Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff, a California resident, brought a putative class action against ADT in California Superior Court, alleging that ADT recorded his telephone conversation with an ADT representative without his consent in violation of Section 632 of California's invasion of privacy law, Cal. Penal Code 632. The case was removed to the United States District Court for the Northern District of California on diversity grounds. The court agreed with the district court's conclusion that plaintiff's pleadings failed to state a plausible claim upon which relief could be granted. The court remanded, however, in order to give plaintiff an opportunity to seek to amend his complaint to successfully plead a cause of action under the federal standards set forth in Ashcroft v. Iqbal and Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly. View "Faulkner v. ADT Security Services, Inc., et al" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to reentry as a removed alien without a plea agreement. The district court included a crime of violence sentencing enhancement based on its conclusion that defendant's prior Washington State third-degree rape conviction qualified as a forcible sex offense under U.S.S.G. 2L1.2. Defendant appealed his sentence. The court held that because the Guidelines were amended in 2008 to include as a forcible sex offense any sex offense involving the absence of the victim's consent, the district court did not err in entering the enhancement in this case. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Gallegos-Galindo" on Justia Law

Defendant, a citizen of Mexico, pleaded guilty to third degree rape under Oregon law in December 1999. In 2002, he pleaded guilty for failing to register as a sex offender and voluntarily left the country some time later. After being indicted in 2010 for illegally reentering the country after having been previously removed, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment on the ground that his 2004 order of removal was invalid because the IJ incorrectly determined that his Oregon statutory rape conviction was an aggravated felony and, as a result, erroneously informed him that he was not eligible for voluntary departure. The court concluded that defendant's underlying removal proceeding was consistent with due process because he was correctly informed that he was ineligible for discretionary relief from removal under the applicable law at the time of his removal hearing. Accordingly, the court reversed the dismissal of the indictment against defendant and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Vidal-Mendoza" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought innocent spouse relief, claiming that she did not understand the nature of her husband's business and claiming ignorance of his fraudulent actions regarding his tax liabilities. At issue was how the Tax Court should review appeals for equitable innocent spouse relief from joint and several liability for unpaid taxes under 26 U.S.C. 6015(f). The court joined the Eleventh Circuit and held that the Tax Court properly considered new evidence outside the administrative record. The court also concluded that the Tax Court correctly applied a de novo standard of review in determining the taxpayer's eligibility for equitable relief. Accordingly, the court affirmed the Tax Court's judgment. View "Wilson v. CIR" on Justia Law

Defendant was convicted for failing to appear in violation of 18 U.S.C. 3146 and subsequently appealed his sentence of 27 months' imprisonment. At issue was which subsection of 18 U.S.C. 3146(b)(1)(A) established the appropriate maximum prison term in this circumstance. The court joined the First, Sixth, and Seventh Circuits in holding that it determined the applicable maximum by looking to the underlying criminal offense, rather than to an intervening violation of supervised release. Because the underlying offense, unlawful possession of a mail key, was punishable by a prison term of five years or more, the five-year maximum prison term found in subsection (ii) applied in this circumstance. Accordingly, the court affirmed the sentence. View "United States v. Jensen" on Justia Law

After defendant allegedly traveled to Mexico and engaged in illicit sexual conduct involving a minor, the government indicted defendant on one count of violating 18 U.S.C. 2423(c) and, because he was under a state-law duty to register as a sex offender, one count of violating section 2260A. The court held that the section 2260A count against defendant did not violate ex post facto principles. Even accepting defendant's argument that the state laws applied the registration requirement to him retroactively, the additional punishment under section 2260A was not for his earlier crimes. Accordingly, the court reversed the district court's dismissal of that count and remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Hardeman" on Justia Law

Respondents appealed the district court's grant of habeas corpus to petitioner pursuant to the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (AEDPA), 28 U.S.C. 2254. Petitioner was convicted of first degree murder with a deadly weapon and robbery with a deadly weapon. The district court granted habeas relief, concluding that the Kazalyn instruction for first degree murder given in petitioner's case violated her due process rights and that the improper instruction did not constitute harmless error. The court held that, in light of Nika v. State, petitioner's claim that the Kazalyn instruction violated her due process rights because it did not provide a distinct definition for deliberation failed. Byford v. State, which narrowed the scope of conduct that could qualify as first degree murder by expanding and separating definitions of premeditation, deliberation, and willfulness, should be applied to petitioner's conviction, which was not final at the time Byford was decided. The court held that the erroneous instructions constituted harmless error. The court reversed and remanded for the district court to consider petitioner's other claims in her petition which were not addressed by the district court. View "Babb v. Lozowsky, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose out of a dispute between the government and the county concerning the clean up of an abandoned landfill. The government entered into a consent decree with the county and the county then moved to modify the decree. The district court suspended the decree pending further findings and the government appealed. The county later moved to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction, arguing that the order was not appealable because it was nonfinal. Because the government failed to satisfy the Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc. factors, the court held that it did not have jurisdiction at this time and dismissed the appeal. View "United States v. El Dorado County, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of her former employer, Montblanc, and its President and CEO, Jan-Patrick Schmitz. The court concluded that Montblanc demonstrated that plaintiff could not perform the essential functions of store manager by offering her admissions that her disability prevented her from performing any work and plaintiff, in response, offered no submission establishing a triable issue of fact. Therefore, summary judgment on plaintiff's disability discrimination claim under the California Fair Employment and Housing Act (FEHA), Cal. Gov't Code 12940(a), was proper. Because plaintiff pointed to no evidence that would raise a triable issue of whether Montblanc's true reason for terminating her employment was discriminatory, the court affirmed summary judgment on the retaliation claim under section 12940(h). Further, Schmitz's conduct during a store visit did not constitute harassment under section 12940(j). Finally, plaintiff's claim of intentional infliction of emotion distress failed where Schmitz's conduct could not be characterized as exceeding all bounds of that tolerated in a civilized community and plaintiff's alleged emotional distress was not "severe." Accordingly, the court affirmed the dismissal of all of plaintiff's claims.View "Lawler v. Mountblanc North America, LLC, et al" on Justia Law

This case arose from a dispute over the character Superman that Jerome Siegel and Joseph Shuster jointly created and thereafter gave rights to DC Comic's predecessor. Defendants appealed the district court's denial of defendants' motion, pursuant to California's anti-SLAPP statute, Cal. Civ. Proc. Code 425.16, to strike certain of DC Comics' state law claims. At issue was whether the court's decision in Batzel v. Smith remained good law after the Supreme Court's intervening decision in Mohawk Industries v. Carpenter. In Batzel, the court held that the collateral order doctrine permitted a party to take an interlocutory appeal of an order denying motions to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute. The court held that such motions remained among the class of orders for which an immediate appeal was available. Thus, the holding in Batzel remained good law and the order denying the motion to strike pursuant to the anti-SLAPP statute remained immediately appealable pursuant to the collateral order doctrine. Therefore, the court had jurisdiction and decided the merits in a memorandum disposition filed concurrently. View "DC Comics v. Pacific Pictures Corp., et al" on Justia Law