Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Michelle Wing appealed the district court's revocation of her second term of supervised release, which had not yet commenced, based on newly discovered violations of conditions of her previously revoked first term of supervised release. Wing contended that the district court lacked jurisdiction to revoke her second term of supervised release. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that, under its interpretation of 18 U.S.C. 3583(e)(3), the district court did not have jurisdiction under section 3583(e)(3) to revoke King's second term of supervised release based on newly discovered violations of conditions of her revoked term of supervised release, as subsection (e)(3) requires that the court find by a preponderance of the evidence that the defendant violated a condition of the term of supervised release that is being revoked. View "United States v. Wing" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's dismissal of her claim challenging the termination of her long-term disability benefits under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1132. Plaintiff challenged the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of Unum on it's counterclaim for restitution of overpaid benefits. The court held that the district court abused its discretion by dismissing the claim for denial of benefits for failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The exhaustion requirement should have been excused because plaintiff acted reasonably in light of Unum's ambiguous communications and failure to engage in a meaningful dialogue. Accordingly, the court vacated the judgment in favor of Unum on plaintiff's claim for denial of benefits. View "Bilyeu v. Morgan Stanley Long Term Disability Plan, et al." on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, operators of a shuttle service between Sesabe and Tucson, Arizona, alleged that Border Patrol agents stopped their shuttle repeatedly and in violation of their Fourth Amendment rights. Plaintiffs brought claims against the Border Patrol agents as well as the agents' supervisors, who they claimed reviewed and directed the stops. The court held that plaintiffs' complaint failed to state a claim against any supervisory defendant other than Ralph Hunt, who directly participated in the alleged underlying violations. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's ruling with respect to Hunt, but reversed and directed the entry of final judgment with respect to the remaining supervisors. View "Chavez, et al. v. Ziglar, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of CGI in its action seeking "appropriate equitable relief" under section 502(a)(3) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (ERISA), 29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq. CGI appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment in favor of defendant's counsel and codefendant, dismissing the codefendant from the action. CGI also appealed the district court's grant of proportional fees and costs to the codefendant, deducted from CGI's recovery from defendant. The court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the codefendant, dismissing it from the action. However, because the court saw no indication that in fashioning "appropriate equitable relief" for CGI, the district court did more than interpret the plain terms of the reimbursement provision, and no indication that the district court considered traditional equitable principles in assigning responsibility to CGI for attorneys' fees and costs, the court vacated the judgment in favor of CGI, vacated the judgment that the codefendant deducted fees and costs from CGI's entitlement, and remanded to the district court for further proceedings. View "CGI Technologies and Solutions v. Rose, et al." on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to knowingly taking or receiving obscene matters from an interactive computer service, a crime that did not categorically constitute a "sex offense" as defined by the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act (SORNA), 42 U.S.C. 16911(5)(A). Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's imposition of supervised release conditions. Because defendant was a sex offender under SORNA, the district court was required to impose the registration condition. Even if the district court were not required to impose SORNA registration as a mandatory condition of supervised release, the district court did not commit plain error by imposing registration as a discretionary condition. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Becker" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the 16-level enhancement of his sentence due to his prior 1985 conviction for kidnapping under Arizona Revised Statute 13-1304. Defendant argued that ARS 13-1304 did not meet the generic definition of kidnapping and therefore did not qualify as a "crime of violence" under either the categorical or modified categorical approach. In light of United States v. Gonzalez-Perez, the court held that ARS 13-1304 categorically met the generic definition of kidnapping and affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Marquez-Lobo" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a lawful permanent resident, pled guilty in 2007 to felony domestic battery and was charged with removability based on this conviction. Petitioner subsequently petitioned for review of the BIA's decision to affirm the IJ's denial of his application for cancellation of removal, arguing inter alia that the video-conference hearing violated his right to due process. The court held that the video-conference hearing in this case did not violate due process where petitioner failed to establish that the outcome of his hearing could have been affected by the fact that his hearing was conducted by video-conference; the agency considered the factors relevant to petitioner's application for cancellation of removal; and the court lacked jurisdiction to review the BIA's discretionary decision to deny his application. Accordingly, the petition for review was denied in part and dismissed in part. View "Vilchez v. Holder, Jr." on Justia Law

Petitioners were statutorily eligible for early release from prison in exchange for the successful completion of a residential drug abuse treatment program (RDAP). The Bureau of Prisons (BOP), however, enacted a regulation disqualifying them from the early release incentive on the basis of their current convictions. Petitioners each filed for a writ of habeas corpus asking the district court to invalidate the regulation under section 706 of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 706. The court affirmed and held that the BOP did not violate the APA in excluding inmates from consideration for early release who have a current conviction for felon in possession or a past conviction for homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated assault, arson, kidnapping, or child sexual abuse. View "Peck v. Thomas; Moon v. Thomas; Suesue v. Thomas" on Justia Law

Sierra filed a motion under FRCP 60 in the district court that had issued default judgments against defendant, an officer of a French corporation that bought assets from an insolvent California insurance company pursuant to a rehabilitation plan, asking that court to correct judgments to add an explanation sufficient to permit its enforcement in France. The district court granted the motion and entered two corrected judgments. Defendant appealed. The court affirmed because the operative, substantive terms of the corrected judgments were identical to the terms of the original judgments. Therefore, the amendments only clarified the original intent of the judgments, and the district court did not abuse its discretion in making those changes under Rule 60(a). The court also held that, by failing to challenge the original judgments, defendant waived his arguments as to setoff, release, and the nature and amount of his liability. Finally, the court concluded that the district court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to stay entry of the amended or corrected judgments. View "Garamendi v. Hennin" on Justia Law

Petitioner was charged with two counts of interference with interstate commerce by threat or violence and use of a firearm during the commission of a crime of violence. Several months after petitioner appealed the dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2255 motion as untimely, petitioner filed a pro se habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2241 in the jurisdiction in which he was then incarcerated. Concluding that petitioner had failed to make an adequate claim of actual innocence, the district court construed the petition as a section 2255 motion and dismissed it for lack of jurisdiction. Petitioner timely appealed. Because petitioner failed to meet the escape hatch criteria, he could not bring his claims in a section 2241 petition. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal for lack of jurisdiction. View "Marrero v. Ives, et al." on Justia Law