Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

This appeal arose when the People of California adopted Proposition 8, which amended the state constitution to eliminate the right of same-sex couples to marry. At issue was whether this amendment violated the Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution. The court declined to address the more general questions presented to it concerning the rights of same-sex couples to marry. The court concluded that, through the proponents of ballot measures, the People of California must be allowed to defend in federal courts, including on appeal, the validity of their use of the initiative power. Accordingly, the proponents possessed Article III standing to prosecute this appeal from the district court's judgment invalidating Proposition 8. However, the court concluded that the People could not employ the initiative power to single out a disfavored group for unequal treatment and strip them, without a legitimate justification, of a right as important as the right to marry. By using their initiative power to target a minority group and withdraw a right that it possessed, without legitimate reasons for doing so, the People violated the Equal Protection Clause. Therefore, the court held that Proposition 8 was unconstitutional on this ground and affirmed the judgment of the district court. The court also affirmed the denial of the motion by the official sponsors of Proposition 8 to vacate the judgment entered by former Chief Judge Walker, on the basis of his purported interest in being allowed to marry his same-sex partner.

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a deported alien found in the United States without permission. Defendant contended that the district court should have granted his motion to dismiss the indictment because it was based on a 2001 removal order that was entered in violation of his due process right to counsel, prejudicing his ability to obtain immigration relief. The court concluded that defendant did not waive his right to counsel and was denied his due process right to counsel because he was not properly advised of his rights in a language that he could understand. The court held, however, that this violation of his right to counsel was not inherently prejudicial. Because defendant could not demonstrate that he had a plausible claim to relief in 2001, he was not actually prejudiced as a result of the due process violations in his removal proceedings. Accordingly, entry of the 2001 removal order was not fundamentally unfair.

Plaintiff, the former in-house counsel for Toyota Motor Corp. (TMS), presented TMS with a claim asserting, inter alia, constructive wrongful discharge related to TMS's alleged unethical discovery practices. TMS and plaintiff settled the claims and entered into a Severance Agreement. TMS subsequently sued in state superior court seeking a temporary restraining order (TRO) and permanent injunctive relieve to prevent plaintiff from violating the attorney-client privilege and plaintiff filed a cross complaint for a TRO and a permanent injunction prohibiting TMS from interfering with his business practices and those of his consulting business. The court held that the Federal Arbitration Act (FAA), 9 U.S.C. 1 et seq., governed the Severance Agreement; the FAA authorized limited review of the Final Award; and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard the law governing the Severance Agreement where the arbitrator's writing was sufficient under the terms of the Severance Agreement and the arbitrator did not manifestly disregard California law in addressing plaintiff's affirmative defenses. The court also held that the district court did not err in denying plaintiff's contempt motion. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This case involved the Randolph-Sheppard Vending Stand Act, 20 U.S.C. 107, which established a cooperative program between the federal government and the states to assist blind persons who wish to operate vending facilities on federal property. The California Department of Rehabilitation (DOR) and the U.S. Department of Education appealed from the district court's decision enforcing a 2008 arbitration award issued pursuant section 107d-1(a) of the Act. At issue was whether the 2008 arbitration panel exceeded its authority under the Act when it ruled that DOR had a statutory obligation to sue the General Services Administration (GSA) for its failure to comply with the 2000 Arbitration Award, and therefore was liable for damages in favor of a blind vendor when it failed to do so. Based on the plain language of the Act and other guides to statutory construction, the court concluded that the Act did not impose a statutory obligation on a state licensing agency to sue a federal agency for its failure to comply with a Randolph-Sheppard arbitration award. The 2008 arbitration panel therefore committed a legal error when it interpreted the Act as requiring DOR to bring an action against GSA, and that DOR's failure to do so made it liable for compensatory damages. Because DOR had no statutory obligation to sue GSA to enforce the 2000 Arbitration Award, the 2008 arbitration panel's ruling that DOR became liable for the damages against GSA by failing to bring such an enforcement action was "not in accordance with law" and must be set aside.

