Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a lawsuit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 against defendants claiming that she had been demoted in retaliation for exercising her First Amendment rights by attending a school board meeting and sitting next to her boss, who was fired at the meeting. At issue was whether the district court properly granted defendants' motion for summary judgment holding that defendants' efficiency interests were greater than plaintiff's interest in free association. The court held that it appeared that the triggering factor in defendants' action was simply plaintiff's decision to sit next to her boss at the public school meeting, without even speaking to him. The court also held that, because defendants produced no evidence that plaintiff's association with her boss actually disrupted the office or her performance, or reasonably threatened to cause future disruption, defendants failed to show that its interests in work-place efficiency outweighed plaintiff's First Amendment interests. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants.

Petitioner, a native of the Philippines, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA directing his removal, as well as the BIA's order denying reconsideration. At issue was whether the IJ erred in finding him removable, whether the IJ erred in finding him ineligible for withholding of removal, and whether the IJ violated his due process rights. As a preliminary matter, the court held that petitioner's notice of appeal gave the BIA an adequate opportunity to pass on the arguments he presented. The court also held that the government satisfied its burden of proving removability where petitioner was convicted of a controlled substance offense. The court held, however, that petitioner failed to carry his burden of proving that he was entitled to relief from removal where he failed to demonstrate persecution on a protected ground or that the IJ violated his due process rights where petitioner failed to demonstrate prejudice. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

Plaintiffs, married couples who worked as house parents to children who were "severely emotionally disturbed" in defendants' homes, sued defendants for overtime pay under the Fair Labor Standards Act ("FLSA"), 29 U.S.C. 203(r)(2)(A). The children attended local public schools and participated in other activities away from the homes. Although, the children participated in group therapy conducted by clinicians in the homes, they received most of their medical and psychological treatment outside the homes. Plaintiffs were not licensed medical or social service professionals. Defendants filed an interlocutory appeal challenging the district court's conclusion that defendants' homes were covered by the FLSA and were subject to its overtime provisions. The court held that defendants' homes were not covered by the FLSA because they were not an "institution primarily engaged in the care of the sick, the aged, mentally ill or defective who resided on the premises of such institution." Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

The SEC brought suit against senior officers of Gateway Incorporated ("Gateway") claiming that they unlawfully misrepresented Gateway's financial condition in the third quarter of 2000 in order to meet financial analysts' earnings and revenue expectations. After a three week trial, a jury found former Gateway financial executives, John J. Todd and Robert D. Manza, liable on all claims by the SEC. All parties appealed the district court's order in part. The court reversed the district court's order granting in part Todd's and Manza's motions for judgment as a matter of law on the antifraud claims under the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., because substantial evidence supported the jury's verdict that Todd and Manza at least recklessly misrepresented revenue related to the Lockheed transaction, and that Todd recklessly misrepresented revenue as to the VenServ transaction, in the third quarter of 2000. The court also reversed the district court's order granting Jeffrey Weitzen's, former Gateway President and CEO, motion for summary judgment as to the Section 10(b) and Rule 10b-5 violations because there were genuine issues of material fact regarding whether Weitzen knowingly misrepresented Gateway's financial growth as "accelerated" given his knowledge of the unusual Lockheed and AOL transactions. There were also issues of material fact as to whether Weitzen was a "control person" under Section 20(a). The court affirmed Weitzen's motion for summary judgment as to the Rule 13b2-2 claim because there was no evidence that Weitzen signed a letter to Gateway's auditors knowing that it misrepresented Gateway's financial position. The court also affirmed the district court's order denying in part Todd's and Manza's motions for judgment as a matter of law on the aiding and abetting claims and their motions for a new trial.

