Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Lands Commission appealed the district court's final judgment in this eminent domain case, wherein the United States took a fee simple interest in the property at issue on behalf of the Navy, which has continuously leased this parcel since 1949. In condemning the property, the United States sought to extinguish California's public trust rights. The court concluded that, having paid just compensation, the United States was entitled to the interest it sought in its complaint in condemnation; full fee simple, free of California's public trust. The court concluded that neither the equal-footing doctrine nor the public trust doctrine prevented the federal government from taking that interest in the land unencumbered.

Plaintiff appealed an order of the district court affirming the Commissioner's final decision denying her disability benefits under Title II of the Social Security Act (SSA), 42 U.S.C. 401-434. At issue, among other things, was whether the district court should have considered evidence plaintiff did not submit to the ALJ but submitted for the first time to the Appeals Council, which accepted and considered the new evidence but declined to review the ALJ's decision. The court held that when a claimant submitted evidence for the first time to the Appeals Council, which considering that evidence in denying review of the ALJ's decision, the new evidence was part of the administrative record, which the district court must consider in determining whether the Commissioner's decision was supported by substantial evidence. Considering the record as a whole, the court concluded that the Commissioner's decision was not supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded for an immediate award of benefits.

This case concerned the constitutionality of certain California statutes and regulations that prohibit licensed opticians from offering prescription eyewear at the same location in which eye examinations were provided and from advertising that eyewear and eye examinations were available in the same location. Plaintiffs maintained that these statutes and regulations violated the dormant Commerce Clause. The court held that there was no material issue of fact regarding whether the challenged laws placed a significant burden on interstate commerce and therefore, the court affirmed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the State.

Plaintiffs filed suit in district court under 28 U.S.C. 1332(a)(2). Plaintiffs subsequently appealed from the district court's dismissal without prejudice of their first amended complaint for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The district court, citing Hertz Corp. v. Friend, dismissed the complaint because plaintiffs failed to provide factual support for their allegations of diversity. But Hertz did not impose a heightened pleading standard and, in two orders issued before its order of dismissal, the district court requested that plaintiffs provide further allegations of the corporate parties' principal place of business, not further proof. The district court did not abuse its discretion by requesting proof of the parties' principal places of business, but the court found that the district court's order was inconsistent. Accordingly, the court vacated the order and dismissed the first amended complaint, and remanded.

This case arose when plaintiff alleged that defendant owed it mineral royalty payments pursuant to an area-of-interest provision contained in a 1979 agreement. The court certified two questions to the Nevada Supreme Court: (1) Under Nevada law, does the Rule Against Perpetuities apply to an area-of-interest provision in a commercial agreement? and (2) If the Rule Against Perpetuities did apply, is reformation available under Nevada Revised Statute 111.1039(2)? All further proceedings in the case were stayed pending receipt of the answer from the Nevada Supreme Court.

Defendant appealed his conviction for social security fraud pursuant to 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(5). The court held that the district court committed no reversible error in the formulation of jury instructions; the district court acted within its discretion when it admitted computer-generated records into evidence; the prosecutor's comments did not warrant reversal of defendant's conviction; the district court committed no error when it denied defendant's motion for judgment of acquittal; and 42 U.S.C. 408(a)(5) was not unconstitutionally vague. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Plaintiffs filed a complaint in federal district court against the United States government, alleging causes of action under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671-2680. Specifically, plaintiffs alleged that agents from the DEA committed the torts of assault and battery and intentional infliction of emotional distress when they executed a search warrant at plaintiffs' mobile home. The court agreed with the district court that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DEA Agents' use of force against the adult members of plaintiffs' family was reasonable. The court, however, disagreed with the district court's conclusion that there was no genuine issue of material fact regarding whether DEA Agents used reasonable force against the 11-year-old and 14-year-old plaintiffs. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded for further proceedings.

Plaintiff alleged that defendants' determination, that plaintiff's psychological disorder made her unfit for reinstatement from disability retirement to active service with the Caltrans, deprived her of her right to a reasonable accommodation under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12111-12117. At issue was whether a state employee could sue state officers under 42 U.S.C. 1983 for alleged violations of Title I of the ADA. The court concluded that Congress' inclusion of a comprehensive remedial scheme in Title I precluded section 1983 claims predicated on alleged violations of the ADA Title I substantive rights. The court also concluded that plaintiff's allegations of fact did not state a claim under the Equal Protection Clause.

Plaintiff brought suit against Deerbrook for breach of the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing. Plaintiff was injured in an accident caused by Deerbrook's insured and after plaintiff received a judgment against the insured, the insured assigned his bad faith claim to plaintiff. Plaintiff argued that Deerbrook breached the implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing owed to its insured when Deerbrook did not attempt to reach a settlement of plaintiff's claims after the insured's liability in excess of the policy limit became reasonably clear. Plaintiff subsequently appealed the district court's rejection of his request to instruct the jury that it could consider Deerbrook's failure to effectuate a settlement in determining whether Deerbrook breached the implied covenant. The court concluded that plaintiff's proposed jury instruction was consistent with the law but that there was no evidentiary basis for the instruction. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

These cross-appeals arose from what the court understood to be the largest civil in rem forfeiture proceeding against firearms unlawfully possessed by a convicted felon in American history. The court addressed several issues, holding that Maria Ferro was not entitled to the protections of the so-called "innocent owner" defense, and the district court was therefore correct to hold that the entire collection was subject to forfeiture; following a comprehensive revision of the forfeiture statutes in 2000, forfeitures of instrumentalities of crimes were subject to excessiveness analysis under the Eighth Amendment's Excessive Fines Clause; excessiveness review must consider the individualized culpability of the property's owner and, when analyzing the offending conduct, it must focus only on the conduct that actually gave rise to the forfeiture of the property at issue, not other criminal conduct by the same person; and because the district court erred on this third point, the court remanded for the district court to undertake once again the excessiveness inquiry.