Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

The Federal Lands Recreation Enhancement Act (REA) prohibits the U.S. Forest Service from charging fees solely for parking, undesignated parking, or picnicking along roads or trailsides, for hiking without using facilities and services, and for camping at undeveloped sites. Despite these prohibitions, the Forest Service collected fees from all drivers who parked their vehicles in a piece of the Coronado National Forest running along the Catalina Highway, the only paved road to the summit of Mount Lemmon, a heavily used recreational area. Four recreational visitors used, seeking a declaration that the Forest Service was exceeding the scope of its authority under the REA by charging fees to those who drove to Mount Lemmon, parked their cars, then picnicked, hiked, or camped in nearby undeveloped areas. Plaintiffs also sought to enjoin the Forest Service from collecting such fees. The district court granted Defendants' Rule 12(b)(6) motion to dismiss. The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the Forest Service's fee structure contravened the plain language of the REA. Remanded to allow Plaintiffs to pursue that claim.

Petitioner, a citizen of Mexico, first entered the U.S. in 1989. In 1993, he went to Mexico for two or three weeks. When he attempted to reenter he was arrested and charged with falsely claiming U.S. citizenship and possessing a false identification document. He pleaded guilty to possession of a false identification document, 18 U.S.C. 1028(a)(4), (b)(3). After being released in Mexico he immediately crossed the border on foot. In 2000, the INS charged petitioner with removability, 8 U.S.C. 1227(a)(1)(C)(i). The IJ held that his 1993 departure interrupted continuous physical presence and made him ineligible for cancellation of removal and granted voluntary departure. On remand, petitioner testified that he was not told about the possibility of taking his case to immigration court or given a voluntary departure option in 1993. The IJ found that the 1993 departure was "clearly different from" a mere turn-around at the border and again granted voluntary departure. The BIA dismissed an appeal. The Ninth Circuit denied appeal. Although the 1993 conviction did not declare that he was inadmissible, petitioner was subjected to a "formal, documented process" sufficient to break his continuous physical presence in the U.S.

Plaintiff, and drivers similarly situated, filed a class action against Affinity alleging violations of the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), 29 U.S.C. 201 et seq., and California laws, including failure to pay overtime, failure to pay wages, improper charges for workers' compensation insurance, and the unfair business practice of wrongfully classifying California drivers. On appeal, plaintiff contended that the district court, after applying California's choice of law framework, erred when it concluded that Georgia law applied. The district court concluded that under Georgia law there was a presumption of independent contractor status and to rebut this presumption, plaintiff must establish that an employer-employee relationship existed. The district court found that plaintiff was unable to establish such a relationship and failed to rebut Georgia's presumption. The court held that the parties' choice of Georgia law was unenforceable in California. The court also held that under California's choice of law framework, the law of California applied. Accordingly, on remand, the district court shall apply California law to determine whether the drivers were employees or independent contractors.

Plaintiff sought rescission of her loan secured by a trust deed with the Bank for alleged violations of disclosure requirements under the federal Truth in Lending Act (TILA), 15 U.S.C. 1601 et seq. The district court dismissed the suit as untimely because it was filed after the three-year period set by 15 U.S.C. 1635(f). Plaintiff argued that because she gave the Bank timely notice of rescission, she was not required to bring suit within the three-year period, and the district court erred in dismissing the case. The court held that, under the court's precedent and Supreme Court precedent, the time limit established by section 1635(f) was applicable here. Moreover, as explained in Miguel v. Country Funding Corp., section 1635(f) was a three-year statute of repose, requiring dismissal of a claim for rescission brought more than three years after the consummation of the loan secured by the first trust deed, regardless of when the borrower sent notice of rescission. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court.

Plaintiff, a citizen of Malaysia, alleged that she was mistakenly placed on the "No-Fly List" and other terrorist watchlists. Plaintiff was legally in the United States from 2001 to 2005 as a Ph.D. student at Stanford University. In 2005, plaintiff attempted to travel to Malaysia on a Stanford-sponsored conference where she was to present her doctoral research, she was prevented from flying and detained for questioning, eventually permitted to fly to Malaysia the following day, but has not been permitted to return to the United States since returning to Malaysia. Plaintiff brought suit in federal court seeking, among other things, injunctive relief under the First and Fifth Amendments, with the ultimate aim of having her name removed from the government's watchlists. The court agreed with the district court that plaintiff had standing under Article III to challenge the presence of her name on government watchlists. The court also held that plaintiff had established "significant voluntary connection" with the United States such that she had the right to assert claims under the First and Fifth Amendments. However, the court expressed no opinion on the validity of the underlying constitutional claims. The court vacated in part and affirmed in part the district court's discovery rulings.

