Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff brought this securities fraud action against defendant, a biotechnology company and several of its officers, alleging that, by misstating and failing to disclose safety information about two of the company's products used to treat anemia, they violated the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78j(b), 78t(a), and Rule 10b-5, 17 C.F.R. 240.10b-5. At issue was what a plaintiff must do to invoke a fraud-on-the-market presumption in aid of class certification. The court joined the Third and Seventh Circuits in holding that plaintiff must (1) show that the security in question was traded in an efficient market, and (2) show that the alleged misrepresentation were public. As for the element of materiality, plaintiff must plausibly allege that the claimed misrepresentations were material. In this case, plaintiff plausibly alleged that several of defendants' public statements about its pharmaceutical products were false and material. Coupled with the concession that the company's stock traded in an efficient market, this was sufficient to invoke the fraud-on-the-market presumption of reliance. Therefore, the district court did not abuse its discretion in certifying the class.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, petitioned for review of an order of the BIA upholding the IJ's denial of registry, cancellation of removal, and voluntary departure on grounds of alleged constitutional violations and that as a matter of law the administrative record could not support a finding that he lacked good moral character. The court held that the court lacked jurisdiction to review some of petitioner's claims and where the court did possess jurisdiction, petitioner's claims failed on the merits. Therefore, the court denied the petition for review in part and dismissed in part.

Plaintiff, the former General Counsel of McAfee, alleged that McAfee maliciously prosecuted and defamed him in an attempt to deflect attention from large-scale backdating of stock options within the company. McAfee moved to strike plaintiff's claims pursuant to California's anti-Strategic Litigation Against Public Participation (anti-SLAPP) statute, Code Civ. Proc., 425.16. The district court denied the motion as to plaintiff's malicious prosecution claims, but granted it as to his claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy. Both sides appealed. The court held that plaintiff had not demonstrated that his claims have the requisite degree of merit to survive McAfee's anti-SLAPP motion: McAfee had probable cause to believe plaintiff was guilty of a crime and plaintiff's claims for defamation and false light invasion of privacy were time-barred. Accordingly, the court affirmed in No. 10-15670 and reversed in 10-15561.

Plaintiff sued defendants, employees of the State of Washington's State Operated Living Alternative (SOLA) program, on behalf of herself and her daughter's estate under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that defendants deprived her daughter of her Fourteenth Amendment substantive due process right to safe physical conditions while in involuntary state custody. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court held that defendants had no constitutionally required duty of care towards plaintiff's daughter because there was no special relationship between her daughter and the state and there was no state-created danger. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Appellee pled guilty to one count of conspiracy to engage in human trafficking, and admitted that between 2001 and December 22, 2003, he conspired with others to provide controlled substances to several minors and recruited them to engage in sexual activity. Appellant alleged that she was one of the victims identified in appellee's plea agreement and sought compensatory and punitive damages under the Trafficking Victims Protection Act (TVPA), 18 U.S.C. 1589 et seq. The district court certified an interlocutory appeal on two questions: (1) whether the TVPA permitted recovery of punitive damages, and (2) whether the TVPA's civil action provision, 18 U.S.C. 1595, applied retroactively to conduct occurring before its effective date, particularly when the perpetrator could have engaged in sex trafficking after the statute's effective date. The court held that the TVPA permitted recovery of punitive damages because it created a cause of action that sounded in tort and punitive damages were available in tort actions under the common law. The court also held that section 1595 could not be applied retroactively to conduct that occurred before its effective date.

Defendant pleaded guilty to one count of conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine and requested that the district court recommend a southern California housing designation to the Bureau of Prisons. At the sentencing hearing, neither the district court nor counsel addressed this request. Defendant and the government subsequently filed a joint stipulation asking the court to revise the Judgment and Commitment Order to include the designation recommendation. The district court denied the request. Defendant appealed, asserting jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1291 and/or 18 U.S.C. 3742. The court held that because it lacked jurisdiction to review a district court's non-binding housing recommendation, the appeal was dismissed.

Plaintiff filed suit against defendants, county officers and the county, alleging a state law wrongful death claim and a 42 U.S.C. 1983 claim for excessive force under the Fourth Amendment when her 18-year-old son was shot and killed in his driveway by the officers. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants after concluding there was no constitutional violation. The court held that there were material questions of fact about plaintiff's son's and the officers' actions that precluded a conclusion that the officers' rapid resort to deadly force was reasonable as a matter of law. The court concluded that resolution of these issues was critical to a proper determination of the officers' entitlement to qualified immunity. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's summary judgment on the use of lethal force. The court also reversed and remanded for reconsideration of whether plaintiff's state law wrongful death claim could properly be resolved on summary judgment.

Plaintiffs, four citizens of Iran who came to the United States at various times due to their long-standing opposition to that nation's theocratic regime, sued defendants, raising a number of claims including unlawful detention, inhumane conditions, witness intimidation, and the intentional infliction of emotional distress. The court declined to extend Bivens to allow plaintiffs to sue federal agents for wrongful detention pending deportation given the extensively remedial procedures available to and invoked by them and the unique foreign policy considerations implicated in the immigration context. The court rejected plaintiffs' argument regarding the dismissal of their claim against one agent for witness intimidation and against two agents for conspiracy to intimidate a witness because plaintiffs could not have been prejudiced by any alleged wrongdoing. The court also rejected plaintiffs' claims against the United States under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 1346, because the decision to detain an alien pending resolution of immigration proceedings was explicitly committed to the discretion of the Attorney General and implicated issues of foreign policy, falling within an exception to the FTCA. The court affirmed the district court's denial of plaintiffs' motion to amend their complaint where plaintiffs' woes were not caused by insufficient allegations of factual content and no potential amendments would change the outcome. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs, current or former "franchisee" shuttle van drivers for SuperShuttle in various parts of California, filed a putative class action alleging that plaintiffs were misclassified as "independent contractors" when, in truth, they were "employees" under California law. Plaintiffs alleged that they had consequently been deprived of the full protections provided to employees under the California Labor Code, including overtime and minimum wages, reimbursement of business expenses and deductions wrongfully taken from wages, and meal period pay. The district court granted SuperShuttle's motion to dismiss plaintiffs' state law claims holding that it lacked subject matter jurisdiction. The court held that the third prong in San Diego Gas & Electric Co. v. Superior Court (Covalt) was not satisfied, the California Public Utilities Code 1759 was not implicated, and the district court retained subject matter jurisdiction over the case. On remand, the district court could determine whether the SuperShuttle drivers were employees or independent contractors under California law without hindering or interfering with PUC decisions or policies.

Defendant appealed from the district court's order finding him in violation of his conditions of supervised release based upon his use of marijuana. Defendant asserted that because he had a recommendation from a physician to use marijuana in California pursuant to the California Compassionate Use Act of 1996, Cal. Health & Safety Code 11362.5, he did not violate the possession prohibition of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, 21 U.S.C. 844(a). The court affirmed the judgment of the district court and adopted that court's reasoning, with one addition. Whatever else "order" might mean under section 844(a) of the Controlled Substances Act, it did not include a mere recommendation from a physician pursuant to the Compassionate Use Act.