Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision affirming the Social Security Administration's (SSA) denial of her applications for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income. The court held that because the SSA took nearly two years to investigate whether to reopen a favorable determination on one of plaintiff's applications, much longer than the presumptive time of six months, and because the record did not show that the investigation was diligently pursued, the court reversed.

This Alien Tort Statute (ATS), 28 U.S.C. 1350, case arose out of the operations of Rio Tinto mining group on the island of Bougainville in Papua New Guinea (PNG) and the uprising against Rio Tinto in the late 1980's that resulted in the use of military force and many deaths. The only claims before the court on appeal were plaintiffs' claims for genocide, crimes against humanity, war crimes, and racial discrimination. As a preliminary matter, the court addressed claims regarding more sweeping legal principles that Rio Tinto and the dissent argued which called for the dismissal of the entire action. The court held that only plaintiffs' claims of genocide and war crimes fell within the limited federal jurisdiction created by the ATS and that the crimes against humanity arising from a blockade and the racial discrimination claims did not. Accordingly, the district court's order on prudential exhaustion was affirmed; the district court's dismissal of the claims for racial discrimination and crimes against humanity was affirmed; the dismissal of the claims for genocide and war crimes was reversed; and the case remanded for further proceedings on the claims of genocide and war crimes.

Respondent appealed the district court's order granting petitioner a conditional writ of habeas corpus. At issue was whether the petition was timely; even assuming the petition was deemed timely, whether there was error in the state court's jury instructions; and whether the district court erred by not granting habeas relief on the alternative ground that retroactive application of California Evidence Code 1109 violated the Ex Post Facto Clause. The court agreed with the district court that petitioner did not relent in his efforts and that he was entitled to equitable tolling for his diligence in the face of his counsel's deceit and therefore addressed the merits of the petition. The court held that the instructions directed the jury to consider evidence of petitioner's prior unadjudicated acts of domestic violence, most of which were wholly unrelated to the crimes with which he was charged, to convict him, among other things, of first-degree murder. This was error under Sullivan v. Louisiana and Gibson v. Ortiz and the court affirmed the district court's issuance of a conditional writ. The court also held that the use of certain evidence of domestic violence at Doe's trial did not contravene the Ex Post Facto Clause. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's order granting a conditional writ of habeas corpus.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Ethiopia, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision affirming the IJ's conclusion that petitioner was statutorily ineligible for asylum and withholding of removal because petitioner's armed robbery conviction was "particularly serious." Petitioner had complained to the BIA that the IJ's decision failed to take into consideration several facts. However, all of the purported omissions related to petitioner's claim of a well-founded fear of persecution. The court concluded that the only way to give the BIA the opportunity to correct its own errors was to raise the "particularly serious" issue before the BIA, which defendant simply failed to do. Therefore, the court held that because petitioner did not exhaust the issue before the BIA, the court had no jurisdiction to consider whether or not his crime was "particularly serious." Accordingly, the petition was dismissed.

This case arose when defendant was accused of drunk driving on the Kitsap Naval Base in Bremerton, Washington. At issue was whether the Government violated the Double Jeopardy Clause of the Fifth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution by prosecuting and convicting defendant for a crime after the Navy punished him for the same offense. The Government argued that the Double Jeopardy Clause was not implicated because the non-judicial punishment administered by the Navy under 10 U.S.C. 815 was not criminal in nature. The court agreed and held that the Government's prosecution of defendant was not barred by the Double Jeopardy Clause. Accordingly, defendant's conviction was affirmed.

This case centered around the political corruption of former California Congressman Randall "Duke" Cunningham, who provided lucrative government defense contracts to defendant and others in exchange for expensive meals, lavish trips, a houseboat in Washington D.C., and mortgage payments for his multi-million dollar home. Defendant appealed his convictions on multiple counts of conspiracy, honest services wire fraud, bribery, and money laundering. The court held that, under its holding in United States v. Straub, the district court's determination that it was not authorized to compel use immunity for a defense witness absent a finding of prosecutorial misconduct was erroneous. Because the district court concluded that the proffered testimony would "counter" the testimony presented by the prosecution through immunized government witnesses, and the government did not challenge that finding as clearly erroneous, the court remanded the matter to the district court with instructions to conduct an evidentiary hearing to determine whether compelled use immunity regarding the proposed testimony was constitutionally required. The court affirmed the district court's judgment of conviction in all other respects.

Defendant appealed her jury conviction for one count of conspiracy, one count of bank fraud, and thirteen counts of loan fraud. On appeal, defendant contended that the district court committed prejudicial error by admitting two summary charts under Federal Rule of Evidence 1006; there was insufficient evidence to support each of her convictions; and the district court erred in ordering her to pay restitution in the full amount of the victim lenders' loss, despite a prior civil settlement with the victim lenders that included a release from liability. The court held that the charts were properly admitted under Rule 1006, 404(b), and 403. The court also held that the evidence at trial was sufficient for a rational jury to convict defendant of the crimes for which she was charged. The court held, however, that under the current restitution order, the victim lenders would receive more than their actual losses and therefore, the imposition of the order was plain error. Accordingly, defendant's convictions were affirmed and the restitution order vacated and remanded with instructions.

This case arose when plaintiff hired defendant to move some of his household goods from southern California to the United Arab Emirates (UAE). When the UAE officials discovered plaintiff's box of firearms and ammunition, they arrested him, imprisoned him for 11 days, and tricked him into pleading guilty to smuggling firearms. Plaintiff alleged that he was facing deportation from the UAE and sued defendant based on various tort and contract theories. At issue was whether defendant could compel plaintiff to arbitrate pursuant to the contract's foreign arbitration clause in its shipment contract. The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and held that the district court correctly interpreted the Carmack Amendment, 49 U.S.C. 14706, to preclude foreign arbitration clauses and the Carmack Amendment, having been enacted subsequent to the federal arbitration statutes, controlled this case.

This appeal presented the question of whether a provision of the federal Health Insurance Portability and Accountability Act (HIPAA), Pub. L. No. 104-191, 110 Stat. 1936, preempted Montana's "little HIPAA" law, Mont. Code Ann. 33-22-526(2)(a), for purposes of both conferring federal subject matter jurisdiction and defeating state-law causes of action on the merits. The federal and state HIPAA provisions at issue prohibited certain insurers from charging different premiums to similarly situated participants on account of a participant's health and status-related factor. The court affirmed the district court and held that federal HIPAA preempted the Montana law, both jurisdictionally and on the merits, because Montana's HIPAA provision was identical to, and expressly relied upon, federal law. The court held, however, that federal law did not preempt a claim for relief under a separate Montana unfair insurance practices statute that barred insurers from engaging in unfair discrimination when charging policy premiums to similarly situated individuals, Mont. Code Ann. 33-18-206(2).

Plaintiffs, both women who were tased during an encounter with officers, filed a suit under 42 U.S.C. 1983 seeking damages for the alleged violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. At issue was whether the use of a taser to subdue a suspect resulted in the excessive use of force and whether the officers were entitled to qualified immunity. The court held that, although plaintiffs in both cases have alleged constitutional violations because a reasonable fact finder could conclude that the officers' use of a taser was unconstitutionally excessive, the officers were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' section 1983 claims because the law was not clearly established at the time of the incidents. Therefore, the court reversed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on these claims. In Brooks, however, the court affirmed the district court's denial of qualified immunity on her state law assault and battery claims against the officers.