Defendant was convicted of criminal contempt of court in violation of 18 U.S.C. 402 for "ghostwriting" eight pleadings for a pro se litigant in a civil lawsuit. Defendant appealed his conviction on four grounds, contending that: (1) he was denied his statutory right to a jury trial; (2) he could not be prosecuted for criminal contempt under section 402 on the basis that he did not comply with Local Rules 10-1 and 10-2; (3) Nevada Revised Statute 7.285 was unconstitutionally vague as applied to him; and (4) he did not violate section 7.285. The court held that the failure to try defendant by jury mandated reversal of his criminal contempt conviction where deprivation of the right to a jury trial constituted a structural error requiring reversal. The court also held that local court rules, including Rule 10-1 and 10-2, did not constitute rules within the meaning of section 402 and thus could not serve as predicates for criminal convictions. Therefore, the court reversed defendant's conviction based on the first two claims and did not reach the remaining claims.

This case arose out of plaintiffs' second challenge to the sufficiency of the DOE's Environmental Assessment (EA) of a prospective "biosafety level-3" (BSL-3) facility at the Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory (LLNL). On appeal, plaintiffs petitioned the court to require the DOE to prepare an Environment Impact Statement (EIS), or in the alternative, to revise its EA, in light of the allegations set forth in its original complaint, to determine whether an EIS was required. The court held that the DOE took the requisite "hard look" at the environmental impact of an intentional terrorist attack in the manner required by the National Environment Policy Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321, et seq., and San Luis Obispo Mothers for Peace v. Nuclear Regulatory Commission. The court further held that the district court did not abuse its discretion in denying plaintiffs' motion to supplement the record. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Tractel, manufacturer and seller of the Tirak traction hoist, brought suit claiming that Jiangsu's hoists infringed the trade dress of the Tractel traction hoist. At issue was whether the Tractel traction hoist qualified for trade dress protection. The court agreed with the district court that Tractel did not meet its burden of establishing non-functionality and affirmed the grant of summary judgment in favor of Jiangsu. The court affirmed the district court's award of attorney's fees to Jiangsu upon finding that this was an "exceptional" case meriting fees where Tractel's continued prosecution of its claims was held by the district court to be "unreasonable." While the line delineating "exceptional" cases under the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 1125(a)(3), could be murky, this action fell squarely within the realm of exceptional cases contemplated by the Act. Finally, the court reversed the district court's award of non-taxable costs and certain taxable costs and remanded for further proceedings.

Defendant was sentenced to death in Nevada in 1984 after a three-judge post-conviction sentencing panel found the existence of two statutory aggravating circumstances. However, defendant's death sentence was vacated in 2007 after the Nevada Supreme Court held that it was unconstitutional to use as an aggravating circumstance the fact that a murder was committed in the course of committing another felony or felonies. Nevada subsequently sought to reimpose the death penalty on defendant, using a different statutory aggravating circumstance. Defendant contended that to impose the death penalty a second time, albeit based on aggravating circumstances different than those used in the first trial, violated his right under the Fifth Amendment's Double Jeopardy Clause. The court held that defendant's double jeopardy rights would not be violated by the state again seeking a death sentence based on aggravating circumstances different from those found and used by the sentencer to impose the first death penalty sentence. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of defendant's habeas petition.

Petitioner, a member of the Mam Mayan group, an indigenous group whose members live predominantly in Guatemala, petitioned for review of the BIA's decision denying his application for asylum, withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture (CAT), on the ground, inter alia, that petitioner had not been the victim of past persecution because he was never "personally challenged or confronted by any potential persecutor." The court concluded that the BIA's ruling that the petitioner did not suffer past persecution because his exposure to persecution was "second hand" reflected an incorrect view of the applicable law, which permitted the BIA to take account of the indirect effects of persecution as well as the direct effects, at least where, as here, the connection between the two was so immediate and strong. Therefore, the court remanded the petition to the BIA for further proceedings.