Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed the denial of his federal habeas petition where his charges stemmed from a home-invasion robbery. At issue was the California Court of Appeals' rulings that he had no absolute Sixth Amendment right to the reappointment of counsel after waiving his right to counsel under Faretta v. California and whether the trial court's abuse of discretion in failing to reappoint counsel was harmless beyond a reasonable doubt. Also at issue was whether the California court violated his rights under Apprendi v. New Jersey when it used a prior juvenile conviction as a strike to enhance his sentence. The court held that because neither of these decisions "was contrary to, or involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law, as determined by the Supreme Court," the district court's denial of defendant's habeas petition was affirmed.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, appealed from the BIA's denial of his motion to reopen premised on ineffective assistance of counsel. Petitioner married a U.S. citizen during the pendency of his appeal from the IJ's denial of his affirmative asylum application. Petitioner was the beneficiary of an approved immediate relative visa, and sought to reopen so that he could apply for adjustment of status. The court held that the BIA's denial of petitioner's motion to reopen because counsel did not render ineffective assistance was an abuse of discretion. In addition, if petitioner's failure to depart was not "voluntary" under In re Zmijewska, he remained eligible for adjustment of status and counsel's failure prejudiced him. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision dismissing his appeal from an IJ's order finding him removable and denying his application for cancellation of removal. Petitioner challenged the BIA's finding that his six convictions for "willfully manufacturing, intentionally selling, and knowingly possessing for sale more than 1,000 articles bearing a counterfeit trademark," in violation of California Penal Code 350(a)(2), constituted an aggravated felony as an "offense relating to... counterfeiting." Petitioner also maintained that the generic offense of counterfeiting referred only to the imitation of currency and that this conviction under section 350 did not require proof of his intent. The court held that the definition of aggravated felony extended to convictions for the unauthorized imitation of trademarks. The court also rejected petitioner's remaining argument that section 350 did not incorporate "an intent to defraud" as an essential element of the offense because "[t]he commission of the crime necessarily defrauds the owner of the mark, or an innocent purchaser of the counterfeit items, or both," and the court had "difficulty distinguishing such intent from a general intent to defraud[.]" Accordingly, the petition for review was denied.

Petitioner sought a writ of habeas corpus arguing that the California Supreme Court's delay in resolving the direct appeal from his murder conviction and death sentence denied him his right to due process under the Fourteenth Amendment. The court held that the district court erred when it placed the burden on petitioner to prove his incompetence. The court held, however, that the court need not reverse and remand because, even if assuming petitioner's incompetence, it would not affect the outcome of the appeal. The court further held that petitioner's habeas corpus petition must be denied because no Supreme Court case clearly established a due process right to a speedy trial. Accordingly, the judgment was dismissed in part and affirmed in part.

Defendants, the owner and operator of a Nevada company that inspected homes for construction defects and encouraged homeowners to file claims against their builder under a Nevada statute, appealed an injunction enjoining them from conducting further inspections. Del Webb Communities, Inc. (Del Webb), the developer of a retirement community where defendants inspected many homes, sued, alleging that defendants' business practices violated federal and state law. The court held that the general prohibition against operating "by means of illegal, unlicensed and false practices" was too vague to stand. Accordingly, the court affirmed the remaining provisions of the injunction but rejected the district court's reliance on Nevada's common law of champerty to create a tort cause of action for which Del Webb could obtain relief. Therefore, the court vacated the injunction in part and affirmed in part.

In 1974, African American and Mexican American students sued the Tucson, Arizona, school system alleging intentional segregation and unconstitutional discrimination on the basis of race and national origin. For some 30 years after the parties settled, Tucson's schools operated subject to a federally enforced desegregation decree. At issue was whether the school district had achieved unitary status and whether oversight of the school district's operations could terminate. The court reversed and ordered the district court to maintain jurisdiction until it was satisfied that the school district had met its burden by demonstrating, not merely promising, its "good-faith compliance... with the [Settlement Agreement] over a reasonable period of time." The court also held that the district court must be convinced that the district had eliminated "the vestiges of past discrimination... to the extent practicable" with regard to all of the Green v. Cnty. Sch. Bd. of New Kent Cnty. factors. The court further held that the district court retained discretion to order an incremental or partial withdrawal of its supervision and control. Accordingly, the case was remanded for further proceedings.

Defendants engaged in discovery misconduct that was sufficiently egregious to cause the district court to enter an order of default against them. Although defendants subsequently challenged the default order as erroneous, defendants did not challenge the order of default by way of a Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 55(c) or 60(b). At issue was whether Judge Real, a district court judge, had the power to impose default as a sanction for discovery misconduct and assuming such power, whether Judge Real abused his discretion by imposing default rather than lesser sanctions. The court held that defendants' failures to comply with orders of the court provided Judge Real with the power under Rule 37(b) to impose sanctions sua sponte, up to and including default and that Judge Wilson appropriately revisited previous orders of the court when he replaced Judge Real after Judge Real recused himself. The court also held that the district court possessed the power to impose the sanction of default and that the district court did not abuse its discretion by doing so. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

In consolidated appeals, defendants appealed the denial of their motions for judgment on the pleadings where plaintiffs brought a diversity suit to enforce California Civil Code 2527 and 2528, which required defendants to supply the results of bi-annual studies of California's pharmacies' retail drug pricing for private uninsured customers to their clients, who were third-party payors such as insurance companies and self-insured employer groups. At issue was whether the court was bound by the Erie doctrine to follow the state appellate court decisions striking down section 2527 and if not, whether section 2527 violated the First Amendment or the California Constitution's free speech provision. The court held that the Erie doctrine did not require it to follow the state appellate court decisions and that section 2527 did not unconstitutionally compel speech under either the United States or California Constitutions. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

This case stemmed from defendant's convictions for making two statements regarding Barack Obama on an online message board two weeks before the presidential election. At issue was whether the district court properly convicted defendant under 18 U.S.C. 879(a)(3), which made it a felony to threaten to kill or do bodily harm to a major presidential candidate. The court held that, taking the two statements at issue in the context of all of the relevant facts and circumstances, the court held that the prosecution failed to present sufficient evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant had the subjective intent to threaten a presidential candidate. For the same reasons, given any reasonable construction of the words in defendant's postings, these statements did not constitute a "true threat," and were therefore protected speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, defendant's convictions were reversed.

Petitioner, an Indonesian citizen of Chinese descent, petitioned for review of the BIA's order affirming an IJ's denial of her claims for asylum and withholding of removal. At issue was whether the IJ correctly determined that petitioner's asylum application was untimely because she had not established an exception to the one-year filing requirement. The court held that the BIA erred as a matter of law in finding that fraudulent deceit by an immigration consultant could not constitute an "extraordinary circumstance" that excused an otherwise untimely asylum application. Therefore, the court granted the petition and remanded for the BIA to consider whether the ordeal petitioner experienced constituted fraudulent deceit by an immigration consultant and whether she filed her asylum application within a reasonable time after such circumstance, thereby excusing the untimeliness of her application and requiring the BIA to consider her asylum application on the merits. With respect to petitioner's claim for withholding of removal, the court granted the petition and remanded for further consideration in light of its recent decision in Wakkary v. Holder.