Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

TIRN appealed from the district court's dismissal of its claim on res judicata grounds. TIRN alleged that the State Department failed to satisfy its consultation and environmental assessment obligations under the National Environmental Policy Act, 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531 et seq., in conducting annual certifications of countries exempted from the general ban on shrimp imports. At issue was whether TIRN's current lawsuit for NEPA and ESA violations was precluded by its earlier lawsuits challenging the State Department's regulations implementing the Section 609(b)(2) of Public Law 101-162 certification process. The court held that because TIRN's current challenge arose from the same transactional nucleus of facts as earlier litigation, res judicata barred its claims. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court.

Four mobile home park owners appealed the dismissal of their suit under the Fair Housing Amendments Act of 1988 (FHAA), 42 U.S.C. 3604, 3617, challenging a city zoning ordinance prohibiting any mobilehome park currently operating as senior housing from converting to all-age housing. The court held that because the FHAA was silent on whether such senior housing zones were permissible and because federal regulations allow for them, the judgment of the district court was affirmed.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of India, petitioned for review of the BIA's order dismissing his appeal. Petitioner claimed that the BIA wrongly determined that a violation of California Penal Code 422 constituted a crime involving moral turpitude (CIMT), thus rendering him removable. Although the court previously determined that a violation of section 422 was an aggravated felony, the court had not yet decided whether section 422 was categorically a crime involving moral turpitude. The court did so now and answered the question in the affirmative. The court also addressed and rejected petitioner's other claimed errors. Accordingly, the petition was dismissed in part and denied in part.

Plaintiffs appealed the dismissal of their second amended complaint alleging that HP concealed a design defect in its Pavilion Notebook computers that manifested after the expiration of the warranty and created an unreasonable safety hazard in violation of California's Consumers Legal Remedies Act (CLRA), Cal. Civ. Code 1750 et seq., and Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200 et seq. The court found that the district court did not err in requiring plaintiffs to allege the existence of an unreasonable safety defect and that the district court did not err in holding that plaintiffs failed to plausibly allege the existence of an unreasonably safety defect or HP's knowledge of a defect. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Music Companies sued East Coat and Hudson for eight counts of copyright infringement, corresponding to the eight songs ASCAP's independent investigator heard publicly performed at the Long Beach Roscoe's House of Chicken and Waffles. East Coast and Hudson appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment to Music Companies for the eight counts of copyright infringement, as well as the district court's award of attorney's fees and costs to the Music Companies. The court held that the district court was correct to conclude that the investigator's uncontested declaration was sufficient to establish that no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether copyright infringement occurred at the Long Beach Roscoe's. Because no genuine issue of material fact existed as to whether East Coast and Hudson controlled and derived financial benefit from the infringing performances, the district court properly held that Hudson and East Coast were liable for copyright infringement. Finally, the district court did not abuse its discretion in awarding fees and costs. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

In this federal estate tax refund action, the Marshal Naify Revocable Trust appealed the district court's decision granting the Government's motion for judgment on the pleadings pursuant to Rule 12(c). After Naify's death, the Estate deducted $62 million on its federal estate tax return for the estimated amount of California income that it might owe on the $660 million gain if Naify's California tax avoidance plan failed. The court affirmed the judgment and agreed with the district court that the settlement amount was dispositive because it "determine[d] as a factual matter how much the claim against the estate [was] worth and [was] the only moment at which the value of the claim [became] 'certain.'"

This case stemmed from a dispute that arose after a 20 year lease program ended in which Polar Star owned 300 units of family housing located on Eielson Air Force Base, Alaska. Polar Star leased the units back to the Air Force but the parties could not agree on the purchase price or the amount of rent payable for an additional year on the lease. The United States first sent notice of a one-year renewal of the lease, then filed a protective eminent domain action to condemn a five-month leasehold in the houses. Polar Star subsequently appealed a number of the district court's rulings. The court held that the district court correctly decided that the government's notice of renewal successfully renewed the Project Lease for one year; the district court's finding that the expiration date of the Ground Lease was the error, and therefore the lease ran for 23 years, was not clearly erroneous; the district court correctly determined that it lacked jurisdiction to adjudicate the amount of rent due from the Government to Polar Star on the renewal; Polar Star did not file an action in district court, so the only matter before the court was the Government's condemnation action; the district court correctly determined that the condemnation action should be dismissed; Polar Star's entitlement to rent beyond what the Government paid was not asserted on a claim or counterclaim in the district court; and plaintiffs may be entitled to pursue a claim in the Court of Federal Claims. Accordingly, the district court's judgment of dismissal was affirmed.

Plaintiff, a photojournalist, contended that viewing restrictions at a Bureau of Land Management (BLM) horse roundup violated her First Amendment right to observe government activities. The district court denied plaintiff's motion for a preliminary injunction, concluding that most of the relief sought was moot because the roundup ended in October 2010. Alternatively, the district court concluded that plaintiff was unlikely to succeed on the merits because the restrictions did not violate the First Amendment. The court held that, because the preliminary injunction motion sought unrestricted access to future horse roundups, and not just the one that took place in 2010, the case was was not moot. With regards to plaintiff's First Amendment claim, the district court erred by failing to apply the well-established qualified right of access balancing test set forth in Press-Enterprise Co. v. Superior Court. Accordingly, the court remanded the case to the district court to consider in the first instance whether the public had a First Amendment right of access to horse gathers, and if so, whether the viewing restrictions were narrowly tailored to serve the government's overriding interests.

Petitioner, who is serving a sentence in Nevada State Prison, appealed the dismissal of his claims against prison officials under 42 U.S.C. 1983, alleging that they violated several of his constitutional rights. The court held that petitioner failed to state an Eighth Amendment claim against Correctional Officer Sean LaGier and failed to state a First Amendment retaliation claim against Correctional Officer Joseph Rodriquez, but plaintiff's First Amendment retaliation claims against Associate Warden Mary Carter and Correctional Officers Rosa Rodriguez, Sean LaGier, and Danilo Santos required further consideration. The district court should not have dismissed petitioner's state-law claims with prejudice. Therefore, the court affirmed in part and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant appealed from a restitution order imposed by the district court after a jury convicted her of various crimes associated with her involvement in a fraudulent real estate investment scheme. The court held that the district court failed to provide an adequate explanation of its reasoning in calculating the amount of restitution owed to two of the victims and, therefore, vacated that portion of the restitution order. The court remanded for recalculation and explanation of the award pursuant to the Mandatory Victims Restitution Act of 1996 (MVRA), 18 U.S.C. 3663A.