Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Puget Sound Energy (PSE) maintains and operates a hydroelectric power plant at Snoqualmie Falls in Washington state. PSE sought verification from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) that it could proceed with upgrading and modifying its plant under a series of general nationwide permits (NWPs) authorizing certain discharges rather than applying to the Corps for an individual permit. PSE had already obtained a license for the project from FERC. The Corps verified that it could. Downstream property owners formed the Snoqualmie Valley Preservation Alliance (Alliance) to challenge this decision. The district court granted summary judgment for the Corps. The Ninth Circuit court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) this suit was not an improper collateral attack against the FERC license and amendment; (2) NWP 17, the only nationwide permit which specifically references hydropower projects, is not exclusively applicable to hydropower projects; (3) the Corps did not err in verifying that NWPs 3 and 39 authorize the project; and (4) the Corps' verification letter contained a sufficient articulation of the basis for its decision. View "Snoqualmie Valley Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

Petitioner Andrew Mackey was convicted several crimes in California. Retained attorney Le Rue Grim represented Mackey in post-trial and post-conviction proceedings. Grim subsequently filed a timely petition in the United States district court asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent filed a response to the district court's order to show cause, but Grim did not file a traverse by the due date. Grim then withdrew from the case but failed to notify the court of his intention to withdraw. Consequently, Mackey was unaware that the district court denied his petition and did not have the opportunity to proceed pro se. Mackey then filed a motion to have the district court vacate its judgment and reopen the case. The court denied the motion, determining that it lacked discretion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court would possess the discretion to vacate and reenter the judgment in order to allow Mackey the opportunity to appeal if it were to find that Grim effectively abandoned Mackey, causing Mackey to fail to file a timely notice of appeal. Remanded for findings as to whether Grim's action or inaction constituted abandonment. View "Mackey v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

This case was a challenge to the State of Washington's Building Code brought by the Building Industry Association of Washington (BIAW) along with individual builders and contractors. The impetus for this challenge was the State's 2009 requirement that new building construction must meet heightened energy conservation goals. At issue was the Energy Policy and Conservation Act's (EPCA) preemption-exemption provision, which expressly preempts state standards requiring greater efficiency than federal standards but exempts from preemption state building codes promoting energy efficiency, so long as those codes meet statutory conditions. Plaintiffs argued that the Building Code did not satisfy EPCA's conditions for exemption. The district court held that Washington had satisfied EPCA's conditions and therefore was not preempted. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Building Code satisfied the conditions Congress set forth in the EPCA for exemption from federal preemption. View "Bldg. Ind. Ass'n of Wash. v. Wash. State Bldg. Code" on Justia Law

Defendant Rodolfo Suarez appealed his conviction for conspiracy to distribute and to possess with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant contended that the guilty verdict on that charge was fatally inconsistent with the jury's decision to acquit him on a charge of possession with intent to distribute methamphetamine. Defendant also appealed his sentence of 240 months' imprisonment, which the district court imposed based on the twenty-year mandatory minimum, contending that his 2003 guilty plea to felony drug possession in California state court did not qualify as a "prior conviction" that "has become final" within the meaning of 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A). The Ninth Circuit affirmed Defendant's conviction but vacated his sentence, holding that because Defendant's 2003 guilty plea and participation in a drug rehabilitation program resulted in neither a formal entry of judgment by the state court nor a sentence of imprisonment or probation, the district court erred in applying the twenty-year mandatory minimum sentence under section 21 U.S.C. 841(b)(1)(A) to Defendant. View "United States v. Suarez" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted of possessing with intent to distribute 214.4 grams of actual methamphetamine. Defense counsel indicated that Defendant wanted his family members, including his wife and young son, present at the sentencing hearing. The district court, however, ordered that Defendant's family members be excluded from the sentencing proceedings after expressing displeasure at what it perceived as the manipulative use of Rivera's young son as a sentencing "prop." The Ninth Circuit vacated Defendant's sentence, holding that Defendant's Sixth Amendment right to a public trial was violated by the district court's exclusion of his family members from the sentencing proceedings. Remanded for re-sentencing. View "United States v. Rivera" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction and imposition of a sixty-month sentence following his entry of a plea of guilty to a single charge of possessing child pornography that had been shipped in interstate commerce. The Ninth Circuit (1) affirmed Defendant's conviction, holding that the district court did not err in accepting Defendant's guilty plea, and Defendant's challenges to the grand jury instructions were untimely and therefore waived; but (2) vacated the supervised release portion of Defendant's sentence, holding that the district court committed procedural error by failing to provide adequate analysis for the imposition of the residency restrictions in Defendant's lifetime term of supervised release. Remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Collins" on Justia Law

