Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Defendant was arrested during a DEA "buy bust" operation and subsequently convicted of possession with intent to distribute 500 or more grams of a substance containing methamphetamine and conspiracy to distribute 500 or more grams of a substance containing methamphetamine. Defendant appealed his conviction. The court held that even if the trial court's failure to administer oaths to a government informant's interpreters was plain error, the error did not affect defendant's substantial rights. The court also held that the district court did not plainly err in admitting the nontestifying agents' statements and there was sufficient evidence to sustain the verdict. Because defendant had not identified any other error, there was no cumulative error wanting reversal.

This case concerned the Washington State Grange's proposed People's Choice Initiative of 2004, or Initiative 872. I-872 created a "top two" primary in which the primary served as a means of winnowing the candidates to two rather than selecting party nominees. At issue was whether the State of Washington had designed its election ballots in a manner that eliminated the risk of widespread voter confusion, a question left unresolved in Washington State Grange v. Washington State Republican Party. The court held that the state had done so. The ballots, and related informational material, informed voters that, although each candidate for partisan office could specify a political party that he or she preferred, a candidate's preference did not imply that the candidate was nominated or endorsed by the party, or that the party approved of or associated with that candidate. Given the design of the ballot, and in the absence of evidence of actual voter confusion, the court held that Washington's top primary system, as implemented by the state, did not violate the First Amendment associational rights of the state's political parties. The court also affirmed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' ballot access and trademark claims. The court reversed the district court's order granting the state's request for reimbursement of attorney's fees paid in accordance with a 2006 stipulation.

Defendant appealed his conviction under 8 U.S.C. 1326(b) for illegal reentry into the United States after being deported. On appeal, defendant challenged his conviction based on a collateral attack of the underlying removal order. The court held that a defect in defendant's 1997 immigration proceedings, that he was not meaningfully informed of his eligibility for voluntary departure, violated his due process rights. However, the district court did not consider fully whether defendant suffered prejudice. Therefore, the court remanded to the district court to consider this issue.

Defendant, a citizen of Macau, engaged in efforts to import protected defense articles from the United States into China, without the licenses required by law. Defendant was convicted after a jury trial on four counts of conspiracy and attempt to export defense articles without a license, money laundering, and conspiracy and attempt to smuggle goods from the United States. Defendant challenged his conviction and sentence. The court concluded that venue was proper in the Southern District of California; disagreed with defendant that the Arms Export Control Act, 22 U.S.C. 2778, violated the nondelegation principle; concluded that defendant's conviction on count three must be vacated as a matter of law because attempting to cause an export of a defense article was not a federal crime; defendant's conviction on count four must also be vacated for lack of jurisdiction; and because the district court should have allowed defendant to present evidence of duress to the jury, the court reversed and remanded for a new trial on counts one and two. The court did not reach defendant's arguments regarding his sentence.

After her first termination from the City of Pasadena Police Department and subsequent reinstatement, plaintiff brought a lawsuit in state court claiming that she had been discriminated against and harassed by the City due to its perception that she had a disability. After her second termination, she reinstated her discrimination and harassment claims in an administrative proceeding, where she also argued that the termination was retaliatory. Both of plaintiff's actions resulted in a decision in favor of the City. Plaintiff subsequently brought claims in federal court based on the same theories in state proceedings. The court held that California principles of issue preclusion prevented the court from reaching these issues.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's determination that the Citizenship and Immigration Service (CIS) properly terminated petitioner's lawful permanent resident status and dismissed his appeal. At issue was whether the CIS lost jurisdiction of a petition to remove conditions placed on residence if it did not adjudicate the petition within 90 days, as required by 8 U.S.C. 1186a(c)(3)(A). The court held that the BIA was correct to conclude that the 90 day deadline did not start "running after the first scheduled interview" because this interview "was not intended by CIS to be the final interview." The court also held that it lacked jurisdiction to consider petitioner's due process argument. Accordingly, the petition was denied in part and dismissed in part.

Plaintiff sued the Corps for violating the Age Discrimination in Employment Act (ADEA), 29 U.S.C. 621 et seq., by failing to interview him and rejecting his applications for two promotions. The court found that plaintiff presented a prima facie case of age discrimination and evidence of pretext sufficient to create a material dispute as to whether age-related bias was the "but-for" cause of the Corps' failure to interview and promote him. Accordingly, the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the Corps was reversed.

This case concerned a class action by civilly committed persons confined at Atascadero State Hospital under California's Sexually Violent Predator Act. Cal. Welf. & Inst. Code 6600 et seq. Plaintiffs alleged that the conditions of their confinement violated their constitutional rights under 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court affirmed in part and reversed in part the district court's order denying defendants qualified immunity. The Supreme Court granted defendant's petition for certiorari, vacated the court's judgment, and remanded for reconsideration. The court held that defendants were entitled to qualified immunity on plaintiffs' claims for money damages. The conclusory allegations in plaintiffs' second amended complaint were insufficient to establish defendants' individual liability for money damages. On remand, plaintiffs could proceed with their claims for declaratory and injunctive relief.

Oregon's Measure 37 required state and local governments to compensate private property owners for the reduction in the fair market value of their real property that resulted from any land use regulations of those governmental entities that restricted the use of the subject properties. In this consolidated appeal, at issue was whether Oregon committed a constitutional taking, violated plaintiffs' due process rights, or violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights when Oregon voters enacted Measure 49 to replace and modify remedies available under the previous Measure 37. The court concluded that Oregon did not commit a constitutional taking when it modified Measure 37, because any potential property interest that plaintiffs had for compensation or a specific type of land use under Measure 37 had not vested. Measure 49 also did not contravene substantive due process because it did not implicate fundamental rights. For this reason, and also because the regulatory classification under Measure 49 was not based on a suspect class, Measure 49 survived rational basis scrutiny and had not violated plaintiffs' equal protection rights. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court.

Honda appealed the district court's decision to certify a nationwide class of all consumers who purchased or leased Acura RLs equipped with a Collision Mitigation Braking System (CMBS) during a 3 year period under Rule 23(b)(3). Plaintiffs alleged that certain advertisements misrepresented the characteristics of the CMBS and omitted material information on its limitations. The court held that the district court erred because it erroneously concluded that California law could be applied to the entire nationwide class, and because it erroneously concluded that all consumers who purchased or leased the Acura RL could be presumed to have relied on defendant's advertisements, which allegedly were misleading and omitted material information. Accordingly, the court vacated the class certification order.