Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed an action against defendants (collectively, the Plan) for refusing to pay certain long-term disability benefits. At issue was whether the district court erred in granting summary judgment for defendants and dismissed plaintiff's claims without prejudice due to his failure to exhaust available administrative remedies under the Plan. The court held that the district court adopted the Plan's reading of ERISA, 29 C.F.R. 250.503-1(i) without the benefit of the Secretary of Labor's interpretation of that provision. Therefore, deferring to the Secretary's plausible approach, the court held that where a claimant sought review of his or her disability claims, the quarterly meeting rule was restricted to multiemployer plans. Accordingly, the Plan was required to render a decision within 90 days of plaintiff's administrative appeal and failed to do so. Consequently, plaintiff's claims must be deemed exhausted and the judgment was reversed and remanded.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm in violation of the Armed Career Criminal Act (ACCA), 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). At issue was whether a February 2000 conviction for burglary in the second degree under Oregon Revised Statutes (ORS) 164.215 was a predicate offense under the ACCA and that a May 1999 conviction for felony attempt to elude the police under ORS 811.540(1) was not a predicate offense under the ACCA. The court held that, although burglary in the second degree was not categorically a violent felony under the ACCA, defendant's conviction was a violent felony under the modified categorical approach. The court also held that felony attempt to elude police was a violent felony under the ACCA where the prohibition fell within the residual clause of section 924(e)(2)(B)(ii) in that flight presented a serious potential risk of physical injury to another. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's ruling that defendant's prior conviction for felony attempt to elude the police was not a violent felony and affirmed the district court's ruling that defendant's conviction for second degree burglary qualified as a violent felony. Because defendant had three prior violent felony convictions, the court remanded for resentencing under the mandatory minimum sentence in section 914(e)(1).

This case stemmed from the NRDC's complaint against the South Coast Air Quality Management District (SCAQMD) alleging that SCAQMD violated the Clean Air Act (CAA), section 173(c), by distributing invalid credits from its offset accounts under Rules 1304 and 1309.1 of the Regulation XIII rules; that SCAQMD violated Regulation XIII as well as section 173(c) by maintaining invalid credits in its offset accounts; and that SCAQMD violated the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) rule approving Regulation XIII and section 173(c) by failing to track emission reductions to show it maintained positive account balances in its offset accounts. The NRDC appealed the district court's grant of SCAQMD's motion to dismiss the NRDC's claims against (SCAQMD). The court held that the district court did not err in determining it lacked jurisdiction under section 304 of the CAA over the alleged violations of section 173(c). The court also held that the district court did not err in concluding that the NRDC otherwise failed to state a claim upon which relief could be granted where Regulation XIII did not contain validity requirements for SCQMD's internal offsets and the EPA rules did not require SCAQMD to use a tracking system. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgments.

Petitioner, who came to the United States from Armenia, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision that she failed to satisfy her burden of proving eligibility for asylum and withholding of removal and the BIA's decision that petitioner also failed to satisfy her burden of proving eligibility for protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). At issue was whether the whistleblowing doctrine extended to petitioner who faced retaliation from a notorious criminal who was protected by corrupt government officials. The court held that the record compelled the conclusion that petitioner expressed a political opinion in her unsuccessful attempts to have the notorious criminal prosecuted and that the record compelled a finding that in his threats and attacks on petitioner and her family, the notorious criminal was motivated, in part, by the knowledge that she was exposing his corrupt ties to law enforcement agencies. Therefore, the court applied the whistleblowing doctrine and granted the petition as to the BIA's denial of her claims for asylum and withholding of removal. The court denied, however, the petition to the extent petitioner sought to remand for adequate consideration of her CAT claim where the BIA concluded that the record did not show a likelihood that petitioner would face torture upon returning to Armenia.

