Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, the Chief of Police Services for the City of San Clemente, sued defendants under 42 U.S.C. 1983 after plaintiff was placed on administrative leave after he ran for, and lost, the election of Orange County Sheriff-Coroner. Plaintiff claimed that his placement on administrative leave and subsequent demotion were in unconstitutional retaliation for the exercise of his First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that plaintiff's campaign speech was not protected by the First Amendment because he fell into the narrow "policymaker" exception to the general rule against politically-motivated dismissals. Although the court determined that the district court erred in this conclusion, the court agreed that the district court's alternative holding that Michael Carona, the incumbent Orange County Sheriff who won the election at issue, was entitled to qualified immunity because a government official in his position "reasonably but mistakenly" could have believed that political loyalty was required by someone with plaintiff's job responsibilities at the time he ran against Carona. Therefore, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiffs, parents of GPR, filed an action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 1983 alleging that an officer used excessive force when he shot and killed GPR. GPR and his accomplice were fleeing from the police when GPR, who was driving a truck, reversed and backed rapidly in the direction of the officer, and the officer, fearing for his life, fired at GPR and killed him. The court held that Heck v. Humphrey barred plaintiffs' suit. Plaintiffs sought to show that the officer used excessive force, but the jury that convicted GPR's accomplice had already determined that the officer acted within the scope of his employment and did not use excessive force. Accordingly, a verdict in plaintiffs' favor would tend to undermine the accomplice's conviction. Moreover, the accomplice challenged the propriety of the officer's actions in her criminal trial, her interests in doing so were in no way inconsistent with plaintiffs' interests, and the accomplice was convicted by a jury.

The State of Nevada appealed the district court's permanent injunction prohibiting the retroactive application of two Nevada laws: Assembly Bill 579, expanding the scope of sex offender registration and notification requirements, and Senate Bill 471, imposing, inter alia, residency and movement restrictions on certain sex offenders. The district court permanently enjoined retroactive application of both bills. With respect to Assembly Bill 579, the court held that its retroactive application was constitutionally sound and reversed the judgment of the district court. With respect to Senate Bill 471, the court concluded that its consideration of its disputed provisions was mooted by the State's authoritative judicial admission that - regardless of the existence of the injunction - the State would not retroactively impose residency and movement restrictions. Because the State's concession mooted its own appeal, the court remanded to the district court to consider vacating its order as to Senate Bill 471 in favor of a binding consent decree. Finally, the court affirmed the district court's order denying a stay on payment of attorney's fees.

Just when Defendants-Appellees United States Forest Service and Joseph P. Stringer (USFS), and Intervenor-Defendant Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership (ASRLP) had successfully defended an agency decision to allow snowmaking at a ski resort on federal land all the way to the United States Supreme Court, "new" plaintiffs appeared. Represented by the same attorney as the losing parties in the first lawsuit, the "new" plaintiffs—who had closely monitored the first litigation—brought certain environmental claims that were virtually identical to some that the attorney had improperly attempted to raise in the earlier lawsuit, for no apparent reason other than to ensure further delay and forestall development. "Although it is apparent to [the Ninth Circuit] that the 'new' plaintiffs and their counsel have grossly abused the judicial process by strategically holding back claims that could have, and should have, been asserted in the first lawsuit… [the Court was] compelled to hold that laches [did] not apply here" because the USFS and ASRLP could not demonstrate that they suffered prejudice, as defined by the applicable case law. The Court held that the Save the Peaks Plaintiffs' claims failed under NEPA and the APA. Accordingly, the Court held that the district court properly granted summary judgment to the USFS and ASRLP.

A trustee in Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceedings took possession of Appellant SK Foods, LP's documents, which it had deposited at the its office. Appellants claimed the trustee acted illegally; that the documents should be returned; and that the trustee and his counsel should be removed. The bankruptcy court denied such relief, and the district court affirmed. This appeal raised the issue whether such orders of the bankruptcy court, affirmed by the district court, are final appealable orders under 28 U.S.C. 158(d)(1). Upon review, the Ninth Circuit held that they are not. Accordingly, the Court dismissed the case for lack of jurisdiction.

The issue on appeal in this case came from the dismissal of a putative class action filed in a California district court. The dismissal was based on a Massachusetts federal district court's final judgment certifying a nationwide class and approving a class settlement. A class member appeared through counsel as an objector in the Massachusetts case filed the present suit in California seeking to represent a nationwide class. The California complaint sought damages based in large part on the same facts alleged in the Massachusetts case, but against different defendants. The putative class was part of the same class certified in the Massachusetts case. The California defendants moved to dismiss the case based on a covenant not to sue contained in the settlement and final judgment entered in the Massachusetts case. Under that provision, the class members, including the member who filed the California suit as the named plaintiff, not only released their claims against the Massachusetts defendants but also agreed not to sue "any other person seeking to establish liability based, in whole or in part," on the claims released. The district court held that the covenant was enforceable against the named plaintiff in the California case, declined to appoint or allow a new class representative because no class had been certified, did not decide whether the covenant was enforceable against the absent members of the putative class, and dismissed. The named plaintiff appealed. Upon review, the Ninth Circuit affirmed.

