Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Articles Posted in 2012
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Petitioner, a native and citizen of Mexico, was convicted of armed robbery with a firearm in California in 1981. After serving most of his sentence, Rivera was deported in 1984. Since then, Petitioner twice reentered the country without inspection. The government began a removal proceeding against Rivera in 2004. Rivera admitted removability and sought adjustment of status to lawful permanent resident, Because his 1981 conviction rendered him inadmissible under 8 U.S.C. 1182(a)(2)(A)(i)(I), Rivera applied for a waiver of inadmissibility under section 1182(h)(1)(A) and (B). The immigration judge denied Rivera's application for wavier of inadmissibility. The Board of Immigration Appeals (BIA) affirmed, concluding that Rivera failed to satisfy the hardship standard of 8 C.F.R. 1212.7(d). The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed and denied the application, holding that the BIA properly applied section 1212.7(d) to Rivera. View "Rivera-Peraza v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Bao Tai Nian (Bao), a native and citizen of China, petitioned for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals' (BIA) decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT). Bao arrived in the United States as an alien crew member. His asylum proceeding was thus limited in scope to a so-called "asylum-only" proceeding. The Immigration Judge (IJ) and BIA did not issue a final order of removal, and thus the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals was presented with the question of whether the BIA's denial of asylum in "asylum-only" proceedings was the equivalent of a final order of removal such that the Court had jurisdiction. The Court held that denial of an alien crew member's petition for asylum and other relief in "asylum-only" proceedings was the functional equivalent of a final order a removal, and thus, the Court had jurisdiction to review Bao's petition from the BIA's denial of asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the CAT. The Court then denied Bao's petition for review in a separate memorandum disposition. View "Nian v. Holder" on Justia Law

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At issue in this case was the appropriate venue for continuing crimes, like conspiracy, where the conspirators' activities have a ripple-like effect that may involve numerous districts. Here the district court determined that venue for a drug-sale conspiracy was proper in the North District of California based on two telephone calls initiated by a government informant, who was in the district, to Defendant, who was located outside of the district. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed, holding (1) by using those calls to negotiate the terms of a drug deal to be completed in the Eastern District of California, Defendant propelled the conspiracy into the Northern District of California; and (2) therefore, venue on the conspiracy charge was proper in the Northern District of California. View "United States v. Gonzalez" on Justia Law

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Rene Lopez-Rodriguez, a Mexican citizen, was paroled into the United States to face immigration and criminal charges following his initial detention at a port of entry when marijuana was discovered in a truck he was driving. No criminal charges were filed against Lopez-Rodriguez, but he was later charged with being ineligible for admission because there was "reason to believe" he was or had been an illicit trafficker of a controlled substance. After a hearing before an immigration judge (IJ), the IJ found (1) there was "no reason to believe" that Lopez-Rodriguez was an elicit trafficker in a controlled substance, and (2) Lopez-Rodriguez was admissible. The Board of Immigration Appeals reversed, concluding that the IJ's decision to admit Lopez-Rodriguez was clearly erroneous. Lopez-Rodriguez petitioned for review. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals granted the petition, holding that the Board committed legal error by making its own factual determination and engaging in de novo review of the IJ's factual findings. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Rodriguez v. Holder" on Justia Law

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Appellants filed suit against Rearden Commerce, asserting numerous claims related to a conflict between the parties' marks and names. The district court granted Rearden Commerce's motion for summary judgment as to Appellants' trademark-related claims. Specifically, the district court found Rearden Commerce was entitled to judgment as a matter of law on Appellants' claims of false designation of origin under the Lanham Act, violations of the Anticybersquatting Consumer Protection Act, common law trademark infringement, and violations of the California Unfair Competition Law. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals vacated the district court, holding that genuine issues of material fact existed, which precluded summary judgment in favor of Rearden Commerce. Remanded for further proceedings. View "Rearden LLC v. Rearden Commerce, Inc." on Justia Law

