Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Skydive Arizona sued SKYRIDE for false advertising, trademark infringement, and cybersquatting. SKYRIDE subsequently appealed the district court's grant of partial summary judgment, the jury's actual damages and profits awards, and the district court's damages enhancement. Skydive Arizona cross-appealed the district court's limitation of the permanent injunction to Skydive Arizona, and sought a nationwide injunction against SKYRIDE. The court reversed with regard to the district court's doubling of actual damages, and reinstated the jury's original actual damages award for false advertising, and for trademark infringement. The court affirmed the district court on all other claims. Thus, as modified in actual damages for false advertising, $2.5 million in actual damages for trademark infringement, $2,500,004 in lost profits for trademark infringement, and $600,000 in statutory damages for cybersquatting. Accordingly, the court affirmed in part and modified in part.

Plaintiff sued two Nevada Gaming Control Board agents under 42 U.S.C. 1983, claiming that the agents violated his Fourth Amendment rights by arresting him without probable cause to believe he had committed a crime. The court held that the district court erred when it reserved the issue of whether the agents had qualified immunity for the jury even though the parties did not materially dispute what facts the agents knew when they arrested plaintiff. The court also held that the agents did not violate clearly established rights by arresting plaintiff. Accordingly, the agents were entitled to qualified immunity and the court reversed the district court's denial of their motion for summary judgment.

Defendants, ICC and Charles D. Hendrickson, appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of plaintiff on her claim under the Fair Debt Collection Practices Act (FDCPA), 15 U.S.C. 1692, and the district court's orders granting three of plaintiff's post-summary judgment motions. The court affirmed the district court's order granting summary judgment under Rule 56 where the district court held that there was no genuine issue of material fact but that ICC had violated the FDCPA and that Hendrickson was personally liable as ICC's sole owner, officer, and director because he qualified as a "debt collector" under the FDCPA. The notice of appeal was untimely filed as to the latter three post-summary judgment orders and were dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

Petitioner was convicted of two counts of murder in the first degree, two counts of felony murder, one count of robbery, and one count of grand theft in 1986. Petitioner requested permission to file a second or successive application for writ of habeas corpus in the District of Idaho under 28 U.S.C. 2244(b)(3)(A). The court held that petitioner's claims did not satisfy the requirements of section 2244(b)(2). Therefore, petitioner's motion was denied.

Plaintiff, as the personal representative of the estate of her brother Eric, appealed the judgment of the district court in favor of defendants. The complaint asserted a claim against defendants for violation of 42 U.S.C. 1983 by subjecting Eric to an unreasonable search and seizure and denying due process and the equal protection of the laws. A claim was also asserted under the Americans with Disabilities Act (ADA), 42 U.S.C. 12131, et seq., and the Rehabilitation Act of 1973, 29 U.S.C. 794, as well as several claims under Arizona law. The court reviewed the district court's evidentiary rulings for an abuse of discretion and held, among other things, that the exclusion of testimony showing plaintiff's state of mind was both error and prejudicial and the exclusion of experts' opinions based on that testimony was equally error and prejudicial. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded.

Plaintiffs brought this putative class action against KeyBank, alleging violations of California's Unfair Competition Law (UCL), Cal. Bus. & Prof. Code 17200, in connection with private student loans that KeyBank extended to plaintiffs. The court concluded that (1) the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA) 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., preempted the Broughton-Cruz rule and (2) the arbitration clause in the parties' contracts must be enforced because it was not unconscionable. Therefore, the court did not reach the question, presented in Appeal No. 10-15934, whether the NBA and the regulations of the OCC preempted plaintiffs' UCL claims. Accordingly, in Interlocutory Appeal No. 09-16703, the court reversed the district court's denial of KeyBank's motion to compel arbitration, vacated the judgment, and remanded to the district court with instructions to enter an order staying the case and compelling arbitration. Because the disposition of that appeal rendered the district court's subsequent dismissal order a nullity, the court dismissed Appeal No. 10-15934 as moot.

Defendant appealed his 87-month sentence on a guilty plea to one count of conspiracy to defraud the government by filing false claims. Defendant contended that the U.S. Attorney breached the parties' plea agreement by disclosing admissions made by defendant while cooperating with the government, and by urging imposition of a sentence above the low end of the Sentencing Guidelines. Defendant also contended that the district court erred by improperly imposing a two-level leadership enhancement. The court held that the breach of plea agreement by the U.S. Attorney resulted in plain error that affected defendant's substantial rights. The court also held that the district court committed clear error when it imposed the enhancement under U.S.S.G. 3B1.1(c). Accordingly, the court vacated the sentence and remanded for resentencing before a different judge.

Petitioner, a citizen of Nigeria, sought review of a decision by the BIA to deny him protection under the CAT and to deny his motion to reopen the case to consider new evidence. The court held that collateral estoppel bound the BIA to its prior determination of the facts and legal consequences regarding past incidents of government-sponsored violence against petitioner's family due to his father's activities supporting Christianity over Islam. The court also concluded that the BIA abused its discretion by denying petitioner's motion to reopen to consider the significant new evidence of a Nigerian arrest warrant that charged petitioner personally with inciting opposition to Sharia law. Accordingly, the court granted the petition and remanded for further proceedings.

The Silar Parties and Counsel appealed the district court's order imposing sanctions on them pursuant to Rule 9011 of the Federal Rules of Bankruptcy Procedure and the district court's inherent powers. At issue was whether the district court's order was immediately appealable. The court held that the district court's sanctions order was not an appealable final order. Because appellants were unable to satisfy the threshold requirement of appellate jurisdiction, the court dismissed the appeal.

Defendant stands accused of multiple murders and attempted murders, including the attempted murder of U.S. Representative Gabrielle Giffords. While defendant was in custody, the Bureau of Prisons determined that defendant was a danger to himself or others and conducted hearings pursuant to 28 C.F.R. 549.46(a), Harper hearings, to determine if he could be involuntarily medicated. Defendant subsequently appealed the district court's denial of an emergency motion to enjoin the involuntary medication decision of June 14, 2011 (No. 11-10339); the denial of his emergency motion for a prompt post-deprivation judicial hearing (No. 11-10432); and the denial of his emergency motion to enjoin the involuntary medication decision of September 15, 2011 and the subsequent extension of the commitment order (No. 11-10504). The court concluded that defendant was provided with the substance and procedure demanded by the Due Process Clause before the government involuntarily medicated him; it was clear that defendant had a severe mental illness, that he represented a danger to himself or others, and that the prescribed medication was appropriate and in his medical interest; and there was no arbitrariness in the district court's order denying the motion to enjoin defendant's emergency treatment and he could be involuntarily medicated. The court also concluded that the district court did not commit legal error in its commitment rulings; its finding that there was substantial probability that defendant would be restored to competency in the foreseeable future was supported by the evidence and not clearly erroneous; and defendant could be committed pursuant to the district court's order and subject to its supervision. Therefore, judgment in No. 11-10504 was affirmed. Because the Harper III hearing superseded the Harper hearings and the emergency medication orders, appeals No. 11-10339 and No. 11-10432 were dismissed as moot.