Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff appealed the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City and two of its police officers, in his 42 U.S.C. 1983 action. Plaintiff alleged, inter alia, that the police officers retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment right to freedom of speech after he was cited for a noise violation. The court held that plaintiff had put forth facts sufficient to allege a violation of his clearly established First Amendment right to be free from police action motivated by retaliatory animus, even if probable cause existed for that action. Therefore, the officers were not entitled to qualified immunity and plaintiff's claims should proceed to trial. View "Ford v. City of Yakima, et al" on Justia Law

Good News appealed from the district court's determination on remand from the Ninth Circuit that the Town's ordinance restricting the size, duration, and location of temporary directional signs did not discriminate between different forms of noncommercial speech in an unconstitutional manner. In Reed v. Town of Gilbert, the court held that the ordinance was not a content-based regulation and was a reasonable time, place, and manner restriction. Accepting the court's opinion in Reed as law of the case, the court concluded that the Sign Code was constitutional because the different treatment of types of noncommercial temporary signs were not content-based as that term was defined in Reed, and the restrictions were tailored to serve significant government interests. Good News' other challenges did not merit relief. Further, the court determined that the amendments to the Sign Code made by the Town during the pendency of the appeal did not moot this case and that Good News could file a new action in the district court should it wish to challenge the new provisions of the Sign Code. View "Reed, et al v. Town of Gilbert, Arizona, et al" on Justia Law

Plaintiffs, Filipino World War II veterans and their widows, contended that their Fifth Amendment rights to due process and equal protection were violated by a statute establishing the Filipino Veterans Equity Compensation Fund (FVEC) and by the VA's administration of it, resulting in their lack of payment. The district court dismissed the claims with prejudice on the pleadings for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The court held that the Veterans' Judicial Review Act, Pub. L. No. 100-687, div. A, 102 Stat. 4105, barred review of plaintiffs' due-process claim and the district court's dismissal of the claim was appropriate. Because plaintiffs' complaint did not challenge a new classification established by the American Recovery and Reinvestment Act, Pub. L. No. 111-5, 1002(i), 123 Stat. at 202, and did not allege any plausible facts suggesting that the classification in 38 U.S.C. 107 was created for a discriminatory purpose, the court held that the district court did not err when it dismissed the equal-protection claim under Rule 12(b)(6). View "Recinto, et al v. The U.S. Dept. of Veterans Affairs, et al" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for being a felon in possession of ammunition in violation of 18 U.S.C. 922(g)(1). Defendant argued that the Supreme Court's decision in Flores-Figueroa v. United States effectively overruled United States v. Miller, where the court held that the Government did not need to prove that a defendant knew the firearm or ammunition had traveled in interstate commerce to obtain a conviction under section 922(g)(1). The court did not read Flores-Figueroa, which did not announce an "inflexible rule of construction," as affecting the court's interpretation of section 922(g)(1) and affirmed defendant's conviction. View "United States v. Stone" on Justia Law

Multistar, a for-hire motor carrier engaged in the business of transporting hazardous materials, petitioned for review of FMCSA's order to cease operations, and, in a separate petition for review, challenged the agency's denial of Multistar's petition for administrative review. The court dismissed the petitions insofar as they challenged the "unsatisfactory" rating and the order to cease operations because the court could not reach the merits of Multistar's substantive claims where there was no final agency decision. The court held that Multistar received all of the process it was due with regard to the contested violations, and the agency's denial of Multistar's petition for review was not arbitrary or capricious. Accordingly, the court dismissed in part and denied in part. View "Multistar Industries, Inc. v. USDOT, et al" on Justia Law

Petitioner was convicted of committing lewd and lascivious acts upon his stepdaughter, and of attempting to dissuade her from reporting those acts to the police. Petitioner filed a federal habeas petition under 28 U.S.C. 2254, arguing that he had received ineffective assistance of counsel and the district court granted the petition. The court concluded that petitioner received ineffective assistance of counsel where counsel failed to interview a potentially important witness or to introduce significant exculpatory evidence that she could have provided. Further, counsel's deficient performance prejudiced petitioner where there was a reasonable probability that, but for trial counsel's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been different. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's judgment. View "Cannedy, Jr. v. Adams" on Justia Law

Petitioner appealed from the district court's denial of her 28 U.S.C 2254 petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner contended that the California Court of Appeal unreasonably applied clearly established Supreme Court precedent when it affirmed the trial court's decision to admit as evidence statements made by her during a station-house interview. Because the court concluded that fairminded jurists could disagree as to whether petitioner was "in custody" when she made the statements in dispute, the court affirmed the district court's denial of her application for habeas relief. View "Dyer v. Hornbeck" on Justia Law

Petitioner sought review of the BIA's affirmation of the IJ's conclusion that petitioner's application for cancellation of removal was abandoned after petitioner's counsel did not file the application on time. The BIA found that petitioner had not complied with one of the procedural requirements announced in Matter of Lozado. The court read the BIA's decision as denying petitioner's motion to reopen, over which the court had jurisdiction. The court held that the BIA abused its discretion in applying Lozado where the record was undisputed that petitioner's counsel failed to file his application; petitioner lost his opportunity to apply for cancellation of removal; and therefore, petitioner was prejudiced by counsel's ineffective assistance. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, reversed, and remanded for the BIA to reopen petitioner's case and allow him to file his application for cancellation of removal. View "Correa-Rivera v. Holder Jr." on Justia Law

Defendant appealed his conviction for abusive sexual contact in violation of 18 U.S.C. 1153 and 244, and contested the portion of his sentence imposing a lifetime term of supervised release and several conditions of his supervised release. The court concluded that defendant's confession was properly admitted; defendant validly waived his rights to a jury trial and an indictment, and the district court did not plainly err by accepting defendant's counsel's waiver of his right to confrontation; the court rejected defendant's contention that the trial court abused its discretion in admitting expert testimony about the DNA evidence used to implicate him; the court held that the district court properly admitted the testimony of the grandmother and uncle under the excited utterance exception to the general hearsay exclusion; the testimony of the officer was not properly admitted at trial but its admission was harmless error; and the court rejected defendant's argument that prosecutorial misconduct materially affected the fairness of the trial and that the trial court relied on insufficient evidence. The court remanded for the district court to reconsider the plethysmograph testing requirement, to clarify the condition that defendant "shall not possess, view, or otherwise, use any other material that is sexually stimulating, sexually oriented, or deemed to be inappropriate by the probation officer and/or treatment provider," to adjust his probation requirements so that they were definite and certain, and to provide adequate explanation for defendant's conditions of supervised release. The court affirmed in part and remanded for resentencing. View "United States v. Preston" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of charges stemming from the brutal beating of his wife, petitioned for review of the district court's denial of his petition for writ of habeas corpus. Petitioner claimed that his conviction for assault with a deadly weapon was a lesser-included offense of his conviction for infliction of corporal injury on a spouse, thus, violating the Double Jeopardy Clause. Apprendi v. New Jersey, Texas v. Cobb, and Sattazahn v. Pennsylvania - whether considered individually or together - did not create "clearly established Federal law" requiring a state court to consider sentencing enhancements as an element of an offense for purposes of the Double Jeopardy Clause. A state court could not be expected - much less required - to refer to federal law which was not clearly established. Thus, the court held that the state court's decision was not "contrary to, or an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law." The Supreme Court has not squarely addressed this issue and fairminded jurists could disagree as to the constitutional principle. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "Smith v. Hedgpeth, et al" on Justia Law