Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The district court affirmed a bankruptcy court's confirmation of a Chapter 11 plan of reorganization under 11 U.S.C. 524(g), a special provision for the reorganization of companies facing substantial asbestos-related liability. Appellants were several insurance companies that did not reach settlements with Thorpe and Pacific, together with Debtors in bankruptcy court, and who were denied standing to challenge the reorganization plan. The court affirmed the district court's conclusion that the plan preempted appellants' state law contract rights; disagreed with the position of Debtors that the appeal was equitably moot; and in reaching the merits, reversed the district court's conclusion that appellants lacked standing. The court remanded to the district court with instructions that it return the case to the bankruptcy court to give appellants the opportunity to present their proof and argument.

Plaintiff, a former employee of defendant, filed this action under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1101 et seq., to challenge the termination of his long-term disability benefits. At issue on appeal was whether the district court erroneously relied on Curtis v. Nevada Bonding Corp. to dismiss the case for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court agreed with plaintiff that Vaughn v. Bay Environmental Management, Inc. controlled in these circumstances. Whether plaintiff was a participant for purposes of ERISA was a substantive element of his claim, not a prerequisite for subject matter jurisdiction. Therefore, the court vacated the dismissal and remanded for further proceedings because plaintiff asserted a colorable claim that he was a plan participant and satisfied the threshold for establishing subject matter jurisdiction.

A juvenile male appealed the district court's determination that he was an "Indian" under 18 U.S.C. 1153, which provided federal criminal jurisdiction for certain crimes committed by Indians in Indian country. The juvenile claimed that he did not identify as an Indian, and was not socially recognized as Indian by other tribal members. Nonetheless, he was an enrolled tribal member, had received tribal assistance, and had used his membership to obtain tribal benefits. Therefore, because the juvenile was Indian by blood and easily met three of the most important factors used to evaluate tribal recognition laid out in United States v. Bruce, the court held that he was an "Indian" under section 1153 and upheld his conviction.

This appeal concerned the maintenance of a suit for rescission under section 10(b) of the Securities and Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78a et seq., by plaintiffs Kenneth Weiss and his wholly-owned corporation. The district court granted summary judgment to defendants on all claims and awarded defendants attorneys' fees. The court held that a plaintiff suing under section 10(b) seeking rescission must demonstrate economic loss and that the misrepresentation or fraud conduct caused the loss. The court found that the record revealed that rescission was not feasible in the instant case. Yet employing a rescissionary measure of damages, Weiss would be able to convince the finder of fact that he was entitled to relief. On that basis, the court reversed the district court's grant of summary judgment of Weiss's federal and state securities claims and remanded for consideration under a rescissionary measure of damages. With respect to the statue of limitations issue, the court remanded for consideration in light of Merck & Co., Inc. v. Reynolds. The court affirmed the district court's judgment on Weiss's state law claims of common law fraud, negligent misrepresentation, mutual mistake, and unjust enrichment. The court vacated the district court's attorneys' fee award and dismissed the appeal of this award as moot.

Petitioners petitioned for review of the EPA's approval of the 2004 State Implementation Plan (2004 SIP) for the San Joaquin Valley's nonattainment area for the one-hour ozone National Ambient Air Quality Standard. The court held that the EPA's 2010 approval of the 2004 SIP, which was based on data current only as of 2004, was arbitrary and capricious. The court did not reach petitioners' remaining arguments and granted the petition for review, remanding the matter to the EPA for further proceedings.

Defendant filed a due process hearing complaint with California's Office of Administrative Hearings (OAH), alleging that he was being denied the free appropriate public education (FAPE) that he was entitled to under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA), 20 U.S.C. 1400 et seq. The court certified the following question to the California Supreme Court: Does California Education Code 56041 - which provided generally that for qualifying children ages eighteen to twenty-two, the school district where the child's parent resides is responsible for providing special education services - apply to children who are incarcerated in county jails? The case was withdrawn from submission and further proceedings were stayed pending final action by the Supreme Court of California.

This case concerned a Railcar Contract with TriMet that required Colorado Railcar to secure a $3 million standby letter of credit, which Colorado Railcar arranged through Collateral II, a bankruptcy remote entity. TrimMet certified Collateral II's default and drew on the Letter of Credit when Colorado Railcar defaulted. At issue was whether Collateral II was a surety to Colorado Railcar, entitled to the defense of discharge. The court held that it was not. Because the standby letter of credit issued by KeyBank required TriMet to certify Collateral II's default, TriMet sought clarification that should Colorado Railcar default, TriMet's authority to certify Collateral II's default would be triggered. In response to TriMet's concern, Collateral II agreed to become a part of the Railcar Contract via Modification No. 1, but it undertook no new obligation nor did it subject itself to any additional liability beyond what it previously undertook by securing the Letter of Credit at Colorado Railcar's direction. Thus, no suretyship was created. Because Collateral II was not entitled to the protections of a surety, it was error for the district court to grant summary judgment in its favor.

Plaintiff, a former inmate in the ODOC, sued several ODOC officials in their official capacity, alleging, among other things, that they were substantially burdening plaintiff's practice of his Native American religion in violation of the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), 42 U.S.C. 2000cc to 2000cc-5. At issue was what relief was available to plaintiff. The court concluded that money damages were not available under RLUIPA against state officials sued in their official capacity. Because the ODOC had released plaintiff from its custody, his claims for declaratory and injunctive relief were moot. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiff's claims.

In these consolidated appeals, the court addressed the propriety of various actions taken by the EPA under the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7401, with respect to Montana air quality from 1993 to 2008. In No. 02-71657, Montana Sulphur sought review of the EPA's final rule which partially disapproved a proposed revision to Montana's State Implementation Plan (SIP) governing sulfur dioxide (SO2). In No. 08-72642, Montana Sulphur sought review of the EPA's April 2008 final rule promulgating a Federal Implementation Plan (FIP) for the State of Montana's SO2 emissions. Because the court concluded that the agency did not act arbitrarily or capriciously with respect to either the SIP or FIP, the court denied both petitions for review.

The district court granted a preliminary injunction prohibiting the State of Washington from enforcing its limitation on contributions to political committees supporting the recall of a state or county official. The court concluded that plaintiffs satisfied their burden under Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., to demonstrate that the contribution limit was likely an unconstitutional and harmful burden on plaintiffs' rights of free speech under the First Amendment. Accordingly, the district court did not err in granting the injunction and the court affirmed the judgment.