Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed a complaint against defendant, seeking indemnity and/or contribution based on the damage defendant allegedly caused through gross negligence in removing plaintiff's vessel from a coral reef. At issue was whether the district court properly denied defendant's motion to compel arbitration of the dispute under the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., where defendant alleged that the district court erred in refusing to apply English arbitrability law. The court held that based on the Supreme Court's reasoning in First Options of Chicago, Inc. v. Kaplan, courts should apply non-federal arbitrability law only if there was clear and unmistakable evidence that the parties intended to apply such non-federal law. Because there was no clear and unmistakable evidence in this case, federal arbitrability law applied. Under federal arbitrability law, the court's decisions in Mediterranean Enterprises, Inc. v. Ssangyong Construction Co. and Tracer Research Corp. v. National Environmental Services, Co., mandated a narrow interpretation of a clause providing for arbitration of all disputes "arising under" an agreement. Under this narrow interpretation, the present dispute was not arbitrable. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's judgment.

Three conservation groups (Applicants) appealed from the denial of their motion to intervene on the side of defendants in an action where plaintiff challenged an interim order issued by the Forest Service in response to an adverse decision in prior litigation brought by Applicants. The interim order restricted motorized and mechanized vehicle use in a section of the Gallatin National Forest. The court held that Applicants showed, in a timely-filed motion, that they had a significantly protectable interest in the action; that the disposition could impair their ability to protect that interest; and that the Forest Service could not adequately represent their interest. Therefore, Applicants were entitled to intervene under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a). Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded with further instructions to the district court.

Plaintiff sued Icelandair in federal district court, alleging that it was liable for her injuries under Article 17 of the Convention of the Unification of Certain Rules Relating to International Transportation by Air (Montreal Convention), which established that air carriers were liable for accidents that occurred to passengers while they were boarding, aboard, or disembarking aircraft, S. Treaty Doc. No. 106-45, 33. At issue was whether the district court properly granted summary judgment on behalf of Icelandair. The court held that a plaintiff did not have to prove that an airline violated a Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) standard to establish that there was an "accident" under Article 17 of the Montreal Convention. The court also held that because the district court held otherwise, requiring plaintiff to provide evidence that the airline had failed to meet FAA requirements in order to survive summary judgment, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiffs brought an action under 42 U.S.C. 1983, seeking to prove that they were subjected to excessive force while in custody at the Sacramento County Main Jail. At issue was whether the district court erred by refusing to use certain jury instructions plaintiffs had requested. The court held that the district court prejudicially erred in refusing to instruct the jury that, for purposes of proving a Monell claim, a custom or practice could be supported by evidence of repeated constitutional violations which went uninvestigated and for which the errant municipal officers went unpunished. Therefore, the court vacated the judgment and remanded for a new trial.

Appellants appealed the district court's order affirming the bankruptcy court's decision that they were not entitled to subrogation pursuant to the provisions of 11 U.S.C. 509. With one clarification regarding appellants' predecessor in interest and one exception regarding the creditor, the court adopted the bankruptcy court's discussion and determination denying appellants' assertion that they were entitled to subrogation pursuant to section 509.

Plaintiff brought a 42 U.S.C. 1983 action for damages resulting from a violent attack he allegedly suffered while he was an inmate in the Los Angeles County Jail. At issue was whether the district court properly dismissed plaintiff's supervisory liability claim for deliberate indifference against Sheriff Leroy Baca in his individual capacity under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). The court held that the Supreme Court's decision in Ashcroft v. Iqbal did not alter the substantive requirements for supervisory liability claims in an unconstitutional conditions of confinement case under the Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments where deliberate indifference was alleged. The court further held that plaintiff had sufficiently alleged under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 8(a) a supervisory liability claim of deliberate indifference against Sheriff Baca. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claim and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiffs, raisin producers, appealed an administrative decision by the United States Department of Agriculture (USDA), which imposed civil penalties and assessments for their failure to comply with the reserve pool requirements for raisins, among other regulatory infractions. At issue was the interpretation and constitutionality of a food product reserve program authorized by the Agricultural Marketing Agreement Act of 1937 (AMAA), 7 U.S.C. 601 et seq., and implemented by the Marketing Order Regulating the Handling of Raisins Produced from Grapes Grown in California (Marketing Order), 7 C.F.R. Part 989, first adopted in 1949, which contained the reserve pool requirements. The court held that applying the Marketing Order to plaintiffs in their capacity as handlers was not contrary to the AMAA. The court also held that plaintiffs have suffered no compensable physical taking of any portion of their crops and therefore, the Fifth Amendment posed no obstacle to the enforcement of the Marketing Order under the Takings Clause. The court further held that the district court did not err in finding that the penalties were consistent with the Eighth Amendment and were not excessive fines. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Each of the defendants in these consolidated appeals sought safety-valve relief where they were serving a state probationary sentence when they committed and pleaded guilty to the charge of smuggling methamphetamine into the United States. At issue was whether, given the California state courts' wide latitude to modify ongoing probationary terms under California state law, the federal district courts in calculating criminal history points for purposes of safety valve eligibility must credit state orders terminating probationary sentences. The court held that, in applying the sentencing safety valve, federal courts must credit the California state orders under the California Penal Code 1203.3 modifying or terminating ongoing probationary terms. Accordingly, the court affirmed Audenago Acosta-Montes's sentence and vacated David Yepez's sentence and remanded Yepez's case for resentencing.

This case involved the seizure and administrative forfeiture of two leopard trophies by the United States Fish and Wildlife Service from two hunters (plaintiffs) who attempted to import the leopards from African countries without proper export permits. Plaintiffs contended that the district court erred in dismissing their Civil Asset Forfeiture Reform Act of 2000 (CAFRA) claim for lack of jurisdiction. The court held that the district court properly held that plaintiffs' CAFRA claim was barred from judicial review where plaintiffs received proper notice of the proposed forfeitures; plaintiffs chose to pursue an administrative path and filed petitions for remission and petitions for supplemental remission; and plaintiffs' choice to pursue such administrative remedies waived the opportunity for judicial forfeiture proceedings. Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of the action.

Defendant was charged with crimes stemming from conduct involving her live-in nanny and housekeeper where defendant arranged for her to travel from her native Peru to the United States in 2006 by entering under a fraudulently-obtained visa to serve as a nanny and housekeeper. Defendant appealed her convictions for forced labor, related offenses of document servitude, and harboring an alien for financial gain. Defendant also appealed three sentencing enhancements and the restitution order. The court affirmed the convictions on all counts as supported by sufficient evidence. With respect to sentencing, the court declined to reach the merits of the first enhancement for visa fraud because it did not affect the guidelines offense level; affirmed the second enhancement holding defendant in forced labor for over one year; and affirmed the third enhancement for committing a felony "in connection with" forced labor. As for the restitution order which presented a question of first impression regarding whether child support arrearages belonged to a criminal defendant such that they could be assigned to a victim by restitution order while defendant's children were still minors, the court held that the minor child was the real party in interest to the accrued support. Therefore, any money that defendant received for child support did not belong to her but rather her children and it could not be assigned to the nanny/housekeeper. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed in part and reversed in part.