Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff purchased travel arrangements through Expedia, Inc.'s ("Expedia") website and Expedia emailed him a receipt, which included the expiration date of his credit card. Plaintiff claimed that this email receipt violated the Fair and Accurate Credit Transactions Act ("FACTA"), Pub. L. No. 108-159, 117 Stat. 1952, an amendment to the Fair Credit Reporting Act, 15 U.S.C. 1681 et seq., in part to combat identity theft. At issue was the meaning of the words "print" and "electronically printed" under FACTA, in connection with an email receipt. The court held that "print" referred to many different technologies, all of which involve the making of tangible impression on paper or other tangible medium. The court also held that a receipt, under FACTA that was transmitted to the consumer via email and then digitally displayed on the consumer's screen was not an "electronically printed" receipt. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6).

Defendants, the chairman and chief executive officer of Lunde Electric Company ("company"), appealed convictions stemming from the misappropriation of employee 401(k) contributions to pay the company's operating expenses. At issue was whether there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions under 18 U.S.C. 664, for embezzlement or conversion of elective deferrals, and 18 U.S.C. 1027, for false or misleading statements in a required Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 ("ERISA"), 29 U.S.C 1001 et seq., document. The court held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Counts 17 and 18 under section 664 where there was sufficient evidence for the jury to conclude that the 1991 Profit Sharing Plan had been restated before defendants retained their employees' elective deferrals in the company's general account; where defendants commingled their employees' contributions with the company's assets to prop up their failing business and therefore, intentionally used their employees' assets for an unauthorized purpose; where they sent participants account statements showing 401(k) balances which were in fact non-existent; where defendants' decision to deviate was the wilful criminal misappropriation punished by section 664; and where defendants were alerted repeatedly about their obligation to remit the deferrals and defendants hid their actions from employees. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence to support defendants' convictions on Count 21 under section 1027 where defendants' initial decision to mislead their own employees about the solvency of their retirement plans by filing false account statements and false Form 5500s were the behaviors targeted by section 1027.

Appellant was convicted of robbery affecting commerce and use of a firearm during a crime of violence. At issue was whether the trial court erred in instructing the jury on the definition of "brandish." The court affirmed the conviction and held that the district court neither erred nor abused its discretion in instructing the jury with the statutory definition of "brandish" and declining appellant's proffer of a dictionary definition where, in light of the well-settled principle that, for purposes of statutory interpretation, the language of the statute was the first and, if the language was clear, the only relevant inquiry.

Petitioner filed a petition for a writ of habeas corpus relief after she was found guilty of murder with special circumstances and sentenced to life imprisonment without the possibility of parole. At issue was whether the trial court violated petitioner's Sixth Amendment right to a fair trial by dismissing a juror who was known to be the lone holdout for acquittal. The court held that the removal of Juror No. 6 deprived petitioner of her right to a fair trial by jury where there was at least a reasonable possibility that Juror No. 6's discharged stemmed from his disagreement with his peers over their views of the merits of the case and where there was no good cause to justify the juror's discharge. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court and remanded with instructions to grant the writ.

Defendants, both Mexican citizens, were arrested and charged with illegal entry into the United States in violation of 8 U.S.C. 1325. Defendants appeared at a group plea hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona as part of the district's Operation Streamline. At issue was whether the taking of guilty pleas at a large group plea hearing violated the Fifth Amendment right to due process where defendants contend that the record did not disclose that they voluntarily and understandably pleaded guilty. The court concluded that, because they were not faced with a silent record, defendants must demonstrate that any error in the proceeding or in the transcript was plain and affected their substantial rights. Namely, they must show a reasonable probability that, but for the error, they would not have entered their pleas. The court also held that, because defendants did not even suggest, much less show, that they would not have pleaded guilty if the plea hearing had been more individualized, it could not conclude that there was any plain error. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs filed a suit in federal court seeking injunctive relief against the City and County of San Francisco and its election officials (collectively, "city") alleging that when more than four candidates run for a particular office, the restricted instant runoff voting ("IRV") system precluded some groups of voters from participating to the same extent as others. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment in favor of the city where plaintiffs alleged that the restricted IRV system was unconstitutional by violating the First Amendment, the Equal Protection and Due Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment, and the Civil Rights Act, 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court held that, if the aspects of the city's restricted IRV system scheme imposed any burdens on voters' constitutional rights to vote, they were minimal at best. The court also held that the city had advanced valid, sufficiently-important interests to justify using its system. Accordingly, the court held that plaintiffs had not established that the city's chosen IRV system was unconstitutional and affirmed summary judgment in favor of the city.

Plaintiffs filed a citizen enforcement suit alleging that defendant was discharging toxic pollutants from the Seward Small Boat Harbor and a boat repair yard. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying an award of attorney fees to plaintiffs pursuant to section 505(d) of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. 1365(d). The court held that the district court abused its discretion in concluding that special circumstances supported its denial of an award of attorney fees. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded with instructions to award plaintiffs' fees and costs that were reasonably incurred in furtherance of the CWA's purpose.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of El Salvador, petitioned for review of a decision of the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming an Immigration Judge's denial of his applications for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture. At issue was whether substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination that petitioner failed to show that he was persecuted on account of his membership in a particular social group. The court held that substantial evidence supported the BIA's determination where, although petitioner was not precluded from demonstrating membership in a particular social group as a former military officer, he failed to establish that any persecution was or will be on account of his membership in such a group.

Plaintiff applied at age 51 for supplemental security income based on disability. At issue was whether the administrative law judge ("ALJ") erred by failing to develop the record adequately and should have requested more explanation from two of plaintiff's treating physicians at the Department of Veterans Affairs ("VA"). The court held that the ALJ's failure to assist plaintiff in developing the record by getting his disability determination into the record was probably likely to have been prejudicial because the court gave VA disability determinations great weight. Therefore, the court remanded under sentence four of 42 U.S.C. 405(g), concluding that "the agency erred in some respect in reaching a decision to deny benefits."

Plaintiff sued defendant seeking a declaratory judgment to the effect that defendant's liens were not valid, in whole or in part, where plaintiff received a substantial settlement from her insurer when she suffered serious injuries in a car accident and received extensive health care services from defendant. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment to defendant because it had a right to recover the money spent on plaintiff's medical care under 25 U.S.C. 1621e. The court reversed and held that section 1621e, which allowed healthcare providers to recover expenses from third-party tortfeasors, relevant insureres, or other third parties, did not apply to the action where defendant sought to enforce a right of recovery against plaintiff to whom it provided services.