The central issue on appeal in this case arose from an order that denied a pretrial special motion to dismiss under Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute (Nev. Rev. Stat. 41.635-670), and whether that order was appealable under the collateral order doctrine as established by Supreme Court precedent. In 2009, Defendant-Appellant attorney Scott Ferrell sent demand letters to Plaintiffs-Appellees Metabolic Research, Inc. (Metabolic), at its address in Las Vegas, Nevada, and to General Nutrition Centers, Inc. (GNC), at its address in Pittsburgh, Pennsylvania. The demand letters purported to notify the recipients that they had violated California law by falsely advertising the properties and potential benefits of "Stemulite," which they marketed as a natural fitness supplement. Defendant represented that he was acting on behalf of three individuals and a class of similarly situated people, all of whom he alleged purchased Stemulite in California, in reliance on the supposed false advertising, and had not received the purported benefits. In his letters, Defendant set out his allegations, and concluded them with offers to compromise and allow Plaintiffs time to agree to an injunction. If Plaintiffs did not accept his offer, Defendant stated he would file suit. Metabolic filed suit in Nevada against Defendant and his putative class action plaintiffs charging them with extortion, racketeering and conspiracy. Defendant removed the case to the federal district court in Nevada, then moved to dismiss Metabolic's case based on Nevada's anti-SLAPP statute. In its order dismissing Ferrell’s motion, the district court found that Ferrell had not established that the demand letter to Metabolic constituted a good-faith communication in furtherance of the right to petition because it concluded that Nevada’s anti-SLAPP legislation only protected communications made directly to a governmental agency and did not protect a demand letter sent to a potential defendant in litigation. Finding that the Nevada legislature did not intend for its anti-SLAPP law to function as an immunity from suit, Defendant's motion was not immediately appealable. The Ninth Circuit held that the district court's denial of Defendant's special motion was not made in error.

The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (REA) prohibits the U.S. Forest Service from charging fees solely for parking, undesignated parking, or picnicking along roads or trailsides, for hiking without using facilities and services, and for camping at undeveloped sites. Despite these prohibitions, the Forest Service collected fees from all drivers who parked their vehicles in a piece of the Coronado National Forest running along the Catalina Highway, the only paved road to the summit of Mount Lemmon, a heavily used recreational area. Four recreational visitors used, seeking a declaration that the Forest Service was exceeding the scope of its authority under the REA by charging fees to those who drove to Mount Lemmon, parked their cars, then picnicked, hiked, or camped in nearby undeveloped areas. Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the Forest Service from collecting such fees. The district court granted Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Forest Service's fee structure contravened the plain language of the REA. Remanded to allow Plaintiffs to pursue that claim.

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, first entered the U.S. in 1989. In 1993, he went to Mexico for two or three weeks. When he attempted to reenter he was arrested and charged with falsely claiming U.S. citizenship and possessing a false identification document. He pleaded guilty to possession of a false identification document, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(4), (b)(3). After being released in Mexico he immediately crossed the border on foot. In 2000, the INS charged petitioner with removability, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). The IJ held that his 1993 departure interrupted continuous physical presence and made him ineligible for cancellation of removal and granted voluntary departure. On remand, petitioner testified that he was not told about the possibility of taking his case to immigration court or given a voluntary departure option in 1993. The IJ found that the 1993 departure was "clearly different from" a mere turn-around at the border and again granted voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied appeal. Although the 1993 conviction did not declare that he was inadmissible, petitioner was subjected to a "formal, documented process" sufficient to break his continuous physical presence in the U.S.

Plaintiff, and drivers similarly situated, filed a class action against Affinity alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and California laws, including failure to pay overtime, failure to pay wages, improper charges for workers' compensation insurance, and the unfair business practice of wrongfully classifying California drivers. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court, after applying California's choice of law framework, erred when it concluded that Georgia law applied. The district court concluded that under Georgia law there was a presumption of independent contractor status and to rebut this presumption, plaintiff must establish that an employer-employee relationship existed. The district court found that plaintiff was unable to establish such a relationship and failed to rebut Georgia's presumption. The court held that the parties' choice of Georgia law was unenforceable in California. The court also held that under California's choice of law framework, the law of California applied. Accordingly, on remand, the district court shall apply California law to determine whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors.