Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner appealed from a decision of the United States tax court concluding that he owed $128,292 in income tax for the 2004 taxable year. Petitioner entered into an agreement with Optech Limited pursuant to which he transferred floating rate notes (FRNs) worth approximately $1 million to Optech in return for a nonrecourse loan of ninety percent of the FRNs' value. The agreement gave Optech the right to receive all dividends and interest on the FRNs and the right to sell the FRNs during the loan term without Petitioner's consent. Instead of holding the FRNs as collateral for the loan, Optech sold the FRNs and transferred ninety percent of the proceeds to Petitioner. Petitioner did not report that he had sold the FRNs in his 2004 federal income tax return. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the tax court, holding that Petitioner's transaction with Optech constituted a sale for tax purposes despite its taking the form of a loan because the burdens and benefits of owning the FRNs were transferred to Optech. View "Sollberger v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

At issue was in this case was whether Petitioner, a California prisoner, was entitled to habeas corpus relief where Petitioner alleged violations that required the California state courts to suppress the incriminating statement he made after he expressly waived his Miranda rights. The California court of appeal affirmed Petitioner's conviction, concluding that Petitioner was required under Davis v. United States to unambiguously invoke his right to counsel. Petitioner later filed a federal habeas petition. The district court denied the petition but granted a certificate of appealability on Petitioner's Miranda claim and his ineffective assistance of counsel claim. A divided three-judge panel of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas petition. The Ninth Circuit then granted rehearing en banc. The Court reversed the district court's denial of habeas relief, holding that the state court's decision was an unreasonable application of clearly established federal law. Remanded with directions to grant a conditional writ of habeas corpus. View "Sessoms v. Runnels" on Justia Law

The IRS issued a Notice of Deficiency (NOD) to Alex and Liset Meruelo a few days before the three-year statute of limitations expired. Alex was a partner in a partnership. The Meruelos petitioned the tax court challenging the deficiency contained in the NOD and subsequently moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction on the ground that the IRS issued the NOD prematurely, making it invalid. The tax court held that the NOD was valid and not premature and that the items were affected items. The parties later reached an agreement as to all issues, except the validity of the NOD. The tax court then entered a final decision holding that the Meruelos were liable for $1,387,006 in additional income tax and $277,401 in penalties. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding that (1) a NOD issued when no partnership-level proceeding or final partnership administrative adjustment have been issued is valid; (2) a NOD issued when the normal three-year statute of limitations has not expired is valid; and (3) therefore, the tax court had jurisdiction. View "Meruelo v. Comm'r of Internal Revenue" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of six murders in Arizona state court and was sentenced to death in 1998. Petitioner was also convicted of first-degree attempted murder, aggravated assault, armed robbery, and first-degree burglary. The district court granted a certificate of appealability (COA) on Jones's prosecutorial misconduct claim. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals expanded the COA to include ineffective assistance of counsel allegations related to Petitioner's prosecutorial misconduct claim. The Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court's denial of Petitioner's habeas corpus petition, holding (1) on all contentions of prosecutorial misconduct, there was no fundamental unfairness to Petitioner and no due process violation; (2) on the ineffective assistance of counsel claims, the prejudice prong of Strickland was not satisfied; and (3) therefore, Petitioner received a fair trial leading to his jury conviction, and it was not objectively unreasonable for the Arizona courts to deny habeas relief. View "Jones v. Ryan" on Justia Law

Defendant, a fifty-seven-year-old native and citizen of Mexico who was diagnosed with paranoid schizophrenia, appealed from his conviction, following a bench trial, of two counts of assault on a federal officer. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) the district court erred in its application of the "reasonable apprehension of harm" prong of common law assault, and because the evidence would have been sufficient to convicted Defendant of attempted battery if the district court had not relied on the erroneous model jury instruction then in effect, the judgment of conviction on the second count was reversed and remanded for retrial under the proper standard; (2) the district court did not err in precluding Defendant from introducing evidence as part of a diminished capacity defense; and (3) the district court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to admit mental health evidence in support of Defendant's theory of self-defense. View "United States v. Acosta-Sierra" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Honduras and a lawful permanent resident alien of the United States, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) order dismissing his appeal from an immigration judge's order finding him removable as an alien convicted of an aggravated felony. At issue before the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was whether Petitioner's conviction under Article 92 of the Uniform Code of Military Justice qualified as an "aggravated felony" under the modified categorical approach as explained in the Court's recent en banc decision in United Sates v. Aguila-Montes de Oca. The Court granted the petition, concluding that Petitioner's Article 92 conviction was not an aggravated felony and Petitioner was therefore not removable. Remanded with instructions to vacate the removal order against Petitioner. View "Aguilar-Turcios v. Holder" on Justia Law