This suit followed BP Exploration (Alaska) Inc.'s (BPXA) temporary shut-down of its pipelines and oil production in Prudhoe Bay, Alaska, upon its discovery of a leak in a pipeline located in its Prudhoe Bay Eastern Operating Area. Plaintiff, on behalf of a class of purchasers of BP p.l.c. shares, subsequently brought a class action suit against BPXA alleging claims arising under Sections 10(b), 18, and 20(a) of the Securities and Exchange Act (SEC), 15 U.S.C. 78b(b), 78r, and 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5. Both parties appealled in part from the judgment of the district court. The court held that BPXA's breach of a contractual promise of specific future conduct, even though the contract was filed in conjunction with SEC reporting requirements, was not a sufficient foundation for a securities fraud action. The court declined plaintiff's invitation to review other issues that were not certified for interlocutory appeal. In light of the court's conclusion that breached contractual obligations did not constitute misrepresentations by BPXA that were actionable under the securities laws, the court did not reach the issue of scienter. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Petitioner was convicted of first-degree murder, kidnapping, and molestation of a nine-year-old girl and received the death sentence. Petitioner requested permission to file a second or successive application for a writ of habeas corpus and a stay of his execution. The court held that defendant failed to satisfy the requirements of 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(2) where petitioner waited ten years after the enactment of Arizona's DNA testing statute, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 13-4240, before filing a motion requesting DNA testing of inculpatory hair evidence presented at trial and where, whatever the DNA testing of the hair evidence might reveal, the evidence could not refute the overwhelming inculpatory evidence presented at petitioner's trial. The court also held that petitioner's motion to stay pending disposition of his application was moot and that petitioner's motion to stay in light of the recent appointment of the Arizona Federal Public Defender as associated co-counsel was denied where petitioner's prior counsel remained on the case and the recent addition of new counsel did not deny petitioner the meaningful assistance of counsel. Accordingly, the court denied petitioner's application for permission to file a second or successive habeas corpus petition and denied petitioner's motions for stay of execution.

Appellants formerly maintained railroad tracks on a parcel of land in Stockton, California, that was contaminated by petroleum. The petroleum was spilled at a nearby industrial site and migrated onto the property via an underground french drain that appellants had installed in order to remove water from the roadbed. At issue was whether appellants were liable for the contamination of the property under the law of nuisance or under California's Polanco Redevelopment Act (Act), Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459 et seq. The court held that there was no evidence that appellants actively or knowingly caused or permitted the contamination as required for nuisance liability and liability under the Act's Water Code provision, Cal. Health & Safety Code 33459(h). The court also held that appellants were not "owners" of the property under the Act's Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act (CERCLA), 42 U.S.C. 9607(a), provision when the contamination occurred. The court further held that, because the record established no genuine issue of material fact as to appellants' liability, appellants were entitled to summary judgment. Therefore, the court need not reach any of the damages issues on appeal or cross-appeal.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus challenging the Bureau of Prison's (BOP) calculation of his Good Conduct Time (GCT) credit under 18 U.S.C. 3624(b), contending that he accrued 82 days of GCT during the 21 months he served in state custody on state charges before he was sentenced in federal court on a related felon-in-possession charge. The court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's petition for writ of habeas corpus. The Court held that, because a prisoner could receive GCT credit under section 3624(b) only on time he had served on his federal sentence, and his federal sentence did not begin under 18 U.S.C. 3585 until he had been sentenced in federal court, defendant was not eligible for GCT credit for the 21 months he spent in state custody, serving a state sentence, before imposition of his federal sentence, notwithstanding the district court's statement that defendant's federal sentence was to be served concurrent to his unfinished sentence. Accordingly, the BOP's calculation of defendant's GCT credit and of his expected release date must be upheld.

This is the second appeal arising from the failed prosecution of defendants for securities and investment fraud. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion in denying defendants' motion to reopen under Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(3) based on an internal government memorandum (memo) written shortly after the district court dismissed the indictment. The court held that the district court acted within its discretion in finding that the memo did not show fraud on the court or provided a basis to reopen the case to allow discovery into that issue where the memo was not a revelation of new information about the discovery misconduct during trial and where the memo was consistent with the court's prior conclusion that the government's misconduct during trial was a mixture of intentional and negligent pretrial and trial acts and omissions. Accordingly, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Debtor filed a Chapter 11 Bankruptcy petition in 1998 and submitted a plan of reorganization ("Plan"), continuing to operate as a debtor-in-possession. Article X of the confirmed Plan provided for the discharge of all debts pursuant to which debtor was the "primary obligor." In 2007, the IRS contacted debtor's principal officers regarding potential assessment of a Trust Fund Recovery Penalty ("TFRP") pursuant to 26 U.S.C. 6672. At issue was whether the collection of a TFRP from the principal officers violated the express terms of Article X discharging such claims. The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's dismissal of the action for lack of jurisdiction where the relief sought by debtor would effectively preclude the IRS's collection of a section 6672 assessment and therefore, fell squarely within the reach of the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. 7421(a), and the court's holding in American Bicycle Ass'n v. United States. The court also held that, in light of the well-established principle that section 6672 liability was a separate and distinct liability, the court agreed with the bankruptcy court's alternative holding that, although a corporation could be the primary obligor on its own underlying tax obligation, it was not the primary obligor on the separate and distinct assessment under section 6672. Rather, the corporate officers were the primary obligors on the TFRP liabilities, as these liabilities were assessed independently under section 6672 for the officers' own willful conduct. Accordingly, the judgment of the bankruptcy court was affirmed.