Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant appealed from his conviction for maintaining his residence for the purpose of manufacturing, distributing, or using methamphetamine. Defendant contended that the district court erred in denying his motion to suppress certain inculpatory statements he made to DEA officials. Because the government did not bear its burden of showing that these statements were not the product of government officials' concededly illegal searches of defendant's home and garage, the court reversed his conviction. The court also concluded that, although the evidence was sparse, it was sufficient to allow a jury to infer that one of the primary or principal uses to which defendant devoted his property was the manufacture, distribution, or use of methamphetamine. Therefore, the court held that defendant was entitled to a judgment of acquittal on the ground of insufficient evidence. The court also rejected defendant's void for vagueness argument.

Plaintiff, a minor who had been diagnosed with autism, appealed the district court's affirmance of the Hawaii Department of Education (DOE) hearing officer's decision that plaintiff's free and appropriate public education placement complied with the Individuals with Disabilities Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. Plaintiff also claimed that his tuition reimbursement request for the 2007-2008 school year was timely, and that Loveland Academy was his "stay put" placement. The court held that Loveland Acadamy was not plaintiff's stay put placement because the DOE only agreed to pay tuition for the limited 2006-2007 school year and never affirmatively agreed to place plaintiff at Loveland Academy. The court also concluded that plaintiff's tuition reimbursement claim for the 2007-2008 school year was time-barred and that the district court did not err in finding that the 2007 and 2008 individualized education programs complied with IDEA requirements. Accordingly, the court affirmed the decision of the district court.

Plaintiff sued defendant, a general improvement district, arguing that defendant's policy of only allowing people who own or rent real property within defendant's 1968 boundaries to access beaches that it owned and operated was unconstitutional under the First Amendment and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The district court granted defendant's motion for summary judgment. The court held that the beaches were not a traditional public forum, and that plaintiff's exclusion from beaches did not violate either his First Amendment or Fourteenth Amendment rights. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Petitioner was convicted of murder and other aggravated enhancements. This case reached the court on a certificate of appealability granted by the district court on the issue of whether the state court of appeal acted contrary to clearly established federal law as determined by the Supreme Court of the United States when it held that the supplemental jury charge given at petitioner's trial was not coercive. The court affirmed the denial of the writ of habeas corpus because the state court of appeal's decision met the federal review standards set forth under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254(d).

The Church appealed the adverse grant of summary judgment on its claim that the County enforced a land use regulation in violation of the Church's constitutional and statutory rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act of 2000 (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc. The court agreed with the district court that the Church failed to establish that its RLUIPA claims were ripe absent a final determination from the County on its Use Permit application and held that the Church failed to make a sufficient showing of the ripeness of any of its constitutional claims. Accordingly, the district court's judgment was affirmed.

Plaintiffs contended that Barack Obama was constitutionally ineligible to be President of the United States. In addition to plaintiffs' constitutional claims, as well as their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief, plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their quo warranto claims for improper venue; their Freedom of Information Act (FOIA), 5 U.S.C. 552 et seq., claims for failure to state a claim; and their Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO), 18 U.S.C. 1961 et seq., claims against defendants First Lady Michelle Obama, Secretary of State Hillary Clinton, Vice President Joe Biden, and former Secretary of Defense Robert Gates, for failure to state a claim. The court adopted the district court's classification of the parties and held that each plaintiff lacked standing; the proper venue for plaintiffs' quo warranto claims was in the District of Columbia, pursuant to D.C. Code 16-3503; FOIA did not apply to any of defendants because they were all individuals, not agencies; and plaintiffs had six months between the original complaint and the amended complaint to attempt to set forth civil RICO allegations and their failure to do so was inexcusable. Accordingly, the district court properly dismissed plaintiffs' constitutional claims for lack of Article III standing and the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiffs' quo warranto, FOIA, or RICO claims. The dismissal of the district court was affirmed and the emergency petition for writ of mandamus was denied.

UMG filed suit against Veoh for direct and secondary copyright infringement where users of Veoh's service have in the past been able, without UMG's authorization, to download videos containing songs for which UMG owned a copyright. The district court granted summary judgment to Veoh after determining that it was protected by the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), 17 U.S.C. 512(c), "safe harbor" limiting service providers' liability for "infringement of copyright by reason of the storage at the direction of a user of material that resides on a system or network controlled or operated by or for the service provider." The court affirmed the district court's determination on summary judgment that Veoh was entitled to section 512(c) safe harbor protection where Veoh met all the section 512(c) requirements. The district court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of the claims of secondary liability against the Investor Defendants. The court further affirmed the district court's determination that, in this case, attorney's fees could not be awarded under Rule 68. The court remanded for the district court to consider in the first instance whether Veoh was entitled to Rule 68 costs excluding attorney's fees.

Petitioner, born in El Salvador, petitioned for review of the BIA's dismissal of his appeal. The BIA found that petitioner was removable because he had committed a crime of violence and failed to establish entitlement to relief from removeability. The court held that the BIA committed no error when it dismissed petitioner's appeal because he failed to establish a claim of derivative citizenship due to his legitimation under Salvadoran law. In the absence of derivative citizenship, petitioner was subject to removal due to his commission of a crime of violence. Accordingly, the petition was denied.

PAC sought review of an order of the Board holding that PAC violated section 8(a)(1) of the National Labor Relations Act (Act), 29 U.S.C. 158(a)(1), by firing an employee for his outburst during a meeting with PAC management regarding PAC's compensation policies. The court remanded to the Board for proper balancing of the Atlantic Steel factors in light of its conclusion that the Board erred in its initial assessment that the nature of the employee's outburst weighed in favor of protection. The court granted the Board's petition for enforcement of the order with regard to the Board's findings that PAC committed unfair labor practices by inviting the employee to quit in response to his protected concerted protests of labor conditions. Accordingly, Paragraphs 2(a)-(c) of the Board's order were vacated and Paragraphs 1 and 2(d)-(e) were enforced.

Brian Fitzgerald appealed for a second time the district court's award to him of $33,333 in quantum meruit - for his services in a medical malpractice case appellee had settled on behalf of Wende Nostro, a client Fitzgerald had referred to appellee - based on the unjust enrichment he conferred on appellee. The court held that the initial measure of Fitzgerald's quantum meruit award was one-third of appellee's $500,000 recovery from the Nostro settlement, or $166,666. The court further held that the $166,666 amount should be reduced to the extent Fitzgerald decreased the overall value to appellee of the Nostro case. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's order and remanded with instructions that the district court enter a final quantum meruit award of $100,000 for Fitzgerald.