Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

A.S., a California minor, filed a request for a special education due process hearing where he was eligible for special education services under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act ("IDEA"), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq., as an emotionally disturbed child. At issue was which California agency was responsible for funding a special education student's placement in an out-of-state residential treatment facility. The court requested the California Supreme Court exercise its discretion and decide the following certified question, "Whether under California law the school district responsible for the costs of a special education student's education while the student is placed at an out-of-state residential treatment facility is the district in which the student's de facto parent, who is authorized to make educational decisions on behalf of the student, resides."

Plaintiffs, twenty-two Argentinian residents, brought suit against DaimlerChrylser Aktiengesellschaft ("DCAG") alleging that one of DCAG's subsidiaries, Mercedes-Benz Argentina ("MBA"), collaborated with state security forces to kidnap, torture, and kill plaintiffs and/or their relatives during Argentina's "Dirty War." At issue was whether the district court had personal jurisdiction over DCAG. The court held that DCAG was subject to personal jurisdiction in California through the contacts of its subsidiary Mercedes-Benz USA ("MBUSA") where MBUSA was DCAG's agent, at least for personal jurisdiction purposes, and that exercise of personal jurisdiction was reasonable under the circumstances of the case.

Plaintiff, on behalf of himself and a class of owners and lessors of 2007 model year and older Volkswagen and Audi vehicles, alleged that defendant, Volkswagen of America, Inc., limited the availability of replacement vehicle keys and failed to sufficiently disclose information about the potential difficulty and expense of obtaining such replacements. At issue was whether objector-appellant had Article III standing to appeal a settlement agreement between the parties. The court dismissed the appeal for lack of standing and held that objector-appellant, who expressly disavowed any financial interest in the fee defendant was ordered to pay to plaintiff's counsel, failed to demonstrate how he had suffered injury as a result of the fee order.

Plaintiff, an Oregon non-profit organization, sued defendants under the citizen suit provision of the Clean Water Act ("CWA"), 33 U.S.C. 1365(a), alleging that defendants violated the CWA and its implementing regulations by not obtaining permits from the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") for stormwater, largely rainwater, runoff that flowed from logging roads into systems of ditches, culverts, and channels and was then discharged into forest streams and rivers. At issue was whether plaintiff's complaint was properly dismissed with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim. The court reversed the district court's dismissal and held that stormwater runoff from logging roads that was collected by and then discharged from a system of ditches, culverts, and channels was a point source discharge for which a National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System permit was required.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Vietnam, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' ("BIA") decision affirming an Immigration Judge's order of removal. At issue was whether petitioner's state misdemeanor conviction for rendering criminal assistance was a crime related to obstruction of justice and thus constituted an aggravated felony under the Immigration and Nationality Act ("INA"), 8 U.S.C. 101(a)(43)(S). The court granted the petition for review and held that petitioner's conviction lacked the necessary actus reus and was not categorically an obstruction of justice according to the definition provided in In Re Espinoza-Gonzalez. The court also held that nothing in the record of petitioner's conviction established that he provided assistance to an individual who was subject to a pending judicial proceeding or ongoing police investigation and therefore, his conviction did not qualify as obstruction of justice under the modified categorical approach.

The state appealed the district court's grant of a conditional writ of habeas corpus where defendant was charged with murder. At issue was whether petitioner's lawyer rendered ineffective assistance of counsel while trying to have him acquitted of the death penalty. The court reversed and held that petitioner had not made out his claim that his counsel's assistance was constitutionally deficient and even if he had, the gruesome nature of the crime, coupled with the relatively weak additional evidence that might have been revealed, led the court to conclude that any ineffectiveness was not prejudicial.

The court issued an order and amended the opinion replacing [The district court excluded this evidence under its Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) Local Rule 6-11, which it read to create a "privilege" for "evidence regarding the details of the parties' negotiations in their mediation."] in lines 20-24, page 4909, with [The district court excluded this evidence under its Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) local rule on "confidential information," which it read to create a "privilege" for "evidence regarding the details of the parties' negotiations in their mediation." A local rule, like any court order, can impose a duty of confidentiality as to any aspect of litigation, including mediation. See N.D. Cal. ADR L.R. 6-12(a); see also 28 U.S.C. 652(d).] The petition for rehearing en banc was denied and no further petitions for rehearing or rehearing en banc may be filed.

Petitioner filed a pro se petition for writ of habeas corpus in federal district court alleging that his prolonged detention was unlawful. At issue was whether petitioner's bond hearing, provided under Casas-Castrillon v. Department of Homeland Security, violated due process. The court clarified that once an alien received a Casas bond hearing before an immigration judge ("IJ"), he could appeal the IJ's decision to the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA"). If the alien was dissatisfied with the BIA's decision, he could then file a habeas petition in the district court challenging his continued detention. The district court's decision on the habeas petition could then be appealed to this court. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court with instructions to dismiss petitioner's petition without prejudice where he did not exhaust administrative remedies before pursuing habeas relief.

Defendant was arrested and charged with illegal entry into the United States and appeared at a group plea hearing in the United States District Court for the District of Arizona as part of the district's "Operation Streamline." At issue was whether the taking of guilty pleas at a large group plea hearing violated a criminal defendant's rights protected by Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 and the Fifth and Sixth Amendments. The court held that any Rule 11(b)(1) error was harmless where defendant would not have changed her plea of guilty if the magistrate judge had conducted sixty-seven separate advisements of rights and that, although the district court failed to comply strictly with Rule 11(b)(2), such failure was not plain error where the record reflected that defendant's plea was fully informed and the record did not demonstrate that such a plea would have changed if the magistrate had expressly inquired into the voluntariness of her decision. The court also held that the record did not suggest that defendant misunderstood her rights or involuntarily entered her plea and there was no question that this procedure complied with due process. The court further held that the plea hearing did not deprive defendant of her right to counsel where she was provided with adequate, even superior, representation by counsel and failed to demonstrate a reasonable probability that the result of the proceeding would have been different if counsel had not been temporarily separated from her during the group advisement. Accordingly, the court confirmed defendant's conviction and sentence.

Petitioner, a native of India, petitioned for review of a decision by the Board of Immigration Appeals ("BIA") affirming the immigration judge's ("IJ") determination that he was removable for having been convicted of two or more crimes involving moral turpitude ("CIMT"). At issue was whether the BIA properly determined that petitioner's conviction for failing to register constituted a CIMT and, coupled with a conceded theft CIMT, rendered him removable. The BIA then found it unnecessary to conduct a modified categorical analysis regarding petitioner's indecent exposure convictions. The court held that, in light of significant intervening developments, the case must be remanded for the BIA to consider whether petitioner's crime constituted a CIMT under the proper definition of moral turpitude as outlined in Matter of Silva-Trevino. The court also held that should the BIA determine that petitioner's failure to register conviction did not qualify as a CIMT, it should consider the issue left open in its prior ruling regarding petitioner's indecent exposure convictions.