Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal grew out of an adversary proceeding in debtor's Chapter 7 bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy trustee filed a complaint against debtor and her husband, claiming that certain money and property belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate. The trustee sought turnover to the bankruptcy estate of certain proceedings from the sale of the couple's homestead, a rental property held in the husband's name, and income earned from the rental property. The bankruptcy court rejected all of the trustee's claims and the Bankruptcy Appellate Panel affirmed. The court concluded that the proceeds of the homestead sale belonged to debtor's bankruptcy estate but that the rental property held in the husband's name and the income did not. Accordingly, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

Petitioner, a California state prisoner, appealed the district court's order denying his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner claimed that testimony introduced during his trial violated his Sixth Amendment right to confrontation. In light of the extensive, reasoned disagreement between the lower courts as to the question presented by petitioner's claim - whether forensic lab reports were testimonial - and between the Justices when they reached the issue, the court could not say that the state unreasonably applied clearly established Federal law. The court concluded that the state court probably committed constitutional error, but the court was not free to correct it under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996, 28 U.S.C. 2254(d). The error could have been brought before the Supreme Court in a correctable posture, had petitioner filed a cert petition after the California Supreme Court denied review in 2005. The case would have arrived at the Court nearly two years before Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts, and it was possible that the Court would have granted cert and decided on petitioner's case that forensic lab reports were testimonial. The Court did not decide until 2011, in Bullcoming v. New Mexico, that the right to confrontation could be satisfied only by the live testimony of a declarant.

Petitioner, a prisoner of the State of California, appealed from the denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus. The court remanded to the district court to determine in the first instance whether, under California law, petitioner filed his petition in the court of appeals within a reasonable time after the denial of his first petition in the superior court. In determining whether, under the circumstances of the case, California law would excuse petitioner's delay, the district court should consider all relevant factors.

Defendant was sentenced to a 17-year prison term pursuant to a plea agreement. Two years later, defendant filed a motion to reduce his sentence under 18 U.S.C. 3582(c)(2), which the district court granted. While this case was pending, the United States Supreme Court decided Freeman v. United States. The court concluded that Justice Sotomayor's concurrence in Freeman controlled this case because defendant's plea agreement was a Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(c)(1)(C) plea agreement. Applying her opinion, the court held that the district court lacked jurisdiction to reduce defendant's sentence because the imposed 17-year sentence was "based on" the parties' plea agreement and not on "a sentencing range that has subsequently been lowered by the Sentencing Commission."

Petitioner appealed the district court's denial of his petition for a writ of habeas corpus, claiming that the district court incorrectly interpreted an earlier ruling by the California Supreme Court on one of his state habeas petitions. At issue was whether, when the the California Supreme Court denied a habeas petition with citations to Ex parte Swain, the denial was necessarily based on untimeliness. The court agreed with petitioner that the answer was no and that the district court did not correctly apply California law in determining that the California Supreme Court's denial of his petition with citation to Swain and People v. Duvall meant that petitioner's petition before the California Supreme Court was untimely. Because the federal statute of limitations was tolled during the pendency of timely filed state petitions, petitioner's federal petition was therefore timely, and the court reversed and remanded to the district court to consider the petition on the merits.

This case involved intellectual property related to the Superman character created by writer Jerome Siegel and illustrator Joe Schuster. In 2010, D.C. Comics filed a lawsuit against Marc Toberoff, owner of a joint venture with the heirs of Shuster and Siegel (Heirs), the Heirs, and three entities in which Toberoff owned a controlling interest (collectively, petitioners), claiming that Toberoff interfered with its contractual relationships with the Heirs. Toberoff had hired lawyer David Michaels to work for one of his companies. Michaels remained in Toberoff's employ for only about three months before absconding with copies of several documents from the Siegel and Shuster files. These documents formed the basis of this lawsuit. About a month after the suit was filed, Toberoff asked the U.S. Attorney to investigate Michaels and, in response, the U.S. Attorney's Office issued a grand jury subpoena for the documents at issue as well as a letter stating that if Toberoff voluntarily complied with the subpoena, the Government would "not provide the...documents...to non-governmental third parties except as may be required by law or court order." At issue was whether a party waived attorney-client privilege forever by voluntarily disclosing privileged documents to the federal government. Given that Congress has declined broadly to adopt a new privilege to protect disclosures of attorney-client privileged materials to the government, the court would not do so here. The court also rejected petitioner's assertion that even if the court rejected selective waiver as a general matter, the court should enforce a purported confidentiality agreement based upon the letter from the U.S. Attorney's Office where petitioners have provided no convincing reason that post hoc contracts regarding how information could be revealed encouraged frank conversation at the time of the advice. The court further rejected petitioners' remaining claims and denied the petition for mandamus.

This case stemmed from a class action that began more than a quarter century ago where Idaho state prisoners at the Idaho State Correctional Institution (ISCI) prevailed on their claims that, inter alia, because of deliberate indifference, without any connection to a legitimate penological purpose, the inmates were subjected to needless pain and suffering on account of inadequate medical and psychiatric care. The district court issued an injunction to remedy the constitutional violations and the injunctions remained in effect in 2008 and 2009 when the facts giving rise to this case occurred. The Portland law firm of Stoel Rives, LLP was appointed to represent the prisoner class. At issue on appeal was whether Stoel Rives was entitled to an attorneys' fee award in the class action under the Prison Litigation Reform Act (PLRA), 42 U.S.C. 1997e. The court held that, in this case, the judge had discretion to consider whether Stoel Rives's work on a motion to compel conformity to the injunction was "directly and reasonably incurred in enforcing the relief." The district court acted within the bounds of its discretion in awarding fees in a reasonable amount for bringing about that conformity with the injunction. Here, Stoel Rives's work was what one would expect of a lawyer working for a client that could afford its efforts but that was not indifferent to the cost. The firm showed no evidence of milking the case, and the fees were "directly and reasonably incurred." Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment.

Proposition 200, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-166(F)(the registration provision), required prospective voters in Arizona to provide proof of U.S. citizenship in order to register to vote and required registered voters to show identification to cast a ballot at the polls, Ariz. Rev. Stat. 16-579(A)(the poll place provision). At issue on appeal was whether Proposition 200 violated section 2 of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 (VRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973, was unconstitutional under the Fourteenth Amendment or Twenty-fourth Amendment to the Constitution, or was void as inconsistent with the National Voter Registration Act of 1993 (NVRA), 42 U.S.C. 1973gg et seq. The court upheld Proposition 200's requirement that voters show identification at the polling place, but concluded that the NVRA superseded Proposition 200's registration provision as that provision was applied to applicants using the National Mail Voter Registration Form to register to vote in federal elections.

Defendant pled guilty to Abusive Sexual Contact where the victim was his wife's minor niece who had been staying with the couple. On appeal, defendant appealed his sentence of 151 months' imprisonment and the imposition of a two-level enhancement pursuant to U.S.S.G. 2A3.1(b)(3), claiming that he was not entrusted with custody, care, or supervisory control of the victim. The court held that the district court's application of the enhancement was fully supported and that court did not err in applying the enhancement in this case.

Plaintiffs brought several state causes of action in Arizona state court against Medtronic for injuries sustained by Richard Stengel from his use of a pain pump manufactured by Medtronic. Medtronic timely removed the case to the United States District Court for the District of Arizona and the district court dismissed plaintiffs' claims as preempted by federal law. The court held that even if some of plaintiffs' claims could be interpreted to escape express preemption, they could not be interpreted to escape implied preemption. Therefore, the district court correctly held that plaintiffs' proposed amendment was futile and thus did not abuse its discretion in denying leave to amend.