for carrier liability under the Carmack Amendment to recover damages plaintiff paid to its insureds after the insureds' shipment of household goods were destroyed by a fire while in transit. Pickens was the receiving carrier and the goods were destroyed in the custody of Atlas. At issue was whether the district court properly interpreted sections 14706(f) and 14706(b) of the Carmack Amendment when apportioning the replacement value of household goods and apportioning costs. The court held that the district court properly apportioned the damages as it did under section 14706(f)(2), (3) to limit Atlas' liability to the tariff amount of $5.00 per pound in the absence of a declared value. The court also held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in apportioning costs where Atlas had custody of the shipment when it was destroyed and was liable to Pickens.

Defendant appealed convictions of resisting a government employee or agent and obstructing a license plate where the charges arose out of a traffic stop that escalated into an altercation between defendant and four park rangers. Defendant had a broken leg and was driving a motorhome that was towing a pick-up truck when he was stopped. At issue was whether defendant's convictions were supported by substantial evidence, whether defendant was entitled to a necessity defense when he resisted the park rangers due to his broken leg, and whether a towed-vehicle, by definition, was not "self-propelled" for purposes of 36 C.F.R. 4.2(b). The court held that there was substantial evidence in the record to support defendant's conviction where a reasonable factfinder could find that defendant willfully resisted arrest when he tensed his arms and made fists, jerked his right arm out of two park rangers' grips, did not get on the ground when ordered to do so, and rotated his body to the right. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the rejection of defendant's necessity defense where he failed to demonstrate that no rational factfinder, after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the government, would reject his necessity defense. The court further held that it would be illogical to consider "self-propelled" as an impermanent quality and affirmed defendant's conviction for obscuring a license plate under section 4.2(b).

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their putative class action asserting antitrust claims against defendants where plaintiffs alleged that the fares they paid for airline tickets were unlawfully excessive and in violation of both state and federal antitrust and consumer protection laws. At issue was whether plaintiffs' state law claims were properly dismissed; whether the court erred in denying plaintiffs' leave to amend to add federal claims; and whether the court had jurisdiction to review the interlocutory case management order governing the pretrial coordination of pending cases in the same multidistrict litigation. The court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' state law claims and held that the Airline Deregulation Act of 1978, 49 U.S.C. 41713, preempted state regulations of foreign air carriers. The court also held that the district court erred in denying plaintiffs' leave to amend to add federal antitrust claims where the district court applied an incorrect legal standard to plaintiffs' motion by denying leave to amend on the basis of the court's prior case management order. The court further held that it lacked jurisdiction to review the interlocutory case management order where these decisions did not represent final judgments.

United States Fidelity & Guaranty Co. ("Insurer") filed a federal action against Lee Investments, LLC ("Employer") seeking rescission of a workers' compensation policy and related relief on account of the Employer's alleged misrepresentations when Employer's employee injured herself while assembling a water slide at Employer's California waterpark. At issue was whether a federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction over an insurance company's diversity action seeking rescission of a workers' compensation policy and if so, whether it was required to dismiss the case because exclusive jurisdiction was vested by state law in a state workers' compensation agency. The court held that a federal district court had subject matter jurisdiction where the parties were diverse and the amount of controversy exceeded $75,000 and where the action did not arise under California's workers' compensation laws, Insurer filed an original claim in federal court, and Employer failed to demonstrate fraud or collusion. The court also held that the California's Workers' Compensation Appeals Board did not have exclusive jurisdiction to hear Insurer's claims. Therefore, the district court properly exercised jurisdiction, correctly addressed the law, acted well within its discretion in making innumerable litigation decisions, and did not err in granting certification.