Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Gregory Haynes was the counsel for the plaintiff in the underlying action. The district court (1) determined that Haynes continued pursuit of plaintiff's claims after it was clear the claims were frivolous and in bad faith, and (2) determined that the defendants had incurred excess costs and fees of over $360,000 due to Haynes' misconduct. The court imposed sanctions on Haynes in this amount pursuant to 28 U.S.C. 1927, declining to consider Haynes's assertion that he could not possibly pay such an award. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals remanded for further proceedings, holding (1) a district court may reduce a section 1927 sanctions award in light of an attorney's inability to pay; and (2) because the district court appeared to believe it was without discretion to reduce the sanctions award on this ground and accordingly failed to consider whether to exercise that discretion, the case was remanded. View "Haynes v. City of San Francisco" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to mail fraud and money laundering. Based on the sentencing factors set out in 18 U.S.C. 3553(a), the district court imposed a prison sentence longer than the one proposed by the parties in the plea agreement and also in excess of the range recommended by the advisory Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant appealed his sentence, claiming both procedural error and substantive unreasonableness. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) though it imposed a sentence outside of the Guidelines range, the district court did not err by failing to provide prior notice under Fed. R. Crim P. 32(h), as this notice was not required when varying a sentence based on section 3553(a) factors; and (2) the district court did not impermissibly rely on Defendant's inability to pay restitution by considering the financial impact his crimes had on his victims. View "United States v. Rangel" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted by a jury of drug-related crimes involving the distribution of methamphetmaine, cocaine, and marijuana. Defendant appealed the district court's denial of his motion to suppress evidence obtained from a series of electronic surveillance orders authorizing interception of communications over cellular phones associated with him and his alleged co-conspirators. Defendant contended that these orders by their terms authorized more than standard intercepts, permitting more intrusive roving intercepts without meeting the statutory prerequisites of 18 U.S.C. 2518. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) if the government seeks authorization for the use of new technology to convert cellular phones into roving bugs, it must specifically request that authority, the court must scrutinize the need for such surveillance, and the authorization orders must be clear and unambiguous; but (2) in this case, the district court did not err in finding that the orders were intended only to authorize standard interception techniques and that the government did not do otherwise. View "United States v. Oliva" on Justia Law

M.P., a student with disabilities, appealed the district court's ruling that the Anchorage School District (ASD) did not deny him a free and appropriate public education (FAPE) because the failure to develop an updated Individualized Education Program (IEP) was mostly attributable to his "parents' litigious approach." The Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (IDEA) mandates that public educational agencies review and revise annually an eligible child's IEP. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part, holding (1) the district court relied on an improper basis when it declined to consider whether the ASD complied with the IDEA's substantive requirements; (2) the ASD deprived M.P. of a substantively adequate FAPE by relying on an outdated IEP to measure M.P.'s academic and functional performance and provide educational benefits to M.P.; and (3) M.P.'s parents were entitled to reimbursement for private tutoring expenses incurred in 2008 and review of the propriety of private tutoring expenses incurred in 2009. Remanded. View "Anchorage Sch. Dist. v. M.P." on Justia Law

Sean Runningeagle and his cousin Corey Tilden were convicted of murdering two victims. The state trial court imposed a sentence of death upon Runningeagle but not upon Tilden. Runningeagle's direct and collateral appeals were rejected by the state courts. Runningeagle subsequently appealed the district court's denial of his federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus and request for an evidentiary hearing. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding (1) the state courts' denial of Runningeagle's claim that prosecutors withheld evidence obtained from a former cell-mate of Tilden's in violation of Brady v. Maryland was not an unreasonable application of or contrary to clearly established law; (2) the state Supreme Court's holding that counsel did not provide ineffective assistance was not an unreasonable application of the standard established in Strickland v. Washington; and (3) the state Supreme Court's determination that certain comments made by the prosecutor, while improper, did not amount to a due process violation was not an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. View "Runningeagle v. Schriro" on Justia Law