In this case the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals noted, "This appeal reads like a telenovela, a Spanish soap opera. It pits music celebrities, who make money by promoting themselves, against a gossip magazine, that makes money by publishing celebrity photographs, with a paparazzo, who apparently stole the disputed pictures, stuck in the middle." Noelia Monge and Jorge Reynoso ("the couple"), Latin American celebrities, claimed that Maya Magazines, Inc. and Maya Publishing Group, LLC (collectively, "Maya") infringed their copyrights by publishing previously unpublished photos of their clandestine wedding in "TVNotas," a Spanish-language celebrity gossip magazine. The district court granted Maya summary judgment on the ground that publication of the images was fair use under the Copyright Act of 1976. The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that Maya did not sustain its burden of establishing that its wholesale, commercial use of the previously unpublished photos constituted fair use, and thus, the district court should have granted the couple's summary judgment motion on this issue. Remanded. View "Monge v. Maya Magazines, Inc." on Justia Law

Grand Canyon Trust appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the United States Bureau of Reclamation (Reclamation) and the United States Fish and Wildlife Service (FWS) rejecting the Trust's claims alleging that Reclamation and FWS violated the Endangered Species Act (ESA), the National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), and the Administrative Procedure Act in the operation of the Glen Canyon Dam. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals dismissed as moot in part and affirmed in part, holding (1) several of the Trust's claims were moot; (2) Reclamation did not violate the ESA by not consulting with FWS before issuing each annual operating plan (AOP) for the Dam; and (3) Reclamation did not violate NEPA by not preparing an environmental assessment or environmental impact statement for each AOP. View "Grand Canyon Trust v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation" on Justia Law

Ariz. Rev. Stat. 33-1126(A)(6) and (7) allow a debtor in bankruptcy proceedings to exempt the cash surrender value of life insurance policies and proceeds of annuity contracts from the bankruptcy estate if the debtor names certain beneficiaries. Ronda Hummel and Joan Tober separately filed Chapter 7 petitions. Hummel claimed the three life insurance policies she owned were exempt, and Tober claimed the annuity she owned as exempt. Both debtors named their adult, non-dependent daughters as beneficiaries. The Chapter 7 Trustees in both cases objected to the claimed exemptions, arguing they did not apply because the named beneficiaries were not dependents of the debtors. The bankruptcy court overruled the Trustees' objection. On appeal, the bankruptcy appellate panel filed a single order for both cases and reversed, holding that the statutes required the named beneficiaries to be dependents for the exemption to apply. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that as a matter of first impression in Arizona, the statutory text does not require a debtor's child to be a "dependent" to qualify for the exemption. Remanded. View "Tober v. Lang" on Justia Law

The Scotts Company, an Ohio LLC, brought a diversity action against Seeds, Inc., a Washington corporation, in federal district court. Thereafter, Millhorn Farmers, Maple Leaf Farms, Mica Creek, and Tim Freeburg (Growers) sued Seeds and Scotts in Washington state court. Maple Leaf Farms and Mica Creek were Washington corporations, Millhorn Farms was an Idaho corporation, and Tim Freeburg was a citizen of Idaho. Scotts subsequently filed an amended complaint in federal court adding the Growers as defendants and seeking declaratory relief. The district court subsequently realigned the Growers and plaintiffs and Seeds and Scotts as defendants and held, alternatively, that it would stay the federal proceedings in favor of the related state court proceedings under either the Brillhart doctrine or the Colorado River doctrine. Because the parties' realignment resulted in the absence of complete diversity of citizenship between defendant Seeds and newly-aligned plaintiffs-Growers, the district court dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed, holding that the district court should not have declined to entertain the claim for declaratory relief under the Brillhart doctrine, and instead, the claims should have been evaluated under the Colorado River doctrine. Remanded. View "Scotts Co., LLC v. Seeds, Inc." on Justia Law