Justia U.S. 9th Circuit Court of Appeals Opinion Summaries

Plaintiff filed suit under the Quiet Title Act (QTA), 28 U.S.C. 2409a; Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5 U.S.C. 500 et seq.; and Declaratory Judgment Act (DJA), 28 U.S.C. 2201-02, seeking to quiet fee-simple title to the Oro Grande mining claim and its improvements. The court held that the district court did not err in dismissing plaintiff's claims under Rule 12(b)(6); with regard to plaintiff's first QTA claim, the court concluded that the Solicitor's Opinion was entitled to at least Skidmore deference, and, thus, plaintiff did not have a "valid existing right" to a fee-simple patent on its Oro Grande mining claim; with regard to plaintiff's second QTA claim, plaintiff did not plead with particularity the circumstances under which its title to the structures was acquired; and since the QTA was the exclusive means for challenging the United States' title to real property, the court concluded that the district court also properly dismissed plaintiff's APA and DJA claims. View "McMaster v. United States" on Justia Law

Plaintiff, guardian to Madlyn Liebsack, filed suit under the Federal Tort Claims Act (FTCA), 28 U.S.C. 2671 et seq., after Madlyn was left in a permanent vegetative state when she was treated with an elevated level of lithium to treat her schizoaffective disorder. Plaintiff contended that federal healthcare providers negligently failed to monitor Madlyn's lithium levels and the government's primary defense was that an advanced nurse practitioner who was responsible for Madlyn's psychiatric care was at fault. On appeal, plaintiff challenged the district court's liability and damages rulings and the government challenged the damages ruling. The court held that Alaska Statute 09.20.185 was a state rule of "witness competency" that applied to this action under Federal Rule of Evidence 601, as well as part of Alaska's substantive law, making it applicable to FTCA actions under section 2674; none of the government's evidence regarding the nurse's negligence complied with section 09.20.185; and the error was not harmless. Accordingly, the court reversed and remanded. View "Liebsack v. United States" on Justia Law

Petitioner, convicted of murdering his wife, petitioned for federal habeas corpus relief, claiming that his constitutional right to adequate notice of the nature of the charges against him was violated when the trial court instructed the jury on aiding-and-abetting liability. The district court agreed and granted the petition. The court concluded that the prosecution's conduct affirmatively led petitioner to believe it would rely on an aiding-and-abetting liability theory. Thus, the aiding and abetting jury instruction violated petitioner's fundamental right to receive notice of the nature of the charges against him and have a meaningful opportunity to prepare a defense. Given the closely balanced evidence, the court could not say that the trial court's error was harmless. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment of the district court. View "Smith v. Lopez" on Justia Law

After the Department denied Memorial's application for a Certificate of Need to perform elective percutaneous coronary interventions (PCIs), Memorial filed suit alleging that the PCI regulations were an unreasonable restraint of trade in violation of the Sherman Act, 15 U.S.C. 1, and unreasonably discriminated against interstate commerce in violation of the dormant Commerce Clause and 42 U.S.C. 1983. The court concluded that the requirements did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause where the minimum procedure requirement did not burden interstate commerce and the minimum procedure requirement protected public safety. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's dismissal of all of Memorial's remaining claims. View "Yakima Valley Mem'l Hosp. v. Dep't of Health" on Justia Law

Defendant pled guilty to illegally entering the United States during an "Operation Streamline" proceeding. The court concluded that, although the district court did not err by advising defendants of their rights en masse, it erred by not questioning defendant individually to ensure that she understood her rights; the government has not carried its burden of proving that defendant would have pleaded guilty even without the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11(b)(1) error; and, therefore, defendant's convictions must be vacated and the matter remanded for further proceedings. View "United States v. Arqueta-Ramos" on Justia Law

At issue in this case was the City's enactment of an ordinance which had the practical effect of prohibiting new group homes - i.e., homes in which recovering alcoholics and drug users live communally and mutually support each other's recovery - from opening in most residential zones. The court reversed the district court's dismissal of plaintiffs' disparate treatment claims; plaintiffs have created a triable fact that the ordinance was enacted in order to discriminate against them on the basis of disability, and that its enactment and enforcement harmed them; and the court reversed the district court's dismissal of all of plaintiffs' damages claims, except for its dismissal of Terri Bridgeman's claim for emotional distress. View "Pac. Shores Properties v. City of Newport Beach" on Justia Law

Petitioner, a welder who injured his back in 2003, petitioned for review of the Benefits Review Board's affirmance of an ALJ's finding that petitioner's pay increases after the date of injury were reflective of his wage-earning capacity and shall be used to calculate his disability benefits. The court held that, under the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act (LHWCA), 33 U.S.C. 901-950, scheduled wage increases given by a non-union employer to all employees in a certain class based solely upon seniority are a general increase in wages and did not increase a claimant's wage-earning capacity. Accordingly, the court granted the petition for review, vacated the Board's decision, and remanded for recalculation of petitioner's partial disability benefits. View "Petitt v. Sause Brothers" on Justia Law

This appeal stemmed from the City's offering of municipal bonds to finance the development of a cable and Internet system. Nuveen subsequently brought federal and state securities claims against the City, alleging that the City misrepresented the risks to investors. The court concluded that Nuveen has not shown a triable issue of fact on the issue of loss calculation in regards to its federal claims under Section 10b-5 and Section 20(a) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. 78u-4(b)(4); the City enjoys statutory immunity from suit on Nuveen's state claims where California courts have applied section 818.8 of California's Government Claims Act to immunize public entities from liability for misrepresentations sanctioned by those entities; and, although the City was entitled to summary judgment, Nuveen had reasonable cause to bring suit and the evidence suffices to establish its good faith. Accordingly, the court affirmed the district court's denial of the City's motion for defense costs, as well as the district court's grant of summary judgment in favor of the City. View "Nuveen Municipal v. City of Alameda" on Justia Law

Defendant appealed the jury verdict finding him guilty of sexual exploitation of a child in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2251(a) and knowingly receiving child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. 2252A(a)(2). The court concluded that section 2251(a) did not require that the defendant have knowledge that the materials used to produce child pornography had traveled in interstate commerce; the district court did not abuse its discretion in admitting at trial defendant's prior conviction for possession of child pornography; and a rational jury could conclude that the videos introduced at trial depicted sexually explicit conduct. Accordingly, the court affirmed the judgment. View "United States v. Sheldon" on Justia Law

Rocky Mountain and American Fuels filed two separate actions against CARB, contending that the Low Carbon Fuel Standard, Cal. Code Regs. tit. 17, 95480-90, violated the dormant Commerce Clause and was preempted by Section 211(o) of the Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. 7545(o), known as the federal Renewable Fuel Standard (RFS). The court held that the Fuel Standard's regulation of ethanol did not facially discriminate against out-of-state commerce, and its initial crude-oil provisions (2011 Provisions) did not discriminate against out-of-state crude oil in purpose or practical effect. The court also held that the Fuel Standard did not violate the dormant Commerce Clause's prohibition on extraterritorial regulation. The court vacated the preliminary injunction and remanded to the district court for further considerations under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. View "Rocky Mountain Farmers Union v. Corey" on Justia Law