Kennard Johnson was sentenced to eleven years, four months in the superior court of California following his entry of a plea of guilty to four theft-related counts for defrauding an auto dealership and stealing a vehicle. Johnson petitioned for a writ of habeas corpus in federal court, which the district court granted. Johnson appealed, challenging the adequacy of the district court's chosen remedy for the violation of Johnson's Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and claiming that it was error for the district court to grant the writ subject to imposing a new sentence within the lawful maximum range. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of Johnson's habeas petition but vacated the district court's remedy, holding (1) the district court's decision to grant the writ subject to the state court resentencing Johnson failed adequately to remedy the constitutional violation, as the ineffective assistance of counsel Johnson received affected the entire plea negotiation stage of the proceedings in the superior court; and (2) the district court should grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus, subject to the state court vacating Johnson's conviction and granting him a new trial. View "Johnson v. Uribe " on Justia Law

Chi Mak appealed his jury conviction of conspiring to violate export control laws and attempting to export a defense article to the People's Republic of China in violation of the Arms Export Control Act (AECA). The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the AECA and its implementing regulations do not violate Mak's First Amendment rights since the AECA is substantially related to the protection of an important governmental interest; (2) the court's instructions to the jury concerning technical data did not violate Mak's Due Process rights because they expressly required the government to prove that the documents at issue were not in the public domain; (3) the court's instructions to the jury on willfulness did not violate Mak's Sixth Amendment rights because they did not prevent the jury from fully deliberating as to whether Mak acted willfully, as required by the AECA; and (4) the documents at issue were covered by the United States Munitions List at the time Mak attempted to export them, and therefore, Mak's conviction did not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause. View "United States v. Mak" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed from his conviction and sentence for illegally re-entering the United States after previously having been deported. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) Defendant's prior conviction for burglary under Cal. Penal Code 459 qualified as a crime of violence under the immigration laws and for sentencing purposes; (2) the district court did not err in denying Defendant a two-level downward adjustment for acceptance of responsibility under the sentencing guidelines. The Court distinguished the district court's denial of an acceptance of responsibility adjustment here from cases in which district courts interpreted the guidelines to forbid the award of such an adjustment to any defendant who forces the government to prove his guilt at trial. View "United States v. Ramos-Medina" on Justia Law

Pursuant to the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor must file a statement of intention indicating whether she intends to surrender or retain personal property that secures a debt, and if a debtor fails to timely do so, the automatic stay terminates and the property is removed from the estate unless the chapter 7 trustee obtains a determination that the property is of consequential value or benefit to the estate. In this case, Debtor did not file a statement of intention with respect to personal property that was pledged to Creditor, and the chapter 7 Trustee did not seek a determination that the property was of value or benefit to the estate. However, Trustee appealed the bankruptcy court's ruling that 11 U.S.C. 362(h) terminated the automatic stay on all of the debtor's personal property secured by Creditor's claim and not just on personal property scheduled as securing the claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed and adopted in full the opinion of the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel, holding that under the unambiguous language of section 362(h), all personal property secured by a scheduled debt is released from the automatic stay if a debtor fails to timely file and comply with her statement of intention. View "Samson v. W. Capital Partners, LLC" on Justia Law