Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed his sentence of three years' imprisonment for unlawfully exporting PVS-14 Gen 3 night-vision devices in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA), 22 U.S.C. 2778. These devices, designed for military use, enabled users to see at greater distances in low light and dark conditions. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by following the Sentencing Guidelines where the sentence was substantively reasonable because the district court explained that it had considered the 18 U.S.C. 3553(a) factors and the district court had granted a downward departure.

Defendant was convicted of robbery and aiding and abetting robbery in Indian country in violation of U.S.C. 1153(a) and 2111. On appeal, defendant contended that the government did not present sufficient evidence to establish that he was an "Indian" for purposes of prosecution under section 1153. The court disagreed and held that, in light of all the evidence presented at trial, a reasonable trier of fact could have found that defendant was an Indian. Therefore, the court affirmed defendant's conviction.

Defendant was convicted, on a plea of guilty, of serving as an airman without an airman's certificate. Defendant appealed from his sentence on the ground that the district court procedurally erred by sentencing him pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A5.2 rather than U.S.S.G. 2B1.1. The court held that, by relying on defendant's uncharged relevant conduct in selecting the applicable guidelines, the district court incorrectly calculated defendant's guidelines range. In doing so, the district court committed procedural error in sentencing him and therefore, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing under the correct guideline.

This case stemmed from FERC's statutory mandate set out in the Federal Power Act (FPA), 16 U.S.C. 824-824w, to ensure that all rates and charges made, demanded, or received by power wholesalers were just and reasonable. Petitioners subsequently sought review of FERC's final order (Order 697), contending that the order violated FERC's governing statutes. In Order 697, FERC codified the existing limited market-based policy, along with multiple enhancements, in a final rule. At issue was whether the market-based regulatory policy established by FERC's order was permissible under the law. Taking into account Chevron deference, the law of the circuit, other relevant precedent, and the direction of the Supreme Court as to how the court should approach such administrative law issues concerning federal agencies, the court concluded that Order 697 did not per se violate the FPA.

Defendant, the former Chief Executive Officer of Brocade Communications (Brocade or the Company), a company the developed and sold data switches for networks, appealed his conviction in a second criminal trial for securities fraud and making false filings; falsifying corporate books and records; and making false statements to auditors in violation of securities laws. Defendant was previously convicted of violating the securities laws but the court vacated that conviction because of prosecutorial misconduct and remanded for a new trial. In this appeal, the court held that there was no evidence of sufficient facts in the record to support any allegation of prosecutorial misconduct. The court also held that there was sufficient evidence of materiality to support defendant's conviction. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion by not giving defendant's proposed jury instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Defendant appealed his jury conviction for assault with a dangerous weapon and possession of a contraband in prison. On appeal, defendant argued that the district court abused its discretion by refusing to instruct the jury on his theory that he acted in self-defense; the district court violated his Confrontation Clause rights by refusing to allow him to cross-examine the treating physician about the cause of the victim's injuries; the district court erred by refusing to let him designate the treating physician as his expert witness on causation during trial; and his sentence was substantively unreasonable because his guidelines range sentence included "recency points," which were removed from the guidelines after he was sentenced. The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that defendant's evidence was mere speculation and that a jury could not rationally sustain the defense based on the evidence presented. The court also held that the district court did not err in limiting cross examination of the treating physician and that the district court did not abuse its discretion in declining to permit defendant to add the treating physician as a defense witness on the causation issue during trial. The court further held that defendant's sentence was reasonable. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Petitioner, a death row inmate, appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner raised three grounds for relief: (1) petitioner claimed that the state failed to disclose an oral agreement with a co-defendant, in violation of Brady v. Maryland and Giglio v. United States; (2) petitioner claimed that the state failed to correct the co-defendant's false testimony denying the existence of this agreement, in violation of Napue v. Illinois; and (3) petitioner claimed that his trial counsel provided ineffective assistance at the penalty phase in violation of Strickland v. Washington. The court affirmed the denial of relief with respect to petitioner's guilt-phase claims based on Brady, Giglio, and Napue. However, the court reversed on petitioner's penalty-phase claim of ineffective assistance of counsel, which was not decided on the merits in state court. The court concluded that counsel's complete failure to investigate and present mitigating evidence of petitioner's troubled childhood, his mental illness, and his history of chronic drug abuse constituted deficient performance. The court further concluded that this failure prejudiced petitioner. Therefore, the court granted the writ with respect to petitioner's death sentence.

This case stemmed from the USFS's issuance of a revised Travel Management Plan governing recreational motorized and nonmotorized use on 1.1 million acres of the Lewis and Clark National Forest, including the Middle Fork Judith Wilderness Study area. At issue was whether the Travel Management Plan violated the Montana Wilderness Study Act of 1977 (Study Act), Pub. L. No. 95-150, section 3(a), 91 Stat 1243, and the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq. The court held that nothing in the Study Act, which required the USFS to manage a wilderness study area so as to "maintain" its wilderness character as it existed in 1977, prohibited the USFS from exercising its discretion to enhance the wilderness character of a study area. The court also held that NEPA did not require the USFS to prepare a supplemental draft environmental impact statement (EIS) where, as here, the final decision made only minor changes and was qualitatively within the spectrum of the alternatives discussed in the draft EIS. Accordingly, the court reversed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Peru, sought review of a decision by the BIA denying his motion to reopen on the ground that petitioner had failed to voluntarily depart. The court held that where, as here, a period of voluntary departure technically expired on a weekend or holiday, and an immigrant filed a motion that would affect his request for voluntary departure on the next business day, such period legally expired on that next business day. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review and remanded to the BIA for adjudication of petitioner's motion to reopen on the merits.

During petitioner's murder trial, defense counsel failed to object to the prosecutor's use of peremptory challenges to strike six Hispanic venirepersons. Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus based on defense counsel's claimed ineffective assistance of counsel. At issue was whether defense counsel's failure to object to the prosecutor's allegedly group bias-based peremptory challenges constituted ineffective assistance of counsel, which ineffectiveness now required a grant of federal habeas relief under the Sixth Amendment. The court affirmed the district court's denial of petitioner's claim because he failed to present evidence sufficient to overcome the strong presumption that counsel's performance was reasonable, as set out in Strickland v. Washington.