Former Arizona Congressman Richard G. Renzi sought to invoke the Speech or Debate Clause ("Clause") of the Constitution to preclude his prosecution for allegedly using his public office to benefit himself rather than his constituents. Renzi denied the charges against him but argued on interlocutory appeal that he was protected by the Clause from even the burden of defending himself. Specifically, Renzi claimed that the public corruption charges against him amounted to prosecution on account of his privileged "legislative acts"; that "legislative act" evidence was improperly presented to the grand jury; that the United States must show that its investigation did not benefit from its review of "legislative act" evidence; and that the district court erred by declining to wholly suppress all of the evidence against him relating to his illicit "negotiations." The court held that it lacked jurisdiction under the collateral order doctrine to consider Renzi's suppression claim and therefore, dismissed that part of his appeal. The court also held that the Clause was a privilege that "had enabled reckless men to slander and even destroy others with impunity," but the Supreme Court had made equally clear that the Clause did not "make Members of Congress super-citizens, immune from criminal responsibility." Accordingly, the court held that Renzi's actions fell beyond the Clause's protections and denied him the relief that he sought.

This case stemmed from a federal grand jury indictment of twenty-two persons, including the seven defendants at issue, for illegal activities related to the Mexican Mafia. Defendants appealed their convictions of conspiracy in violation of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act ("RICO"), 18 U.S.C. 1962(d), and their sentencing enhancement for carrying out the conspiratorial agreement by acts subjecting them to life imprisonment. Defendants raised numerous issues individually and collectively but the court found no error and held that the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, challenged a decision of the BIA denying him cancellation of removal and voluntary departure. At issue was whether the BIA erred in determining that petitioner was ineligible for cancellation of removal because his convictions for carrying a concealed weapon under California Penal Code 12025(a) did not constitute a removable firearms offense under 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(2)(C). Also at issue was whether the BIA erred in denying petitioner voluntary departure because the denial was based on his criminal conviction under section 12025(a) and that conviction did not render him ineligible for voluntary departure. The court held that a conviction under section 12025(a) was categorically a "firearms offense" under section 1227(a)(2)(C) and therefore, the BIA properly held that petitioner was statutorily ineligible for cancellation of removal. The court dismissed petitioner's second ground for appeal because it found that the BIA's denial of voluntary departure was a matter of discretion and the court lacked jurisdiction to review such a discretionary decision. Accordingly, the court denied in part and dismissed in part.

This case stemmed from an asset purchase transaction where defendants and plaintiff entered into an allocation agreement that included an arbitration clause. Defendants appealed from the district court's order enjoining arbitration and denying their motion to stay judicial proceedings under section 3 of the Federal Arbitration Act ("FAA"), 9 U.S.C. 3. Defendants contended that the arbitration clause reserved the question of arbitrability for the arbitrators, and that the district court erred in determining that the dispute was not subject to arbitration. The court held that the arbitration clause in the agreement clearly and unmistakably expressed the parties' intent that the arbitrators determine questions of arbitrability, and that the district court therefore erred in permanently enjoining the arbitration and failing to stay judicial proceedings under section 3 of the FAA. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with instructions to grant the motion to stay proceedings under section 3 and dissolve the permanent injunction.

Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion to correct a federal sentencing enhancement imposed on account of his Utah conviction for burglarizing a "dwelling." At issue was whether the court's decision in United States v. Grisel had retroactive effect. The court concluded that Grisel did have retroactive effect where Grisel was a non-constitutional decision of substantive law. Under Grisel, defendant's burglary conviction did not qualify categorically as a predicate offense and the documents in the record were not sufficient to sustain the sentence under a modified categorical analysis. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court and remanded for resentencing on an open record.

The court agreed to hear this case en banc in order to reconsider its precedent as to which parties could be sued as defendants in actions for benefits under 29 U.S.C. 1132(a)(1)(B), part of ERISA. Some of the court's previous decisions had indicated that only a benefit plan itself or the plan administrator of a benefit plan covered under ERISA was a proper defendant in a lawsuit under that provision. The court concluded that the statute did not support that limitation, however, and that an entity other than the plan itself or the plan administrator could be sued under that statute in appropriate circumstances. Therefore, the court held that Reliance Standard Ins. Co. was a proper defendant in a lawsuit brought by plaintiff under ERISA and overruled its prior decisions to the contrary. To apply that decision and to resolve other issues raised in the appeal, the court transferred this case back to the three-judge panel to which the case was previously assigned.