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Plaintiff Paul Braunstein, the owner and operator of an Arizona engineering and land surveying firm that previously performed work for the Arizona Department of Transportation, sought damages based on Arizona's use of an affirmative action program in its award of a 2005 transportation engineering contract. The district court concluded that Braunstein lacked standing to seek damages in this equal protection suit because he never demonstrated that the challenged affirmative action program affected him personally or impeded his ability to compete for subcontracting work. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed in part and reversed in part, holding (1) the district court correctly concluded that Braunstein lacked standing; but (2) the district court erred in awarding Defendants attorneys' fees and imposing sanctions against Braunstein's attorneys for unreasonably prolonging the proceedings. View "Braunstein v. Ariz. Dep't of Transp." on Justia Law

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Appellants, three individuals who participated in businesses that helped customers evade federal and state income taxes, were convicted for conspiracy to defraud the United States, mail fraud, false representation of a Social Security number, passport fraud, and failure to file income tax returns. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the convictions and sentences for all Appellants with the exception of one Appellant (Giordano)'s restitution order, which was vacated and remanded for recalculation, holding (1) Appellants' convictions did not violate the First Amendment, as Appellants did far more than advocate tax evasion and instead developed a vast enterprise that helped clients hide their income from federal and state tax authorities; (2) the indictment did not erroneously include misdemeanor crimes among the eighty-one objects of the felony conspiracy count; (3) the district court did not err in instructing the jury on the crime of failure to file income taxes; but (4) the district court failed to consider evidence that Giordano presented at sentencing. View "United States v. Meredith" on Justia Law

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Puget Sound Energy (PSE) maintains and operates a hydroelectric power plant at Snoqualmie Falls in Washington state. PSE sought verification from the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers (Corps) that it could proceed with upgrading and modifying its plant under a series of general nationwide permits (NWPs) authorizing certain discharges rather than applying to the Corps for an individual permit. PSE had already obtained a license for the project from FERC. The Corps verified that it could. Downstream property owners formed the Snoqualmie Valley Preservation Alliance (Alliance) to challenge this decision. The district court granted summary judgment for the Corps. The Ninth Circuit court of appeals affirmed, holding (1) this suit was not an improper collateral attack against the FERC license and amendment; (2) NWP 17, the only nationwide permit which specifically references hydropower projects, is not exclusively applicable to hydropower projects; (3) the Corps did not err in verifying that NWPs 3 and 39 authorize the project; and (4) the Corps' verification letter contained a sufficient articulation of the basis for its decision. View "Snoqualmie Valley Pres. Alliance v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng'rs" on Justia Law

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Petitioner Andrew Mackey was convicted several crimes in California. Retained attorney Le Rue Grim represented Mackey in post-trial and post-conviction proceedings. Grim subsequently filed a timely petition in the United States district court asserting ineffective assistance of counsel. Respondent filed a response to the district court's order to show cause, but Grim did not file a traverse by the due date. Grim then withdrew from the case but failed to notify the court of his intention to withdraw. Consequently, Mackey was unaware that the district court denied his petition and did not have the opportunity to proceed pro se. Mackey then filed a motion to have the district court vacate its judgment and reopen the case. The court denied the motion, determining that it lacked discretion to vacate the judgment pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 60(b). The Ninth Circuit reversed, holding that the district court would possess the discretion to vacate and reenter the judgment in order to allow Mackey the opportunity to appeal if it were to find that Grim effectively abandoned Mackey, causing Mackey to fail to file a timely notice of appeal. Remanded for findings as to whether Grim's action or inaction constituted abandonment. View "Mackey v. Hoffman" on Justia Law

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This case was a challenge to the State of Washington's Building Code brought by the Building Industry Association of Washington (BIAW) along with individual builders and contractors. The impetus for this challenge was the State's 2009 requirement that new building construction must meet heightened energy conservation goals. At issue was the Energy Policy and Conservation Act's (EPCA) preemption-exemption provision, which expressly preempts state standards requiring greater efficiency than federal standards but exempts from preemption state building codes promoting energy efficiency, so long as those codes meet statutory conditions. Plaintiffs argued that the Building Code did not satisfy EPCA's conditions for exemption. The district court held that Washington had satisfied EPCA's conditions and therefore was not preempted. The Ninth Circuit affirmed, holding that the Building Code satisfied the conditions Congress set forth in the EPCA for exemption from federal preemption. View "Bldg. Ind. Ass'n of Wash. v. Wash. State Bldg. Code" on Justia Law