In 1993, James Alderson filed a qui tam action under the False Claims Act (FCA) alleging Medicare fraud by Quorum Health Group, Inc., a hospital management company, and several related entities including the Hospital Corporation of America, Inc. (HCA). The United States intervened in 1998. The United States settled its FCA claims against HCA for $631 million in 2003. Alderson received sixteen percent of the settlement as his relator's share. Alderson and related taxpayers, Appellants, filed income tax returns for tax year 2003 reporting the relator's share as ordinary income. They later filed amended returns characterizing it as capital gain, seeking refunds of about $5 million. The Internal Revenue Service (IRS) denied the refund claims. Appellants then filed suit in federal district court. The court granted summary judgment to the United States, holding that the relator's share was ordinary income. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Alderson's qui tam award under the FCA was ordinary income. View "Alderson v. United States" on Justia Law

Appellant, a former pilot for Vision Airlines, sued Vision on behalf of a Class of other pilots and flight crew employees to recover hazard pay, which Appellant and the Class alleged Vision had accepted on their behalf and never paid to them. After nearly two years of discovery disputes between Vision and the Class, the district court sanctioned Vision by striking its answer, entered default judgment against Vision, and held a jury trial to determine damages. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit Court rejected Vision's arguments that (1) the district court abused its discretion by striking Vision's answer, (2) the claims in the complaint were legally insufficient to support the default judgment, and (3) the district court abused its discretion by certifying the Class. The Court then reversed the order dismissing the Class's claim for punitive damages, holding that the district court erred in dismissing the Class's claim for punitive damages. View "Hester v. Vision Airlines, Inc." on Justia Law

Plaintiff, who suffered from limb girdle muscular dystrophy, sued Walt Disney World Company under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), claiming that Disney denied her full and equal access to Disneyland by prohibiting her from using a Segway at Disneyland. Disney's policy was to allow wheelchairs and motorized scooters, but two-wheeled vehicles or devices were prohibited. The district court granted summary judgment for Disney, holding that Plaintiff was judicially estopped from claiming she couldn't use a motorized wheelchair, so there was no genuine issue of material fact as to whether it was necessary for Plaintiff to use a Segway to visit Disneyland. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding (1) Plaintiff was judicially estopped from claiming she couldn't use a motorized wheelchair or scooter; but (2) Disney must take reasonable steps to make Plaintiff's experience less onerous and more akin to that enjoyed by its able-bodied patrons under the ADA unless the device could not be operated in accordance with legitimate safety requirements. View "Baughman v. Walt Disney World Co." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the denial of his motion to suppress evidence of his possession of marijuana. Defendant argued that an officer's two separate commands directing him to empty his pockets each constituted illegal searches in violation of the Fourth Amendment. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed, holding (1) because Defendant did not comply with the officer's first command, the command did not cause an intrusion upon Defendant's reasonable expectation of privacy in the contents of his pockets, and thus, it was not a search; and (2) the officer's second command, with which Defendant complied was a search within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment, but the search was not illegal because it was supported by probable cause and because exigent circumstances justified searching Defendant without a warrant. View "United States v. Pope" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs were owners and operators of motels in Los Angeles. Plaintiffs challenged the constitutionality of Los Angeles Municipal Code (LAMC) 41.49, which requires operators of hotels in the City to maintain certain guest registry information and to make that information available to police officers on request. Appellants contended that LAMC 41.49 was facially unconstitutional under the Fourth Amendment because it authorized unreasonable invasions of their private business records without a warrant or pursuant to any recognized warrant exception. Following a bench trial on stipulated evidence, the district court held that the ordinance was reasonable and granted judgment in favor of the City, concluding that the hotel operators did not establish that they had a privacy interest in the guest registry information. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that Plaintiffs' facial challenge to the ordinance failed. That the ordinance might operate unconstitutionally under some circumstances was not enough to render it invalid against a facial challenge. View "Patel v. City of Los Angeles" on Justia Law