Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner, a citizen and national of Honduras, filed an application for deferral of removal under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). The BIA denied the application, concluding that petitioner had not established that he would more likely than not be tortured if removed to Honduras. The court held that, because the BIA failed to give reasoned consideration to potentially dispositive testimony by petitioner's expert witnesses and did not address all of petitioner's claims, the court granted the petition and remanded to the BIA.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus, challenging the California Board of Parole Hearings' (Board) denial of his parole. Defendant, the warden, appealed the district court's order instructing the Board to conduct a new parole hearing. The court held that because the district court's order was not a final decision, the court dismissed the appeal for lack of appellate jurisdiction.

Plaintiffs, individual homeowners, sued defendants, some of the nation's largest housing developers, seeking damages, attorneys fees and costs, and the option to rescind their home purchases due to defendants' fraud, negligent misrepresentation, breach of implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing, and violations of California law. At issue was whether plaintiffs, who purchased homes in new developments, had standing to sue defendants for injuries allegedly caused by defendants' practice of marketing neighboring homes to individuals who presented a high risk of foreclosure and abandonment of their homes, financing those high-risk buyers, concealing that information, and misrepresenting the character of the neighborhoods. The court held that the district court erred in dismissing plaintiffs' overpayment and rescission claims for lack of Article III standing. The court also held that plaintiffs' decreased economic value and desirability were cognizable injuries. While the court agreed with the district court that, on the current record, plaintiffs have not established a sufficient causal connection between any decreased value and desirability and defendants' actions, plaintiffs should be permitted to amend their complaint and attach expert testimony on causation. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

This case was related to certain documents produced in discovery and filed in the bankruptcy court, containing allegations that Father M and D, two priests who were not parties to the Portland Archdiocese's bankruptcy case, had sexually abused children. The bankruptcy court held that the discovery documents at issue could be disclosed to the public, because the public's interest in disclosure of these discovery documents outweighed the priests' privacy interest under Rule 26(c) and that the documents filed in court could be disclosed because they did not contain "scandalous" allegations for purposes of 11 U.S.C. 107(b). The court affirmed the bankruptcy court's ruling as to the release of discovery documents disclosing Father M's name under Rule 26(c), because the public's serious safety concerns could not be addressed if Father M's name was redacted. But because the record did not reflect the existence of any similar significant public interest that required the disclosure of Father D's name, the court held that Father D's name must be redacted from any discovery documents that were released. Finally, because of the mandatory duty to keep scandalous material confidential at the request of a party under section 107(b), the court reversed the decision to release the punitive damages memorandum and attached documents.

Plaintiff brought suit against the Dealership and Porsche when the pre-owned car that she purchased from the Dealership developed serious mechanical problems during the warranty period and the Dealership refused to honor her warranty claims. Plaintiff alleged breach of implied and express warranties under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq., and breach of contract and unconscionability under California law. The district court granted the Dealership's petition to compel arbitration pursuant to the mandatory arbitration provision in the sales contract that plaintiff signed when she bought the car and stayed the action against Porsche. Plaintiff's principal argument on appeal was that the MMWA barred the provision mandating pre-dispute binding arbitration of her warranty claims against the Dealership. Although the text of the MMWA did not specifically address the validity of pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration, Congress expressly delegated rulemaking authority under the statue to the Federal Trade Commission (FTC). The FTC construed the MMWA as barring pre-dispute mandatory binding arbitration provisions covering written warranty agreements and issued a rule prohibiting judicial enforcement of such provisions with respect to consumer claims brought under the MMWA. Because it was required to defer to the reasonable construction of a statute by the agency that Congress had authorized to interpret it, the court held that the MMWA precluded enforcement of pre-dispute agreements such as Porsche's that required mandatory binding arbitration of consumer warranty claims. The court declined to address plaintiff's remaining claims. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff brought suit against Toyota when the new car that she leased developed mechanical problems during the warranty period and Toyota failed to repair them to her satisfaction. In addition to several California state law claims, she alleged breach of warranty under the Magnuson-Moss Warranty Act (MMWA), 15 U.S.C. 2301 et seq. The district court granted Toyota's motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction on the ground that plaintiff did not, before filing suit in civil court, pursue her claims through the California Dispute Settlement Program (CDSP) that Toyota maintained and specified in its warranty. Plaintiff appealed, arguing that her failure to initially resort to the CDSP provided Toyota an affirmative defense to her warranty claims under the MMWA, but did not defeat subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the prerequisite in section 2310(a) of the MMWA that a "consumer may not commence a civil action... unless he initially resorts to [an informal dispute settlement procedure]" was merely a codification of the MMWA's exhaustion requirement and did not operate as a jurisdictional bar. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded so that the district court could consider how to proceed with the instant action, including the failure-to-exhaust issues.

Defendant appealed from his conviction for importation of marijuana and possession of marijuana. Defendant contended, inter alia, that the district court erred by preventing him from presenting evidence of duress at trial and by refusing to give a jury instruction on the defense of duress. The court held that the district court did not err in finding that defendant failed to make the prima facie showing of duress necessary to present the defense at trial and to receive a duress jury instruction.

Defendant was convicted of, among other things, shipping and receiving firearms through interstate commerce while using a controlled substance, in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(3) because defendant illegally grew and sold marijuana, as well as had a business of dealing in firearms. At issue was the constitutionality of section 922(g)(3). The court held that because Congress could constitutionally deprive felons and mentally ill people of the right to possess and carry weapons, the court concluded that Congress could also prohibit illegal drug users from possessing firearms.

Defendant was convicted of misdemeanor possession of methamphetamine possession and sentenced to three years' probation. Defendant appealed his conviction and two conditions of probation, one permitting suspicionless searches and one requiring him to submit to DNA collection. The court affirmed defendant's conviction and upheld the imposition of the suspicionless search condition in light of the court's precedents. The court held, however, that the district court exceeded its statutory authority by imposing the DNA condition pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 14132(d). Accordingly, the court reversed with instructions to strike that condition and to order expungement of DNA records collected pursuant to it.

This case arose when the SEC instituted an enforcement action against several companies, which, among other things, led to the court appointment of a receiver. Debtor was an attorney who represented some of the defendants in this enforcement action. At issue was whether the exception to discharge in 11 U.S.C. 523(a)(19) applied when the debtor himself was not culpable for the securities violation that caused the debt. The bankruptcy court held that the debt was subject to discharge; the district court disagreed and held that the debt was excepted from discharge in bankruptcy. The court held that section 523(a)(19) prevented the discharge of debts for securities-related wrongdoings only in cases where the debtor was responsible for that wrongdoing and debtors who could have received funds derived from a securities violation remained entitled to a complete discharge of any resulting disgorgement order. Therefore, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.