Plaintiff brought suit in federal district court challenging the 2004 Framework, the Forest Services' recommendations to the Sierra Nevada Forest Plan, as inconsistent with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA), 42 U.S.C. 4321 et seq., and the Administrative Procedures Act, 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq., claiming that the 2004 EIS did not sufficiently analyze the environmental consequences of the 2004 Framework for fish and amphibians. The court held that the Forest Service failed to take a hard look at environmental consequences on fish in the 2004 EIS, in violation of NEPA. There was a lack of analysis of the likely impact on individual species of fish in the 2004 EIS and the lack of any explanation in the 2004 EIS as to why it was not "reasonably possible" to perform some level of analysis of such impact. The court held, however, that the Forest Service did take a hard look at environmental consequences on amphibians in the 2004 EIS, in compliance with NEPA. Therefore, the court reversed in part and affirmed in part.

This case concerned California's adoption of an initiative constitutional amendment to prohibit same-sex marriage. At issue was whether the district court abused its discretion by ordering the unsealing of the video recording of the trial, which had purportedly been prepared by the trial judge for his in-chambers use only and was later placed in the record and sealed by him. The order, issued by his successor following his retirement, would permit the broadcast of the recording for all to view. The court concluded that the district court abused its discretion by ordering the unsealing of the recording of the trial notwithstanding the trial judge's commitment to the parties that the recording would not be publicly broadcasted. The district court further abused its discretion by holding that the determinations made by the trial judge regarding the placement of the recording under seal did not bind a different judge presented with a motion to unseal - a conclusion the court regarded as an "implausible" and "illogical" application of the law. Therefore, the court reversed the order of the district court and remanded with instructions to maintain the recording under seal.

Plaintiffs sued Roommate.com in federal court, alleging that the website's questions requiring disclosure of sex, sexual orientation and familial status, and its sorting, steering and matching of users based on those characteristics violated the Fair Housing Act (FHA), 42 U.S.C. 3601 et seq., and the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code 12955. Because precluding individuals from selecting roommates based on their sex, sexual orientation and familial status raised substantial constitutional concerns, the court interpreted the FHA and the FEHA as not applying to the shared living units. Therefore, the court held that Roommate.com's prompting, sorting and publishing of information to facilitate roommate selection was not forbidden by the FHA or the FEHA. Accordingly, the court vacated the district court's judgment and remanded for entry of judgment for defendant. Because plaintiffs were no longer prevailing, the court vacated the district court's order for attorney's fees and dismissed the cross-appeal on attorney's fees as moot.

This case arose from a landlord-tenant dispute in the wake of the WaMu failure in September 2008. GE alleged that Chase failed to pay rent on two properties under lease agreements that Chase assumed after it purchased WaMu's assets and liabilities from the FDIC pursuant to terms of a written Purchase & Assumption Agreement (P&A Agreement). GE filed suit against Chase alleging breach of the lease agreements and the district court granted Chase's motion to dismiss GE's complaint on the grounds that GE lacked standing to enforce or interpret the terms of the P&A Agreement. The court held that because GE was not an intended third-party beneficiary of the P&A Agreement, GE had no enforceable rights under that contract. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

Defendant appealed his convictions related to an alien smuggling organization, challenging the sufficiency of the evidence on two grounds. First, he argued that there was insufficient evidence of alienage with respect to the ten material witnesses named in the indictment who did not testify at trial. Second, as to his conviction for aiding and abetting the bringing of illegal aliens to the United States for financial gain, he contended that there was insufficient evidence linking him to the cross-border transportation of the named material witnesses before they were dropped in the United States, as required by United States v. Lopez. The court held that the jury could reasonably find that defendant rented properties knowing they would be used as load houses long before the named material witnesses were brought across the border. The court also held that defendant knowingly and intentionally aided in bringing about the smuggling of the named material witnesses into the United States. Therefore, a reasonable jury could find sufficient "specific evidence" linking defendant to "intentionally aiding...the cross-border transportation" of the named material witnesses prior to when they were dropped off in the United States. Accordingly, the judgment was affirmed.

This appeal involved Continental's pursuit of a breach of contract claim against Thorpe in Thorpe's Chapter 11 bankruptcy proceeding. The district court affirmed the bankruptcy court's order denying Continental's motion to compel arbitration and disallowing its claim. The court held that the bankruptcy court had discretion not to enforce the arbitration clause at issue and that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in denying Continental's motion to compel arbitration. The court also held that the bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in declining to give Continental further opportunity for discovery and Thorpe could not contract away its right to avail itself of the protections of 524(g) of the Bankruptcy Code. Accordingly, the lower courts correctly disallowed Continental's claim.