Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiffs appealed summary judgment rejecting their claims under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974, (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. Plaintiffs were employees of Litton and participated in its retirement plan (Litton Plan B). Following corporate mergers and plan modifications, plaintiffs sued the successor corporation and Northrop Plan B, the plan that replaced Litton Plan B under section 502(a)(1)(B) to enforce their understanding of their rights under Northrop Plan B. The court held that summary judgment was appropriate on plaintiffs' claims under section 502(a)(1)(B) and 502(a)(3), rejecting their claims based on reformation and surcharge.

Plaintiffs, current and former customers of AT&T, filed a class action against AT&T, alleging unjust enrichment and and breach of contract. AT&T responded by seeking to enforce an arbitration agreement contained in its contracts with plaintiffs. The district court refused to enforce the arbitration agreement on state-law unconscionability grounds, relying primarily on the agreement's class-action waiver provision. The court reversed the district court's substantive unconscionability ruling where the FAA preempted the Washington state law invalidating the class-action waiver. The court remanded for further proceedings related to plaintiffs' procedural unconscionability claims for the district court to apply Washington choice-of-law rules.

This case arose out of a dispute between two telecommunications carriers over their interconnection agreement (ICA) under the Telecommunications Act of 1996, 47 U.S.C. 151 et seq. Plaintiff Western is a commercial mobile radio service (CMRS) provider and Defendant Qwest is a local exchange carrier (LEC). The court concluded that Western has failed to exhaust the prudential requirement that it first present its claim, that Qwest violated its statutory duty to negotiate the ICA in good faith, to the Public Utility Commission (PUC) before bringing that claim in federal court. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's decision dismissing that claim. The court also concluded that the ICA's provision (1) requiring Western to interconnect with Qwest's network via at least one point per Local Access and Transport Area (LATA); and (2) providing Western with the signaling systems of its choice only where such systems were available, did not violate the Act. However, the court concluded that the ICA, as approved, did violate the Act insofar as it applied to access charges, rather than reciprocal compensation, to calls exchanged between a CMRS provider and a LEC, originating and terminating in the same LATA, when those calls were carried by an interexchange carrier (IXC). Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's decision upholding the PUC's approval of the ICA to that extent, and remanded to the PUC for further proceedings.

Two non-Indian entities brought this action to enjoin Navajo Nation tribal officials from applying tribal law to them in tribal courts. They claimed that both their contract with the tribe and federal law deprived tribal officials of authority to regulate them. At issue was whether the Navajo Nation itself was a necessary party under Rule 19. The court held that the tribe was not a necessary party because the tribal officials could be expected to adequately represent the tribe's interests in this action and because complete relief could be accorded among the existing parties without the tribe. Thus, this lawsuit for prospective injunctive relief could proceed against the officials under a routine application of Ex parte Young and should not be dismissed.

Plaintiff environmental groups sought to enjoin the implementation of a statute, Section 1713 of the 2011 Appropriations Act, that ordered the Secretary of the Interior to remove a portion of a distinct population of gray wolves from the Protections of the Endangered Species Act (ESA), 16 U.S.C. 1531, without regard to any statute or regulation that might otherwise apply. Plaintiffs brought this action contending that Section 1713 violated the separation of powers. The district court rejected plaintiffs' claims on the grounds that Congress had acted within its constitutional authority to change the laws applicable to pending litigation. The court held that because this case was controlled by Robertson v. Seattle Audubon Society, the court affirmed the judgment.

Under 28 U.S.C. 1919, when a suit was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction, the court "may order the payment of just costs." This case required the court to parse the term "just" and consider what constituted "just costs." Here, the district court awarded costs to defendants on the ground that they were necessarily incurred in defending in the action. Because the district court implied a presumption of award of costs that was absent in the permissive statute, and because it equated incurred costs with "just costs," the court concluded that the district court abused its discretion under section 1919.

Plaintiff was injured when the automobile in which he was traveling collided with an automobile owned and driven by an off-duty sailor whose negligence was conceded. Plaintiff and his wife brought suit against the United States on a theory of respondeat superior. The court concluded that a servicemember en route to participation in a recreational activity, where participation was encouraged by the Navy but not required, was not acting in the line of duty. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment for the government.

The Nevada Constitution authorized the citizens of Nevada to enact statutes and amend the Nevada Constitution through the initiative process. To place an initiative on the ballot, proponents must obtain signatures from a number of registered voters equal to 10 percent of the votes cast in the previous general election. This signature requirement was also subject to a geographic distribution requirement known as the All Districts Rule. Plaintiffs sought an order declaring the All Districts Rule unconstitutional and enjoining the state from enforcing it. The court held that plaintiffs have not demonstrated the existence of a genuine issue on their claims that the All Districts Rule violated either the Equal Protection Clause or the First Amendment. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

The Hawaii Longline Association appealed the approval of a consent decree entered into by plaintiff environmental groups and defendant federal agencies affecting the regulation and management of the Hawaii shallow-set, swordfish longline fishery. Appellant challenged the district court's vacatur of a regulation increasing the limit on incidental interactions between longline fishing boats and loggerhead turtles and replacing the increased limit with a lower limit that was previously in effect. Appellant argued that the district court abused its discretion in approving a consent decree that violated federal law by allowing the National Marine Fisheries Service to change duly promulgated rules without following the procedural rulemaking requirements of the Magnuson-Stevens Act, 16 U.S.C. 1851-1856, and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq. Because the consent decree was injunctive in nature, the court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. 1292(a)(1). The consent decree did not purport to make substantive changes to the Fishery regulations so the rulemaking provisions of the Magnuson Act and the APA did not apply. The district court did not clearly err in finding that a return to lower incidental take limits was more protective of loggerhead turtles. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendants appealed their convictions for bulk cash smuggling and failure to file reports on exporting monetary instruments. Border agents found a bag containing $500,000 in cash in a box under a sheet in the back of defendants' van when they were making an early morning crossing. No declaration of possession had been made. Defendants appealed their convictions and sentences, contending that there was insufficient evidence to convict, that there was instructional error, that their convictions violated the double jeopardy clause, that the indictments should have been dismissed because the government had destroyed evidence, that prosecutorial misconduct and false comments in argument gave them a right to a new trial, that there was cumulative error, and that the district court misapplied the sentencing guidelines. The court rejected all these contentions and affirmed the judgment. The court remanded to the district court and ordered it to amend the judgments to remove references to 31 U.S.C. 5324(b)(1).