Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Petitioner sought review pursuant to a certificate of appealability of the denial of his petition for habeas corpus. Petitioner was found guilty of robbery with a deadly weapon, false imprisonment, battery with a deadly weapon, and battery causing substantial bodily harm. The court held that the Nevada Supreme Court's determination that the trial court did not abuse its discretion in refusing to declare a mistrial was not inconsistent with Dawson v. Delaware. Even if there was an error, that error would be harmless. Therefore, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the petition on Ground 1. The court also affirmed the district court's holding that Grounds 3, 4, 5, and 6 of the amended petition did not relate back to the original petition and that petitioner's mental condition did not excuse his procedural default on Grounds 2 and 7. The court further held that petitioner had not made a substantial showing that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on Ground 1.

Defendant pled guilty to possession of stolen mail and access device fraud. This appeal addressed access device fraud under 18 U.S.C. 1029 and, specifically, whether the Government must prove the usability of an expired credit card number in order for a district court to enhance a sentence. The court held that, for an unauthorized access device whose usability was not readily apparent, such as an expired credit card number, some proof of usability was required when the defendant did not concede the fact or when the defendant challenged the enhancement. Therefore, the sentence was vacated and the case remanded for further proceedings.

Petitioner, a native and citizen of Lebanon, petitioned for review of a decision from the BIA which upheld the IJ's determination that petitioner had committed a particularly serious crime, rendering him ineligible for asylum or withholding of removal. The BIA also affirmed the IJ's finding that conditions had changed in Lebanon such that it was no longer more likely than not that petitioner would be tortured upon his return. The court affirmed the IJ and BIA's determination that petitioner had committed a particularly serious crime by committing a complex mail fraud scheme to defraud victims of nearly $2 million and was therefore, not eligible for asylum or withholding removal. The court also held that substantial evidence supported the conclusion that conditions in Lebanon had changed such that it was no longer more likely than not that petitioner would be tortured upon his return there. Accordingly, the court denied the petition.

Plaintiff appealed the district court's decision affirming the Commission's denial of her application for disability insurance benefits and supplemental security income under the Social Security Act (SSA), 42 U.S.C. 301 et seq. The court held that the ALJ did not err in weighing the evidence as she did or finding that plaintiff's testimony regarding the severity of her impairment was not credible. Although the ALJ erred in failing to give germane reasons for rejecting the lay witness testimony, such error was harmless given that the lay testimony described the same limitations as plaintiff's own testimony, and the ALJ's reasons for rejecting plaintiff's testimony applied with equal force to the lay testimony. Applying the principles set forth in the court's social security cases, as well as in Shinseki v. Sanders, the court upheld the ALJ's decision as supported by substantial evidence.

Plaintiffs alleged that section 31 of article I of the California Constitution violated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and caused the unfair exclusion of African American, Latino, and Native American students from higher education. They sought to enjoin the Governor and the President of the University of California, Mark Yudof, from enforcing section 31. Yudof asserted that he was immune from suit under the Eleventh Amendment and that he was an improper defendant pursuant to Rule 21. Although the court held that plaintiffs' suit against Yudof was not barred by Eleventh Amendment immunity, the court held that plaintiffs' equal protection challenge to section 31 was precluded by Coalition for Economic Equity v. Wilson, where the court previously upheld the constitutionality of section 31. Accordingly, the district court correctly dismissed the complaint against the Governor and Yudof for failure to state a claim.

Petitioner appealed the district court's dismissal of his 28 U.S.C. 2254 habeas corpus petition. The district court dismissed petitioner's pro se petition as untimely under the one-year statue of limitations set forth in the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2244(d)(1), and alternatively, as a "second or successive" petition under section 2244(b). The court concluded that the district court erred in sua sponte dismissing the petition as untimely without providing petitioner with prior notice and an opportunity to respond. The court also held that the petition was not "second or successive" under AEDPA because it was the first petition to challenge the amended judgment of conviction, which was entered after his initial petition.

Defendant was convicted of murder and subsequently appealed the denial of his request for an evidentiary hearing on his claim of ineffective assistance of counsel during the guilt phase of his bifurcated trial. Because the government did not argue that defendant's trial counsel was effective, the question shifted to prejudice. The court concluded that the district court did not err in declining to order an evidentiary hearing because defendant could not establish prejudice from counsel's failure to present a mental state defense during the guilt phase.

Petitioner, in his capacity as the State Director of the United Public Workers, AFSCME, Local 646, AFL-CIO (UPW), negotiated contracts with dental and health insurance providers, HDS and PGMA, on behalf of UPW members and their families. A jury subsequently convicted petitioner of fifty counts of "theft of honest services" from the UPW and its members, as well as conspiracy, embezzlement, money laundering, and health care fraud. At issue was the instructional omission to the jury regarding honest services fraud in light of the Supreme Court's holding in Skilling v. United States. The court held that the error had no "substantial and injurious effect or influence in determining the jury's verdict." Accordingly, the court affirmed the theft of honest services, money laundering, and health care fraud judgments of conviction against petitioner and affirmed the judgment of the district court.

In consolidated appeals, Marcus Major and Jordan Huff appealed from their convictions under Title 18 U.S.C. 1951 and 924. They also appealed from their sentence pursuant to section 924(c). The court held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting evidence of other crimes and in admitting evidence of defendants' affiliation with the High Roller Boyz. The court also held that there was no constitutional error in the district court's effort to restrict defendants' contact with anyone other than their attorneys; section 924(c) did not violate the doctrine of separation of powers or violate the Eighth Amendment; and the district court was correct in concluding that section 924(c) required the court to determine the order in which a defendant received convictions, rather than the order in which offenses were committed. Applying the rule of lenity, when the district court did not have sufficient information to determine the order in which the jury made determinations of guilt during jury deliberations on multiple counts under section 924(c), it must order the convictions so that the mandatory minimum sentenced was minimized. In this case, application of the rule required the district court to deem one of the brandishing counts, rather than a discharging count, to be the first conviction.

When a dispute arose regarding certain services Janice Karman, plaintiff, provided in connection with the movie, "Alvin and the Chipmunks, The Squeakquel," plaintiffs (Karman and Bagdasarian Productions) filed this action. Fox moved to stay the case and to refer the dispute to a referee as the parties' Purchase/Producer Agreement-Literary Material provided. The district court granted the motion and plaintiffs brought this interlocutory appeal to contest the reference. The court concluded that the district court's order was not final, plaintiffs have not been put "out of court" by the order, and the collateral order doctrine was inapplicable because the decision to refer could be reviewed and, if incorrect, later remedied by the court. As such, the appeal was premature and the court lacked jurisdiction over it under 28 U.S.C. 1291.